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Abstract  
 
Standardising the USGS Volcano Alert Level System: acting in the context of risk, 
uncertainty and complexity. 
 
A volcano alert level system (VALS) forms a key component of a volcano early warning 
system, which is used to communicate warning information from scientists to civil authorities 
managing volcanic hazards. In 2006, the United States Geological Survey (USGS) standardised 
its VALS, replacing all locally developed systems with a common standard. The emergence of 
this standardisation, and resulting implications, are charted here, in the context of managing the 
scientific complexities and diverse agencies involved in volcanic crises. The VALS concept 
embodies a linear reductionist approach to decision-making, designed around warning levels 
that correspond to levels of volcanic activity. Yet, complexities emerge as a consequence of the 
uncertain nature of the physical hazard, the contingencies of local institutional dynamics, and 
the plural social contexts within which each VALS is embedded, challenging its responsiveness 
to local knowledge and context. Research conducted at five USGS managed volcano 
observatories in Alaska, Cascades, Hawaii, Long Valley, and Yellowstone explores the benefits 
and limitations standardisation brings to each observatory. It concludes that standardisation is 
difficult to implement for three reasons. Firstly, conceptually, natural hazard warning systems 
are complex and non-linear, and the VALS intervenes in an overall system characterised by 
emergent properties and the interaction of many agents, for which forecasting and prediction are 
difficult. Secondly, pragmatically, the decision to move between alert levels is based upon more 
than volcanic activity and scientific information, with broader social and environmental risks 
playing a key role in changing alert levels. Thirdly, empirically, the geographical, social and 
political context to each volcano observatory results in the standardised VALS being applied in 
non-standard ways. It is recommended that, rather than further defining a standardised linear 
product, VALS should focus on developing systems based upon processes and best practice 
designed to facilitate communication and interaction between scientists and users in context. 
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It is in the admission of ignorance and the admission of uncertainty that there is a hope for the 
continuous motion of human beings in some direction that doesn't get confined, permanently 
blocked, as it has so many times before in various periods in the history of man.  
 
Richard P. Feynman 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
 
The explosive eruption of Eyjafjallajökull volcano in southern Iceland on 15-20 April 2010 
caused an unprecedented closure of UK, European, and North Atlantic air space, grounding 
commercial flights in many parts of the world. Once the relatively small volcanic eruption 
pierced its overlying glacier, it resulted in an explosive phreatomagmatic eruption (triggered by 
water-magma interaction), generating significant quantities of ash that covered most of Europe, 
trapped by unusual weather patterns. The decision to close commercial airspace followed 
international protocols that guided responses to the presence of volcanic ash clouds along 
established flight paths (Prata and Tupper, 2009, p.305, ICAO, 2004). These guidelines were 
developed following two significant aircraft encounters with ash in regions prone to explosive 
volcanic activity. In 1982, a British Airlines Boeing 747 lost all four engines flying though the 
volcanic plume of Mt. Galunggung in Indonesia falling over 7 kilometres before restarting the 
engines (Miller and Casadevall, 2000). Shortly after in 1989, during the eruption of Mt. 
Redoubt in Alaska, another 747 also had full engine failure, restarting them only minutes before 
colliding with mountains, and costing US$80 million in damage to the aircraft; the second 
costliest volcanic eruption after Mt. St. Helens in 1980 (Neal et al., 1997, Casadevall, 1994, 
Brantley et al., 1990). Since these near-disasters, the aviation industry has worked for over 
thirty years to develop internationally standardised protocols and procedures to prevent aircraft 
encountering ash (Casadevall et al., 1994). A policy of 'if ash, no fly' was adopted 
internationally by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) (ICAO, 2004). 
However, this policy was eventually disregarded during the Eyjafjallajökull ash crisis, raising 
fundamental questions, discussed later, about the application of standardised protocols in 
volcanic ash hazard management.  
 
According to the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the cost of the flight ban of 
15-20 April to the European aviation industry is estimated at over £1.1billion (IATA, 2010) 
without taking into account the wider costs to the European economy, loss to travel companies, 
and the chaos caused for travellers globally. The ICAO standardised rule of 'avoiding ash' 
generally assumes that aircraft can divert or re-route and still access the country of destination, 
as is commonly done when volcanoes erupt in Alaska. However, in Europe, the context is 
completely different, with crowded flight paths and small countries that can be 'locked in' by 
disperse ash clouds. In retrospect, it is clear that the development of standardised protocols did 
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not consider significant economic loss resulting from closure of large air spaces over many 
countries, or the realisation that countries that do not host active volcanoes can be extensively 
affected by volcanic activity. The initial response of UK aviation agencies relied heavily on 
international protocols developed from experience elsewhere as decision-makers were 
unfamiliar with volcanic activity. This initial response was later modified, however, resulting in 
the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), changing the protocols to accommodate changes in 
perception in relation to flight through dilute ash clouds.  
 
It took nearly three decades to establish a sophisticated volcanic ash plume / cloud warning 
system therefore, it is no surprise that there was scepticism and concern that, within three weeks 
of the Eyjafjallajökull event, the CAA established a ‘safe’ concentration of ash and removed the 
buffer zone based on 'evidence gathering', when this had not been achieved in thirty years 
(CAA, 2010b, CAA, 2010a, CAA, 2010c). The composition, size and reactivity of ash is 
different for each volcano, making it difficult to establish how much ‘ash’ damages aircrafts and 
their engines, and the effects of different levels of exposure to ash on aircraft engines. The 
distinct lack of scientific information to enable a quantitative ‘risk assessment’ is precisely why, 
historically, a precautionary approach had been adopted by the aviation sector. However the 
effect of adopting the precautionary approach during the Eyjafjallajökull eruption by closing 
European airspace was more than a financial inconvenience; it raises a number of fundamental 
questions relating to internationally standardised early warning systems (EWS) for aviation and 
ash hazards:  
 
i. What are the roles of social and economic risk factors in managing natural hazards? 
ii. How are decisions made in complex, uncertain and risky situations, particularly when 
there are issues of accountability? 
iii. How efficient are standard protocols if they do not consider local contexts?  
 
It is important that these questions are addressed, not only for the aviation sector who will 
review how effective their standardised early warning system is for ash hazards, or for the UK 
and Europe to be better prepared for future ash clouds in their airspace, but also because early 
warning systems are becoming increasingly standardised, it seems, with inadequate knowledge 
of the consequences. To address these concerns, this thesis charts the emergence and 
implications of the standardisation of Volcano Alert Levels Systems (VALS) as a strategy for 
managing the scientific complexities and diverse agencies involved in volcanic crises. VALS 
are a key component of a volcano early warning system (VEWS), used to communicate warning 
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information from scientists to civil agencies managing volcanic hazards. The thesis focuses on 
the VALS standardised by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) in 2006 and applied at 
all five of their volcano observatories in the United States (U.S.). The standardised VALS 
replaced three different locally developed VALS that existed at three volcano observatories, 
with a common standard, including the internationally adopted VALS for ash hazards used 
during the Eyjafjallajökull eruption. This thesis thus is a timely investigation into the 
aforementioned questions: the role of social and economic factors in managing hazards, 
decision-making in uncertainty, and the function of standardisation in the use and apparent 
effectiveness of VALS. 
 
In this introductory chapter, the problems that volcanic crises present are addressed, 
demonstrating the need for mitigatory actions such as EWS to help mobilise scientific 
knowledge to prevent loss of life and reduce socio-economic impact. In addition, the research 
objectives of this thesis are justified, alongside the reasoning underpinning the choice of case 
study, the United State Geological Survey (USGS). Finally, the arguments proposed in this 
thesis are introduced and presented along with the key research questions. 
 
 
1.1  Volcanoes and Society 
 
If the management of a volcanic crisis is unsuccessful, the resulting disaster can cause 
significant loss of life, socio-economic impact, and damage to the environment. This section 
reviews the hazards volcanoes produce, their power to kill large populations and cause 
considerable socio-economic losses, why people live near to volcanoes, and how scientists try to 
understand volcanic behaviour to provide warnings by establishing volcano observatories that 
use EWS to reduce the impact of volcanic activity on society. 
 
1.1.1.  The impacts of volcanic activity on society 
 
Volcanic activity can produce a range hazards arising from both fall (ash, ballistics) and flow 
processes (pyroclastic flows, surges, lateral blasts, debris flows / lahars, floods and lava flows), 
to volcanic gases, earthquakes and tsunamis (Francis and Oppenheimer, 2004), driven by the 
unique combination of underlying geochemical and geophysical processes, and tectonic location 
(Sigurdsson and Houghton, 2000). All these hazards have potential to kill and affect people's 
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livelihoods, while post-eruption erosion and sedimentation can lead to disruption of existing 
systems of provision and sanitation, contributing to famine and disease. 
 
Over the last century, one incident in particular stands out as an anomaly; the tragedy that struck 
Armero, Columbia in 1985 when a small eruption at Nevado del Ruiz generated a lahar that 
killed over 25,000 inhabitants. Despite numerous recent large eruptions including the Mt. St. 
Helens in Washington State, U.S. in 1980 and Mt. Pinatubo in the Philippines in 1991, Nevado 
del Ruiz stands out as tragedy because, rather than a failure of scientific knowledge or 
technology, local government and decision-makers failed to act on warnings issued by scientists 
monitoring the volcano (Barberi et al., 1990). It was caused ‘purely and simply, by cumulative 
human error - by misjudgement, indecision and bureaucratic short-sightedness’ (Voight, 1990, 
p.383). This event highlighted the limitations of scientific knowledge in preventing volcanic 
disasters, and resulted in a paradigm shift within the volcanological community towards 
developing an understanding of local contexts when issuing volcanic warnings. More than 20 
years later, major disasters caused by natural hazards are still occurring; also not because of 
unclear scientific evidence or advice, but due to failures in other areas. Examples are the failure 
to have an EWS in place for the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami (UN ISDR PPEW, 2006); neglect of 
civil defences and full consideration of risks involved in Hurricane Katrina, 2005 (Select 
Bipartisan Committee, 2006); and the 2010 earthquake of Chile that scientific studies had 
anticipated (Ruegg et al., 2009). The consequences of not having a EWS can be very costly and 
damaging to local cultures. 
 
Measuring the real socio-economic impacts of volcanic hazards is difficult since the effects can 
take years to occur and are often difficult to isolate from other social or political events. 
Sometimes the impact is visible and in some cases quantifiable, as exemplified by the ongoing 
eruptions of the Soufriere Hills volcano in Montserrat, which has resulted in the permanent 
evacuation of the capital city of Plymouth and two-thirds of the island’s population (Aspinall et 
al., 1998, Druitt and Kokelaar, 2002, Young et al., 1998). The Emergency Disasters Database 
(EM-DAT) archives essential data from 1990 to present, on the occurrence and effects of over 
18,000 mass disasters, defined as when so many persons are injured that local emergency 
medical services may be overwhelmed. Their data includes total number of people affected by 
volcanic activity (see Table 1.2) and economic costs (Table 1.3). 
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Country Year Number of Total Affected 
Mt. Pinatubo, Philippines 1991 1,036,065 
Cerro Negro, Nicaragua 1992 300,075 
Tungurahua, Ecuador 2006 300,013 
Galunggung, Indonesia 1982 300,000 
Merapi, Indonesia 1969 250,000 
Mt. Karthala, Comoros 2005 245,000 
Mayon, Philippines 1993 165,009 
Rabaul, Papua New Guinea 1994 152,002 
El Reventador, Ecuador 2002 128,150 
 
Table 1.1 Top ten most important volcano disasters for the period 1900 to 2010 sorted by 
numbers of total affected people at the country level (EM-DAT, 2008) 
 
Country Year Damage (000 US$) 
Nevado del Ruiz, Colombia 1985 1,000,000 
Mt. St. Helens, U.S. 1980 860,000 
Mt. Pinatubo, Philippines 1991 211,000 
Galunggung, Indonesia 1982 160,000 
Tungurahua, Ecuador 2006 150,000 
Colo, Indonesia 1983 149,690 
El Chichón, Mexico 1982 117,000 
Rabaul, Papua New Guinea 1994 110,000 
Usu, Japan 1945 80,000 
 
Table 1.2 Top ten most important volcano disasters for the period 1900 to 2010 sorted by 
economic damage costs at the country level (EM-DAT, 2008) 
N.B Damage is the cost that corresponds to the damage value at the moment of the event, i.e. 
the figures are shown true to the year of the event 
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Figure 1.1 Location of the volcanoes listed in Table 1.2 and 1.3. Image courtesy of Smithsonian Institute Global Volcano Program.
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Although more than 350 people died as a result of the Mt. Pinatubo eruption (see Table 1.1), 
Table 1.2 indicates that it affected over one million people, many of whom were saved by 
evacuations (discussed below), however it was also an extremely costly disaster (Table 1.3). 
The U.S. suffered considerable economic losses as a consequence of the burial of Clark Air 
Base (Philippines) under several metres of ash (Newhall and Punongbayan, 1997), as well as 
from the 1980 eruption of Mount St. Helens (Washington State) that killed over sixty people 
and levelled the surrounding area (Foxworthy and Hill, 1982). The data from EM-DAT reveal 
that volcanic hazards continue to affect large populations and cause significant economic losses. 
This data does not include the Eyjafjallajökull eruption, which as mentioned previously cost 
over £1.1billion in lost business for the aviation sector in Europe alone (IATA, 2010). It is very 
difficult to determine the true economic cost of volcanic hazards as it depends of a number of 
factors relating to ‘the precise nature of volcanic activity; the timing of various eruptive phases 
relative to climatic seasons and agricultural and other cyclical economy (e.g. tourism); 
population density and types of economic significance for the rest of the country’ (Benson, 
2005), as well as secondary impacts generated by the volcano’s activity. Whilst only 0.02% of 
deaths from disasters in 2006 were the result of volcanic activity (Hoyois et al., 2007), often 
secondary volcanic hazards such as tsunamis or debris flows generated by volcanic activity are 
classified under different hazard categories. Therefore, volcanic disaster figures, such as those 
from EM-DAT, sometimes do not capture the often-devastating consequences of volcanic 
activity and consequently volcanoes should still be regarded as potentially large killers. Benson 
(2005) suggests that relating the damage to the Gross Domestic Product of the Country at the 
time of event can be a more accurate measure of cost.  
 
Increased global trading, growing economies, and ever-expanding critical infrastructure make 
the function of society more vulnerable to volcanic hazards, even those that occur remotely, as 
exemplified the Eyjafjallajökull ash crisis in Europe. Given the movement of people from rural 
areas to cities, Chester et al (2000, p.89) argue that that ‘urbanisation, particularly in developing 
countries, has led to increasing global exposure to a variety of natural hazards, not the least of 
which are risks posed to large cities by volcanoes’. Volcanic hazards can destroy or reduce the 
facilities that enable business, infrastructure, and commerce to function. Economic damage 
potential is not just confined to populated areas; agricultural lands can be damaged, and 
essential infrastructure such as pipelines, electricity, rail lines and communication cables can be 
destroyed causing regional and national disruption (Keys, 2007). The aviation sector is 
particularly vulnerable to ash, often from remotely located volcanoes that can result in millions 
of pounds worth of damage to aircraft and place the lives of the passengers in danger (Miller 
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and Casadevall, 2000). Ash can also present severe health concerns such as respiratory 
problems or poisoning to local or distal populations (Baxter, 2004). Thus whilst absolute loss of 
life in volcanic disasters have reduced, they are still the cause of considerable disruption.  
 
There are currently 1,511 known active volcanoes globally (volcanoes known to have erupted 
during the Holocene (the last 10,000 years) (Simkin and Siebert, 1994))  with over 10 per cent 
of human population living within close proximity to an active volcano (Francis and 
Oppenheimer, 2004, McGuire and Kilburn, 1997). Given the unpredictable nature of volcanoes 
and their hazards, it is difficult to manage crises at volcanoes where large populations live in 
close proximity. Unfortunately, rising populations, particularly within large urban areas near 
active volcanoes such as Mexico City (Popocatepetl) and Tokyo (Mt. Fuji), increase the 
exposure of these populations to volcanic hazards. These hazards can have significant impacts 
on differing spatial and temporal scales. Populations, tens to hundreds of kilometres away from 
volcanoes, can remain unaware of volcanic activity, yet be devastated by lahars, mudflows, 
debris flows (Mothes et al., 1998, McGuire and Kilburn, 1997), or ashfall (Tilling et al., 1990). 
On a global scale, the emission of sulphur gases can cause global cooling (Newhall and 
Punongbayan, 1997, McGuire, 2002). What defines a vulnerable population, in the context of 
volcanic activity, depends upon the characteristics of the potential hazards, the geographical 
location of the population, and meteorological conditions at time of the hazard's activity as 
rainfall, snow and high winds can exacerbate problems (Sigurdsson and Houghton, 2000). In 
some respects, humanity has been lucky during the last century since many recent large 
eruptions occurred in uninhabited regions such as the 1912 eruptions of Katmai volcano 
(Alaska), and the 1955-6 eruptions at Bezymianny (Kamchatka, Russia). In contrast, there were 
three episodes of major caldera unrest at Long Valley (U.S.) 1980-4, Campi Flegrei (Italy) 
1982-4, and Rabaul (Papua New Guinea) 1983-5, that did not result in eruptive activity, yet 
caused major social and economic disruption; including the evacuation of 40,000 people at 
Campi Flegrei (Chester et al., 2005, Tilling and Lipman, 1993). 
 
Despite the damage potential of volcanic hazards, human settlements continue to grow on and 
around volcanoes, attracted by potentially fertile soils, a more pleasant climate, reservoirs for 
the storage of ground waters, high scenic values, tourism, and sources of heat and mineral 
resources. Often, many do not realise the mountain they live near is a volcano, and those that do 
may be willing to take the risk based upon past frequencies and scales of eruption. There are 
both demands and benefits in relation to mitigating against volcanic hazards as fully as possible, 
driven by both vulnerable populations and government authorities. Conversely, given the 
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existing advantages of living within a volcanic area, there can be a perception that too much 
money is being spent on a precautionary approach for a hazard that is unlikely to occur within 
the population’s lifetime, or even within the next thousand years. Therefore, not only is 
knowledge of volcanic behaviour uncertain, but also divergent attitudes to risks in different 
contexts (Slovic, 2000), make it difficult to prevent building or developing lands that may be 
identified as hazardous.  
 
1.1.2  Mitigating against volcanic hazards  
 
Since 10 percent of the human population lives on and around volcanoes, there is a need to 
reduce the risks that volcanic hazards pose. Historically this has been accomplished using 
traditional disaster preparedness and mitigative actions, commonly used in natural hazard 
disaster management. Following a number of volcanic crises, some handled successfully; others 
not, groups of scientists began thinking about how best to manage volcanic risk drawing on 
lessons learnt. In 1989, Tilling designed an effective program of volcanic hazard mitigation. 
Based on a foundation of basic studies of physical processes, the program recommends volcano 
monitoring and research programs to understand a volcano's behaviour. This program also 
promotes integration between scientists and civil authorities, and the responsibilities that each 
have, since government bodies have to consider socio-economic and political factors in addition 
to scientific information in order to make decisions relating to volcanic activity (Fig. 1.1) (Scott 
and Tilling, 1989, Tilling et al., 2003, Tilling, 1989). One key aspect of mitigation involves 
educating the local population via outreach programs that teach about the physical hazard, and 
the appropriate responses relevant for each hazard.  
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Figure 1.2 Volcano hazard mitigation (Tilling, 1989, p.242) 
 
Five specific measures have been identified (Tilling, 1989) to provide short or long-term 
mitigation: identification of high-risk volcanoes; hazard identification, assessment and zonation; 
volcano monitoring and eruption forecasting; engineering-oriented measures, and volcanic 
emergency management (Table 1.4). In the case of volcanic hazards most mitigation measures 
involve developing a foundation of knowledge relating to the volcano’s behaviour and a 
programme of monitoring. It is important to note that the critical role of volcanic emergency 
management is identified as undervalued, partly because of the complexities of society. This 
suggests that although mitigatory actions are useful, it is important that they are integrated with 
emergency practitioners during a volcanic crisis, and highlights the importance of local context 
at such times. 
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 Mitigation of 
Volcanic Risks 
Description of associated processes 
1 Identification of 
high-risk volcanoes 
 
Only a small fraction of known active volcanoes have been studied in 
detail. A number of the world’s largest and most dangerous 
volcanoes occur in densely populated countries with limited 
economic and scientific resources and a lack of political will to study 
and monitor them.  
2 Hazard 
identification, 
assessment and 
zonation 
Reconstructing a volcano's past eruptive behaviour and events can 
provide the basis for assessing potential hazards for future eruptions. 
Hazard zonation maps are useful tools for decision-makers and land 
use planners. GIS has helped to make maps more accessible. 
3 Volcano monitoring 
and eruption 
forecasting 
Short-term eruption forecasts are still predominantly made on seismic 
and ground deformation data alone. However, optimum monitoring is 
achieved by integrating a combination of approaches, rather than just 
relying on any one precursor. 
4 Engineering-
orientated measures 
(mitigation) 
Volcanic eruptions cannot be controlled, however some hazards can 
be mitigated or tempered by engineering methods, or structures to 
reduce impact or extent of damage. To date, engineering 
countermeasures have mitigated lava and debris flows, floods, and 
ash fall on buildings. 
5 Volcanic 
emergency 
management 
 
Emergency management plays a critical role in coping a volcanic 
crisis, yet receives little attention. This is understandable given that 
volcanic hazards occur infrequently relative to human life span and to 
other hazards, and the demands of an increasingly complex society.   
 
Table 1.3 Mitigation of volcanic risks (compiled from Tilling, 1989) 
 
In 1993, Chester also acknowledged the role of social contexts as a contributing factor to 
volcano crises by reviewing developed and underdeveloped world responses during low 
magnitude / high frequency and high magnitude / low frequency events (Fig. 1.2). From this 
study Chester highlights the importance of understanding the vulnerability of affected 
populations and that bottom-up approaches should be adopted in the development of plans, so 
local people have ownership over mitigatory activities.    
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Heimaey, Iceland (1973) 
Mount Etna, Sicily (1983) 
Kilauea, Hawaii (many) 
 
Nyiragongo, Zaire (1977) 
Karthala, Comores, Indian Ocean 
(1972) 
 
Figure 1.3 A classification of responses to historical eruptions based on the physical 
characteristics of the eruption and the level of economic development attained by the country in 
question (Chester, 1993, p.247) 
 
Since the 1980 eruption of Mt. St. Helens there have been significant advances in the 
development of mitigatory approaches and techniques for volcanic hazards, predominantly 
driven by improvements in instrumentation, data collection and transmission resulting in better 
data analysis and interpretation, facilitating more refined techniques of volcano monitoring and 
eruptive forecasting1 (discussed further in chapter 2). A majority of this progress is the result of 
improved computer, satellite, data storage and telemetric technologies. Regardless of these 
advances, they need to be incorporated via ‘contingency planning and effective communication 
between scientists and authorities’ to improve warnings (Tilling, 1989, p.237). Volcano 
observatories typically bring together different mitigatory activities in relation to volcanic 
hazards and their potential consequences.   
 
                                                     
1 Forecasting and prediction are often considered synonymous; however, it is recommended to adopt the 
following definitions. A forecast is a comparatively imprecise statement of the time, place, and nature of 
expected activity. Prediction is a comparatively precise statement of the time, place and ideally, the nature 
and size of impending activity. SWANSON, D. A., CASADEVALL, T. J., DZURISIN, D., HOLCOMB, 
R. T., NEWHALL, C. G., MALONE, S. D. & WEAVER, C. S. 1985. Forecasts and predictions of 
eruptive activity at Mount St. Helens, USA: 1975-1984. J. Geodynamics, 3, 397-423.  
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1.1.3  The role of volcano observatories 
 
A volcano observatory is essentially a facility wherein monitoring data are assembled and 
analysed in order to better understand a volcano's behaviour so as to provide warnings to 
populations that allow them to be better prepared for volcanic hazards. They range from small 
offices, manned by one person and with limited monitoring equipment, to highly sophisticated 
offices with a wide range of state-of-the-art monitoring equipment. The functions of a volcano 
observatory can be broken down into: i) data collection via the process of volcanic activity 
detection using various monitoring techniques; ii) data analysis: assessment and interpretation 
of data; iii) forecasting: establishing the volcano's status from the data analysis i.e. quiescent, 
restless or building to eruption; and in the latter case the likely timing, duration and climax of 
the eruption and the nature of associated hazards; iv) providing an alert level for the volcano's 
behaviour based upon discussion and consensus, and v) research relating to volcanic behaviour 
and the applicability and effectiveness of monitoring techniques, amongst other areas.  
 
A volcano observatory forms a central focus for the monitoring of volcanic activity and 
communication, including with civil authorities and local government through emergency plan 
coordination, the media via, interviews and press releases, and the public, via education and 
outreach events. As well as the duty to provide warnings, a volcano observatory also provides a 
research environment. With large archives of monitoring data from previous volcanic activity, 
research is fundamental to the progress of volcanology and subsequently the ability to analyse 
data and provide accurate and detailed forecasts in a timely manner. Providing warnings with 
increased certainty enables civil authorities to make decisions that are more informed, however,  
many unknowns remain in relation to volcanic processes (see chapter 2) such that significant 
scientific uncertainties continue to present problems for volcanologists and civil authorities. 
 
Most volcanoes located near large population centres will be subject to extensive monitoring to 
minimise loss of life or livelihood as much as possible, with civil authorities charged with 
communicating any changes in volcanic activity to a range of national, regional, and local 
stakeholders. The necessity to translate scientific knowledge into effective warnings for natural 
and man-made hazards has generated the need for early warning systems (EWS) that are 
designed to provide ‘timely and effective information, through identifying institutions, that 
allow individuals exposed to a hazard to take action to avoid or reduce their risk and prepare for 
effective response’ (UN ISDR, 2003). Typically, national governments designate a volcano 
observatory with the legal responsibility for the provision of warnings about volcanic hazards. 
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1.1.4  Volcano early warning systems  
In many parts of the world, VEWS have been developed by volcanologists and government 
policy makers to provide warnings to populations at risk from volcanic hazards and to allow 
them to seek safety, both locally and regionally (Peterson et al., 1993). Key decision-makers, 
responsible for safety, environment, and socio-economic issues usually require information 
relating to: when and where the volcano will erupt; the magnitude, style and duration of the 
eruption; likely hazards and expected location; and the effect of volcanic hazards on the local, 
regional and global scale. In contrast to many other hazards, such as hurricanes or landslides, 
scientific understanding of volcanoes remains limited, making it difficult to address these 
questions. It is imperative to continue researching the processes involved in driving volcanic 
eruptions and the hazards produced to develop better warning signals and understand the 
consequences for each hazard (Scarpa and Tilling, 1996, Tilling, 2002). Given limitations in 
scientists' capability to forecast or predict volcanic activity, however, managing volcanic crises 
requires careful consideration and understanding of how to take action in the context of 
uncertainty, both scientifically and socially (Leonard et al., 2008). To operate effectively, a 
VEWS should therefore be fully integrated to cover everything from monitoring and detection, 
to analysis and interpretation of the data, to communication and the generation of an effective 
response. 
 
Despite growing populations near to volcanoes, little research has been devoted to establishing 
best practice for VEWS to minimise loss of life and socio-economic damage prior to and during 
volcanic crises. Volcano-related disasters show that the effectiveness of VEWS has been, and 
continues to be, hindered by institutional weaknesses in: procedures and infrastructures, poor 
integration and sharing of knowledge between scientists and community, and ineffective 
communication (Peterson et al., 1993). In addition, the relative impacts of these factors on the 
effectiveness of VEWS are not fully understood.  
 
Generating effective warnings is particularly challenging for a few key reasons. First, 
volcanologists and related scientists are still developing theories to understand the origin, 
processes and eruptive behaviour of volcanoes and their numerous associated hazards. Second, 
volcanic hazards occur within different social contexts involving different cultures, economic 
and political circumstances. In addition, volcanic activity tends to occur over long time frames 
relative to human time-scales and, in particular, periods of political office, and therefore are not 
normally a political priority. This commonly results in limited funding and resources for 
research and volcano observatory upkeep, leading to limited volcanic hazard awareness. Finally, 
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institutional influences can lead to increasing levels of bureaucracy so that decisions become 
complex and take a long time to make. Managing a volcanic crisis can involve numerous 
institutions making it difficult to maintain communication, both internally and externally. 
Tilling states that ‘few would dispute that volcanology has arrived as a modern science; yet for 
me, nagging questions persist about successful application of the science to societal problems. 
Have the advances in volcanology been fully translated into advances in hazards mitigation?’ 
(1989, p259). This ‘nagging’ feeling is based both on his personal experiences and historical 
examples of volcanic crises wherein the failure to provide an effective warning to local 
decision-makers and vulnerable populations so to prevent or minimise loss of life and reduce 
economic loss using a VEWS, has been the result of 'societal problems’, rather than a 
consequence of poor scientific knowledge or certainty in the understanding of the volcano's 
activity; despite advances in hazard mitigation. Chapter 2 discusses further the influence of 
'societal' problems' on the failure of VEWS by demonstrating the influence of political 
interference at Mt. Pelée, Martinique, 1902 (Scarth, 2002), miscommunication between the 
scientists and the media in Guadeloupe, 1976 (Fiske, 1984), interactions between scientists and 
authorities in Montserrat (1995-present) (Druitt and Kokelaar, 2002), and differing levels of 
trust and understanding of the uncertainties and risks involved in volcanic crises (Haynes et al., 
2008a, Haynes et al., 2008b) and the ability for VEWS to successfully fulfil their purpose 
(Peterson et al., 1993). The case studies outlined support Peterson and Tilling’s (1993) assertion 
that, hand-in-hand with advances in scientific understanding, understanding the interface 
between science, decision-making and communication amongst a wide range of public bodies, 
is critical to reducing volcanic risk. Therefore, although critical evaluation of volcanic crises 
research has historically focused on the limitations of science, there needs to be further 
exploration of the social and institutional aspects involved. 
 
1.1.5  Volcano alert level systems and standardisation 
 
A Volcano Alert Level System (VALS) is the part of a VEWS that relates to the processes 
occurring before and during the issuance of a volcano warning. The United States Geological 
Survey (USGS) defines a volcano warning as a ‘series of levels that correspond generally to 
increasing levels of volcanic activity’ (Gardner and Guffanti, 2006). As a volcano becomes 
increasingly active towards eruption, a higher alert level is issued that offers the public and civil 
authorities a framework they can use to gauge and coordinate their response to a developing 
volcanic emergency. VALS are based on a linear design, where the alert level assigned is 
directly proportional to the volcanic activity. In addition, alert levels carry information from the 
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observatory to those who use it in a uni-directional, manner. Globally, many VALS (also 
referred to as status levels, condition levels, or colour codes) are used providing volcanic 
warnings and emergency information in relation to volcanic unrest and eruptive activity based 
on data analysis or forecasts. Yet, there are only two identified papers that discuss VALS in the 
context of their role, operation, limitations and benefits (De la Cruz-Reyna and Tilling, 2008, 
Metzger et al., 1999). VALS remain a ‘black box’, a concept developed by Bruno Latour, where 
the inputs and outputs are known but the inner workings remain hidden and are no longer open 
for debate because they have been accepted by the scientific community and then society alike 
(1987). Latour stated that this is ‘the way scientific and technical work is made invisible by its 
own success. When a machine runs efficiently, when a matter of fact is settled, one need focus 
only on its inputs and outputs and not on its internal complexity. Thus, paradoxically, the more 
science and technology succeed, the more opaque and obscure they become’ (Latour, 1999, 
p304).  VALS are superficially simplistic (one reason they are so easy to black box) and so tend 
to be treated as such, but they encompass a number of complex issues with a range of physical, 
social and institutional dynamics as just described. By opening the black box, through 
establishing how they function in the context of the USGS, this research looks at how these 
complexities are managed and, sometimes, how they are excluded from these warning tools.  
 
In 2006, the United Nations conducted a Global Early Warning Survey that resulted in five key 
recommendations, including one to ‘develop a globally comprehensive early warning system, 
rooted in existing early warning systems and capacities’ (UN ISDR PPEW, 2006, p.vi). 
Consequently, VALS in a number of countries (including Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines 
and the U.S.) have been standardised at a national level so that a single VALS is used for all 
ground based volcanic hazards. The advantages are provision of consistent warnings for civil 
authorities required to take action and facilitation of national policies for emergency 
management. As earlier highlighted, however, the Eyjafjallajökull ash crisis raised important 
questions about the applicability of standardised VEWS and VALS when operating within local 
and novel contexts, and the overall robustness of standardisation as a strategy in managing such 
complexity. It is clear this conflict warrants further investigation. This research thus adds to the 
understanding of specific functions of the VALS, but also aids the development of broader 
understanding of the issues involved in managing complex hazards. 
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1.2 Research objectives 
 
1.2.1  Research questions 
 
In summary, volcanoes are a complex and dangerous phenomena, which, despite many decades 
of research, leave many scientific questions unanswered. During a volcanic crisis there is a need 
to protect lives, infrastructure, and the socio-economic fabric of areas at risk. To do this VEWS 
and VALS have been developed as tools to provide effective warnings to limit loss and 
disruption. Historically, as discussed further in chapter 2, when VEWS have failed to provide an 
effective warning (see section 1.1.4) it has frequently been the consequence, not of deficiencies 
related to of scientific knowledge despite all the uncertainties, but to a lack of consideration of 
pertinent social contexts and weaknesses in decision-making and communication, highlighting 
the fact that local context is often critical. Yet many countries are now standardising their VALS 
in response to the UN's recommendation to develop a global platform for EWS. The 2010 
Eyjafjallajökull ash crisis raises questions about the applicability of standardised VALS on a 
global scale because it was unable to accommodate local context. Therefore, the question arises: 
to what extent are linear, standardised VALS an effective warning tool for volcanic hazards 
in different contexts of complexity, uncertainty and risk? This study addresses this over-
arching query through seeking to answer three constituent questions that examine the issues of 
using VALS to manage complexity, decision-making, and communication that emerge from the 
literature review in chapter 2. 
  
1. Why and with what implications did a linear VALS emerge as a tool for managing complex 
volcanic hazards? 
2. How are decisions made using the standardised VALS given contexts of complexity, 
uncertainty and risk? 
3. Does the standardised VALS function effectively in communicating information about 
hazardous volcanic behaviour to a range of users? 
 
In addressing these questions, the USGS VALS is selected as forming the most appropriate case 
study. 
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1.2.2  Introducing the USGS volcano alert level system 
 
This study seeks to demonstrate that the current lack of research surrounding the effectiveness 
of VALS necessitates the development of a deeper understanding in relation to standardising or 
adopting frameworks for VALS. The chosen case study lends itself best to a detailed analysis of 
the standardisation process, in relation to managing the complexities involved and, in addition, 
allows the opening of the ‘black box’ that is VALS. 
 
The USGS is accepted as being one of the world’s leading geological institutions. It supports 
five well-funded volcano observatories, located in regions of significant volcanic hazard, high 
population or important infrastructure, and operating in Alaska, the Cascades (north-western 
U.S.), Hawaii, Long Valley (California) and Yellowstone (Wyoming), as part of the Survey’s 
Volcano Hazard Program (VHP). The USGS has substantial experience, both within the U.S. 
and abroad, via the Volcano Disaster Assistance Program (VDAP) jointly funded by the Office 
of Foreign Disaster Assistance of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and 
the VHP. This program supports a team of scientists to respond rapidly to volcanic emergencies 
in the U.S. and abroad, by deploying portable volcano-monitoring equipment. Since 1986, the 
VDAP team has responded to 20 volcano emergencies, in Central and South America, the 
Caribbean, Africa, Asia, and the South Pacific. They have also provided monitoring equipment 
and technical assistance at 59 volcanoes in 18 countries and maintain close relations with a 
number of observatories around the world following collaborative work (Ewert et al., 2007). 
The USGS are a good institution to explore a global emerging shift towards standards, because 
they have significant experience of designing and operating VALS in other countries. In 
addition other countries often look to what the USGS are doing and to seek advice from them.    
 
In 2006, the USGS adopted two standardised VALS (one for ground-based hazards, and the 
other for aviation ash hazards) replacing pre-existing VALS that were locally developed at each 
volcano observatory (Gardner and Guffanti, 2006). The VALS developed by Alaska Volcano 
Observatory (AVO) was adopted as the international warning system for volcanic ash by the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) in 2006, and as such is the first globally 
standardised VALS in the world. Early warning is an important issue to the USGS, exemplified 
by their New Volcano Early Warning Systems report (NVEWS) (Ewert et al., 2006, Ewert et 
al., 2005) that addresses the need to balance monitoring, research capabilities and warning 
requirements to successfully manage volcanic crises. In 2009, the U.S. American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act provided some US$15.2 million to upgrade volcano monitoring as outlined in 
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the NVEWS report to provide state-of-the-art monitoring capabilities, demonstrating that 
volcanic hazards are taken seriously by the U.S. Government (USGS Newsroom, 2010).  
 
Within the time limitations of this study, only one national case study proved manageable. The 
U.S. has, and remains, at the centre and forefront of shifts towards standardised emergency and 
disaster management protocols (see chapter 4). The advantage of comparing the approaches of a 
number of different observatories / VALS within one country lies in the fact that the broader 
economic, political, and cultural and communication issues are relatively more closely aligned, 
differing only on a regional or local level. This results in fewer variables in the study, 
facilitating focused research on the hazard and social impacts on decision-making within a 
VALS, rather than broader concerns such as diverse cultural attitudes, political structure and 
economic capabilities. One additional benefit for selecting the U.S. is the practicalities of using 
the English language, and the resulting ease of access to the large and varied portfolio of USGS 
publications. 
 
1.2.3  Thesis outline 
 
In this study, I draw upon literature from the fields of hazard EWS; scientific enquiry, 
volcanology, uncertainty and risk, and complex systems, to demonstrate how and why the 
research questions were formulated and to define the framework within which the empirical 
data were collected (see chapter 2). Literature of VEWS is diverse and fragmented, but this 
thesis seeks to go beyond the single disciplinary approach to volcano warning through 
incorporating insights from the philosophy and sociology of science, and approaching issues of 
risk and uncertainty from a sociological perspective. The role of systems within warnings and 
the need to understand complex systems are used to reconceptualise what VALS are and to 
expand upon the aforementioned research questions.  
 
Qualitative research methods and analysis are used in this study to obtain and dissect the data, 
using a new approach developed to analyse large numbers of interviews conducted during the 
multi-sited fieldwork. The methodology, methods and analysis are reviewed in chapter 3. This 
study adopts methods used within disaster management studies and sociology of scientific 
knowledge studies to provide appropriate qualitative data.  
 
The context of the case study is important, and in chapter 4 the legal mandate of the USGS to 
issue volcanic warnings is addressed. A number of key volcanic crises in the U.S. over the last 
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30 years have led to the development of five volcano observatories and three different formal 
VALS, motivated by local needs and contexts. Lessons learnt during these crises are also dealt 
with in this chapter. At a national level, different pressures have been exerted on the USGS, 
most importantly - in the context of this study - the recent requirements to develop a 
standardised VALS for all five observatories.  
 
The research findings are presented within three empirical chapters focusing upon three key 
themes that emerge from the data and which specifically address the three constituent research 
questions. Chapter 5 reviews the progress of the USGS to develop a design for their 
standardised VALS. The resulting linear VALS is then analysed in the context of its ability to 
manage the complexities involved within a volcanic crisis, including a diverse range of hazards, 
and organisational factors. This chapter also raises questions about the ability of VALS, in 
practice, to manage complex systems using a linear system.  
 
In chapter 6, the role of decision-making in VALS is explored. This includes reviewing the roles 
of scientific and social information when constructing scientific knowledge, including 
monitoring data, analytical tools and evaluating the uncertainties involved; deciding which alert 
level to assign and the associated consideration of local contingencies and risk; and finally the 
gap between decision-making capabilities that connect the scientists and users.  
 
Chapter 7 investigates the communication processes within VALS, through reviewing 
communication products and protocols, and whether they fulfil user needs. The impact of the 
standardised VALS on communication is investigated, considering how it works in practice and 
the importance of local context. In addition, this chapter explores a diverse range of 
communication networks, and consequently, how effective VALS are for users. 
 
Finally, in chapter 8, the discussion and conclusion reflects the empirical findings and addresses 
the key research question. The implications of the research conclusions are considered from 
both theoretical and practical perspectives and suggestions for future research on VALS are 
presented.  
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Chapter 2. Using early warning systems to manage complexity  
 
 
Studies on volcanic hazards typically focus on the use of scientific information when issuing 
warnings. The volcanic crises discussed in the introduction chapter demonstrate that in practice, 
issuing warnings and alerts is far more complex than simply understanding the science of the 
hazard. Ignorance of the social context in which the hazard is occurring has resulted in 
numerous crises (e.g. the tragedy of Nevado del Ruiz in 1985 (Voight, 1990)); this includes 
institutional, political, economic, and cultural circumstances. Civil authorities, with 
responsibility to take action on the basis of a warning, have to make difficult decisions and so 
‘busy decision-makers swamped with information tend to gravitate towards reliance on simple, 
straightforward messages’ (Glantz, 2009, p.xv). To reduce volcanic crises, examples have 
demonstrated that scientific knowledge of the volcanic hazard needs to be integrated with 
relevant contextual information. Volcano early warning systems (VEWS) typically bridge this 
gap therefore this chapter aims to understand more about VEWS; how they manage the 
complexities involved, and how the different actors within them interact.  
 
This chapter divides into four parts. The first part outlines early warning systems (EWS); 
explaining how they are conceptualised from a theoretical, sociological and institutional 
perspective. Increasing levels of globalisation are generating multi-platform EWS that are 
standardised. This process is examined to see how standardisation may affect EWS. The second 
part will discuss how EWS work in practice, using examples of VEWS and volcano alert level 
systems (VALS), to demonstrate the issues identified that impact the effectiveness of a EWS. 
The third part addresses issues of science, uncertainty and risk in volcanic hazards and warning 
systems. This section reviews how scientists understand volcanic behaviour and the techniques 
they employ to manage these complexities, including the understanding and operation of 
decision-making processes. Scientific uncertainty and risk make this a difficult task for 
scientists. However, understanding how these issues are approached from a social science 
perspective provide new methods of understanding these problems, whilst also recognising the 
importance of social context. In the fourth part VEWS and VALS are reconceptualised as tools 
that aim to manage the many physical and social complexities involved, which are often locally 
dependent. This is in contradiction to the rising levels of standardisation within EWS. 
Complexity science can provide theoretical and practical methods to conceptualise and manage 
the many complexities involved in developing an effective warning. Finally, the four key 
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themes that emerge from this literature review: uncertainty, decision-making, communication, 
and accommodating local and national users, are reviewed prior to their exploration in the 
methodology chapter.  
 
2.1  Defining early warning systems 
 
Despite an abundance of EWS related research, there is little consensus about what they are, or 
how they are defined (Glantz, 2004). EWS are seen as ‘a means of getting information about an 
impending emergency, communicating that information to those that need it, and facilitating 
good decisions and timely response by people in danger’ (Mileti and Sorenson, 1990, p.2-1). 
Whilst this is a simple definition, the operation of a EWS is far more complex, partly due to 
variations spatially (global, national, regional, local), temporally (rapid onset, slow onset, 
frequent, infrequent), in function (safety, property, environment), and in hazard (weather, 
climate, geo-hazard). This chapter only focuses on natural hazards (i.e. geological and 
meteorological) that are rapid onset (occur within a short period). EWS also operate in different 
economic, political and social circumstances; use different communicative tools (from 
technology to word of mouth); and link many different organisations (or actors) such as science 
(government and private), engineering, technology, government, news / media, and the public. 
This leads to different perspectives of what EWS are, and what they should do. For 
Governments, EWS are an important tool for disaster risk reduction (DRR) measures; 
consequently, EWS tend to be highly centralised. Decisions have to be made about the benefits 
of EWS relating to: cost-benefit, timeliness (what constitutes a warning, are they a forecast, 
projection or trend, and how early is early), establishing different levels of warning, and lastly 
accountability.  
 
Following the Indonesian Ocean tsunami of 2004, Hurricane Katrina in the U.S. in 2005, and 
the UK floods in 2008, recent publications highlight that EWS are becoming an increasingly 
topical and important area within disaster risk reduction methods (Glantz, 2009, IFRC, 2009, 
Hall, 2007). Despite the importance of EWS, research about their application and effectiveness 
is fragmented, unconsolidated and patchy. Individual studies on EWS review the wide scope of 
institutions involved, technologies used, decision-making capabilities, and interactions within 
the system. However, these generally focus on three sub-systems: hazard detection (hazard 
indicators and monitoring systems), management (of information, communication, and 
generation of a warning), and response (receiving, believing and acting on the warning) (Mileti 
and Sorenson, 1990). This study brings into focus a more holistic perspective of EWS, viewing 
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them as a system that attempts to interact with a number of complex systems, such as the 
physical hazard and society, to provide sufficient warnings for appropriate action to take place. 
Historically EWS research focused on two key areas: forecasting techniques for natural hazards 
within the scientific community, and exploring strategies to disseminate warnings effectively 
and credibly to vulnerable populations, often referred to as the ‘last mile’ within disaster 
studies. Studies on the last mile relate to large literatures on risk perception (Slovic, 2000, 
Gaillard and Dibben, 2008), vulnerability (Wisner, 2004, Birkmann, 2006, Bankoff et al., 2004), 
resilience (Bankoff, 2007, Kelman and Mather, 2008), and capacity and communication 
(Tierney and Dynes, 1994). This PhD is different in that it considers the ‘first mile’ as an 
overlooked, but key, component in EWS in an increasingly globalised yet patchily standardised 
world. This ‘first mile’ relates to the design and operation of EWS and raises questions about 
how effective they are in communicating warnings and information to all the users of the 
system. These user groups are growing in diversity as trade and travel becomes increasingly 
international. Understanding the ‘first mile’ requires investigation into how scientists 
understand volcanoes, how they manage the associated uncertainties and risks, and how they 
attempt to manage them both theoretically and practically, which is explored further in section 
2.3. 
 
Institutionally, the EWS literature is seen as problematic due to a diverse range in definitions of 
concepts and terms, even as basic as disaster, hazards, risk, warning, and vulnerability. 
Although some glossary style documents have been compiled (UNDHA, 1992, UN ISDR, 
2003), the lack of any consistent use of definitions in disaster management has been interpreted 
as a problem: ‘unless we clarify and obtain minimum consensus on the defining feature per se, 
we will continue to talk past one another on the characteristics, conditions and consequences of 
disasters’ (Quarantelli, 1995, p.225). However, the wide range in definitions for many disaster 
terms in the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA) glossary highlight 
diverse views about what is at stake; whether this relates to reducing liability, discharging 
responsibility and / or protecting values. Contrasting views on how to conceptualise disasters 
and define terms suggest these terms themselves reflect complex phenomena requiring further 
exploration.  
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2.1.1.  Theoretical approaches to early warning systems 
 
The diversity in EWS and of the agencies involved results in different ways of conceptualising 
EWS. The next section first explores theoretical approaches to EWS by reviewing the concept 
and its evolution from a linear to a complex system. Second, the role of EWS within disaster 
management studies; and third, institutional approaches towards EWS, including that adopted 
by the United Nations.  
EWS form a relatively new area of inquiry within the context of disaster research, obtaining 
growing recognition in 1960s. Prior to this, studies typically viewed early warning as a linear 
process (Gillespie and Perry, 1976); where there is a clear relationship between a hazard 
occurring and generating a warning forming a cause and effect relationship. Linear processes 
are characteristically embodied in the Newtonian paradigm, and often referred to as reductionist 
as it aims to strip relationships to their simplest format. However, in 1969, a study by Barton 
changed this to view early warnings as a system. Barton’s work (1969) on disaster classification 
generated a paradigm shift from the descriptive to the analytical, by developing four classifying 
variables in his typology of disasters: scope of impact, speed of onset, duration of impact, and 
social preparedness. This work influenced Gillespie and Perry who said that ‘by adopting a 
systems perspective, the disaster researcher can not only describe and classify disasters more 
effectively, but can also move towards a more analytic approach’ (Gillespie and Perry, 1976, 
p.305). A systemic approach enabled the development of models for the prediction of 
individual, group and organisational behaviours, going beyond the simplistic cause and effect 
relationships within an early warning.  
 
Although the idea of ‘systems’ influence on disasters had first been identified in 1958 (Form 
and Nostow, 1958), it took decades to take hold. General Systems Theory (GST) emerged 
following the Second World War as an interdisciplinary approach to the field of science and the 
study of the complex systems in nature and society (Bertalanffy, 1975). The term ‘systems’ has 
many definitions, although the one adopted in this research is that of a group of interacting, 
interrelated, or interdependent elements forming a complex whole, which is nearly always 
defined with respect to a specific purpose (Kim, 1994). Originating in biological studies in the 
1920s, GST recognised that systems are greater than the sum of their parts (Bertalanffy and 
Woodger, 1933), providing a holistic approach to disaster studies by demonstrating that the 
processes involved are interrelated. In 1975, models of idealised EWS were developed such as 
in Fig. 2.1, which does not show EWS as a linear progression through the different stages of 
disasters in chronological order, but indicated that an EWS comprised of subsystems (in this 
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case evaluation-dissemination and response) that have inputs, outputs and feedback between 
them. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Systems model of an early warning system (White and Haas, 1975, p.185) 
 
By the 1980s, Foster (1980) identified that decision-making and communication processes 
between different actors in EWS were non-linear and could be understood better within the 
context of systems theory as a dynamic system. Foster also developed an idealised EWS to 
represent the different stages, using a system style layout as seen in Fig. 2.2. Although this 
model recognised the role of organisations and policy, it maintains an element of linearity rather 
than presenting a series of feedback loops that are multi-directional enabling a systems 
approach, as Foster states ‘every warning system should be designed to facilitate a two-way flow 
of information’ (Foster, 1980, p.203) (author’s emphasis).  
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Figure 2.2 Idealised warning systems (Foster, 1980, p.172) 
 
The EWS models developed by White and Haas (1975), and Foster (1980), as shown in Fig. 2.1 
and Fig. 2.2, divide EWS into component parts and consider each part separately to ensure their 
proper function (White, 1995). It is important to note that both these models are idealised and 
are not descriptive of what actually happens in an EWS. However, the models struggle to view 
EWS as a system because they fail to ‘identify emergent properties arising from interacting 
elements and because it does not consider that the behaviour of systems is due as much to their 
external environment as to their internal mechanisms’ (White, 1995, p.41). White argues that 
disaster studies tools which provide a holistic approach, by considering how human behaviour 
and context can affect the management of risk, should be used.  
 
By the late 1990s, there was growing recognition that interactions between natural 
environments, human perception, actions and organisations are part of a genuinely ‘complex’ 
system (Mileti, 1999). The term ‘complex’ has become a popular and often misused term both 
in the physical and social sciences. Complexity can only emerge within a system, but a 
complexity approach is different to that of systems theory. Systems theory stipulates that 
systems have rules, a form of control system guiding the elements, rationale and predictable 
processes, and change their structure according to rule based learning. Complex systems do 
none of these things as they defy rules, are unpredictable and self-organise (Ramalingam et al., 
2008). When a complex systemic approach is adopted it ‘focuses on interaction among the 
elements of a system and on the effects of its interactions; it examines a variety of factors at one 
time; it integrates time, feedback, and uncertainty’ (Mileti, 1999, p.107). It is the reciprocal 
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interactions or feedback amongst variables or subsystems, as well as time delays in seeing the 
results, that create complexity, making the system difficult to understand (Senge, 1990). As a 
result complexity highlights serious limitations to our scientific knowledge because it breaks 
traditional reductionist Newtonian thinking that regards science as infinitely divisible and 
measurable (Capra, 1996); ‘complexity argues against reductionism, against reducing the whole 
to the parts’ (Urry, 2005a, p.401). The concept of complexity and chaos has questioned the 
naivety that science depends on patterns by establishing a link between determinism and 
predictability (Sardar and Ravetz, 1994, Nowotny et al., 2001). Therefore it is important that 
analyses of complex systems are not left to scientists, since these systems are transdisciplinary, 
involving human agents, science and society (Nowotny, 2005).  
 
Mileti (1999) was not alone in recognising that systems are firmly entrenched in thinking and 
research on hazards and disasters. According to Gillespie et al. knowing how to mitigate the 
negative consequences of natural disasters and respond effectively requires three steps: 
‘understanding the physical and social systems involved in disasters, communicating that 
understanding clearly to decision-makers, and knowing what interventions may be effective’ 
(Gillespie et al., 2004, p.82). Complex systems theory provides a holistic approach to integrate 
these three steps and understand how complex interactions generate certain behaviour, although 
it is difficult to monitor these complex interactions (discussed further in part four). 
Theoretically, the framing of EWS has evolved through systems thinking throughout the last 
fifty years with growing recognition of the social systems involved in a EWS. 
 
2.1.2  Early warning systems within disaster management  
 
Individuals, who developed theories on how disasters and EWS operate, as outlined above, were 
not alone in recognising that social systems have a significant role in disaster management. In 
the last century, human geographers have influenced disaster management thinking by 
challenging top-down expert-driven approaches, by instead suggesting bottom-up locally 
integrated ones. In the 1930s and 1940s the ‘dominant approach’ was widely accepted (Wisner, 
2004), stating that factors such as ‘material wealth, experience of hazardous events, systems of 
belief, and psychological considerations are all important in controlling how individuals, social 
groups, and indeed, whole societies respond to disasters’ (Chester et al., 2005, p.416). This 
approach implied there are adjustments that individuals and societies can make to deal with 
natural hazards. In the 1980s, Kenneth Hewitt (1983) discussed the inherent complexities in 
natural-disaster planning in ‘Interpretations of Calamity’ disputing the dominant approach. This 
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new approach adopted the view that most disasters in developing countries are the result of 
poverty and deprivation rather than extreme natural hazard events, and so those economically or 
geographically marginalised suffer the most (Susman et al., 1983). Radical alternatives changed 
the way natural hazards are studied by scientists, social scientists, and policy-makers to 
emphasise the uniqueness of the location, suggesting that successful hazard reduction is 
dependent on not only understanding the physical environment and hazards, but also the socio-
economic and cultural conditions of the society. To be successful, adjustments to hazards should 
be sensitive to the local environment and be intercultural. The common acceptance of this 
alternative way of thinking did not occur until the World Conference on Natural Disaster 
Reduction in 1994, where the published Yokohama Strategy reviewed, in part, how we could 
transform society to reduce disasters using radical alternatives (UN ISDR, 2004).  
By the 1990s, EWS became an area of focused research within disaster management studies. 
EWS are difficult to understand because they encompass the physical hazard and the context of 
the ‘society’ affected. Mileti & Sorenson (1990) provide one of the first detailed reviews of 
EWS from a social science perspective. Based on 200 studies in the U.S., they established three 
key findings. First, variation in the nature and content of warnings has a large impact on 
whether the public responds. Second, the characteristics of the population receiving the warning 
affect the response (i.e. gender, ethnicity and age, and other social, psychological and 
knowledge characteristics). Third, many current myths about public response to emergency 
warnings are at odds with field investigation results, for example ‘cry-wolf’ syndrome, public 
panic and hysteria. These results indicate there is a difference between 'ideal' models and those 
in practice. Drawing on case studies the authors outline guidance for what information warning 
messages should contain: the hazard, location, guidance, time, and sources. For many hazards, 
including volcanoes, this is extremely challenging to achieve since hazards have different levels 
of predictability, detectability, certainty, lead time, duration of impact, and visibility as 
scientific capabilities remain limited, making it difficult to generate ‘specificity, consistency, 
accuracy, certainty and clarity’ (Mileti and Sorenson, 1990, p.3-11) in warnings. Mileti and 
Sorenson (1990) state it is not possible to review EWS in a comprehensive manner by just 
isolating the social and physical elements since there is a need to establish organisational 
effectiveness, work with other organisations, and maintain flexibility during warnings. The 
report presents a model of EWS (see Fig. 2.3) with a detection component (monitoring and 
detection, data assessment and analysis, prediction and informing), emergency management 
component (interpretation, decision to warn, method and content of warning, and monitoring of 
response), and response component (interpretation and response). This builds on the White and 
Haas (1975) model (Fig. 2.1) by emphasising the different subsystems and their relationships 
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and institutional roles, rather than only focusing on the relationship between the hazard, warning 
and response. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 The general components of an integrated warning system (Mileti and Sorenson, 
1990, p.2-4) 
 
2.2.3  Institutional approaches and issues 
 
In recent decades, global institutions that provide guidelines and best practices for EWS have 
increasingly recognised the role of EWS in disaster management. The largest institution 
concerned with EWS is the United Nations (UN). The UN General Assembly designated the 
1990s as the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR), which in 2000 the 
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) replaced. Throughout the 1990s and 
2000s, the UN held a number of EWS conferences resulting in a number of publications 
(Kuppers and Zschau, 2002, UN ISDR, 2006b, UN ISDR, 2006a). In 2005, the UN established 
the Hyogo Framework, a global blueprint for disaster risk reduction (DRR) efforts during the 
next decade with the goal to substantially reducing disaster losses by 2015. One of its’ five key 
priorities for actions is to ‘identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning’ 
(UN ISDR, 2005, p.6), highlighting growing awareness of the role EWS has within institutional 
governance.  
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Following the catastrophic Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004, the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations called for the development of a global EWS for all natural hazards and communities. It 
was felt that if an EWS were in place when the tsunami struck the Indian Ocean region, many 
thousands of lives could have been saved (230,000 are estimated to have been killed in eleven 
countries (Thieren, 2005)). In March 2005, the UN ISDR Platform for the Promotion of Early 
Warning (PPEW) undertook a global survey to identify existing capacities and gaps in EWS. 
The report was intended to provide a wake-up call for governments and other agencies about the 
role of EWS in reducing human and economic loss from natural hazards. Published in 2006 the 
‘Global Survey of Early Warning Systems’ was the culmination of this research, and a number 
of EWS conferences conducted in over 23 countries with 20 international agencies (UN ISDR 
PPEW, 2006). The report advocated that EWS should be 'people-centred' (i.e. community 
based) in that it requires many systematic approaches and diverse activities spanning four key 
elements: risk knowledge, monitoring and warning service, dissemination and communication, 
and response capability (see Fig. 2.4).  
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 The elements of a people-centred early warning system (UN ISDR PPEW, 2006, p.2) 
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According to the UN an EWS ‘can only be effective if the element and the linkages are well-
understood, well-designed and well-operated’ (Basher, 2006, p.2176). Yet, the model presented 
in Fig. 2.4. does not indicate what these linkages are. Aside from presenting an idealised EWS 
the survey concludes that the world is far from having the global system for all hazards and 
communities called for by the UN Secretary-General, but it does make five key 
recommendations (UN ISDR PPEW, 2006, p.vi):  
1. Develop a globally comprehensive EWS, rooted in existing EWS and capacities  
2. Build national people-centred EWS (i.e. community based)  
3. Strengthen the scientific and data foundation for early warnings  
4. Fill the main gaps in global early warning capacities  
5. Develop the institutional foundations for a global EWS 
 
These recommendations illustrate the difficulties and contradictions involved in developing a 
globally comprehensive EWS. First, they raise questions about the viability of developing a 
global VEWS, the transferability of the four identified elements of EWS, and their compatibility 
in one globalised system. With different hazards, countries, varying levels of scientific 
capabilities and communication technologies available, and different local decision-making 
structures, and institutions, uniformity is likely to be difficult to achieve. Second, it is appears 
contradictory to develop a system that can be globally comprehensive, yet built by the local 
community. Third, the role of ‘scientific and data foundation’ in preventing EWS failure is 
questionable given this thesis has already reviewed examples that have shown that frequently it 
is not scientific or technological deficiencies that cause failure, but social and institutional 
elements, as this literature review will go on to demonstrate further in part two (e.g. the Nevado 
del Ruiz tragedy). Fourth, the UN state it is important to identify what the major gaps are in 
EWS, but identifying these gaps may be difficult given that what may be a gap in resources and 
capabilities for one country, may not pose a problem in another, due to differing social and 
institutional contexts such as available funding. Therefore, consideration of the local resources, 
knowledge and capabilities to prevent failure in EWS is required. Last, there may be issues with 
developing institutional foundations for a global EWS when the requirements for emergency 
response vary in different nations. Hall (2007) has commented that despite the efforts by the UN 
events focused on early warning systems, there still lacks ‘coordinated, collaborative 
international action’ (p.32) to make the move from debate to tangible results. Additionally Hall 
outlines that the emphasis within EWS has consequently been more to do with funding of 
current capabilities and development in science and technology, which has ‘distracted us from 
the central issue of address the real needs of the communities and people at risk’ (Hall, 2007, 
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p.32). Some scientists agree, suggesting that they must step outside their ‘ivory tower’ and try to 
anticipate the consequences of developing warning tools and to make sure they will actually 
lead to hazard reduction (Malone, 2008). Discussions with a number of disaster practitioners at 
conferences attended during the research imply that grassroots organisations and NGOs find the 
UN's suggestions somewhat utopian given the reality in which these groups have to operate. 
 
To improve EWS, the UN has called for more effective procedures via standardisation and the 
application of new technologies and enhanced scientific understanding (UN ISDR PPEW, 
2006). Such a strategy poses two potential weaknesses. First, standardisation, by definition, 
tends to exclude the importance of incorporating local factors into a global procedure (discussed 
below). Second, the focus on science and technology implicitly assumes that social and cultural 
variations are secondary factors, when the introduction and this chapter illustrate the importance 
of social context in making EWS effective. Hence, even if standardisation may yield improved 
strategies for gathering and interpreting warning signals, it will still favour inflexible procedures 
not designed to accommodate local social and cultural constraints. The UN has not developed 
new approaches to EWS that consider the complexities involved; instead they focused on the 
need for developing global platforms and standardising. Standardisation is reductive, and so 
counteracts systematic approaches to managing crisis. Despite this, frequently standardised 
methods are used to manage hazards or complex situations. 
 
2.1.4  The emergence and challenge of standardisation  
 
Globally, the levels of standardisation in protocols and procedures for disasters and emergency 
management have risen, including the development of an Indian Ocean Tsunami EWS 
following the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami. Within the U.S., the 9/11 terrorist attacks led to a 
significant change in government policy resulting in the standardised National Incident 
Management System (NIMS), the Homeland Security Alert Level, and other alerting and 
warning protocols for electronic technological warning capabilities. Standardising warnings is 
not a new concept, but as disaster practitioners learn more about the complexity of natural 
disasters, concerns are being raised that it is increasingly difficult to use ‘nonlinear’ methods of 
communication and that ‘faced with the nature and complexity of challenges involved in 
societal responses to hurricanes [or disasters], interdisciplinary work that, for example, 
integrates appropriate meteorological and social science research will be critical’ (Gladwin et 
al., 2009, p.4). In addition, there appears to be insufficient literature on the effectiveness of 
standardisation as a tool to manage complex disaster-related issues; subsequently there is 
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minimal understanding of what benefits or limitations standardisation can bring. Within disaster 
studies guidelines and models for applying standards have been developed, such as consistency 
and quality control, for developing and using emergency plans (Alexander, 2005). Alexander 
argued that whilst viewing standards as unnecessarily restrictive and overly prescriptive, they 
could also help guarantee the quality, content and relevance of these plans. Given the lack of 
other data around the standardisation of EWS, reviewing other standardised processes such as 
medical procedures or technological processes can demonstrate issues that standardisation raises 
as a method of managing complexity. This section draws on these examples to review issues 
that standardisation raises that may be relevant to standardising EWS. 
 
Whilst some regard standardisation as a constraint, a number of features also make 
standardisation attractive. First, it improves the ‘doability’ of work. Fujimura argues that 
‘doability’ enables scientists to ‘constrain work practices and define, describe, and contain 
representations of nature and reality’, and enables a ‘dynamic interface to translate interest 
between social worlds’ (Fujimura, 1987, p.205). Second, it enables simpler procedures for 
people to learn from and carry out. Third, in a number of spheres, particularly medical and 
ethical, it provides answers to concerns relating to the processes or procedures by the public 
(Hogle, 1995). Medical practices regard standardisation as necessary to control processes and 
make outcomes more effective and reproducible. Fourth, standardisation provides political 
ordering and control. In summary, standardisation offers a tool to communicate in compatible 
ways (via language or protocols), ensure minimum quality, and provide a reference point (David 
and Greenstein, 1990).  
 
A number of factors influence the standardisation of a process, when and where it is 
standardised, and how the process occurred previously. Standardisation may benefit policy 
makers or the people who manage the process and require legal accountability, but provide few 
benefits to users of the process. To standardise there is an element of persuasion, coercion or 
even force required to obtain consensus or compromise, usually dependent on what is being 
standardised and the rationale; for example within computer technology it is clear that 
standardisation was preferable as it enabled greater flexibility for users (Hanseth et al., 1996).  
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Standardising a process is difficult, predominantly because it fixes the process in an ever 
changing and dynamic world. In addition, there is no guarantee that researchers or users in 
different locations will use them in the same way. Scientists tend to ‘tinker’ with standard 
procedures, often making assumptions of the standard application, so although standardisation 
can increase 'doability' it does not guarantee reproducibility (Fujimura, 1987). In fact, it can 
create problems that begin to work against the benefit of standardisation, creating tension 
between the efforts to rationalise work, and changes in the local conditions, which affect the 
work (Fujimura, 1987). Often local practice can render a process less standard, rather than more 
predictable and uniform (Hogle, 1995). Since the cultural, organisational and institutional 
relations that characterise a process change, it seems difficult to remove contingency and 
national variation; for example, medics acting within a standard process bring their own 
experience and technical contingencies that mean local cultural meanings and categories remain. 
It is difficult for standardised technologies to be flexible, unless black boxed like a computer, 
because once a standardised system is in place it already has a number of users geographically 
and organisationally that are difficult to change (Hanseth et al., 1996).  
 
One key practical problem in creating standards or universalities is the relationship that occurs 
with pre-existing infrastructures, procedures and practices. To some extent, new standards need 
to incorporate and extend the old ones. Timmermans and Berg (1997), believe that universality 
is always local universality, depending on how standards manage the tension of transforming 
work practices whilst simultaneously being grounded in those practices. Whilst many scientific 
laboratories have standard procedures that ‘work’ successfully, studies have shown that ‘the 
successful working of a standard procedure is built out of painful processes of adaption and 
learning to ‘fit’ techniques to settings, and scientists to their methods’ (Knorr-Cetina et al., 
1995, p.157). In a dynamic, uncertain reality, stability is a consequence of continuous balancing 
of temporary agreement, beliefs and mini-social contracts. Therefore, the progression of a 
standardised system or process is not always one way, it can resist changes and stabilise into 
diverse cultures and adaption's; often corporate sponsors of a standardisation not only 
standardise the product or process, but also the intra-organisational links and organisational 
regime that optimises the standard process (Jordan and Lynch, 1998). Another key 
complication, seen particularly within the technology sector, is constant destabilisation due to 
new developments often triggered by cost-benefit and risk-benefit analysis (Webster, 2004). 
Consequently, standardised processes are viewed as ‘open-ended; closure is never truly 
achieved’ (Timmermans and Berg, 1997, p.287).  
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The historical development of technology provides an example as to how standardisation is a 
social construct, shaped by the local and relevant contexts. Pinch and Bijker (1987) developed 
the theory of the social construction of technology (SCOT). They argued that human action 
shapes technology rather than it being technology that determines human action. They argued 
that the ways in which a technology is used cannot be understood without understanding how 
that technology is embedded in its social context (Bijker et al., 1987). A technology's success 
cannot be achieved by just saying it is ‘best’; an understanding of what is defined as best and 
the groups and stakeholders that participate in defining it is required. Pinch and Bijker (1987) 
use an excellent example of the success of the chain-driven bicycle, relative to the 
‘primitiveness’ of the Penny Farthing. Historically bicycles were valued according to different 
standards than today; men valued the speed, thrill, and spectacularity of the Penny Farthing, in 
contrast to the security and stability of the chain-driven Safety Bicycle, and there was concern 
as to how women could ride a Safety Bicycle wearing a skirt or dress. The SCOT research 
methodology aims to reconstruct and analyse how technology developed by reviewing the 
problems and conflicts that occurred by connecting them to the design features of the artefact, in 
this case a bicycle. A key paper on standardisation, or ‘making things the same’ focused around 
the adaptation, development and standardisation of weapons during the French Revolution. The 
paper used the theory of SCOT to demonstrate that what can appear as ‘objective’ artefacts can 
be ‘coordinated across vast physical, temporal and cultural boundaries’ (Alder, 1998, p.499). 
Standardisation can be implemented in different ways; based on a number of assumptions, or 
via groups that create a number of boundary objects, but frequently it is automations and 
commercialisation that drives the process (Jordan and Lynch, 1998).  
 
Standardisation requires establishing boundaries, often in complex scenarios, making it difficult 
to decide what to leave outside of standardisation, and what to include. Most studies on 
standardisation across different practices have demonstrated it is not possible to factor in 
uncertainty or ignorance when designing a standard, and that knowledge, practices and 
technologies of the present shape the standardisation. Clearly, these aspects are not static, but to 
reflect this within the tool of standardisation is not easy. Standardising something like EWS that 
are diverse and pluristic is challenging. This section has demonstrated that despite institutional 
recommendations to standardise EWS, other examples of standardisation highlight there are 
many potential problems that warrant further investigation before applying them in practice. 
The next section reviews how EWS work in practice, focusing on VEWS to demonstrate the 
importance of local context, and the challenges of standardising them. 
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2.2 Early warning systems in practice 
 
Globally there is recognition that EWS are an essential tool for disaster risk reduction (DRR), 
yet, many institutions still view them solely as warning provider, for example taking form of a 
siren or issuing or an alert. A majority of advances in EWS over the last twenty years come 
from improved technology for monitoring, instrumentation, data collection, and data processing 
(Sorensen, 2000). This resulted in significantly improved prediction and forecasting, in addition 
to facilitating more widespread warnings using sophisticated technology for example, using 
phone and mobile-phone automatic ring systems, automatic television warning messages and 
internet messages. However, numerous examples such as Guadeloupe in 1976 (Fiske, 1984) and 
Nevado del Ruiz in 1985 (Voight, 1990) illustrate that in practice, warnings are not useful if 
based on poor scientific data, and / or communicated ineffectively, and do not generate the 
required response due to lack of understanding of the message. Therefore, recent research on 
warning systems argue that integrated warning systems that merge scientific, managerial, 
technological and social sub-systems maximise public protection (UN ISDR, 2006a, UN ISDR 
PPEW, 2006, IFRC, 2009).  
 
Important practical research has been conducted on sub-systems of EWS (i.e. hazard 
monitoring, risk assessments and forecasting tools), yet numerous case studies indicate that is 
not the individual components of EWS that are causing failure, but the processes that link them 
(Garcia and Fearnley, 2011). These vital processes include effective decision-making processes 
(Leonard et al., 2008), communication (Solana et al., 2008), trust building and participatory 
activities (Haynes et al., 2008a), and defining accountability and responsibility so people know 
what to do clearly (Glantz, 2004). This section uses examples from VEWS to first review the 
significance of decision-making; second the need for effective communication; and last, the 
importance of local context that helps establish trust and accountability. Finally, volcano alert 
level systems, the focus of this study, will be discussed. 
 
2.2.1  Decision-making  
 
Every aspect of a EWS involves a decision, from interpreting monitoring information, to issuing 
a warning, to deciding to evacuate a town, to the person on the street deciding what to do. 
Decision-making is still considered under a systemic approach, using a logical sequence 
between the definitions of the problem, the risk assessment, and its solution, rather than 
considering the complexities involved (UNDRO, 1990). A wide range of institutions have to 
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make decisions about appropriate actions and the conventional view is these move along a linear 
chain as shown in Fig. 2.5, taking a top-down approach. Some countries, such as the U.S., adopt 
this top-down approach to decision-making wherein populations turn to their local civil 
authorities for information and advice to make informed decisions. Countries that adopt a 
bottom-up approach place greater responsibility on the individual or community. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5 The decision-makers within EWS from one extreme to the other  
 
In 2004, the Humanitarian Practice Network developed a model of EWS (see Fig. 2.6) that 
shows EWS as a more complex system, with feedback loops and variables, but also identifies 
the need for risk assessment, understanding vulnerability, and public education. Unlike the 
linear models shown in Figs. 2.1-2.3, this model illustrates that decision-making is a core 
component of EWS and is not a linear process, but the result of feedback from different actors 
involved in the EWS. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6  Generic model of forecasting / warning systems developed by Schlosser, C. (Twigg, 
2004, p.301) 
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Historically high levels of uncertainty in natural hazard science have resulted in scientists 
becoming core stakeholders in EWS, due to their expertise and responsibilities, so that EWS 
became ‘hazard-focused, linear, top-down, expert / driven systems, with little or no engagement 
of end-users or their representatives’ (Basher, 2006, p.2712). From this, mistrust of expert and 
local authorities can develop based on criticism that implementing a EWS is a long-term 
process where local populations can sustain themselves and thus benefit for generations to 
come. Twigg (2004, p.306) highlights that:  
 
The bulk of effort and expense is put into transmitting detailed clearly presented 
information to decision-makers and government emergency management services. 
Far less effort and funding go into disseminating this information right down to 
individual communities or households through accessible messages that will warn 
them and help them to make sensible decisions about how to respond. 
 
To date there has been little evaluation of the influence of institutional organisation and the flow 
of information between different actors in a EWS on making decisions. Typically, government 
institutions that mange potential disasters use simple policy, often prescriptive in manner 
however, with the recognition that decision-making is more complex, local practitioners and 
vulnerable populations are increasingly managing disasters relevant to them using community 
based EWS. These EWS are based upon local capabilities and technologies where communities 
can have ownership, generating an EWS that adopts a bottom-up approach. The idea of 
community-based EWS has gained momentum, in line with the radical approach developed by 
Hewitt (1983), and is suggested as an approach to develop people-centric EWS by the UN ISDR 
PPEW (2006). 
 
2.2.2  Communicating a warning 
 
Warning effectiveness is not just a function of good hazard knowledge and the generation of a 
warning message, but needs to be complemented by accurate knowledge of risk and risk 
management actions (Leonard et al., 2008). However, the effectiveness of an integrated 
response can be constrained by communication, coordination, training, and organisational 
constraints (Paton et al., 1998). Once a decision to warn has been made, communication of it, in 
an understandable format to decision-makers and the public is fundamental. It is imperative that 
all warning communication must be one consistent message, with no contradiction to generate 
confusion, to help establish faith between the public and other users that the information is 
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correct, and useful (Mileti and Sorenson, 1990). This creates a problem because often there is 
scientific controversy. 
 
A number of volcanic crises have highlighted the importance of effective communication 
between different actors of a VEWS. The first crisis illustrates the need to communicate danger 
to the public and decision-makers. The 1991 eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in the Philippines 
demonstrated the success of educating the public and government of volcanic hazards by using a 
video on ‘Reducing Volcanic Risk’ filmed by the late Maurice and Katia Kraft. This video 
enabled scientists to help the government and local populations understand the extent of 
devastation that Mt. Pinatubo could cause, and generated the political will for the safe 
evacuation of over 60,000 vulnerable people (Tayag et al., 1996). Second, is the issue of 
communicating with stakeholders to prepare for volcanic crises. The study by Solana et al 
(2008) highlighted the importance of stakeholder (e.g. civil agencies, land owners, the public) 
discussion prior to an emergency to establish plans and to discuss expectations and knowledge 
limitations at Vesuvius volcano observatory, Italy. Third, miscommunication can often occur 
between the scientists and the media. A public power struggle between two scientific groups 
over the interpretation of volcanic activity of Soufriere Hills at Guadeloupe during 1976, 
resulted in widespread confusion (Fiske, 1984). In another example, when Galeras volcano in 
Colombia reawakened in 1989, the media publicised the unrest as another potential tragedy like 
Nevado del Ruiz, scaring local communities. This resulted in the public loss of confidence in 
the scientists. Banks, businesses and traders, who were seriously affected by the uncertainties of 
the situation, forced the regional and local authorities to ignore the volcanic activity (Velasco, 
2000, Cardona, 1997). It took many years to rebuild relationship at Galeras between the 
scientists and the local authorities, because of the media’s actions.  Lastly, interactions and 
relations between scientists and authorities can strain communication. At Soufriere Hills 
volcano, Montserrat (1995-ongoing), communicating the level of risk of local populations with 
the local government became a difficult task. Poor social dynamics within the scientific 
community at Montserrat led to the introduction of expert elicitation to weight the value of each 
‘experts’ view on the scientific interpretation of the volcano’s behaviour (Aspinall et al., 2003).  
This led to distrust and a lack of credibility of the volcano observatory by the local communities 
(Haynes et al., 2008a).  
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Within a volcano observatory, culture can shape the ability to communicate and discuss 
contentious views at a time of crisis. In the ‘USGS: Long Valley Caldera Response Plan 2002’ 
(Hill et al., 2002) a conceptual framework for organisational culture was developed that 
incorporated elements of society (cultural, social, political and judicial systems), history (the 
organisation’s genesis, history, and transformations) and contingency (technology, economics). 
Broader cultural and social dynamics are also relevant as vulnerable populations have specific 
cultural preferences. It is interesting that historically warnings have been tailored to local 
cultures by using different shapes, colours, and words that the particular users are familiar and 
comfortable so that warnings can be communicated more effectively (discussed in chapter 4).  
 
2.2.3  The importance of local context 
 
Local context is very important to the success of VEWS. This section outlines four key local 
contexts: the political context, issues of trust and credibility, resources available to operate the 
VEWS, and finally the type of volcanic activity.  
 
Several historical volcanic disasters have resulted from political interference. The 1902 eruption 
of Mt. Pelee that destroyed Saint-Pierre, Martinique was in part the result of politicians who, in 
the middle of an election placed pressure on inhabitants to vote, effectively ‘obliging them to 
stay in the city and vote’, resulting in the death of approximately 30,000 people (Scarth, 2002, 
p.43). In Montserrat, (1995 to present) the decision to evacuate nearly two thirds of the island 
took much longer than expected while the government remained uncertain as to the status of the 
volcano, despite scientific advice (Haynes, 2008). Forecasting volcanic eruptions is made 
further difficult for monitoring scientists because they are confronted by differing political and 
economic interests; this is most prominent when developing risk maps and issuing alerts. The 
possibility of lawsuits and false alarms leading to a loss in credibility and potential 
inappropriate decisions in the future are consistent concerns (Denis, 1995). 
 
The ability of responsible scientists to maintain trust and credibility during volcanic crises is 
vital to the safety of vulnerable populations (Peterson et al., 1993). Insights from VEWS case 
studies demonstrate there is no one formula for transmitting scientific knowledge, so that the 
credibility of experts is in a sense always being negotiated and evaluated therefore, trust cannot 
be routinised (Wynne, 1996). The relationship between scientific expertise and the public is 
therefore far more complex than typically recognised in calls for ‘public understanding’ that 
emanate from the scientific establishment. A study in Montserrat discovered the most trusted 
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source for volcanic information is 'friends and relatives' (Haynes et al., 2008b, Haynes et al., 
2008a), thus highlighting the need for volcanologists to negotiate acceptable levels of risk and 
trade-offs with the public.  
 
Ideally, a VEWS would have adequate resources and scientists / staff to maintain full 
communications with stakeholders, develop land-use plan based on the hazards, and run 
emergency drills. However, this optimal response on an active volcano rarely coincides with an 
actual crisis (Peterson et al., 1993). There are too few observatories, many with limited staff, 
funding and equipment for monitoring, resulting in poor communication with local civil 
officials, and sometimes scientists are so engrossed in their work that they regard interactions 
with the press and public as annoyances and distractions.                                                                                    
 
Vulnerable populations vary around a volcano, from those that live on the volcano and nearby, 
to those that live 10’s of kilometres away in the river valleys formed by the volcano, to those 
that live 100’s of kilometres away that can be affected by ash. These vulnerable groups have 
different needs relating to the different hazards and their knowledge of them. With these factors 
to consider there is a real problem in making sure that scientific information is communicated, 
understood and effectively aids decision-making to respond to an imminent crisis. Peterson et 
al. (1993) identified five key factors that lead to some of the complexities involved in operating 
a VEWS. The majority of these observations relate to the physical aspects of the volcano that 
determine the ability for scientists to communicate effective warnings. For example, ‘small, 
frequent eruptions induce good communications and promote good relations between scientists 
and the public’, as ‘uncertainty about the outcome of volcanic unrest, especially if major 
violence is among the possibilities, seems to induce poor inter-relations’, partly the result of 
high levels of uncertainty (Peterson et al., 1993, p.340). In addition there is recognition that ‘the 
public often has unrealistic expectations of scientists' forecasting ability’ (Peterson et al., 1993, 
p.348). Therefore, the volcano’s eruptive style, activity and hazards are integral to making a 
warning relevant to the affected community. 
 
In summary, many lessons have been learnt from VEWS that operate in practice, and during 
real crises; including the volcanological community who have subsequently reviewed their 
professional conduct during volcano crises (Newhall et al., 1999). The few case studies outlined 
in this section demonstrate the value that a more comprehensive understanding of decision-
making, communication, and the relevance of local contexts can make VEWS more effective 
(Ronan et al., 2000). These examples also demonstrate the need for flexibility in a VEWS for 
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variation in the physical hazard and the social context, both of which are locally dependent. This 
raises questions about the ability for a standardised VEWS to achieve its objective. Volcano 
alert level systems (VALS) focus on the process of deciding a warning and communicating it. 
Since this process has repeatedly failed in numerous examples outlined in this section, this 
thesis focuses on VALS, the first mile of a VEWS, rather than the broader scope of a VEWS. 
 
2.2.4  The case of volcano alert levels 
 
Volcano alert level systems (VALS) are a key sub-system within a VEWS that focuses on the 
development and communication processes of warnings both prior to and during an event. 
Typically within a VALS scientists assess the state of the volcano, anticipate future behaviour 
and decide the alert level. The USGS defines a VALS as (USGS, 2009b): 
 
A series of levels that correspond generally to increasing levels of volcanic 
activity. As a volcano becomes increasingly active or as our monitoring data 
suggest that a given level of unrest is likely to lead to a significant eruption, we 
declare a corresponding higher alert level. This alert level ranking thus offers the 
public and civil authorities a framework they can use to gauge and coordinate their 
response to a developing volcano emergency. 
 
There are many aspects involved in developing a VALS such as the design of the system, the 
criteria for different alert levels, and the communication between users of the alert / warning. 
Users often tie alerts issued by scientists into some level of response; this makes a VALS a 
‘bridge’ between the physical and social issues involved in providing hazard warnings. Whilst 
theoretically VALS are not a complex system, they interact and aim to manage complexity to 
provide effective warnings.  
 
In 1985, the United Nations Disaster Relief Organisation (UNDRO) published a report on 
‘Volcanic Emergency Management’ outlining one of the first examples of a VALS, called 
‘Stages of alert of volcanic eruption’ (UNDRO, 1985, p.54). Each progressive alert level 
reflects increasing indicators that the volcano is about to erupt, providing an approximate period 
and a recommended response by disaster managers. VALS follow a linear progression whereby 
alerts rise with perceived increasing levels of danger. The UNDRO report also provides strong 
guidance in relation to limiting panic in volcanic crises via public announcements, decided prior 
to any emergency, with the public made aware of the arrangements for information. These 
details vary in each place, region, country, according to the different ‘political and social 
structure of the community and the technical means available. It is therefore difficult to lay 
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down any detailed guidelines for public information and warning’ (UNDRO, 1985, p.55). 
Possibly, because of the importance of local contingencies, literature on VALS since 1985 has 
remained limited, with some gray literature written by various volcano observatories, 
institutions and individuals. It has not been possible to find specific literature that addresses 
VALS at any depth, and therefore no comparative or analytical work on VALS exists to the 
authors' knowledge. Although as of 2006 the UN recommends standardisation of EWS, it seems 
the UN previously recognised the importance of local context and developed an idealised VALS 
for countries to adopt or adapt if they required. 
 
In recent decades increasing standardisation within national VALS has occurred, to allow 
national adaptations to fit better with the type of volcanism they encounter and their emergency 
management protocols. In the U.S., there are two standardised VALS, one for ground hazards 
using words, and one for aviation hazards using colours. In New Zealand, they also use two 
standardised VALS, but one is designed for the hazards expected at frequently active cone 
volcanoes, and the other for reawakening volcanoes; both are based on numbered levels (from 0 
to 5) (GNS, 2010). Both the U.S. and New Zealand alert levels are decided by the current 
activity of a volcano; they do not provide action or advice to users for mitigative action. In 
contrast, the Japanese VALS states the measures to be taken by specifying areas of danger, 
indicating extent of evacuation, and outlining the expected volcanic activity (Japan 
Meteorological Agency, 2010). Providing advice on mitigative action or evacuations to civil 
authorities or emergency managers is also commonly seen in VALS used in developing 
countries. These few examples illustrate that there are many factors involved in designing a 
VALS including: what information is provided, whether actions are recommended, the style of 
warning (actual or forecast), and the number of VALS used. 
 
The World Organisation of Volcano Observatories (WOVO) states that, although there is often 
worldwide interest in the status of a volcano, 'with the exception of colour codes for aviation, 
currently there is no standardised international volcano alert levels system’ (WOVO, 2008). 
This is due to a ‘wide variation in the behaviour of individual volcanoes and in monitoring 
capabilities, and different needs of populations, including different languages and symbolism of 
colours or alert levels’ (WOVO, 2008). The WOVO recognise the importance of local 
contingency, but also the fact that the aviation sector requires a standardised tool they can 
understand regardless of which airspace they are flying through (discussed further in chapter 4). 
Whilst the VALS for aviation is standardised globally by the International Civil Aviation 
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Organisation (ICAO), VALS used on the ground have significant differences in their design and 
use.  
 
Despite these variances, and in relation to the discussion focusing on the standardisation of 
EWS discussed above, there has been consideration over the possibility of developing a globally 
standardised VALS for ground hazards. Scott (2007) investigated this prospect at volcano 
conferences in the late 1990s and early 2000s, concluding there cannot be international 
uniformity in VALS given the wide range in volcanic eruptions and hazards, and the recurrence 
of activity that requires a wide variety of needs to be catered for. Scott questioned whether the 
process of standardising VALS actually ‘undermines the important function they achieve?’ 
(Scott, 2007, p.90) This thesis will address this question in the empirical chapters (4-7), but it is 
important to note that the considerations made during Scott’s study focused only on the hazard 
and not on interpretations of the hazard, institutional aspects, or the social contexts in which the 
hazard occurs. These aspects play a vital role in VALS, as will be shown in case studies 
outlined below that reviews the operationalisation of VALS.  
 
Given the importance of VALS in providing volcanic information to decision-makers, only two 
papers have been published that specifically review the implementation of VALS, discussing 
how they operate and analysing their strengths and weaknesses. The first key study reviews the 
impact of issuing a ‘yellow alert’ in Quito, Ecuador, for Guagua Pichincha volcano, during 
unrest in 1998 (Metzger et al., 1999). The VALS used was devised with the USGS and based on 
four colours (white, yellow, orange and red). The issuance of the yellow alert level (second 
stage of alert) was during a politically sensitive time, when national level trade unions were 
calling for a general strike to protest the economic austerity plan implemented by the new 
President. Yet, the VALS created enough awareness to demonstrate that natural risks could 
outweigh political circumstances by challenging responsibility, legitimacy and credibility. A 
number of factors contributed to the fact that officials responded to the volcanic crisis. First, the 
Mayor, (president of the ecological Nature foundation), was risk averse enough to get involved. 
This highlights that personalities and the experiences of decision-makers can influence the 
management of a disaster. Second, the yellow alert level provided a point of reference for 
politicians, based on the observed phenomena, generating an atmosphere of trust. Third, the 
analysis by Metzger et al. of the decision-making process and political implications of 
announcing a yellow alert exposes the difficulties in managing volcanic risk when there are 
problems over scientific uncertainty and communication, with not only the local authorities, but 
also scientific experts. At the end of the study, the authors analyse the impact of the yellow alert 
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level one year on from its issuance, discovering interesting results. The yellow alert was no 
longer a reference point, as they ‘witnessed a gradual change from a system of alerts based on 
scientific criteria to one based on the expected consequences’ (Metzger et al., 1999, p.220). This 
led to differentiated spatial management of the crisis, driven by the areas of higher risk to 
certain hazards. Unfortunately, the alert level system was not redesigned to reflect these spatial 
differences in risk, resulting in confusion within local populations. In conclusion, 'the way alerts 
are managed reflects the difficulty the authorities experience in assimilating the changes in 
volcanic activity, even though these changes are slow, which in turn reduced political credibility 
during the volcanic crisis management' (Metzger et al., 1999, p.221). This study demonstrates 
that VALS become complicated precisely because they have different stages of alert that impact 
the vulnerable society, and indicate the VALS are constantly changing, and therefore difficult 
systems to understand. 
 
The second study by De la Cruz-Reyna and Tilling (2008), focuses on the introduction of a 
‘Volcano Traffic Light’ alert system for Popocatépetl volcano in Mexico that was also assisted 
by the USGS. This VALS has seven levels of alerts for emergency-management authorities, but 
only three levels for the public (green-yellow-red). The authors state that ‘the problem of 
attaining a perception of risk as uniform as possible in a population measured in millions during 
an evolving eruption requires searching for communication tools that can describe – as simply 
as possible – the relations between the level of threat posed by the volcano, and the level of 
response of the authorities and the public’ (De la Cruz-Reyna and Tilling, 2008, p121). The 
traffic light design aimed to make the system proactive, efficient, unambiguous and culturally 
adequate, which it appears to have achieved. This paper highlights the fact that there is a further 
disparity within national VALS, as some countries, such as Mexico, have different VALS for 
the decision-makers and for the public.  
 
Both papers highlight the need for VALS to be locally adapted, and demonstrate the difficulties 
of using a linear VALS when volcanic crises can occur for long periods, causing warning 
information requirements to change as seen in the Metzger et al. study (1999). By studying 
operationalised VALS, this thesis can provide further insight into how they work in practice.  
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2.2.5  Summary 
 
This chapter, so far, has demonstrated that for EWS to be effective, a better understanding of the 
role of social issues, and of the communication and decision-making processes in EWS needs to 
be developed. There are two key objectives to warnings; to be noticed and encoded, and to 
provide understandable information for recipients to make informed decisions regarding 
compliance (Laughery, 2006). Whether warnings achieve these objectives is dependent on the 
design of the warning, as well as the characteristics of the users and the situation.  
 
Over the last forty years, volcanic crises have supported the argument that EWS are not linear, 
but have to negotiate numerous complex systems. This requires a bottom-up approach that 
considers local context (contingency) that needs to respond to changes over time, and are 
socially constructed and adapted by the relevant society’s requirements. This contradicts 
increasing levels of standardisation in EWS that do not facilitate local flexibility or recognise 
the complexities involved, and how to best govern them. However, examples outside of disaster 
management have shown that although standardisation is reductive, it helps establish 
responsibilities and cooperation between the different groups involved. Currently there are two 
key challenges to standardising volcanic warnings: first, the variability of the hazard and 
location; and second, the social context of users of the warning, who have fundamentally 
different requirements (i.e. between aviation and ground users). Therefore, a key question is 
how can a warning be standardised to consider local context and appeal to a diverse range of 
users? 
 
All too often the standardisation of systems has led them to be ‘black boxed’; this has happened 
to VEWS and VALS despite numerous attempts over decades to represent them and address the 
processes that occur within them. This thesis seeks to open the VALS black box. Part three of 
the literature review investigates the processes that occur within a VALS by examining how 
scientists understand and manage the complexity of volcanic hazards and the issues that arise 
during the process and how social science approaches to these issues can provide insights into 
the black box of VALS.  
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2.3  Volcanology, uncertainty and risk 
 
The ability for a VALS to provide accurate and timely warnings is limited by the level of 
scientific knowledge about volcanoes their behaviours’. This section first addresses how 
scientists who study volcanoes view and manage these limitations using various tools, and how 
the complex behaviour of volcanoes leads to scientific uncertainty. Scientists build models to 
develop forecasts, and conduct quantitative risk assessments to address scientific uncertainties 
(e.g. probabilistic risk models), but due to a lack of data and high levels of uncertainty these 
processes are socially constructed. The scientific community commonly define risk as a 
mathematical process however; social scientists view risk, particularly where uncertainty is 
high, as a far more complex and abstract concept. The philosophy and sociology of scientific 
knowledge can provide insights into the management of uncertainty within scientific 
knowledge; therefore, this section goes on to reflect how social scientists view risk both 
conceptually and practically. This raises issues concerning who is the expert in determining the 
risks and in decision-making, and how this affects developing policy, such as the 
standardisation of VALS. 
 
2.3.1  The complex science of volcanology 
 
Volcanoes are complex natural phenomena because whilst volcanic behaviour tends to follow 
some underlying principles, it is not linear nor chaotic in nature (Sornette et al., 1991). To date 
the volcanological community has been unable to generate accurate and reliable predictive 
models for use on a single volcano, let alone for the many types of volcano and styles of 
eruption that occur, although improvements in forecasting volcanic behaviour is being 
developed via a number of models (Kilburn, 2003). Volcanoes tend to occur at tectonic plate 
boundaries, where plates are either converging (as around the Pacific Ring of Fire which hosts 
approximately 80 percent of currently active volcanoes) (Clapperton, 1977), or diverging (in 
Iceland and along the Mid Atlantic Ridge). A number of volcanoes, however, occur above 
mantle plumes in intra-plate settings. These occur on either continental crust (Yellowstone, 
Wyoming) or oceanic crust (Hawaiian Islands). The key to differences in relation to volcanic 
types is the chemistry, which characterises magma composition and its interaction with the 
environment (Francis and Oppenheimer, 2004). Since magma can only be analysed to very 
shallow depths the only indicators of magma composition are the deposits produced by volcanic 
activity such as lava flows. Different magma geochemistry generates a range of igneous rocks 
typically classified by their silica content, ranging from silicic (granite, dominantly continental 
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crust) to mafic (basalt, dominantly oceanic crust). Depending on the tectonic location of the 
volcano, the geochemistry of the magma will vary given the interaction of different crust types, 
and the host rock through which the magma travels through, which may be metamorphic or 
sedimentary rocks. Different magma compositions lead to different styles of eruptions. 
However, it is not just magma composition that is important in controlling hazards, but also the 
potential for magma and water interaction, the stability of the volcano, and interactions with the 
physical environment. There are further types of volcanic styles resulting from the interaction of 
volcanic activity with water causing phreatomagmatic eruptions and structural failures such as 
lateral blasts. Italian geologist Giuseppe Mercalli developed a system of volcanic terminology in 
the early twentieth century based on the observations of the violence and characteristics of some 
well-known eruptions: Hawaiian, Strombolian, Vulcanian, Pelean, Sub-Plinian, Plinian and 
Ultra-Plinian (Scarth, 1994). This system is still widely used today despite more quantitative 
measures of determining eruption styles such as the ‘violence’ of eruption using the Volcano 
Explosivity Index (VEI) ranging from 0-8, or a number of other parameters that may be based 
on tephra (fragmented rock) fall out and intensity. Different styles of volcanic eruptions produce 
a number of different hazards as outlined in the introduction. Duration of a volcanic eruption 
can range from minutes to decades, and volcanoes can erupt frequently, or remain dormant for 
thousands to hundreds of thousands of years resulting in explosive resurgence (as seen at 
Chaiten volcano in Chile, 2008). Volcanoes can change style during or between eruptions 
without any warning. All these factors contribute to the complexity of volcanoes; they each 
have individual characteristics, although these can change. Consequently, understanding and 
managing volcanic hazards is difficult, but three main methods are adopted; reviewing a 
volcano's history, monitoring it, and developing engineered structures that can mitigate against 
volcanic hazards. 
 
To understand past activity of a volcano, detailed mapping and field work is used to collect and 
analyse samples to review the magma composition, date the rocks using radiocarbon and a 
number of other techniques (Chester et al., 2005), and to establish the geological history. 
Drawing a hazard map indicates historical hazards and the scale of their impact on the land 
surrounding the volcano. Hazard maps aid emergency planners review emergency plans by 
identifying areas of danger, the hazards that a volcano may produce, and to prevent them 
evacuating people to dangerous areas. Although mapping is valuable, it requires time, money 
and skilled geologists, something not all volcano observatories can afford.  
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Monitoring techniques are used to detect and quantify expressions of magma migration at depth, 
and to monitor other related hazards. By monitoring current volcanic activity, it is possible to 
detect changes in activity and develop forecasts of potential volcanic activity or hazards. 
Monitoring traditionally developed from geophysical techniques such as seismicity (McNutt, 
2000), monitoring ground deformation (Dzurisin, 2007), and gravity modelling (Battaglia and 
Segall, 2004). In addition, geochemical measurements of volcanic gases (typically sulphur 
dioxide and carbon dioxide) and geothermal liquids help develop a picture of what is occurring 
underground (Edmonds, 2008). The ability to use monitoring data to develop forecasts is 
improving significantly as new technologies such as computer, satellite and telemetry 
technology improve data transmission, analysis and modelling techniques. New state-of-the-art 
monitoring methods include remote sensing techniques (Galle et al., 2003) and infrasonic 
pressure sensors (Johnson et al., 2008). The USGS states that volcano monitoring occurs in two 
modes: a forecasting mode before and between eruptions, and an alerting mode when the 
volcano is erupting, changing the focus of the monitoring methods used. 
 
The development of scientific understanding and technology is rapidly expanding scientist's 
ability to monitor volcanoes and interpret data. There is still a need, however, to synthesize 
monitoring and historical data relating to volcanic behaviour into an integrated model. This 
development has meant that scientists felt that ‘until recently, the science of volcano monitoring 
has largely been in the observation itself, with the interpretation of observations best described 
as an art’ (Francis and Oppenheimer, 2004, p.446). Although improved monitoring has enabled 
forecasting to evolve from empirical pattern recognition, to modelling some of the underlying 
dynamics, there are still many uncertainties therefore it could be implied that volcano 
monitoring still remains an art, despite monitoring developments. This is discussed further in 
section 2.3.3.  
 
Engineering large-scale structures to mitigate against the impact of volcanic hazards has been 
used in a number of countries including Japan and Italy. Engineering methods are typically 
employed for effusive volcanic activity because the consequences of this type of activity can be 
manipulated such as at Mt. Etna in 1992 (Barberi et al., 1993), and 1973 at Heimaey Island, 
Iceland (Williams and Moore, 1983). Engineering around volcanoes has developed significantly 
via Sabo structures, built to cope with secondary erosional hazards such as debris flows and 
mudflows by filtering different sizes of boulders and sediment (Takahashi, 2007). The use of 
engineering in managing volcanic crises remains limited, partly due to high costs and the ability 
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to contain only specific hazards. However, in some cases they have enabled populations to live 
safely on and around volcanoes, as seen at Unzen in Japan (Ikeya, 2008). 
 
2.3.2  Modelling and quantifying uncertainty 
 
Once a volcano erupts there is often no time to evacuate effected regions, therefore a 
precautionary approach is adopted. Consequently forecasting the nature, scale and extent of 
volcanic hazards is essential despite the difficulties in generating an accurate forecast. Scientists 
(typically geochemists, geophysicists, geologists, volcanologists and mathematicians) have 
exploited a range of quantitative theoretical and statistical models of volcanic monitoring data to 
develop better prognosis of a volcano’s behaviour, and deal with the high levels of uncertainty 
involved. Many volcanic systems are inherently unpredictable, complex and sometimes chaotic, 
however some systems can be constrained, particularly for volcanoes showing regular periodic 
behaviour (Sparks, 2003, Marzocchi et al., 2007, Marzocchi et al., 2006). Therefore, volcanoes 
are not considered chaotic systems, but complex ones.  
 
Scientists and mathematicians attempt to understand underlying dynamic volcanic processes by 
developing theoretical models. Often only one component of many processes occurring can be 
modelled, thus removing consideration as to how processes may interact with one another. In 
addition, obtaining measurements to test models can be extremely difficult (often due to high 
temperatures and pressures) so that observations are fed into models without fully 
understanding the dynamics involved. A number of theoretical models have been developed that 
have been successfully used for many years including the Mogi point source model used to 
model ground deformation (Mogi, 1958), models to forecast lava flow velocities and distances 
for ‘Aa’ and ‘Pahoehoe’ flows (Kilburn, 2003, Kilburn, 2004), and forecasting eruptions using 
multi-scale fracturing (Kilburn, 2003, Kilburn and Sammonds, 2005). Whilst these and other 
models have been useful, the physical properties of magmas are highly complex, non-linear, 
time-dependent processes that are typically coupled making it difficult to isolate any one 
process (Melnick and Sparks, 1999). The non-linear and time-dependent characteristics of 
volcanic systems are fundamental disadvantages in the ability to develop forecasts, given the 
complexities and subsequent uncertainties involved.  
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Due to the intrinsic uncertainties within the complex volcanic system Sparks (2003) argues that 
‘forecasts of eruptions and hazards need to be expressed in probabilistic terms that take account 
of uncertainties’ (p.1). It is thought by scientists that statistical analysis of complex 
volcanological data can improve forecasting by developing rigorous methods for quantifying the 
likelihood of outcomes given a set of observations, both present and past (Mader, 2006). There 
are a number of ways in which statistical tools are used to forecast volcanic activity: forecasting 
methods and application (Varley et al. 2006), volcanological time series (Young et al., 2006), 
methods that link numerical simulations of volcanism and probabilistic modelling including 
sensitivity analyses and inversion techniques (Neuberg et al., 2006), and forecasting activity 
based on geostatistical concepts (Jaquet et al., 2006). Frequently decision-support models 
combine these statistical estimations to provide what scientists regard as ‘objective’ analyses of 
eruptive state in probabilistic terms.  
 
Many volcanologists believe the future of forecasting lies in statistical modelling. In practice, 
however, the statistical modelling of volcanic behaviour and processes inevitably has high 
levels of uncertainty, making decisions based on the interpretation of raw data difficult. To 
solve this issue decision-support models are commonly applied in forecasting models, based on 
Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN)2, that provide a general framework to combine uncertain 
evidence (soft or hard data, beliefs, probability distributions) on the basis of evidential 
likelihood of each element (Aspinall et al., 2003). An example commonly used is that of event 
trees, used as a framework to discuss probabilities of possible outcomes of volcanic unrest and 
convey hazard information to non-scientists (Newhall and Hoblitt, 2002). Additionally, 
combining an evidence-based approach with other formalised procedures such as the elicitation 
of expert opinions provides an auditable trail for the way scientific information has been used 
(Aspinall et al., 2002, Aspinall et al., 2003, Aspinall et al., 2006b). Quantifying the value of an 
expert is difficult, so expert elicitation generated controversy when applied at the Montserrat 
crisis in 1996-7. Rather than rely on the opinions of experts, Marzocchi facilitated a quantitative 
volcano risk metric to base decisions for eruption forecasting using a Bayesian Event Tree3 
(BET_EF) (Marzocchi et al., 2006, Marzocchi et al., 2007), and a probabilistic scheme for 
2  Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) use models for reasoning about uncertainty.   
3 Bayesian Event Tree (BET) translates volcanological input into probability of any possible volcano-
related event. 'Volcanological input' is every type of information relevant for the event under study. It 
ranges from models (i.e., ash fall model), to historical / volcanological information (i.e., eruptive 
catalogues), to monitoring measures (i.e., detecting magma movement). Taken from: Probabilistic 
Volcanic Hazard Assessment and Eruption Forecasting: The Bayesian Event Tree approach. Open File 
Report, Marzocchi, W., Selva, J., and Sandri, L. INGV, Bologna, Italy, p.81. 
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eruption forecasting and cost-benefit analysis (Marzocchi and Woo, 2007). However, when 
these schemes were applied in Italy during the 2007 Stromboli response, they demonstrated 
only a small cost-benefit in their application (Bertolaso et al., 2009) demonstrating limited value 
in practice.  
 
Of particular interest to this study is the quantitative approach adopted to change an alert level 
(Aspinall et al., 2003, Baxter et al., 2008). ‘Volcanic crises may be represented as a staged 
progression of states of unrest’ and ‘if the state conditions can be interpreted physically, e.g., in 
terms of advancing materials failure, this knowledge could be used directly to inform a decision 
on alert level setting’ (Aspinall et al., 2006a, p.112). Since civil authorities often respond 
directly to alert level changes Aspinall and Cooke (1998, p.4) state that: 
 
Setting the level always becomes especially critical or contentious when a decision 
may be needed to switch from one level to another. It is at these times that the 
formalized elicitation approach comes into its own and, at the MVO [Montserrat 
Volcano Observatory], a semi-quantitative weighted voting scheme was devised 
and used to good effect in 64 separate reappraisals. 
 
 
By using the expert elicitation system Aspinall et al. developed, they provided the decision-
makers with an ‘optimal’ value from the expert elicitation and the measure of the spread of 
views so they could make their own judgement in accepting recommendations, see Fig. 2.7.  
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Figure 2.7  Repeat appraisals of volcanic alert level using expert judgement elicitations 
(Aspinall and Cooke, 1998, p.4) 
 
Although Aspinall et al. recognise the difficulty in identifying the 'state' conditions of the 
volcano, they suggest that by using a decision-support tool ‘the assessed probability of an event 
to any number of such varying and variable factors can be resolved objectively in terms of an 
evidence-based decision’ (Aspinall et al., 2003, p.284) (author’s emphasis). Insights provided 
by the sociology of scientific knowledge (discussed in the next section) indicate that no such 
decision-support tool, or any statistical model, is objective because the parameters put in place 
to run the model are inherently subjective. In fact, Aspinall et al. go on to state that in practice 
there will ‘often be a multitude of observations, theories, models and expert opinions to 
consider, most of which can address only partially the issue of a volcano’s state and its possible 
progress to eruption, and some of which will be contradictory’ (Aspinall et al., 2006a, p.113), 
implying there are no objective interpretations . This point will be expanded in section 2.3.4 that 
reviews the role of risk assessment to manage the scientific uncertainties in volcanic crises 
commonly employed by scientists.  
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Obtaining and modelling data play a role in understanding and managing phenomena that result 
from volcanic processes, yet actual understanding of these processes remains incomplete. The 
interpretation of monitoring data by scientists is critical, as there are no right or wrong answers; 
rather there are theories of what they may indicate. It is therefore imperative to understand what 
factors affect this process of interpretation and theory development, and to question how 
knowledge is constructed and what it means. What to do when there are large uncertainties? 
How can decisions be accountable? Over the last 50 years the philosophy and sociology of 
science has surveyed, criticised and transformed our knowledge practices. The next section 
explores some of these discoveries within the context of how people have thought about coping 
with scientific uncertainty in different contexts.  
 
2.3.3 Theorising the philosophy and sociology of uncertainty 
 
The problems of scientific uncertainty and lack of consensus in data and interpretation are not 
unique to volcanology. Questions regarding the assumptions, foundations, and implications of 
scientific knowledge have long been a feature of the philosophy of science and highlight the 
difficulties involved in establishing both 'science' and 'scientific knowledge' (Curd, 1998). The 
philosophy of science has developed from repeatedly asking questions concerning the nature of 
truth, how to form theories, and proving them. Scientists investigate the world using 
experiments, observations, and theory-structure that generate and validate scientific ideas, but 
there are problems with these methods. This section will review some of these issues and their 
implications for the methods adopted by scientists to understand volcanic behaviour and form 
warnings. 
 
Philosophers typically adopt one of four methods to understand how scientific knowledge is 
constructed and how its special character can be defined: inductivism (Chalmers, 1999), 
falsification (Popper, 1968), scientific values in paradigms (Kuhn, 1962, Kuhn, 1977), and 
scientific conduct (Merton and Storer, 1973). Historically arguments were commonly 
constructed using induction, ascribing properties or relations based on a number of observations 
or experiences, or to formulate laws based on limited observations of recurring phenomenal 
patterns, much like volcano scientists do with monitoring data. Yet to borrow Karl Popper’s 
example, the assumption that all swans are white is invalidated when one black swan is 
observed. Since inductive conclusions cannot yield certainty, Karl Popper a critic, replaced it 
with falsification. His argument states that logically no number of positive outcomes at the level 
of experimental testing can confirm a scientific theory however; a single counterexample is 
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logically decisive as it shows the theory to be false. Therefore, he argued that a theory or 
hypothesis should be considered scientific if, and only if, it is falsifiable.  
 
Falsification has its limits; when evidence conflicts with prediction of a law or theory, it could 
be the evidence at fault, not the theory. This is known as the Duheim / Quine thesis, i.e. the 
claim that a theory can never be conclusively tested in isolation, what is tested is an entire 
framework of beliefs (Gillies, 1998). Kuhn tried to solve the problem by determining that 
historically scientific revolutions are characteristic of scientific progress, where a revolution 
involves the abandonment of one theoretical structure and its replacement by another 
incompatible one. He stated that the disorganised and diverse activity that precedes the 
formation of an area of science becomes structured and directed when a scientific community 
adheres to a single paradigm. A paradigm sets the standards for legitimate work within the 
science it governs, and comprises general theoretical assumptions, laws, and techniques for their 
application that members of a particular scientific community adopt. Therefore, rival paradigms 
are ‘incommensurable’. Kuhn took a ‘relativist’ view whereby the account of progress is 
determined by the values of the individual, group or culture rather than a definitive, neutral 
factor. Although Kuhn was not comfortable with portraying a relativist position, he indicated 
that the way we discover nature is ‘intrinsically sociological’.  
 
Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions in the 1960s opened the door to the study of the 
sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK). SSK is based on the assumptions that natural 
reasoning capacity and sense perceptions are not sufficient conditions for the production of 
scientific knowledge. Sociologists began to look at contents, style, methods, conventions and 
institutions, in other words knowledge itself as being socially and materially constituted. This 
research initially focused on historical studies of changing paradigms in science, exploring how 
scientific understanding changed not only because of internal scientific debate, but also due to 
external context. Bloor’s ‘Strong Programme’ was right at the heart of the new SSK by denying 
the exceptionality of scientific methodology. He stated that the sociology of knowledge 
examines the interaction between whatever counts as knowledge in a particular culture and the 
social characteristics of that culture (Collins, 1981). Bloor offers a characterisation of scientific 
method by stating that science proceeds by arranging experiments so that social, psychological 
and other variables are as balanced as possible. The key finding of the Strong Programme is of 
‘finitism’, where the drawing of implications is always a cultural accomplishment. Finitism was 
a significant turning point in science studies establishing that people collectively determine 
what knowledge is, even if they experience that knowledge as compelling and external to 
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themselves. What the Strong Programme demonstrated is that scientists are not objective, and 
their capabilities to interpret and analyse hazard data will depend on ‘finitism’ i.e. cultural 
aspects, both within for example the volcano observatory and organisation, and the country and 
regional cultures. As discussed in the above section it is clear that some scientists do not think 
of their science as subjective, socially constructed, or recognise and the importance of culture in 
their beliefs. The Strong Program has since been supplemented by other schools: the empirical 
program of relativism EPOR (Collins, 1981, Collins, 1990), Actor-network theory (Latour, 
1987, Latour, 2005), Constructivism (Knorr-Cetina, 1981, Knorr-Cetina, 1999), Social 
construction of technology (SCOT) (Bijker et al., 1987), Symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 
1969), Ethnomethodology (Lynch, 1993), and the Normative Structure of Science (Merton and 
Storer, 1973). 
 
Developments in the philosophy and sociology of science demonstrate that observational data is 
not an infallible tool in developing models as it excludes the unknown. Testing and verifying 
theories on volcanological processes are difficult for a number of reasons: a volcano needs to be 
well monitored and erupt frequently to provide the best hope of developing a good scientific 
understanding, and scientists need to be able to measure processes like pyroclastic flows using 
robust technology (which is still not possible). Scientists employ computer models to simulate 
volcano’s behaviour, but the interpretation depends on the analyst as much as the interpretation 
of science, and their assumptions when inputting parameters of a model. This raises questions 
about the validity of developing models and forecasts for volcanic hazards and the reliance that 
scientists can develop on models, forgetting that the underlying science remains indefinite.  
 
In addition to the social construction of knowledge by scientists, the cognitive ‘product’ of the 
work of science is shaped by scientists’ choice of work organisation (Yearley, 2005) and its 
cultural approach to complexity. Merton and Storer (1973) outlined that if the exceptional 
quality of science cannot be located in a method, then it could be located in the social norms 
that govern conduct within the scientific community. The way organisations are structured and 
how and why they behave in such a way is important in the context of VALS since there are a 
number of stakeholders and organisations involved, each with a key role in knowledge 
production. Vaughan (1999) drew on organisational theories to demonstrate ‘the ironic fact that 
organisations, necessary to produce, coordinate and maintain complex techno-scientific systems 
also have irreducible and emergent effects of the way complex information is transmitted, 
communicated, processed and stored’ (p.913). Failed organisations (Vaughan, 1996, Eden, 
2004, Knorr-Cetina, 1999) have highlighted the problems involved in large government related 
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scientific institutions that have to make decisions (such as the issuance of volcano alert levels). 
Eden (2004) investigated how organisations frame the problem they try to solve, defining 
frames as ‘problem representation and solution requirements within which are embedded 
organisational goals, assumptions and knowledge about the world and traces of previous 
definitions of problems and solutions’ (p.224). Her model demonstrates that problem-solving 
and sense-making are more intimately related than has been acknowledged in the existing 
literature. However, volcanic crises not only deal with laboratory sciences, but with hazards that 
are both situated and idiographic. Consequently, there are difficulties in using risk frameworks 
to manage volcanic crises that suggest that they are better considered through frameworks of 
uncertainty.  
 
2.3.4 Risk and uncertainty in the science of volcanology  
 
Scientists commonly regard risk as the interaction between the hazard and society; ‘the 
magnitude of a potential loss – of life, property, or productive capacity – within the area subject 
to hazard(s)’ (Wright and Pierson, 1992, p.28). Historically risk has been reviewed using risk 
assessments that are quantitative, despite often being based on qualitative measurements 
(Stirling, 2003, p.36). Scientific methods of understanding risk include a range of ‘quantitative 
and / or expert-based risk assessment techniques, involving varying forms of scientific 
experimentation and modelling, probability and statistical theory, cost-benefit and decision 
analysis, and Bayesian and Monte-Carlo4 methods’ (Stirling, 2007, p.309), as demonstrated in 
the section 2.3.2. They are intrinsically reductive processes from complex and contested 
realities (i.e. what a volcano’s activity is) into a discrete set of ordered categories (such as alert 
levels) amongst other simplifications. Assumptions in volcanic risk are based on past 
behaviours but there are situations where the unknown or unexpected (i.e. ignorance) have 
occurred (as seen at Mt. St. Helens in 1980, and Mt. Unzen in 1991).  
 
Within mathematical and scientific disciplines, risk assessment is usually conducted on the basis 
illustrated in Fig. 2.8, which demonstrates ‘the unifying approach to risk and risk analysis is 
based on the idea that risk is a way of expressing uncertainty related to future observable 
quantities’ (Aven, 2003, p.47). Models in risk analysis, such as Fig. 2.8, first require observable 
quantities used to develop a deterministic model that link the systems performance with these 
4 Monte Carlo methods (or Monte Carlo experiments) are a class of computational algorithms that rely on 
repeated random sampling to compute their results. 
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observations. Ultimately, it is possible to calculate the uncertainty distribution of the 
performance measures and determine a suitable prediction. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8 Basic elements of risk analysis (Aven, 2003, p.49) 
 
These models are useful when there are observable quantities, but as discussed, there are few 
such quantities in volcanic processes. Without such quantities, it is not possible to conduct a risk 
analysis, as there is no basis on which to calculate probabilities. In addition, the risk analyst’s 
understanding of the world would be dependent on, or influenced by their own experiences or 
the behaviour of a particular volcano. Because of this there would be different levels of 
ambiguity arising from different framing assumptions (i.e. the views of the different users), and 
ignorance in assessing the uncertainties involved because it is not possible to fully quantify the 
likelihoods or characterise all the possible outcome factors i.e. our uncertainty about our 
uncertainty (Cyranski, 1986). This means that when it comes to volcanic hazards, a 
mathematical approach to risk assessment is not yet possible to any meaningful degree. In the 
context of high uncertainty, Stirling states that ‘reductive quantitative risk fails to recognise the 
intrinsic limitations and contradictions in the rational choice foundations that underlie risk 
assessment’ (Stirling, 2003, p.52). This suggests that models, such as Bayesian event trees and 
expert elicitation, are less useful because they do not consider ambiguity and ignorance when 
attempting to quantify risk.  
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It is difficult when there is no scientific certainty to say that whatever evidence there is, it is 
enough ‘to determine that the potential harm is significant and irreversible’ (von Krauss et al., 
2005, p.4). However, there is a need to address these uncertainties and risks, despite the 
complexities involved. Complexity impinges upon scientific enquiry in three key ways: ‘i) 
physical reality where the properties of self-organization, irreducible uncertainty, emergent, and 
others come into play; ii) the need to consider different epistemologies (a plurality of 
perceptions or viewpoints must be acknowledged and respected, even if not accepted as equally 
valid); iii) the need to consider different “intentionalities” (differing goals)’ (Gallopin et al., 
2001, p.226). Complex volcanic behaviour generates scientific uncertainties, making it difficult 
for decision-makers responsible for public safety to establish what the risks are. Therefore, these 
risks are multiple as there are many stakeholders involved in any one-volcano crisis.  
 
Risk is a concept that is often perceived to have a potentially negative impact on an asset or 
some characteristic of value that may arise from some present process or future events. 
Commonly risks are presented as a probability of a known loss or gain. In his seminal work 
‘Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit’, Frank Knight established the distinction between risk and 
uncertainty: ‘a measurable uncertainty, or ‘risk’ proper, as we shall use the term, is so far 
different from an unmeasurable one that it is not in effect an uncertainty at all. We [...] 
accordingly restrict the term ‘uncertainty’ to cases of the non-quantitative type’ (Knight, 1921, p 
I.I 26). This implies that unless risk is quantified, it is not a risk but what we call uncertainty.  
 
A traditional risk assessment uses a powerful set of methods when looking at risk, but as shown 
in this section they are not applicable under conditions of high uncertainties. Although nearly 
every aspect of a VALS is uncertain, understanding uncertainty alone does not capture 
‘incertitude’; a concept that combines uncertainty, ignorance, ambiguity and risk to provide a 
more holistic view of knowledge, or lack of (Stirling, 2007)5. This has practical implications for 
the robustness of conventional reductive risk assessment in decision-making, and Stirling 
believes that persistence in using these reductive methods under conditions other than a strict 
state of risk (as defined by Knight 1921), are irrational, unscientific and potentially misleading. 
Uncertainty indicates that a single aggregated picture of risk is neither rational nor ‘science-
based’; ambiguity highlights that it is not rigorous or rational to provide a single ‘sound 
scientific’ picture of risk; and ignorance demonstrates that parameters are not only contestable 
but also, at least in part, unknown (Stirling, 2007, p.310). Ignorance can also be classed as ‘the 
black swan’, reflecting our reliance on inductive knowledge (Taleb, 2007). These four elements 
5 Stirling's concept of incertitude emerged from his work on science and technology policy. 
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of incomplete knowledge are presented in Fig. 2.9 providing schematic examples and showing 
the relationship between knowledge of probabilities (risk, uncertainty) and the outcomes 
(ambiguity and ignorance).   
 
 
Figure 2.9  Contrasting states of incomplete knowledge, with schematic examples (Stirling, 
2007, p.312) 
 
The concept of ‘incertitude’ provides a tool to evaluate the risks covered by existing forms of 
assessment in volcanology, as shown in Table 2.1. The sub-table on risk in Table 2.1 reviews 
the volcanological literature that evaluates methods of assessing risk, which are usually adopted 
under conditions when systems are familiar and conditions controlled. Given our knowledge of 
volcanoes remains incomplete, as discussed in section 2.3.1, it is unsurprising that many of the 
methods applied to understand risk are based around probabilistic models. The sub-table on 
uncertainty reviews the methods used to analyse the complex, non –linear system of volcanoes 
and typically uses historical data to understand the volcano’s past behaviour as a method of 
indicating future behaviour, and reviewing possible outcomes via event trees. Ambiguity relates 
to the contested framings, assumptions and disagreements between experts, and relates to the 
impact of behaviour, trust, compliance, ethics and equality when assessing risk and uncertainty 
and making sense of data. Volcanological approaches to ambiguity have predominantly 
revolved around the work conducted on expert elicitation and guidelines developed for 
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scientists during a crisis. Approaches to ignorance are broad and motivate most research on 
volcanic processes and behaviour. The quest to understand incomplete knowledge and 
unanticipated events is driven by experimental research, monitoring volcanoes so that it possible 
to determine volcanic activity, and by developing databases to share knowledge globally to 
prevent ignorance about events already experienced.  
 
Table 2.1 demonstrates that within volcanic risk literature, assessments have considered 
different aspects of incertitude, but not under Stirling’s’ categories of risk, ambiguity, 
uncertainty or ignorance. Studying the interrelationships between these four aspects may 
provide beneficial insights. This supports the view that taking a more holistic approach to the 
decision-making processes involved in VALS may be advantageous; recognising the limitations 
of science and the incertitude involved. In natural hazards, risk is regarded as the likelihood of 
occurrence of a hazard which is determinable through the formula ‘risk = likelihood of 
occurrence x seriousness’ or ‘risk = hazard x vulnerability’ (Wisner, 2004). For either 
definition, quantifying risk is difficult given the inability to quantify social concepts such as 
'seriousness' and 'vulnerability', and excludes issues relating to incertitude. Uncertainty about 
when a volcano is going to be active, what type of hazard it is going to produce, and how this is 
going to affect vulnerable populations affects how effective a VEWS or VALS can be. 
Scientific uncertainties result in passing on uncertain information in a warning, placing the 
vulnerable populations at risk. Risk assessments by scientists aim to overcome this issue by 
evaluating the risk of them getting their forecast right or wrong. The next section explores a 
social scientific approach to understanding risk rather than using reductive risk assessments. 
Chapter 2. Literature Review 
80 
 
Risk: State of incomplete knowledge: familiar systems, controlled conditions, engineering failure 
 
Methodological Responses Related Volcano Literature  References 
Risk assessment Mapping and historical 
evidence 
(Pareschi et al., 2000) 
Multi-attribute utility theory Statistical models – predictive 
and hazard specific 
(Varley et al., 2006) 
Cost-benefit, decision analysis Decision analysis with cost 
benefit models 
(Marzocchi and Woo, 
2007) 
Monte Carlo modelling n.a (Jaquet et al., 2006) 
Bayesian methods BET modelling (Marzocchi et al., 
2007) 
Statistical errors, levels of proof n.a  
 
Ambiguity: State of incomplete knowledge: contested framings, questions, assumptions, 
methods, comparing incommensurables, disagreements between specialists, disciplines; issues of 
behaviour, trust and compliance; interest, language; matters of ethics and equity 
 
Methodological Responses Related Volcano Literature References 
Participatory deliberation Expert solicitation, 
stakeholder negotiation 
(Aspinall et al., 2006b) 
Stakeholder negotiation IAVCEI crises guidelines (Newhall et al., 1999) 
Q-method, repertory grid n.a  
Scenario workshops n.a  
Multi-criteria mapping n.a  
Interactive modelling n.a  
 
 
Uncertainty: State of incomplete knowledge: complex, non-linear, open systems 
 
Methodological Responses Related Volcano Literature References 
Burden of evidence Geological reports looking at eruption 
styles 
(Tilling, 2002) 
Onus of persuasion Research further to understand volcano 
behaviour 
(Dzurisin, 2007) 
Uncertainty factors Use event trees and databases (Newhall and Hoblitt, 
2002) 
Decision heuristics n.a  
Interval Analysis Volcano interval analysis (Pyle, 1998) 
Sensitivity analysis n.a  
 
 
Ignorance: State of incomplete knowledge: unanticipated effects, conditions; surprises, 
unknowns 
 
Methodological Responses Related Volcano 
Literature 
References 
Targeted research and horizon 
scanning 
Monitoring 
volcanoes 
(McGuire et al., 1995) 
Transdisciplinary and 
institutional learning 
Experimental 
research 
(Johnson et al., 2008) 
Open-ended surveillance and 
monitoring 
Overseas assistance USGS VDAP team 
Evidentiary presumptions Databases  WOVOdat 
Adaptive management n.a  
 
Table 2.1  Studies within the volcanological community that address the methodological responses to risk decision-making, and ‘uninvestigated’ responses framed 
by Stirling’s model of incertitude (Stirling, 2007, Stirling, 2003)  
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2.3.5  Social dimensions to understanding risk 
  
Risk remains an elusive, contested and inherently controversial concept with a number of 
specialist definitions and classifications to define its meaning. There are different facets of risk 
such as how do we know risk, how is it perceived, and how do people and institutions embody 
this knowledge? Risk has two key schools of thought. First, the mathematicians, scientists and 
economists who want to define risk using a quantitative value as explored above. Second, social 
scientists who view risk as a social construct that is difficult to reduce to a number given the 
complexities involved in perceiving risk, the irreducibility of contingency, and the effect of 
societies on actions. This section reviews social scientists approaches to risk to explore how 
they can help understand volcanic risk in uncertain contexts with particular emphasis on what is 
at stake for publics. 
 
So far, this chapter has focused on how scientists understand risk to formulate a warning and 
reviewed the social context in which they make these decisions. However, there is a process of 
communication involved to relay the identified risks to non-scientists, who have their own 
social contexts that shape their understanding of the risks involved. In communicating risk 
Fischoff, an experienced emergency manager, suggested that: ‘to get the content of a 
communication right requires a significant analytical and empirical effort. It means summarising 
the relevant science, analysing recipients’ decisions, assessing their current beliefs, drafting 
messages, evaluating their impact, and iterating the process as needed. Accomplishing these 
tasks can significantly reduce the chances of producing messages that patently violate the norms 
of communication’ (Fischhoff, 1995, p.142). Therefore to communicate risk in the 'right' way is 
a complex process, because there are different concepts of what the risk actually is between the 
scientists and the decision-makers.   
 
The sociological concept of risk is broad and fuzzy which, although is often regarded as a 
weakness, reflects a key sociological insight that ‘risk involves more than simply an objectively 
given probability’ (Arnoldi, 2009, p.5). Sociologists are cautious of how risks are calculated, 
but are interested in the objectifications of risk i.e. how they are made and what they are used 
for. A majority of sociologists adopt a social constructivist approach to risk, but there is a wide 
spectrum of risk analysed in sociological analysis as this quote highlights: 
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Risk is a calculation. Risk is a commodity. Risk is a capital. Risk is a technique of 
government, Risk is objective and scientifically knowable. Risk is subjective and 
socially constructed. Risk is a problem, a threat, a source of insecurity. Risk is a 
pleasure, a thrill, a source of profit and freedom. Risk society is our late modern 
world spinning out of control (Garland, 2003, p.49). 
 
For social scientists risks are potential dangers that have social and political consequences, are 
understood within a social and cultural context, and influence the practices and knowledge’s 
with which society is governed. These three key aspects are derived from three of the most 
important sociological theoretical approaches to risk developed by Ulrich Beck, Mary Douglas 
and Michael Foucault. Douglas focused on the cultural logic behind differences in what people 
fear and what risks they take. Her work stems from an anthropological approach to risk and 
highlights the role that different beliefs play when defining risk, and the cultural and social 
rationales behind these approaches (Douglas, 1984, Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983). Slovic 
builds on this approach by reviewing the psychometric response to risk, risk perception, but 
instead focuses on individual approaches to risk (Slovic, 2000, Slovic, 1999, Slovic et al., 
2007). The influence of culture however extends from local risk perception to the cultural 
influence of scientific institutions, the public understanding of science, and use of scientific 
expertise for political purposes (Jasanoff, 1987, Lynch and Jasanoff, 1998, Jasanoff and 
Martello, 2004). 
  
Given these insights into the complexity of risk and risk perception, communicating risk 
becomes a challenging process. In the 1970s Stuart Hall, who worked within communication 
studies, focused on the process of message exchange rather than the complex structure of 
relations involved in a message. Hall (1980) stated that not only are frameworks of knowledge, 
relations of productions, and technical infrastructure important to understand when encoding a 
message (or warning), but also when decoding it. Hall’s work on encoding and decoding 
challenged prior mass communication models by arguing that ‘(i) meaning is not simply fixed 
or determined by the sender; (ii) the message is never transparent; and (iii) the audience is not a 
passive recipient of meaning’ (Procter, 2004, p.59). Consequently, there is a lack of fit between 
the two sides of communication where encoding and decoding are the points of entrance and 
exit to different systems of discourse. This is illustrated in Fig. 2.10, which illustrates Hall’s 
model to show information production (encoding), and readings (decoding). Consequently, it is 
not possible to predict how others will interpret a message, such as a warning.  
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Figure 2.10 Encoding / decoding (Hall, 1980, p.130)  
 
The concept of encoding / decoding demonstrates that social and cultural contexts are critical to 
generating an effective warning. It is therefore difficult to see how standardising messages  (i.e. 
the USGS VALS) can capture these different important contexts. After twenty years experience 
of communicating risk, Fischhoff concludes that ‘a complex network of mutually respectful 
relationships may offer the best hope of reaching agreements, when they are there to be had 
(Fischhoff, 1995, p.144). This suggests adopting an approach of post-normal science (discussed 
in the next section).  
 
Beck coined the phrase 'relations of definitions' to encapsulate his view that risks are socially 
constructed; ‘relations of definitions include the rules, institutions and capacities that structure 
the identification and assessment of risks; they are the legal, epistemological and cultural matrix 
in which risk politics is conducted’ (Beck, 1997, in abstract). Beck’s key work (Adam et al., 
2000, Beck, 1992, Beck et al., 1994) stems from investigating the dangers presented by new 
technologies (i.e. the 1986 nuclear disaster at Chernobyl) and the difficultly that humans have in 
coming to terms with these risks because they are complex and overspill conventional modern 
forms of managing risks in society, given the significant uncertainties involved. The problems 
that arise in contexts of uncertainty develop from a lack of trust, and the need to make 
accountable decisions, both politically and in terms of responsibility. Beck famously argued that 
modern society has become a ‘risk society’ driven by new risks (such as climate change) that 
are the unintended side effects of technological developments originally designed to solve, not 
create problems. Beck distinguishes between ‘dangers’ as caused by nature, and ‘risks’ as 
caused by humans. Risks are therefore manufactured or fabricated uncertainties (Beck, 1992, 
p.19). Volcanic hazards sit at an uncomfortable boundary between danger and risk since it is the 
presence of humans on and around volcanoes that creates a risk, in addition to the dangers 
created by hazards. In a ‘risk society’, individuals are ever more conscious of self-produced or 
manufactured risk. This new type of risk tends to be intangible; detected only by scientific tests 
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and are often latent in that their damage will only manifest over time. This means that 
traditional risk assessment and management are no longer relevant as not only are public views 
influenced by ideologies and values, so are the scientists, particularly when working within the 
confines of their own expertise (Beck, 1992). In the risk society, science is both problematic and 
paradoxical, mostly because science produces as much uncertainty as certainty. Beck describes 
a new condition of science, where it is science that has made risk knowable, but when faced 
with risk, more science is called for. With increasing levels of politicisation, science is losing its 
autonomy and ‘science becomes more and more necessary, but at the same time, less and less 
sufficient for the socially binding definition of truth’ (Beck, 1992, p.156). 
 
Beck's theory of risk is part of his larger theory of ‘reflexive modernisation’ or ‘second 
modernity’. The change from an industrial society to a risk society means ‘that doubt and 
uncertainty are replacing trust and belief in progress though science and technology' (Arnoldi, 
2009, p.50). The main criticism of Beck's theory is his focus on uncertainty rather than risk, but 
Beck, like Knight, believes risks are calculable therefore they would be defined as uncertainties 
if incalculable. Funtowicz and Ravetz (1994) argue that contrary to Beck's views, there is no 
longer a distinction between ‘natural’ and ‘man-made’ disasters because ‘all disasters are in 
some sense man-made’ (p.576). They state that even with disasters caused by natural 
phenomenon ‘the systems or containment, planning, warning, protection, amelioration and 
recovery are of the same emergent complex character as in the case of industrial disasters’ 
(p.576). Another German sociologist, Niklas Luhmann, defines danger and risk differently; 
dangers as random events, while risks are attributable to decisions where individuals or society 
has narrowed their frames of expectation. Therefore for Luhmann, a risk society is a society that 
does not know what to expect any more, yet is forced to make decisions (Luhmann, 1993, 
Luhmann, 1998).  
 
These approaches to risk suggest that VALS (as framed in the USGS standardisation process) 
work to exclude risk by describing only the volcanic activity. Consequently, VALS become a 
closed system focusing solely on science, without the need to engage with users about which 
alert level to issue. By doing this, VALS do not suggest any form of mitigative action, and 
consequently reduces accountability when changing alert level (Haag and Kaupenjohann, 2001). 
Therefore, VALS ignore issues of risk by focusing only on observations or inductive 
knowledge, which also have attached uncertainties and risks. Scientists consider the decisions 
and actions taken by the authorities and public in response to a VALS as risk-related because 
they involve ‘complex inter-plays between public perceptions, societal demands and infra-
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structure capacities’ (Aspinall et al., 2003, p.113). This creates a paradox because the scientists 
tend to ignore risk, yet, as part one explored, a VALS cannot exclude risk in practice because it 
is dependent on local context and perception.  
 
2.3.6  New approaches to risk management  
 
Sociological studies on risk reconceptualise not only what risk is, but also how to best measure 
it and for whom is this measurement best? This section first reviews the role of experts in 
developing knowledge and a warning; second conceptual and theoretical approaches to risk 
management by integrating different experts using a post-normal science approach; and finally 
how these approaches can aid the development of policy such as adopting a precautionary 
approach.  
 
In recent decades, debate has developed about just whom the experts are in relation to scientific 
topics that relate to complex issues, notably in the context of the Chernobyl fallout and its effect 
on sheep farming in Cumbria (Wynne, 1996, Irwin and Wynne, 1996, Wynne, 1982). In recent 
decades crude deficit models of the public understanding of science have been replaced by more 
contextual models of the communication of science that views publics as having different 
knowledge's and making use of scientific knowledge in different ways (Lash et al., 1996, Irwin 
and Wynne, 1996). Today, the public are the focus of many scientific-institutional concerns, 
despite ever increasing levels of scientific complexity and uncertainty (Wynne, 2005). Wynne 
demonstrates that the role of the expert can no longer be confined to the scientists. 
  
In the last twenty years there has been a growing recognition by philosophers and sociologists 
of science that when there are extensive scientific uncertainties, science can no longer be treated 
as ‘normal’ where there is universal, objective and context-free knowledge (Gibbons, 1994). 
Science, it is argued, is post-normal in that it has entered the polity, and is no-longer viable as 
‘normal’ puzzle-solving conducted in abstraction from the issues of who pays and why. 
Consequently, this suggests complex science (such as volcanic behaviour) is more akin to post-
normal science (PNS). This is where ‘facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and 
decisions urgent’ (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993, p.744). Mode 2 is a mid-20th century theory of 
knowledge production that is context-driven, problem-focused and interdisciplinary. It involves 
bringing together multidisciplinary teams for short periods of time to work on specific problems 
in the real world (Gibbons, 1994). Labelling this knowledge as Mode 2 knowledge production 
distinguishes this new theory from traditional research based on academic, investigator-initiated 
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and discipline-based knowledge production, labelled Mode 1. PNS expanded on Mode 2 theory 
to create a new way of thinking about science that complements the diverse expertise in 
complex contexts. Since ‘we can no longer separate ‘nature’, ‘science’ and ‘society’ (Ravetz, 
2004, p.348), decisions of risk have to consider various sorts of uncertainty and value-
commitments, and therefore scientific aspects in these situations should be complemented by 
other considerations (De Marchi and Ravetz, 1999). PNS helps provide a basis to understand 
complexity so that ‘we may successfully anticipate, when possible, and adapt, when appropriate 
or necessary, to changes in the self-organising systems of which we are an integrated and 
dependent part’ (Kay et al., 1999, p.737). All these modes help recharacterise the role of science 
in society theoretically. They illustrate that the division of volcanic hazards, science and the 
society in which the hazard affects cannot be separated within a VALS, but require greater 
integration.  
 
Like Mode 2 knowledge, PNS brings together an extended peer community to enter into a 
dialogue about the uncertainty, ignorance, perspectives and values of each stakeholder, using 
their expertise. Values of relevant policy stakeholders therefore replace the scientific method. In 
recent years, the principles and practices of PNS have been widely adopted under the title 
'participation'. PNS can be represented by Fig. 2.11 that reviews increasing levels of uncertainty 
and decision-making stakes that indicate that a complex situation is within a PNS state.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.11 Post-normal science (Ravetz, 2004, p.354) 
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There is a growing paradigm of placing uncertainty at the heart of the science-policy and 
science-society interface, but this assumes there is consensus of what uncertainty is within the 
science community. Sluijs highlights that although PNS and other reflexive sciences aim to 
assimilate uncertainty by placing it in a deliberative environment, there is a major pitfall to this 
process. By changing the categories by which one judges the problem, it is likely to generate 
new problems, ‘as every categorisation is an imperfect reduction of complexity’ (van der Sluijs, 
2005). Therefore, even if adopting a PNS method to discuss assigning an alert level in a VALS, 
it is likely to encounter new problems; however, the value that this approach provides is that it 
integrates different levels of expertise that helps develop policy that is more robust. 
 
Growing recognition that the public and other stakeholders have a role to play in policy 
development implies that top-down policy making is no longer viable. Effective risk reduction 
requires that all actors are involved in the social learning process; adopting a bottom-up 
approach promotes local stakeholders to create a more resilient community (O'Brien, 2008, 
O'Brien and Read, 2005). However, there is a distinction between risk perceived by experts and 
laypersons. Jasanoff and Lynch (1998) suggest that less hierarchical and more inclusive styles 
of decision-making may be more favourable when developing policy. The relationship between 
science and politicians should therefore be viewed as a process of ‘hybrid management’ through 
bounding and demarcating their relevant domains of authority; neither science or politics has a 
monopoly on truth or power, especially when there is a complex mix of facts and values (Miller, 
2001). Often there are controversies during decision-making, but the process can end or be 
resolved by ‘closure’ (Martin et al., 1995a). Closure can be achieved via four different social 
approaches: positivist where scientists (both physical and social) provide the expert knowledge; 
group politics where scientific expertise is heard via a democratic panel and reviewed within the 
context of political, economic and social resources; via the sociology of scientific knowledge 
where scientific knowledge is reviewed in context of wider society dynamics; and finally, social 
structure (Martin et al., 1995a). Whilst most controversies do not fit neatly into these four 
approaches, there is a need to recognise that they engage both the ‘inside’ scientific 
technological knowledge, and ‘outside’ politics of competing interest groups and thereby 
integrate the investigation of both science and politics.  
 
In many countries VALS are a form of policy used to determine a risk assessment on volcanic 
hazards. This policy is designed to ‘close down’ social appraisal, whereby the design of the 
VALS has been developed to ‘cut through messy, intractable, and conflict prone diversities of 
interests and perspectives to develop clear, authoritative, prescriptive recommendations 
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informing decisions’ (Stirling, 2008, p.278). During a volcanic crisis, there is little time to be 
deliberating actions; although deliberation can occur in establishing the VALS and for planning 
purposes (Mitchell, 2006). Many argue that adopting a ‘closing-down’ approach is the only way 
to achieve effective management of policy, in this case by providing an alert level that excludes 
local contingencies, assumptions or sensitivities in its framing. This approach is common within 
scientific advisory processes in many countries despite different jurisdictions and institutional-
cultures (Jasanoff, 2005). It could be interpreted that VALS aims to ‘close down’ or reduce 
complex and uncertain science into a simplified linear process; an approach often used in 
conditions where science is more certain i.e. normal science. In contrast an approach of 
‘opening-up’ is focused on ‘plural and conditional’ policy advice that involves systematically 
reviewing different courses of actions under different framing conditions that relate to the ‘real 
world of divergent contexts, public values, disciplinary perspectives, and stakeholders interests’ 
(Stirling, 2008, p.280). This opening-up process provides robust information for policy 
development, accountability and transparency without the need for justification. Some studies 
have reviewed methodological approaches to hazard crises highlighting need to move away 
from traditional techniques (Ronan et al., 2000).  
 
The PNS based approaches of precaution; deliberation and participation, are opening up 
transparent, localised processes that are non-compliant with the concept of standardisation that 
restricts flexibility both in practice and on a policy level. Precaution can be viewed as a process, 
focusing on responding to a problem by providing ‘adoption of more long-term, holistic, 
integrated and inclusive social processes for the governance of risk than are typically embodied 
in conventional risk assessment’ (Stirling, 2003, p.52). The precaution process advocates 
shifting attention to system properties, moving development of risk-inducing technologies and 
activities to earlier in the process, and reviewing benefits as well as adverse affects. This 
process is often compared with ‘sound scientific’ methods of risk assessment that do not offer 
‘unqualified rational, rigorous or robust basis for decision-making under uncertainty, ambiguity 
or ignorance’ (Stirling, 2007, p.314). The precautionary approach provides a tool to fulfil these 
requirements, making it more robust than current scientific risk management techniques. This 
approach offers open policy discourse and democratic accountability through open and 
continuing criticism, debate and concern (Stirling, 2007). In addition, it encourages greater 
humility that can restore the credibility of risk science, reveal the importance of divergent 
values, and uphold the central role of democratic accountability and public consent, which could 
be beneficial within disaster management contexts. Fig. 2.12 below outlines a general 
framework for effectively articulating conventional risk assessment with other broader qualities 
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and associated methods of the precautionary principle by using ‘a criteria-based screening 
process to identify crucial attributes of scientific uncertainty, or social or political ambiguity. 
When none of these criteria is triggered, then the case in question is subject to conventional risk 
assessment. Only when there is uncertainty or ambiguity does the process initiate a more 
elaborate precautionary appraisal or deliberative process’ (Stirling, 2007, p.313-314).  
 
Unfortunately, there is a common perception that the precautionary principle must be used 
cautiously because it does not ‘lead us anywhere’ when developing policy, and tax payers 
money can be wasted on something of high uncertainty that may not happen. Many could argue 
this is what happened during the Eyjafjallajökull eruption in 2010, which closed UK and 
European airspace due to volcanic ash. 
  
 
 
Figure  2.12 A framework for articulating precaution and risk assessment (Stirling, 2007, p.313) 
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Focusing on policy is important because the pressure to develop VALS often comes from 
government, partly to provide security, but also from other civil authorities to provide 
information enabling them to fulfil their responsibilities (reviewed in more detail in chapter 4). 
Policy makers ‘set the agendas that determine the questions asked of scientists; scientists 
formulate hypothesis in ways limited by their tools and their imaginations; thus, the information 
they provide to policy makers is limited and to a degree socially determined’ (Kriebel et al., 
2001, p.875) therefore, there will always be value judgements in policy development.  
 
2.3.7  Summary 
 
Social science theory and practices can help provide insights into improving VALS, for 
example by using more interactive processes suggested by adopting a PNS approach in the 
planning and development stages. In addition, the growing recognition that VALS are difficult 
to use during long volcanic crises, indicates that the design, operation and meaning of them may 
be critical for its success. Therefore, stakeholder participation can ensure that VALS are 
relevant for users. With contention over who the expert is and a growing number of people and 
businesses impacted by a diverse range of volcanic hazards, the issue of policy development is 
further exacerbated by increasing levels of globalisation as the number of stakeholders rises. 
The need to balance the needs of local static populations (usually most vulnerable) with those of 
mobile non-local populations (i.e. aircraft) makes the job of VALS very difficult. At the root of 
these problems are the many different and complex systems involved (the volcano, social 
context, institutional environment, location of users of the VALS, communication etc.). Part 
four aims to understand complex systems in order to reconceptualise how VALS operate. 
 
 
2.4  Reconceptualising volcano alert level systems 
 
There is a growing recognition that VALS interface with complex systems and that VALS have 
to negotiate many issues, in addition to globalisation, pluralisation, and an erosion of expertise. 
Linear models of VALS are also unable to represent the relationships and feedback within these 
complex systems because of their constraints in design. If society wants to be prepared for 
volcano crises then it needs a ‘truly complex-systemic approach to both the practice and method 
of science’ (Gallopin et al., 2001, p.223). There is a need to understand the connectedness, 
relationships and contexts of volcanic warnings and their dynamics in order to investigate ‘how 
the different components and processes interact functionally to generate system responses and 
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emergent properties, how the system adapts and transforms itself’ (Gallopin et al., 2001, p.223). 
Therefore, this section first aims to review complexity theory and its use in practice, particularly 
within disaster management studies; and second reconceptualising VALS by viewing them as a 
tool that interfaces complex systems and applying the methods to best manage that interface.  
 
2.4.1  The contributions of complexity theory  
 
Complexity is remarkably difficult to define, yet is present in and around us every day. Whether 
it is the way that insect colonies function, how the brain works, or how the world wide web and 
national economies operate, there are a number of common properties that complex systems 
have (Mitchell, 2009, p.13). The first is complex adaptive behaviour; the collective action of 
vast number of components that give rise to complex hard-to predict, and changing patterns of 
behaviour. The second is signalling and information processes that result from the components 
producing and using information and signals from both their internal and external environments. 
Third is adaption, because complex systems adapt, or change their behaviour to improve their 
chances of survival or success through learning or evolutionary processes (Mitchell, 2009, 
p.13). A complex system can be defined as ‘a system in which large networks of components 
with no central control and simple rules of operation give rise to complex collective behaviour, 
sophisticated information processing and adaptation via learning or evolution’ (Mitchell, 2009, 
p.13). In addition, complex systems ‘exhibit nontrivial emergent and self-organising 
behaviours’ (Mitchell, 2009, p.13). 
 
Complexity theory is different to chaos theory which is deterministic therefore, with knowledge 
of the initial conditions and of the context of an action (which is often not possible), the course 
of this action can be predicted (Gleick, 1987). Complexity theory, although rooted in chaos 
theory, is non-deterministic and therefore it is not possible to predict the future. The emergence 
of complexity theory shows a domain between deterministic order and randomness which is 
complex (Cilliers, 1998), also referred to as the ‘edge of chaos’ (Bak, 1996). Since it is not 
possible to know the initial conditions of a disaster or the context of action, emergences fall 
under the classification of complexity, rather than chaos.  
 
The popularisation of the chaos theory demonstrated that ‘experts’ did not know as much as 
they thought resulting in closing the gap between the governors and the governed in developing 
policy. Complexity theory has been applied to core topics of sociology, spurring a diverse range 
of studies (Urry, 2005b, Nowotny, 2005), but this application has not been without contention 
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(Hemaspaandra and Ogihara, 2001). Pragmatists suggest that complexity provides a lens that 
helps us to look at our world and shape our actions, but it should not be seen as the only way to 
look and do things, Chambers questions whether ‘we have a deep a paradigmatic insight, an 
interesting parallel, or an insignificant coincidence' (1997, p.200). Critics dismiss the relevance 
of complexity science beyond the natural sciences, due to a lack of specific application (Sokal 
and Bricmont, 1998). Since there are many examples of application (including technology and 
mathematics) this argument has become less of a criticism. However, many still have concerns 
with the reliance of complexity thinking as a method of solving all apparent woes. The most 
robust critique is that key concepts of complexity are often poorly understood, with issues of 
their relevance and applicability often ignored or glossed over (Piepers, 2006). Whether or not 
critics believe that complexity can show anything new in the social sciences, it is becoming a 
popular method to view an ever increasingly interconnected and uncertain world, that is unable 
to be viewed or understood using reductionist methods. There will however, always be concern 
that the theory that tries to explain everything, may in fact explain nothing at all. 
 
A core element of complexity is that traditional ‘boundaries’ no longer exist, although they may 
be in place institutionally. Drawing boundaries is an eminently social process and boundaries 
are routinely drawn between science and non-science, experts and lay persons, science and 
politics and the social and the natural (Gieryn, 1983) with consequences for what is taken into 
account when understanding and managing risk. Complexity appeals most to those who feel that 
top-down and reductionist approaches are inappropriate in real world situations because 
complexity approaches ‘use rules which promote and permit complex, diverse, and locally 
fitting behaviour; decentralise, minimise controls and enable local appraisal, analysis, planning 
and adaption for local fit in different ways’ (Chambers, 1997, p.221). 
 
2.4.2 Managing complexity in practice  
 
Using VALS to communicate hazard information has identified the need to manage and interact 
with a number of complex systems, including the volcano, environment, and society. But how 
are these complexities negotiated? Historically cost-benefit models and producing policy that 
tends to revert to a ‘reductionist’ nature have been adopted, but today it is expected to know 
better, but how exactly this can be done, remains a challenge.  
 
Complexity literature offers little resolution as to how to model and use complexity to help 
manage knowledge and make decisions. There is one such model, Cyneform (Snowden, 2005, 
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Kurtz and Snowden, 2003), that addresses differing levels of complexity, not by narrowing 
opportunities through compartmentalising them into frameworks, but moving from different 
stages of known, knowable, complex and chaotic systems (Fig. 2.13). Cyneform is a model or 
approach to policy formation and operational decision-making that recognises the value of 
uncertainties and risk, by reducing pattern entrainment. Although the model originates within 
knowledge management research, it is a sense-making framework which means its value is not 
in logical arguments of empirical verification, but in decision-making and facilitating shared 
understandings to emerge though the many discourses of the decision-makers (Ravetz, 1999). 
This model enables people to make sense of complexity by relaxing three basic assumptions 
prevalent in organisational decision-making: assumptions of order, rational choice, and of 
intent. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.13 Cyneform model (Kurtz and Snowden, 2003, p.468) 
 
The four different domains in the model represent the dynamics of situations, decisions, 
perspectives and conflicts when making a decision under uncertain conditions. The boundaries 
shown are more like phase changes than physical boundaries, so it is possible to consider the 
problem as it moves between different phases, such as ‘knowable’ to ‘complex’. This model 
helps understanding and the interpretation of problems by indicating they are not always static, 
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which is an interesting concept because in volcanic crises order, complexity and chaos are all 
involved at different stages and within different systems.  
Recently a number of studies (Paraskevas, 2006, Ramalingam et al., 2008) have looked at how 
complexity theory can be used to model and understand a variety of crises, providing insights 
into how VALS may be reconceptualised. During the 1980s and 1990s theories on complexity, 
chaos, and complex adaptive systems began to emerge within disaster management literature. 
By the 2000s numerous papers highlighted the need for holistic systemic approaches that 
accommodate the complexities involved, and provide integrated approaches to disaster 
management (McEntire and Fuller, 2002, Geis, 2000). To date no single overarching theory has 
been ascribed, suggesting that no one theory captures every variable and issue associated with 
disasters (McEntire, 2004). For this reason, complexity and chaos theories have gained 
recognition with the growing understanding that disaster responses should be flexible and 
adaptive (Koehler, 1995, Mileti, 1999). Likewise, climate change debates have generated a 
wealth of literature relating to uncertainty, risk and the plural values of society built on the 
theory of systems through the concept of complexity and chaos.  
 
Studies of organisational crises that adopt a complex science approach demonstrate that a 
complexity-informed framework can aid the design of response to a crisis by developing a co-
evolving system that essentially self-organises, learns and adapts to their dynamically changing 
environment; a complex adaptive system (CAS) (Paraskevas, 2006, Zhong and Low, 2009). A 
CAS is defined as ‘a number of components of agents, that interact with each other according to 
sets of rules that require them to examine and respond to each other’s behaviour in order to 
improve their behaviour’ (Stacey, 1996, p.10), and evolve (Axelrod and Cohen, 1999). 
Interactions within the system can produce unexpected patterns or behaviours that can have 
unexpected effects on other parts of the system creating non-linear feedback networks. During a 
crisis, feedback is required to monitor the progress of the crisis response, and this feedback 
enables a system to self-correct or modify behaviour, learning from experience. Crisis response 
communication systems, such as VALS, can be viewed as CAS where agents self-organise and 
restructure at a local scale. 
 
In 2008, the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) reviewed the applicability of complexity 
approaches within real world crises (Ramalingam et al., 2008). The report highlights that 
complexity science can generate useful insights into managing complex problems, with a more 
realistic and holistic approach, supporting useful intuitions, actions, and policy. The idea of self-
organisation indicates that ‘actors at all levels of a given system need to be empowered to find 
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solutions to problems, challenging the existing dichotomies of ‘top-down’ versus ‘bottom-up’  
so often discussed in disaster practice and international aid agencies' (Ramalingam et al., 2008, 
p.62). The concepts of complexity challenge the very method in which current governance 
conducts its work, as outlined in the following quote (Telford and Cosgrove, 2006, p.119): 
 
International agencies need to pay as much attention to how they do things, and 
their capacities to do them, as they do to the content of their policies and 
programmes [...] sensitivity to context and the flexibility to adapt to evolving 
realities are essential, instead of applying predetermined strategies and one-size-
fits-all solutions. 
 
Complexity theory and models can provide a tool for practitioners, policy makers, managers and 
researchers to reflect collectively on how they are trying to solve problems, by providing better 
awareness of why disaster or development and humanitarian work is so problematic.  
 
2.4.3 Summary, research themes and questions 
 
This section has demonstrated that complex systems are difficult to manage because they are 
un-deterministic and are constantly changing and adapting. VALS attempt to manage the many 
complex systems within a volcanic crisis, many locally focused. Standardisation provides a ‘one 
size fits all’ approach that is reductive in nature and potentially unable to accommodate local 
flexibility required to effectively prevent loss of life and minimise economic impact. If VALS 
are going to be standardised nationally or globally then it is unlikely they will be able to 
integrate local needs and available resources so that they are relevant to the vulnerable 
population. Instead, standardisation appears to be a tool that helps simplify the organisational 
elements of VALS for policy-makers and large-scale decision-makers, such as government 
institutions. Currently there is no literature reviewing the impacts of the standardisation of 
VEWS or VALS from either a national or a local perspective, therefore it remains unknown as 
to how standardisation can compromise the need to accommodate users both local and global, 
and effectively manage complexity. This is an important issue that warrants further research, 
and if left answered could generate a number of problems that could lead to further disasters, 
rather than reducing them.  
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This literature review has identified a number of empirical themes. By understanding how these 
operate in practice within a VALS, in the context of the USGS case study, it is possible to 
address these issues: 
 
1. Standardisation: There many diverse users of VALS, given the diversity of volcanic 
hazards and spatial distribution of the users, so how can a VALS accommodate all these 
separate and diverse needs, whilst maintaining an effective level of understanding. The process 
of standardisation is generally perceived as a top-down approach adopted by policy makers, so 
does a VALS only address their needs, or does it consider the local and vulnerable populations' 
needs?  
 
2. Decision-making: Decision-making occurs at every stage of the VALS, from designing 
the VALS, the scientist interpretation of the science (SSK) (via monitoring, modelling and 
forecasting), deciding an alert level (managing the uncertainties and risks), and then providing 
guidance on possible implications using a complex scientific approach (PNS, Cyneform 
techniques). The complexities and uncertainties make decision-making an iterative process that 
requires effective communication between the actors of a VALS. 
 
3. Uncertainty: The numerous complex systems involved in VALS means there are high 
levels of uncertainty in many aspects of VALS, including the physical hazard and social 
contexts. This makes decision-making and risk management extremely challenging. 
Understanding that a VALS operates within a complex adaptive system that will change and 
adapt over time, means that uncertainty also includes ambiguities, ignorance and risk; 
collectively referred to as 'incertitude'.  
 
4. Communication: Communication is critical to the success of a VALS, but how best 
can alerts be developed and understood. Communication consistently fails during volcanic 
crises, whether it is the warning, communication between scientists, or scientists and decision-
makers, the media, public, or government officials. Consideration of the encoding and decoding 
of messages can provide insights into how to communicate warnings and how complexity 
(including uncertainty) is understood between different actors in the VALS.  
 
These four themes are dependent and influence one another. Uncertainty makes decision-
making difficult. This in turn makes communication less focused; consequently, this affects the 
many users of the VALS and their needs. 
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To recap, using the USGS VALS as a case study, the aim of the research is to answer the 
following research questions, and secondary queries, through reviewing the use of a newly 
emplaced standardised VALS at five volcano observatories, three of which previously had a 
locally developed VALS. Through the lens of standardisation, it is possible to look into the 
VALS black box to understand better, how they function, and to determine whether 
standardisation is an effective method of managing complexities. 
 
To what extent is a linear, standardised VALS an effective warning tool for volcanic 
hazards in different contexts of complexity, uncertainty and risk?  
 
1. Why and with what implications did a linear VALS emerge as a tool for managing complex 
volcanic hazards? 
1.1. How did the standardised VALS emerge? 
1.2. What are the complexities that VALS aim to manage? 
1.3. How capable is a linear system in managing these complexities? 
 
2. How are decisions made using the standardised VALS given contexts of complexity, 
uncertainty and risk? 
2.1. How is scientific knowledge constructed? 
2.2. How is risk considered when scientists make decisions? 
2.3. How are decision made between scientists and users with different needs and expertise?  
 
3. Does the standardisation of VALS function in communicating volcanic hazards between 
different users? 
3.1. How does the communication process function? 
3.2. Can a standardised VALS accommodate the needs of different users? 
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Chapter 3. Methods 
 
 
This chapter introduces and explains the methodological approach adopted in the thesis. To 
reiterate, the aim of this research is to open up the volcano alert level system (VALS) black box, 
in order to explore how this linear tool operates in practice to communicate volcanic hazards, 
and to review the extent to which standardisation is an effective method of managing volcanic 
hazards. To address these research questions qualitative social science methods are adopted. A 
multi-sited ethnographic study was conducted at all five volcano observatories of the United 
States Geological Survey (USGS) (outlined below). Semi-structured interviews were completed 
with a number of actors involved in the VALS: scientists within the USGS Volcano Hazard 
Program (VHP), including volcanologists, seismologists, glaciologists and chemists; with users 
of the VALS at other federal agencies, such as the National Weather Service, U.S Forest and 
National Park managers; and with collaborative partners, such as Universities and State 
officials. The interviews provide insights into the personal perspectives of the variety of 
scientists and users involved in the design and implementation of the VALS.  This is 
complemented by ethnographic observational data on the interactions between these different 
perspectives in practice, and document analysis on the historical emergence and stabilisation of 
these policies. Developing this research approach to VALS raises a series of issues including the 
conceptual challenge of building a rigorous, yet open-ended and exploratory research 
methodology alongside the practical question of obtaining access to the USGS volcano 
observatories. 
 
This chapter opens with an exploration of the conceptual basis for the methodology, reviewing 
related social science and disaster management studies to develop a multi-sited ethnographic 
approach to studying knowledge's in practice. Second, the chapter outlines the research 
approach and methods used in this study, outlining the rationale behind their selection. Third, 
the methods of describing, interpreting, and analysing the data collected are reviewed, including 
a new method developed during the research to cope with the many interviews conducted, based 
on the adaptation of mind mapping. In addition, the organisation of the data collected into 
empirical chapters is reflected in this section.  
 
This study seeks to open up and understand a new area of research within disaster management, 
focusing on the 'first mile' of a VEWS through understanding the processes by which scientists 
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understand scientific information, make decisions and communicate them as part of a VALS. To 
understand these processes, the use of social science theory and practices that emerge in the 
literature review provide frameworks and models to conceptualise the complexities within a 
VALS. It follows that social science methodologies present the best opportunity to investigate 
these issues and provide the type of information required to address the exploratory research 
questions. My background is within geological sciences, using standard scientific research 
methodologies, so this is also personal exploration into the social science research 
methodologies required to achieve the interdisciplinary goals of this thesis.  
 
 
3.1 Methodological contexts and choices  
 
All research is underpinned by underlying assumptions about what constitutes ‘valid’ research 
and data. The philosophical assumptions within research relates to the underlying epistemology 
guiding the research, which Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) categorise as being either positivist, 
interpretative or critical. The methodologies used within this study do not adopt a simple 
positivist approach; rather, the research methodology is designed to be sensitive to the 
subjective elements of decision-making which influence the performance of the VALS in 
practice. Such interpretative research does not seek to enumerate the measurable properties of 
social characteristics and contexts, but instead aims to explore the constitution of shared 
meanings or contested moments through attention to language and practice. This form of 
research does not predefine dependent and independent variables, but focuses on the complexity 
of human sense-making as the situation emerges (Kurtz and Snowden, 2003). Critical research 
focuses on social critique such as the oppositions, conflicts and contradictions within 
contemporary society and aims to be emancipatory. This too has a role within the 
methodologies used in this study. The underlying epistemology and methodological choices in 
this thesis are derived from related studies in the sociology of science and disaster management, 
which are reviewed below.  
 
 
 
3.1.1  Qualitative research methods in disaster management 
 
Qualitative research methods have been commonly used within natural disaster studies for many 
years. Barton's work on disaster classification (1969) helped to trigger a move from descriptive 
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disaster studies into more analytical ones, consequently both qualitative and quantitative tools 
have been adopted as recommended (Gillespie and Perry, 1976). The gradual shift from a 
dominant to radical perspective, follow the publication of Hewitt's 'Interpretation of Calamity' 
(1983), which brought into focus the role of location and socio-economic and cultural 
conditions of the affected society. This shift is reflected by the adoption of qualitative studies; 
‘human behaviour is significantly influenced by the setting in which it occurs; thus one must 
study that behaviour in situations’ (Marshall and Rossman, 2006, p.53). Qualitative research 
aims to develop in-depth understanding of human behaviour and the rationale behind this 
behaviour by investigating the why and how of decision-making, not just what, where, and 
when. Qualitative methods provide tools to review contextualisation, conduct interpretation, and 
understand actor’s perspectives within this research, but there are limitations. The key criticism 
of qualitative methods are the axiological issues concerned with the personal values, morality, 
and the ethics of the researcher who will impose their values on the inquiry and its analysis. As 
discussed in chapter 2, all research methods have subjective elements, but social science 
methods tend to be more explicit about this. 
 
The growing interdisciplinary character of natural disaster studies means it is unsurprising that 
qualitative methods have been commonly adopted in studies focusing on VEWS. As Velasco 
(2000) describes, studies in VEWS or VALS tend to focus on context, offering valuable 
empirical detail on lessons learned. The study of the Nevado del Ruiz tragedy by Hall (1990) 
adopt social science research methods, using interview techniques and historical document 
archives to develop a picture of the actions that led to the disaster in 1985. Some studies have 
become focused on the role of socio-economic and political conditions and their influence on 
VEWS, for example by Tobin and Whiteford (2002) who addressed the evacuation of the 
populations living on the foot of Tungurahua volcano in Ecuador following its eruption. Using a 
mixed methodology over 12 months of fieldwork, including observational studies, interviews, a 
qualitative study using small focus groups, and a quantitative survey using formal structure 
questionnaires, they provided a thorough qualitative methodology and analysis to review the 
decision-making processes in response to the eruptive activity by local officials and populations.  
 
During the 1990s and 2000s the UN's Early Warning System conferences I, II and III held in 
Germany, many papers that focus exclusively on case studies and on decision-making by 
responders were published (UN ISDR, 2006a, Kuppers and Zschau, 2002). Many studies 
focused on case study areas or specific crises, discussing the context in which decisions were 
made in the 'last mile'. For example, a study by Sinha and Avrani (1984), reported on the 
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disaster of the 1981 Gujarat cyclone by examining the channels through which warning of the 
impending October-November cyclones were received and disseminated by investigating three 
different villages within Northwest India. They conducted in-depth interviews and group 
discussions with a range of villagers and officials to examine the EWS. Unlike the 
aforementioned research, this thesis focuses on the contexts that are internal to the scientists and 
civil authorities who make decisions that generate warnings. The aim is to demonstrate that 
context is not just important in responding to VEWS in an external sense, but that internal 
context is relevant to the decision-making of scientists and civil authorities in developing the 
warning, in the 'first mile' of the EWS.  
 
Studies within VEWS, as presented thus far, frequently focus on one crisis as a case study, 
focusing on the related contexts of this incident. From this we learn the importance of context in 
EWS and this raises further questions relating to how different crises or contexts compare, and 
the importance of contexts that are internal to developing a warning. Are there trends that can be 
identified in natural hazard crises that occur despite the context, or is the context a unique aspect 
of EWS? How do internal contexts affect the effectiveness of a warning? This study aims to 
expand on VEWS literature by comparing different contexts so as to begin to address the need 
to conduct more comparative studies, particularly relevant given the growing levels of 
standardisation within VEWS, and develop guidance on how to develop a framework for future 
use. 
 
3.1.2 Laboratory studies and the sociology of scientific knowledge  
 
As discussed in the literature review, studies on EWS focus on decision-making outside the 
scientific 'laboratory' where scientists make decisions about scientific knowledge and warnings. 
Within the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) the method for observing where and how 
knowledge is produced via ethnographic studies and discourse analyses is referred to as 
‘laboratory studies’ (Knorr-Cetina et al., 1995).  Laboratory studies became a methodological 
focus of the SSK, which examined how internal scientific standards and experimental evidence 
fail to provide for scientists' beliefs, and how the beliefs and knowledge claims of scientists are 
influenced by their social context. This focus provides a guide to the methodological 
development in this study to develop an understanding of the decision-making processes within 
volcanic behaviour interpretation, analysis and forecasting. The use of SSK research methods 
such as laboratory studies have shown that, through the use of qualitative methods, it is possible 
to delineate issues that this research aims to investigate, including how scientific knowledge is 
constructed and the different values of scientists. 
Chapter 3. Methods 
 
102 
 
 
This study takes from the SSK an interest in the located context and nature of knowledge 
production, the institutional and organisational cultures that shape knowledge practices and the 
social, as well as epistemological, factors which lead to decisions around risk. Together these 
represent an interpretative and critical approach to studying knowledge production and 
communication, drawing inspiration from a large body of work which has emerged since the 
1960s. As described in the literature review (section 2.3.3), the SSK movement demonstrated 
that scientific knowledge is not objective but depends on 'finitism', or cultural contexts. This 
development caused a historical shift in how research methods were used to understand 
scientific knowledge. Thomas Kuhn's intensive documental analysis of how changes in 
scientific paradigms occurred throughout history enabled him to publish 'The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions' providing the foundation for SSK in 1962. Historical documents played 
a vital role in providing an account of the processes of how scientific knowledge was developed 
and the changing roles of values and expertise over time, enabling a comprehensive insight in 
the mechanics of how decision-making processes evolve over time. It is through documents that 
this study is able to review effectively the process of standardisation of the USGS VALS, and 
review the decision-making processes involved.  
 
Ethnographic studies have been used in many SSK studies. In 1979, Latour and Woolgar 
studied the constitution of laboratory science through ethnographic research, reviewing the daily 
lives of scientists. The study observed that the settlement of objective, factual scientific 
outcomes were more complex, contingent and unclear than expected, and largely dependent on 
the local and national context of the UK at the time. This study of the mundane and daily habits 
of scientists triggered a large number of studies of laboratory and other knowledge practices, 
which revealed the range of material and social practices that underpinned accepted 
knowledge's. As David Glover and Sheelagh Strawbridge illustrate:  
 
What is eventually agreed upon as knowledge will have involved choices 
concerning such things as which raw materials to use, which measuring 
instruments and how to set up experiments as well as negotiated decisions about 
the interpretations of results. Moreover, the personalities, relative statuses and 
particular relationships of scientists involved will all affect these decisions’ (Glover 
and Strawbridge, 1985, p.65).  
 
From the late 1970s, attention has focused on studying the complex negotiations, contingencies 
and skills that are involved in creating a 'fact' (Knorr-Cetina et al., 1995, Latour and Woolgar, 
1979). 
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A key method for understanding the decision-making processes of scientists and understanding 
the interrelationships between the scientists and civil authorities that use this information, is 
thus ethnographic observations. In this study, the scientists are located over five different 
volcano observatories or 'laboratories' across a wide range of locations, consequently this study 
is multi-sited with multiple contexts. The next section reviews the value of ethnographic studies, 
in particular methods for reviewing multi-sited research, to provide a framework in which to 
conduct a 'laboratory study' at each observatory.  
 
3.1.3  Multi-sited methods 
 
Traditional ethnographic research involves ‘the study of groups and people as they go about 
their everyday lives’ (Emerson et al., 1995, p.1), involving an immersive study where the 
researcher must live with the group studied and become part of the group, either actively or as 
acknowledged background (Hammersley, 1991). Through this immersion, participation enables 
understanding of the cultures and processes involved, whilst at the same time keeping a certain 
observational distance. Ethnographic conventions claim that ‘a detailed, in-depth picture of a 
group, organisation and its members can be developed', so that the 'social, cultural and political 
issues which other methods find intangible are at the centre of analysis' and that 'ethnography is 
strongly participative, allowing for members of groups to comment on the data and data 
gathering as it occurs’ (Neyland, 2008, p.160). Adopting this approach is valuable to this 
research in understanding the role of conventions at each observatory, and across different 
observatories. In this research, interviews are used as an ethnographic tool to gain insights into 
how VALS operate, supported by ethnographic observations and documental analysis of the 
standardisation process of the VALS at the USGS. These methods used will be reviewed in 
section 3.2. 
In recent decades, ethnography has moved beyond a technique used within anthropology and 
sociology, emerging as a key method in a number of disciplines, including laboratory studies 
and organisational studies (Weeks, 2004). Ethnography has evolved significantly from its 
association with studying singular and, often non-western cultures, to explore late-modern 
cultures in ways that give attention to their poly-vocal, reflexive, and ‘multi-sited’ nature 
(Marcus, 1995). In multi-sited ethnography, the study moves from a single-site location to 
‘multiple sites of observation and participation that cross-cut dichotomies such as the "local" 
and the "global", the "lifeworld" and the "system" ' (Marcus, 1995, p.95). At the core of multi-
sited ethnographic research is the tracing of a cultural formation across and within multiple sites 
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of activity, which involves following connections, associations and putative relations. This 
provides a framework to conduct this multi-sited study, providing a 'way to engage with 
scientific and technical practice in complex allegiances that go beyond description and critique’ 
(Hine, 2007, p.668). Multi-sited ethnographies define their objects of study through different 
modes or techniques, for example they can follow people (i.e. migration studies), or follow a 
thing (i.e. the circulation of material objects such as money); in this thesis, VALS are the object 
being followed. As already outlined, this research aims to define its study through 
understanding the role of local and social contexts in the decision-making of scientists in their 
laboratory (internal), rather than those outside the laboratory (external). Ultimately, as Marcus 
believes, adopting multi-sited approaches makes it possible 'map a terrain, which may not be a 
holistic representation, but one that cannot be understood by analyzing just one site' (Marcus, 
1995, p.112). 
 
There are a number of concerns with using multi-sited ethnography. First, the connection 
between different sites in a local-global contrast can be questioned as to whether this is a strictly 
ethnographic technique. Second, due to the nature of multi-sited ethnographies, the knowledge 
base developed will vary in intensity and quality. Despite these issues, the focus of multi-sited 
ethnographic studies has been to shift the focus to ‘stimulate accounts of cultures composed in a 
landscape for which there is as yet no developed theoretical conception or descriptive model’ 
(Marcus, 1995, p.102). Therefore, adopting this methodology provides a new framing of VALS 
and a method to analyse the impact of standardisation across the decision-making process of 
five different volcano observatories.  
 
 
In summary, this section has reviewed the rationale behind using qualitative research methods 
that historically have been adopted to review social contexts of decision-making outside of 
volcano observatories. Laboratory studies, developed within SSK to review the decision-making 
processes in laboratories, are adopted in this study and include ethnographic observations, 
predominantly via interviews, and documental analysis. These methodological approaches value 
the role of the local context, and by using a multi-sited framework it is possible to provide a 
comparative framework for understanding decision-making processes that occur within a 
VALS, and the impact of standardisation of the VALS in each observatory.  The next section 
outlines the methods used to conduct the study using the methodologies outlined.  
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3.2  Materials and methods 
 
This study comprises a single case study, the USGS VALS, studied across multiple sites. This 
section outlines the research methods used to collect data, first, outlining how the USGS were 
accessed, and understanding  them as an organisation; second, how interviews were conducted 
to obtain most of the empirical data; third, how additional ethnographic observations were made 
during the research; and finally how documents were analysed to reconstruct valuable historical 
and contextual knowledge. 
 
3.2.1  Accessing and understanding the USGS 
 
Volcano observatories are the environments within which scientists operate VEWS and VALS. 
Therefore to understand the context of their environment and decision-making processes within 
the VALS (i.e. monitoring, decision making, communication of the warning) it was imperative 
to spend time within the observatories using ethnographic methods. Conducting research at the 
volcano observatories also provided access to documents, contact details for the key users of the 
VALS to conduct interviews, and attend meetings, workshops, open days, educational events 
and meet collaborating universities and agencies. Using established contacts via my supervisor, 
I applied to conduct research with USGS, and following internal discussions within the USGS, I 
was accepted. The study took part in two phases, a pilot fieldtrip and then the main research 
phase. 
 
The exploratory nature of this research meant that a pilot study was essential. This was 
conducted in 2007 during year one of the research, to establish the key issues of using VEWS. 
During the pilot research six weeks (two weeks at each location) were spent at the Cascades 
(CVO), Long Valley (LVO) and Alaska Volcano Observatories (AVO). Open-ended informal 
interviews were conducted and ethnographic observations were made to understand how each 
observatory operates including the institutional structures, and to establish the different 
processes of the VEWS in place. From this research it emerged that there were concerns relating 
to VALS and its recent standardisation that led to the implementation of new systems at the 
observatories. This focus formed the basis of a more formalised research plan and semi-
structured interview schedule to be taken into the next phase of research. Pilot fieldwork also 
provided the opportunities to explore the feasibility of the research methods.  
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The main research phase was undertaken during 2008 at all five of the USGS' volcano 
observatories, including Yellowstone (YVO) and Hawaii Volcano Observatories (HVO) 
following additional approval from the USGS.  The five observatories are located in: Anchorage 
and Fairbanks (AVO), Vancouver, Washington State (CVO); Big Island, Hawaii (HVO), and 
Menlo Park, California (LVO & YVO). A total of twelve weeks was spent with the USGS, three 
weeks at each location to gather data using three key research techniques: semi-structured 
interviews, a multi-sited ethnographic study, and investigation of document and archival 
collections.  
 
During the fieldwork, I was generously provided with an office, internet connection, 
photocopying and all the other facilities I required to conduct research by the USGS. In 
addition, documents that were made public under the Freedom of Information Act, that review 
the communication between scientists during the standardisation process of the VALS, were 
photocopied from USGS Headquarters in Reston, Virginia, and sent to Menlo Park where I was 
able to review the documents and ship them back to the UK. The VHP team chief scientist 
organised this for me, which reflects the generosity of the USGS shown throughout the whole 
research project. This material provided the basis for documental analysis. 
 
 
 
 
In the first few days at each observatory, I met the scientist in charge (SIC) to discuss the 
research and ask for suggested recommendations about who would be most suitable to interview 
within the observatory (mainly those that interact with the VALS), and the most relevant users 
of the VALS and their contact details. Although many of the recommendations by the SIC were 
accepted, staff and users not recommended but seen by myself to be of relevance to interview, 
were part of the study, to make it more representative and remove bias. I was free to interview 
whom I chose, dependent on their consent and availability. The scientists in the observatories, 
who formed the bulk of the interviewees, were wide ranging from junior to senior positions, to 
the management, and those actively engaged in the standardisation of the VALS. Three weeks 
of fieldwork in each location provided enough time to arrange meetings with all the potential 
interviewees both internal and external to the observatory. Occasionally interviews were 
conducted by phone; this was particularly the case with staff working out of the USGS 
headquarters in Reston, Virginia, and also two members of Yellowstone Volcano Observatory 
located in Utah. Face-to-face interviews were the preferred method, so often I travelled 
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distances to conduct interviews, sometimes in people's homes. At AVO, scientists were visited 
both in Anchorage (USGS) and Fairbanks (Geophysical Institute of the University of Alaska 
Fairbanks (UAFGI), and the State of Alaska Division of Geological and Geophysical Surveys 
(ADGGS). In the Cascades, a brief excursion in Washington State enabled me to interview 
county emergency mangers, National Weather Service staff, and collaborative partners at the 
University of Washington. Finally, I also attended two excursions to Mammoth Lakes town to 
attend the quarterly Unified Command Meeting with the staff and scientist in charge of Long 
Valley Observatory. Regrettably on both occasions the meeting was cancelled at the last minute, 
however, this did provide an opportunity to interview local users of the VALS, meet the USGS 
employee based there, visit the caldera, and develop understanding about the volcano and the 
town’s relationship with it.  In Hawaii, users of the VALS in Hilo, including emergency 
managers and land owners were interviewed and I visited the National Weather Service office in 
Honolulu, Hawaii. Table 3.1 below summarises the full range of interviews conducted and the 
meetings and events I participated in that formed the ethnographic observations. 
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Observatory AVO CVO HVO LVO YVO 
USGS VHP 
Scientists 
interviewed 
• 12 at AVO in Anchorage • 17 at CVO  
• 1 ex-employee via phone 
• 13 at HVO • 6 at LVO 
• 4 at via phone  
• 1 at Mammoth Mountain 
• 1 at YVO 
No. of staff at 
each observatory 
• Approximately 22 full-time staff  • Approximately 45  • Approximately 20 • Approximately 10 VHP 
scientists at Menlo Park   
• 1 
Federal Agencies 
interviews 
• Meteorologist, NOAA / National 
Weather Service (NWS) Center 
Weather Service Unit (CWSU)  
• Traffic Management Officer, 
Federal Aviation  Administration 
(FAA), Traffic Management Unit  
(TMU) 
• Emergency Management 
Specialist, Alaska State 
Department of Homeland 
Security and Emergency 
Management (DHSEM) 
• Meteorologist, NOAA / National 
Weather Service (NWS) 
Anchorage Weather Forecast 
Office (AFO) Alaska 
• Meteorologist in Charge, National 
Weather Service (NWS) Alaska 
Aviation Weather Unit (AAWU), 
Anchorage VAAC  
• Meteorologist, NOAA / 
National Weather Service 
(NWS) 
• 2 U.S Forest Service 
Specialist at Mount St 
Helens Monument 
• 2 Emergency Management 
Specialist at Pierce County 
Department of Emergency 
Management  
• 1 Emergency Management 
Specialist in the Mount 
Baker / Glacier Peak 
Coordination Plan 
• Clackamas County 
Emergency Management 
• 2 Journalists: from the 
Columbian Newspaper and 
Oregon State Newspaper 
• 2 at Kilauea National 
Park Service 
• 1 at State of Hawaii 
DLNR - Natural Area 
Reserve 
• 2 at Hawaii County 
Civil Defense / 
Mayor’s Office 
• 1 at Hawaii Tribune 
Journalist 
• 1 at Washington 
VAAC (via phone) 
• 1 at Hawaii National 
Weather Service, 
Honolulu, Hawaii 
• 1 at Mono County Sheriff 
• 1 at Mammoth Lakes Town 
Management 
• 1 at Mammoth Lakes Police 
Department 
• 1 at Mammoth Lakes Fire 
Service 
• 1 at U.S Forest Service 
• 1 at Mammoth Mountain 
Ski Area Office 
• N/A 
Chapter 3. Methods 
 
109 
 
Collaborating 
partners 
interviewed 
• 3 at University Alaska Fairbanks 
• 2 at Alaska Division of 
Geological & Geophysical 
Survey 
• 1 at University of 
Washington 
• 1 Oregon State Geologist 
• 1 at University of 
Hawaii, Hilo 
• 1 at Center for the 
Study of Active 
Volcanoes, Hilo 
• N/A • 1 at National 
Park Service, 
Yellowstone 
• 1 at University 
of Utah 
Total Interviews • 22 Interviews • 29 Interviews • 23 Interviews • 17 Interviews • 3 Interviews  
Meetings 
attended 
• Weekly science meetings at both 
Anchorage and Fairbanks 
• Weekly science meetings  
• Search And Rescue 
Workshop, Mount Rainier 
• Mt. St. Helens 
Coordination Meeting 
• Alert Level Discussion 
Meeting 
 
• Weekly science 
meetings 
• Kilauea National Park 
Emergency 
Coordination Meeting  
• Kilauea National Park 
outreach meeting 
• 2 Visit to Mammoth lakes 
to at the Unified Command 
meeting at Mammoth 
Lakes, which was cancelled 
both times 
• Interviews with other 
USGS staff involved in 
tsunami,  earthquake and 
debris flow warning 
systems 
• N/A 
Other Events • Small event to mark the 30th 
anniversary of AVO in 
Anchorage 
• USGS Open Day (helped in 
kids room) 
• Educational events at school 
in Washington State 
• Visit to Mt. Hood telemetry 
sites 
• Visit to Orting to see lahar 
EWS 
• Attended fieldwork on 
the lava fields and to 
measure volcanic gases 
• Visited Hawaii Civil 
Defense Emergency 
Operation Centre 
• Access to Menlo Park 
Library  
• Attended USGS lectures and 
events at Menlo Park  
• Partook in a teaching event 
at Stanford University 
• N/A 
 
Table 3.1 Summary of interviews conducted and ethnographic observations via meetings and other events attended.
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3.2.2  Conducting interviews 
 
Interviews are used in this study as in-depth ethnographic tools to discuss the use of VALS and 
the relationships between the actors involved, providing a method to gain personal perspectives 
on the decision-making process involved in a way that exceeds the constraints of a survey 
(McCracken, 1988, Baxter and Eyles, 1999). They also provide a narrative opportunity to 
examine the opinions and views of individuals relating to the standardised VALS established in 
2006. Interviews are particularly useful in circumstances where information is mainly found in 
grey literature or accepted knowledge within an organisation, which has not yet been written 
down. 
 
A research interview is more than just an 'informal chat'; it has the specific purpose to generate 
the information required to address research questions. Interviews provide the opportunity to 
obtain large amounts of contextual data quickly, but to do so the questions need to be well 
designed. Within this study, semi-structured interviews were used to facilitate the flexibility 
required to obtain specific information, whilst also exploring the meaning and understanding 
behind the answers. In the preliminary fieldwork, open-ended interviews were conducted to gain 
insights into the role of the scientists and the function of the volcano observatory from the 
interviewee’s experience. These initial enquiries then formed the basis for the development of a 
more systematic interview schedule (see appendix A). 
 
The semi-structured interview schedule used during the main research phase was centred around 
a set of core questions or themes, repeated with different respondents to explore the issues 
raised by the standardisation of the VALS in more detail, and to follow up questions around 
meaning, understanding and context. Semi-structured interviews are an intensive form of 
research, that enable researchers to fill gaps in knowledge, to investigate complex behaviour and 
motivations, and collect a diversity of opinions and experience (Baxter and Eyles, 1997). A 
disadvantage is that they provide information on the range of views, rather than seeking to 
provide a statistically representative picture. They are also subject to researcher biases. In this 
study, the majority of interviewees were interviewed twice, during the pilot research and main 
study, thus adding insights into the stability and diversity of views, as well as building rapport 
and trust.  
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At the start of the interview, each interviewee was given an introduction to the research, consent 
was requested by the interviewee to digitally record the interview and for me to use the data in 
this study by signing an ethics form (see appendix B), discussed later in this chapter. By making 
the study anonymous it not only protects the employees but also provides more comfort in 
speaking the truth. Following this, the interview commenced, structured around six key themes. 
The first section aimed to understand contextual information about the interviewee such as what 
their job is, in what way they are involved in VALS and VEWS, and what they consider as the 
purpose of VALS and how they define it. In the second section, questions focus on their 
understanding and involvement in the standardisation process, reviewing questions relating to 
why, what, when, and who. Third, the implications of the application of the standardised VALS 
were reviewed by discussing what protocols were in place, how the new VALS was 
implemented and whether any issues for them or the users of the VALS have arisen thus far. In 
the fourth section, questions revolved around how the interviewees dealt with uncertainty and 
how they created meaning within the VALS. This included questions about how alert levels are 
decided, what the decision-making process is, and how uncertainty and risk are considered. In 
the fifth section, I asked interviewees if they could provide examples from their experiences that 
illustrate how VALS worked before and after standardisation, in the attempt to prompt 
contextualisation to the elements of knowledge, uncertainty, risk, and communication involved. 
In the final section, the interview opened out to review the changes the standardised VALS has 
brought, what the future challenges are, and whether in their opinion it is feasible to globally 
standardise VALS. At the end, interviewees were asked if they had any other contributions or 
questions, or feedback to me. This structure was not always suitable for interviews with the 
users of the VALS; consequently, these interviews tended to be more flexible, providing the 
opportunity to learn more about their role and their interactions with the USGS and the VALS, 
and how they are used to fulfil their corresponding responsibilities.  
 
Although interviews were on average one hour long, they varied from fifteen minutes to three 
hours, depending on the availability of the interviewees and their levels of involvement with the 
standardisation of the VALS. All interviews were one-to-one to encourage in-depth discussion 
of complex issues, remove potential bias due to organisational hierarchies that may be apparent 
in group interviews, and enable interviewees to express personal opinions. The same interview 
schedule was repeated with each scientist, returning to the issues from different angles and 
perspectives. A group interview was not seen as suitable for this study. These can be difficult to 
organise and facilitate within organisational settings where there are existing group dynamics, 
which are not known to the researcher and may inhibit certain viewpoints.   
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In total, 93 interviews were conducted with scientists at the volcano observatories, with the 
users of VALS in other US Federal Agencies, such as the US Forest Service (USFS), Federal 
Aviation Authority (FAA), the National Weather Service (NWS), Volcanic Ash Advisory 
Centre (VAAC), and with staff of collaborating universities, and regional and state emergency 
management agencies. These further interviews provided additional perspectives on the 
effectiveness of VALS from the users themselves. Six interviews were conducted on the 
telephone, and one at a conference in Iceland two months after the fieldwork. Table 3.1 provides 
a detailed review of the interviews conducted at each observatory. All interviews were recorded 
on a digital Dictaphone with the participants permission, and field notes were taken during the 
interviews enabling the opportunity to review the interview if focus waned, which fortunately 
was not the case. The process of interviewing is exhausting, and so on most days only two 
interviews were conducted, but in some cases up to four were conducted in one day. All 
interviews were anonymised using a coding system attributing them to the relevant observatory 
or Federal Agency. Given the number of interviews completed, interviews were not fully 
transcribed, rather a different ‘mind-mapping’ methodology was used, discussed further in 
section 3.3.  
 
A number of limitations are recognised in using interviews as a method of collecting data. In all 
interviews the researcher is the research instrument ‘through which data are collected’ (Sorrell 
and Redmond, 1995, p.118). In addition, the presence of the researcher can also bias participant 
accounts. To account for these two forms of bias, steps were taken to make the interviewee as 
comfortable as possible with me; they were given the option to ask questions before the 
interview began and many knew me from the pilot research or had encountered me during my 
time in the observatory whilst conducting the ethnographic aspects of the study. To reduce my 
own bias and assumptions, I sought clarification where needed. Discrepancies in the data may 
also come from the interviewee who may recount a story with errors, either intentionally or not, 
possibly due to memory inaccuracies. Although this can reveal priorities and challenges in 
thought, by interviewing many different people it was possible to create as consistent a narrative 
as possible, and when possible correlate the information with documents and papers.  
 
3.2.3  Additional ethnographic observations 
 
As part of the ethnographic observations I attended a number of meetings and events at each 
observatory (listed in Table 3.1). Through these additional activities, I was able to access 
documents, conduct a more rigorous ethnographic study and become more ‘immersed’ in the 
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institution and the observatory culture. At many of the observatories I registered as a USGS 
volunteer and attended weekly meetings to discuss the week’s news and volcanic activity from 
the different monitoring divisions within the observatory, review various administrative features 
such as new IT tools and products, and new equipment, and attend visitor meetings or lectures. 
Of particular note was a meeting I attended at CVO to review the alert level of Mt. St. Helens, 
providing enormous insight into how the decision-making processes work when assigning 
VALS. During and following meetings, events and fieldwork or trips, notes were made to 
reflect my observations that formed part of the analysis.  
 
Whilst ethnography is a widely used technique, a number of critiques exist in relation to 
ethnography and participation observation (Denzin, 1997). The predominant critique is that 
ethnography is ethnocentric and therefore ultimately relays the view / voice of the researcher. 
Other criticisms are that it is based in on overly holistic notions of culture where the boundaries 
of groups are fuzzy and social mores are contested and mutable. In practice there are a number 
of constraints in using the technique. Significant time in the field is required, and as a result 
trust, credibility and integrity are required by both the researcher and the people they are 
working with to get as accurate a perspective as possible as there is a need for honesty, and 
often employees do not want to say something completely honest in case it should be used as 
evidence or data. Whilst a number of critiques with the methodologies are valid, it is important 
to note that multi-sited ethnographic studies can provide fresh insights to the broader picture, 
which may provide a very different perspective than individual studies of the same picture, 
whilst also highlighting the issues concerned. Biases are kept to a minimum by trying to not 
pass judgement or go ‘native’ but maintain an isolated perspective of the environment. 
 
3.2.4  Analysing documents 
 
Whilst there are records of the standardisation process and the decisions made public under the 
Freedom of Information Act in the U.S. (FOIA), there is little documentation about the USGS 
VALS, the standardisation process and their use. Written and graphical documents, including 
USGS publications, photographs and meeting minutes (available at the individual observatories) 
can provide information about what people said and did during the standardisation process, 
whilst reflecting the values of the different individuals and groups. Since documents are often 
written at the time of the event or shortly after they tend to preserve knowledge and views at the 
time of writing while information is ‘fresh’ in people’s minds. Therefore, the documents 
available under the FOIA provide another dataset to compliment the interviews and provide a 
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more accurate account of the standardisation process as recorded at the time of discussion. They 
are referred to as FOIA archives within the empirical chapters. 
 
In 2007, correspondences between the USGS staff relating to the standardisation of VALS were 
released under the FOIA. Originally, this request was made by a journalist who was looking for 
a controversial story relating to the change in VALS. The journalist never published an article 
on the information made available, presumably as there was nothing controversial in the 
process, however, this request did lead to the collation of email correspondence and other 
documents that chart the standardisation discussions. Although not all the information was 
visible since some had been redacted under certain exemption laws6, I was able to access many 
of the details from other USGS interviewees and develop a better understanding about the 
framing of the issues involved, not just for facts, but also the respective values.  
 
The USGS has published numerous hazard reports, books, bulletins and circulars relating to 
significant events and crises, geological and hazard maps, information pamphlets for the public, 
educational materials and videos, and newspaper articles. Literature, both old and new, can be 
found on the internet, in the volcano observatories and within the institutions' libraries: Menlo 
Park Western USGS Headquarters library, and most of the volcano observatories had a library 
room. Both public and 'grey' literature was given to me, bought or photocopied with permission 
for the purpose of this research. These additional documents provide an important source of 
historical and contextual information about the volcanic crises the USGS have dealt with, the 
development of the volcano observatories, and the evolution of the USGS and VHP; all 
reviewed in chapter 4. 
 
There is some critique in the over-reliance of documents since they may portray biased 
perspectives (Yin, 2003). Therefore, it is critical to be aware of these issues to correctly interpret 
the content and contexts of the evidence. With archival data it is particularly important to check 
the conditions under which it was produced as well as its accuracy. Archival data in this 
research available under the FOIA consisted of: emails, white papers, and other documents 
generated during the time of standardisation of the VALS, all clearly labelled with dates to help 
understand the conditions at the time of writing. Using documentation and archives, 
complimentary values of the different data sets can be identified, strengthening the data used 
within this study. 
6 Information redacted largely included the names of the personnel in documents and correspondence, as 
well as personal information not relevant to the standardisation of the VALS. 
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3.2.5 Summary of research and data 
 
The techniques involved in this research are summarised in Table 3.2 below which outlines the 
methods used and summarises their strengths and weaknesses. 
 
 
Table 3.2 Summary of research methods adopted during the study (adapted from Yin, 2003, 
p.86) 
 
 
 
 
Source of 
evidence 
Details Strengths Weaknesses 
Interviews 
 
• Semi-structured 
interviews 
• Targeted – focuses 
directly on case 
study design 
• Insightful – 
provides perceived 
causal inferences 
• Bias due to poorly 
constructed questions 
• Response bias 
• Inaccuracies due to poor 
recall 
• Reflexivity – interviews give 
what the interviewers wants 
to hear 
Ethnography 
(Direct 
observations) 
 
• Multi-sited 
ethnographic 
study with field 
notes 
• Reality – covers 
events in real time 
• Contextual – 
covers context of 
events 
• Time-consuming 
• Selectivity – unless broad 
coverage 
• Reflexivity – event may 
proceed differently because it 
is being observed 
• Cost-hours needed by human 
observers 
Documentation 
 
• USGS Public 
Docs / booklets 
• Internal USGS 
docs 
• Emails 
• External doc’s 
and books 
• Can be reviewed 
repeatedly 
• Unobtrusive 
• Exact details 
• Broad coverage – 
over time, events 
and settings 
• Retrievability 
• Biased selectivity if 
collection incomplete 
• Reporting bias 
• Access may be deliberately 
blocked 
Archival 
Records 
 
• Freedom of 
information docs 
on 
standardisation 
• Same as for 
documentations 
• Precise and 
quantitative 
• Same as for documentations 
• Accessibility to privacy 
reasons 
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Together these research techniques complement one another to provide a robust mix of methods 
to obtain the data needed to address the research questions, reducing bias, reflectivity and 
selectivity as much as possible. Using these methods it was possible to conduct flexible, open 
exploratory research to address the specific areas of interest, obtaining data from different 
sources to provide a form of corroboration, yet also represent the different values and 
viewpoints of the actors involved in the VALS. 
 
 
3.3  Analysis and reflections 
 
Here I review the tools and methods adopted to analyse the qualitative data and ultimately 
address the research questions. The methods adopted were based on qualitative data analysis 
(QDA), although the process developed to interpret interview data was modified to reflect the 
multi-sited nature of this research and to cope with the large number of interviews conducted 
within the timeframe available and a limited financial budget (I was unable to afford 
transcription by external parties). QDA methods are frequently used in qualitative research, and 
are adapted and applied in this study to manage the large data sets collected. 
 
3.3.1  Qualitative data analysis  
 
QDA involves a range of processes and procedures that transform the qualitative data collected 
into an explanation, understanding or interpretation identifying a person’s point of view, how 
they relate to this view, their context, and how they convey their view.  This process typically 
involves writing and the identification of themes that help interpret and organise the data. 
McCracken (1988, p.29) outlines a 'four-step method of inquiry' for use when conducting long 
interviews that divides the qualitative methods into four different processes: i) the review of 
analytic categories and interview design; ii) review of cultural categories (cultural factors 
relating to the interviewee) and interview design; iii) interview procedure and the discovery of 
cultural categories; and iv) interview analysis and the discovery of analytical categories. 
McCracken's method accurately describes the process of analysis undertaken during this 
research. Since this research is exploratory, it produced an exceptionally large data set making 
analysis a long and iterative process. 
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Documental analysis of the USGS archives involved using quotations and memos to develop 
interpretation of their historical content, factual information, and the representation of different 
values. This information was corroborated with interview data, and other documental 
information published by the USGS. Inferences were made from the documents reviewed, to 
review the discussions in the development of the standardised VALS.  
 
To organise the data sets, all recorded interviews were uploaded into the QDA software 
package, Atlas-Ti. The interviews were played back via freeware called Express Scribe v.4.2.3, 
written by NCH Software, which enabled the interview to be played back at different speeds, to 
aid transcription, so enabling the simultaneous construction of a mind map (see below). During 
play back, a mind map was drawn, important and relevant quote times noted, and the maps then 
scanned into the Atlas-Ti database.  Research memos and original field notes for each interview 
were also uploaded into Atlas-Ti so that all files, audio, visual and written materials relating to a 
single interview were stored together. In Atlas-Ti different Hermeneutic Units were used for 
each observatory, so keeping all the related information for an observatory case study together. 
This method enabled the data to be organised in a manageable form. 
 
3.3.2  Describing, interpreting and analysing the data 
 
In this section, I will discuss the use of mind mapping as a descriptive and analytical tool and 
the development of the analysis method used, providing a rationale and justification for the 
analysis methodology. The analysis in this study consisted of two stands; the more open-ended 
pilot study and the main research phase of the study which was targeted towards specific 
concepts. 
  
Traditional qualitative studies typically use description, classification, and connection processes 
using coding of transcribed interviews (Kitchin and Tate, 2000). Since it was felt that the 
normal process of description, which is transcription for all 93 interviews, would have been too 
time consuming and made the data unmanageable. Therefore, a different method was developed 
to address this problem. Based on the interview schedule, a mind map was produced for each 
interview (see appendix C for sample). The ‘mapped’ interview was represented by seven 
branches representing the different questions in the interview schedule: background and 
involvement of interviewee with VALS, process of VALS, use of VALS, implications of 
standardisation of VALS, case study examples, future of VALS, and an additional branch for 
other information. The mind map thus reflects the interview schedule, while also providing a 
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detailed view of the interview content. In addition, producing the mind map helped develop the 
initial descriptive process into a classificatory and connective one, providing an immediate 
visual comparison between interviews and observatories. The mind maps were cross-referenced 
to the recording, noting the times of significant statements, which were later fully transcribed to 
form quotes for more detailed analysis, thereby following more closely the typology that 
Kitchen and Tate (2000) outline. The quotes were selected on the merit of articulating or 
representing key points that emerged from the interviews, many of which were already 
established following the fieldwork from notes and ethnographic observations. The quotes were 
then reclassified under more specific classification codes (by hand, not using Atlas-Ti) that 
addressed specific aspects of the themes emerging from the data, and are presented in the 
empirical chapters under the research questions they address directly.  
 
Mind maps are diagrammatic representations of words, ideas or tasks, arranged around a central 
theme (Buzan and Buzan, 2006), as opposed to mental maps which are used to refer to a 
person’s individual perception of their world or environment (Gould and White, 1986). They are 
used to generate structure and classify ideas as an aid in study, organisation, problem-solving, 
decision-making and many other purposes. Mind maps are a useful guide to the intuitive 
arrangement of concepts into branches, using key words to make connections between portions 
of information and are often hierarchical. In this respect they bear many similarities to the use of 
nested hierarchies of codes used in QDA. However, there is little published on the use of mind 
maps as a tool in qualitative research. In studies of nursing it has been suggested that ‘mind 
mapping can allow researchers to make rapid and valid transcriptions of qualitative interviews 
without the need for interviews to be transcribed verbatim’ (Tattersall et al., 2007, p.32).  In that 
particular case, maps were generated during the interview, rather than from recorded data. This 
PhD research builds on the research by Tattersall et al. to use the technique to transcribe 
recorded interviews as mind maps. In so doing, the boundary between transcribing and analysis 
becomes blurred. Using a new untested technique provides some concern as it has not been 
ratified, but it is important to note that all forms of analysis are ultimately interpretative, 
requiring a workable combination of researcher creativity and accountability to the data.  The 
mind map records less textual detail than a full transcription, and may only make sense to the 
researcher; it would be difficult for someone to read a mind map and make the connections 
between the branches without actually knowing the information, or to replicate the study.  
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Using mind maps to transcribe has a significant number of benefits. Using an interview 
recording it is always possible to sense and record verbal emphasis or hesitation, which a 
written transcript does not provide. Listening to the interview again and producing a mind map 
provides instant ‘closeness’ and familiarisation of the data that facilitates an understanding of 
the context of the comments, rather than just using text. The process of transcribing using a 
mind map allows creative thinking between the themes and aids in identifying common themes 
that emerge. There is little literature from the academic community on the benefits or use of 
mind maps despite their potential application. This method of research is likely to be something 
that will be addressed more during multi-sited ethnographic studies where the researcher is 
doing exploratory work relating to one research area, but in many locations and thereby must 
conduct a significant amount of interviews to develop a ‘fuller’, more holistic picture. Concise 
methods of description and analysis such as the mind map offer a tool to get the data into a form 
that is usable for analysis quickly. 
 
3.3.3  Considering research ethics 
 
Due to ethical considerations and the requirement to comply with UCL and ESRC research 
ethics frameworks, the identities of interviewees remain anonymous in this study. The volcano 
observatory from which the interviewee is located is recorded and a classification system is used 
to identify whether the interviewee is a volcano hazard program (VHP) manager, senior 
scientist, or scientist; or a user of the VALS where the federal agency or institution will be 
listed. For example, following a quote, the reference may be 'HVO senior scientist 1', or 'LVO 
user - emergency manager 1'. Anonymity has a number of benefits; first, it protects the identity 
of individuals in the observatories, and second, it serves to provide a more honest representation 
of the social dynamics investigated. By presenting the results as anonymous the analysis will aid 
comparison without prejudicial bias relating to the employees. Every interviewee was requested 
to sign an ethics brochure that outlined my research, explained the degree of anonymity and 
requested their consent (see appendix B for the ethics brochure).  
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3.3.4  Introducing the research findings 
 
To analyse the data, extensive writing of ideas, themes and issues led to establishing the 
overarching themes that emerged from the data, which go on to form the empirical chapters. 
The findings are presented in the next four chapters to outline the constituent research questions 
and the themes that emerged from the research and explore some of the issues identified, before 
addressing the research question in the conclusion chapter. The first empirical chapter, the case 
study, is based largely on document and archival analysis, but also includes interview data. This 
chapter aims to provide the contextual information behind the research by reviewing the history 
and development of the USGS, the VHP and the five different volcano observatories. Through a 
number of significant volcanic crises in the U.S., it is possible to review the evolution of the 
VALS and explore some of the difficulties raised in designing and implementing a standardised 
VALS. The chapter also addresses the processes involved in the standardisation of the VALS 
and the factors that triggered the need to standardise.  
 
The three empirical chapters that follow are based on three principal issues that emerged during 
the data analysis: managing complex systems using a linear VALS, decision-making within a 
VALS, and accommodating and communicating with different users, which form the three 
constituent research questions outlined in the literature review. In these chapters the key 
findings of the thesis research are presented in a narrative form, supported by quotes from the 
interviews, again rooted in the data collected. Each chapter will present the issues discovered 
from the research and explore them in further depth, representing the different perspectives 
between the volcano observatories, the different levels of scientists that work in that 
observatory, in addition to the views of the users and collaborative partners of the VALS. The 
contexts from which the issues arise will be explored and each chapter will address key 
literature that supports the observations, providing corroborating theoretical models from the 
literature review. Following the presentation of the empirical data, it is possible to address the 
research questions directly within each chapter, drawing from the empirical data presented and 
the literature presented in the literature review. In the discussions and conclusions the materials 
presented in the empirical chapters are evaluated to address the key research question of this 
thesis, to what extent are linear, standardised VALS an effective warning tool for volcanic 
hazards in different contexts of complexity, uncertainty and risk? 
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Chapter 4. The USGS and Volcano Hazard Program: a local and 
national perspective 
 
 
This chapter discusses the case study of this research, the United States Geological Survey 
(USGS), with the aim of providing contextual information for the following three empirical 
chapters. First, the chapter provides an overview of the USGS, the Volcano Hazard Program 
(VHP) within the USGS, and their respective warning systems and legal mandates. Second, it 
reviews the history and local perspectives behind the formation of the five observatories of the 
VHP. Last, it views the USGS and VHP as an institution from a national perspective providing 
a summary of the centralisation factors that influenced the USGS. Reviewing the USGS from 
these different perspectives provides insight into the pressures placed on the volcano 
observatories at a local level, and the USGS at a governmental level, which led to the 
development of volcano alert level systems (VALS) and their subsequent standardisation in 
2006. The design of the standardised VALS emerged from previously developed VALS and the 
lessons learnt from crises experienced by the observatories during the previous thirty years, 
along with U.S. federal policy development. The catalysts behind the standardisation are 
discussed in this chapter to provide the context from which the analysis of the remainder of this 
thesis is conducted.  
 
 
4.1  The USGS: background and responsibilities 
 
This section provides a brief overview of the USGS, the VHP, and the legal mandates for the 
USGS to provide volcanic hazard warnings. A majority of the material discussed is from 
documentary sources, including USGS publications, published papers and grey literature. 
Additional insights are provided by interviews conducted with the VHP scientists during 
fieldwork conducted in 2008. 
 
4.1.1 The formation of the USGS  
 
During the 1830s, growing awareness of the importance of science in Federal Government led 
to the establishment of the Corps of Topographical Engineers in 1839, to explore and map the 
continent. By 1848, the discovery of gold in California became the focus of the Corps, and by 
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1867, Congress had authorised four major western explorations under the General Land Office 
that focused on geology. Conducted by both military and civilian parties, conflicts occurred 
between the four surveys, resulting in their merging as the Geological and Geographical Survey 
of the Territories, which went on to become the USGS (Rabbitt, 1989). Established in 1879, the 
USGS was originally charged with duties for the ‘classification of the public lands, and 
examination of the geological structure, mineral resources, and products of the national domain’ 
(U.S. Congress, 1879). 
 
Early USGS activities focused on geological surveys of agriculture and water, metal resources 
and geological mapping, but by 1901 oil and other fossil fuels became the top priority (Rabbitt, 
1989). Following the world wars, where mining resources were the primary focus to aid the war 
efforts, the USGS shifted once more towards scientific research and the provision of scientific 
information to understand and describe the earth, becoming a world leading research institute in 
the natural sciences. In 1979, an earthquake in the Imperial Valley, Mexico-California Border, 
caused US$30 million in damage (Rabbitt, 1989), and in 1980, Mt. St. Helens volcano erupted 
explosively. These events, amongst many others, led to a shift in focus of the Survey from 
natural resources to natural hazards, partly the result of the growing realisation of the costs of 
hazards in terms of the value tied up in critical infrastructure. In 1996, the Biological Resources 
Discipline was established within the USGS, so that the USGS now has five key science 
divisions: Biology, Geography, Geology, Geospatial and Water (USGS, 2009c). This thesis 
focuses on the Geology division, specifically the Volcano Hazard Program (VHP). 
 
Today, the mission of the USGS is to ‘serve the Nation by providing reliable scientific 
information to describe and understand the Earth; minimise loss of life and property from 
natural disasters; manage water, biological, energy, and mineral resources; and enhance and 
protect our quality of life’ (USGS, 2009a). The USGS is a bureau of the Department of Interior 
(DoI) of the U.S. Federal Executive Department of the U.S. Government, and is the DoI’s only 
scientific agency with no regulatory responsibility. Employing over 10,000 people the USGS 
has its headquarters in Reston, Virginia, with major offices in Lakewood (Eastern Region), 
Colorado (Central Region), and Menlo Park in California (Western Region). 
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4.1.2  The Volcano Hazard Program  
 
The Volcano Hazard Program (VHP) is one of three hazard programs within the USGS’s 
Geology Division; the others being earthquake and landslide. The USGS has been involved in 
volcanic hazards since its formation in 1879 (pers. comm. at Menlo Park), but became a key 
area of interest when in 1912, Thomas A. Jaguar founded the Hawaiian Volcano Observatory 
(HVO) (Heliker et al., 1968). HVO was administered between 1919 and 1948 by various 
Federal agencies (National Weather Service, USGS, and National Park Service), but from 1948 
was operated continuously by the USGS (Tilling et al., 1987). It was not until the late 1960s that 
the VHP became a separate budget within the USGS (pers. comm. at Menlo Park). Following 
the 1980 eruption of Mt. St. Helens in Washington State, volcanic hazards received increased 
attention from government authorities, the media and public (Wright and Pierson, 1992). The 
U.S. Government expanded the VHP in mid-1980 (Bailey and USGS, 1983), and it continued to 
evolve rapidly following three further periods of volcanic unrest in the 1980s from Long Valley 
Caldera (California), Mt. Redoubt (Alaska) and Mauna Loa and Kilauea (Hawaii). Prior to the 
Mt. St. Helens eruption, the VHP was an interdivisional activity involving the cooperative 
efforts of the Geology, Water Resources, and National Mapping Divisions. After this eruption, 
the VHP worked with the Water Resources Division for 18 months on related projects before 
separating. Today the Geology division frequently collaborates with other USGS departments to 
conduct volcanic research.   
 
The VHP was formed with the aims of: ‘preventing loss of life and property resulting from 
volcanic eruptions and volcano related hydrologic events, and minimising economic hardship 
and social disruption that commonly occur when volcanoes threaten to erupt’ (Wright and 
Pierson, 1992, p.6). To fulfil these aims it focuses on four activities: volcanic hazards 
assessment, volcano monitoring, research, and emergency-response planning / public education 
(Wright and Pierson, 1992). These activities aim to accumulate as much information as possible 
on volcanic processes, and provide the means for public officials to respond to volcanic crises 
rapidly and effectively. In addition to the five volcano observatories (AVO, CVO, HVO, LVO, 
and YVO), the VHP assists the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. In 2002, the 
five U.S. volcano observatories and their federal, state, and academic representatives became 
part of the Consortium of U.S. Volcano Observatories (CUSVO), established as a scientific 
working group to strengthen interaction and communication7. The VHP has a team chief 
scientist that resides at the volcano observatories, and a VHP coordinator, who is based at the 
7 See www.cusvo.org  
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USGS headquarters in Reston, Virginia.  In addition, each observatory has a scientist in charge 
(SIC), which is a rotating position. 
 
The VHP provides information on potential and current hazards to federal, state, and local 
government officials; the media, and other concerned groups, as well as local populations. This 
creates a 'boundary' between the USGS who provide information, and those who use it to take 
action. It is important to note that the USGS itself sees a boundary between the scientific advice 
it provides and the action that must be taken in response to this information: 
  
The USGS does not dictate or even recommend specific mitigation measures, 
because such measures must be balanced by social and economic considerations 
beyond USGS mandate or expertise. Rather, the program provides information 
about volcanic hazards that will help people to choose and manage the risks 
associated with living near a volcano (Wright and Pierson, 1992, p.6). 
 
The USGS monitors 169 active volcanoes characterised by a wide range of eruptive styles and 
located in six different tectonic settings: Aleutian subduction zone (Alaskan volcanoes), Juan de 
Fuca plate remnant of a subduction zone (Cascade volcanoes), three different basin ridge 
spreading centres (including Long Valley volcano), intercontinental hotspot (Yellowstone 
volcano), oceanic hotspot (Hawaiian volcanoes), and Marianas subduction system (Anatahan 
volcano) (VHP manager 1). The VHP has gained experience of volcanic crises all around the 
world via the Volcano Disaster Assistance Program (VDAP) (Ewert et al., 2007) and also 
continues to work closely with the Kamchatka Volcanic Eruption Response Team (KVERT), 
making the USGS one of the most diverse volcano monitoring institutions in the world 
(Kirianov et al., 2002). Observatories located in other countries with many volcanoes such as 
Indonesia, Philippines, New Zealand and Italy do not have such diversity in tectonic locations, 
styles of volcanic activity and experience in crises.   
 
4.1.3  Role, legal responsibilities and mandates 
 
The aims and activities of the VHP have been shaped by the need to provide warnings about 
potential hazards from volcanic activity. On November 23, 1988, the Robert T. Stafford 
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act8 was signed into law; amending the Disaster 
Relief Act of 19749. The Stafford Act was designed to bring an orderly and systemic means of 
8  Public Law 100-707 
9 Public Law 93-288 (88 Stat. 143) 
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federal natural disaster assistance for state and local governments in carrying out their 
responsibilities to aid citizens. Through this act and subsequent Executive Orders, the USGS 
was assigned responsibility for providing technical assistance on volcanic hazards and as the 
authority to issue volcanic warnings. The President delegated responsibility to the Secretary of 
the Department of the Interior to empower the Director of the USGS ‘to exercise the authority, 
functions, and powers granted by Section 202 of the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 with respect to 
disaster warnings for an earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, or other geological 
catastrophe’ (USGS, 2004, p.9)10. In response to this directive, the VHP’s mission was to 
enhance public safety and reduce losses from volcanic events through effective forecasts and 
warnings of volcanic hazards based on the best possible scientific information. The definition of 
a warning is not clearly stated in the Acts, so it is not possible to establish whether it is just to 
provide scientific information or to provide information on the risks. However, a ‘major 
disaster’ combines these issues in its definition as: 
 
Any natural catastrophe […] in any part of the United States, which in the 
determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude 
to warrant major disaster assistance under this Act to supplement the efforts and 
available resources of States, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in 
alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby (FEMA, 2007, 
p.2). 
 
Whilst the USGS is the lead agency for VHP activities, it is just one organisation of many 
involved to comply with the Stafford Act. The USGS works on broader public, interstate and 
regional issues involving other agencies,  referred to as ‘users’ in this study, such as federal and 
state land and mineral agencies, FEMA, Emergency Services, other Federal Agencies (U.S. 
Forest Service (USFS), National Weather Service (NWS), National Park Service (NPS), 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)), state and private universities, and 
clients of emergency-response planning (Federal Aviation Authority (FAA), Army, etc.). The 
need for such diverse federal involvement in the VHP is largely a result of interstate, regional 
and national implications of volcanic disasters, including economic disruption and effect on 
federal lands. In addition, there is a public need for information about impending volcanic 
hazards to aid mitigation and develop integrated research programs to provide sufficient 
warnings. In 2009, the USGS received approximately US$140 million as part of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act to help upgrade and improve some of its laboratories and 
10 Executive Order 11795 entitled ‘Delegating Disaster Relief Functions Pursuant to the Disaster Relief 
Act of 1974’ (30 FR 25939, July 11, 1974) and subsequent actions (as reported in 40 FR 52927, 
November 13, 1975, and 49 FR 213938, 1984) 
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research capabilities (USGS Newsroom, 2010). US$15.2 million will be used to modernise 
equipment as part of the National Volcano Early Warning System (NVEWS) at all USGS 
volcano observatories, including many of the universities and institutes with which the VHP 
collaborates (USGS Newsroom, 2010).   
 
4.1.4  The initial early warning system 
 
In 1977, the USGS developed procedures for providing warnings for all the hazards for which it 
had been given responsibility by the Stafford Act. It drew on the research and experience of 
other government agencies in meteorology and hydrology to establish a three-tiered system. 
Depending on the perceived magnitude of risk of the geological phenomena, a notification was 
issued as a notice, watch, or warning; increasing in severity. Table 4.1 below provides detailed 
definitions of each warning level. It is important to note that first, this system separates risk and 
science by only focusing on scientific information; second, a hazard warning assumes that it 
will be possible to provide a prediction (i.e. time and magnitude) which is extremely hard to do 
for volcanic hazards; third, the time scale for each level varies depending on the accuracy of the 
prediction rather than the anticipated time until event; and last, the most severe warning is 
shown at the bottom of the Table. Only the Director of the USGS could issue this warning. 
 
Notice of 
Potential 
Hazard 
Information on the location and possible magnitude of a potentially hazardous 
geological event, process, or condition. However, available evidence is 
insufficient to suggest that a hazardous event is imminent or evidence has not 
been developed to determine the time of occurrence.  
Hazard 
Watch 
Information, as it develops from a monitoring program or from observed 
precursors, that a potentially catastrophic event of generally predictable 
magnitude may occur within an indefinite time (possibly months to years). 
Hazard 
Warning 
Information (prediction) as to the time, location, and magnitude of a potentially 
disastrous geologic event. 
 
Table 4.1 The 1977 USGS Warning System from the Federal Register (v.42. no.70) (Hill et al., 
2002, p.33) 
 
In 1979 the USGS commissioned a report to analyse and evaluate the warning system for a 
potential landslide in Kodiak, Alaska (Saarinen and McPherson, 1981). The conclusions showed 
that while the USGS had developed a warning system that provided scientific and technical 
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information, ‘it is not enough to deliver technical information and then leave, for local officials 
may not understand the full implications, and hence may not have the tools to prevent a disorder 
and grave danger without inducing undue fear’ (p.77). The report highlighted the need for 
education and communication between the USGS and local authorities and populations, so they 
can understand the full implications of the hazard, and make educated decisions on the basis of 
technical information. Saarinen and McPherson recommended the USGS become more 
sensitive to the views and needs of the affected community, as hazard notification has social, 
economic and political impacts. However, to do this, the report states that the USGS would have 
to go ‘beyond the letter of the law to include empathy for the communities involved’, and by 
doing so the USGS would ‘stand a better chance of having a positive impact on the performance 
of its sometimes unpleasant duty’ (Saarinen and McPherson, 1981, p.80). These 
recommendations were not heeded, most likely because the USGS regards itself as an 
organisation that provides scientific and technical information however, volcanic crises in the 
1980s eventually illustrated the report authors' point. During these crises, explored in the 
accounts of individual observatories below, a number of social, economic and political factors 
had extraordinary impact on VHP scientists’ ability to do their job and fulfil their legal mandate. 
To ignore the local contexts and not recommend specific mitigation measures may make 
providing warnings easier for the USGS, but it does not necessarily make them effective.  
 
The Congressional mandate under the Stafford Act for the USGS to issue ‘timely warnings’ 
(FEMA, 2007, p.5) of potential volcanic hazards to responsible emergency-management 
authorities and to the populace affected, is extremely difficult to achieve. As discussed in the 
literature review, scientists can rarely make accurate forecasts of volcanic activity given 
significant scientific uncertainties. Prior to the Stafford Act scientists focused on understanding 
volcanic processes, hazards and whether they can be modelled. Suddenly scientists had to start 
thinking about the broader implications of their research, and the context of a volcano and its 
activity. This realisation was described during an interview at CVO with a senior member of 
staff: 
 
 
 
 
We would not have been having this conversation when my career began. There 
was no perceived need to think about, talk about issues like this. Volcano scientists 
were monitoring volcanoes and learning about them, and not as engaged in the 
forecasting or prediction business, and probably not as aware of their responsibility 
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to the public. I mean we were trained as scientists and we were learning about 
volcanoes and that was our job. Now, I think, especially after a series of disasters 
that included Nevada del Ruiz, which really was a watershed, when we realised as 
scientists, the potential for that lahar was very clear and yet more than 20,000 
people died, we realised there was a disconnect. Something had to change and the 
onus was partly on us and so now we're having these kinds of discussions; what’s 
the best alert system, what’s the most effective, how do we deal with our 
customers? I don’t know I ever used the word customer until the last decade or 
two. Now, we recognize that and I think that's a positive development. I think there 
has to be give and take […]. Discussions like this are evidence of that it matters 
whether this is a good alert system or not. That is a step forward. (CVO Senior 
Scientist 1). 
 
This comment highlights the growing awareness of VEWS and VALS over the last few decades 
from non-existence, to playing an important role in the VHP and the daily life at a volcano 
observatory. In addition, it highlights the reorientation of the professional identity of the USGS 
and expertise of the volcanologists, which is discussed further in chapter 6. It is not only the 
contingencies of the hazard that make warnings complex, but the trajectory and tracing of 
researchers that leads them to think about risk in certain ways. The warning systems developed 
and lessons learnt by the VHP have been heavily shaped by local volcanic crises that led to the 
establishment of the five different volcano observatories and three different VALS, which are 
discussed in the next section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2  Local perspective: the observatories  
 
During the 1980s, three serious volcanic crises shaped the evolution of the VHP and the early 
use and development of VEWS and VALS. The 1980 eruption of Mt. St. Helens woke the 
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nation to the realisation that explosive eruptions can occur on the mainland, near large 
populations. The volcanic unrest during the 1980s at Long Valley Caldera, California, 
highlighted the need for good communication and trust during a crisis, and the influence of 
politics on the official warning system. Finally, the eruptions of Augustine and Redoubt 
volcanoes, Alaska, created the awareness that ash poses serious risks to the aviation sector. This 
created a demand to develop ash specific warning systems, and the realisation that the users of 
warnings have different needs.  
 
This section aims to provide a summary of these key volcanic events and their influence on the 
development of different observatories and warning systems, reflecting each observatory's 
interpretation of a warning. The lessons learnt by the VHP can be understood by referring to the 
idea of the social construction of technology (SCOT) (Bijker et al., 1987) where, understanding 
what is defined as the best technological solution to a particular contextual problem, means 
reviewing how the groups and stakeholders that participate in it define it. By reviewing the 
individual volcano observatories it is possible to understand the local context and practical 
application of providing warnings, along with the difficulties involved, both scientifically and 
socially. The observatories are reviewed individually, in a chronological order of their 
establishment, to aid the reader in developing a historical context of the issues raised by each 
location, and ultimately the implications this had on the warning system and VALS developed. 
The locations of the observatories and their collaborative partners are shown in Figure 4.1.
Chapter 4. The Case Study 
 
130 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Map of the USGS VHP observatories and their collaborative partners (USGS VHP Website, 2008). The observatories are: the Alaska Volcano 
Observatory (AVO), Cascades Volcano Observatory (CVO), Hawaiian Volcano Observatory, the Long Valley Observatory, and  the Yellowstone Volcano 
Observatory (YVO). The collaborative partners are: University of Alaska, Fairbanks (UAF), Alaska Division of Geological and Geophysical Surveys 
(ADGGS), University of Washington (UW), University of Hawaii, Hilo (UHH), University of Utah (UU), Yellowstone National Park (YNP).
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4.2.1  Hawaii Volcano Observatory (HVO) 
 
HVO is the oldest USGS volcano observatory, established in 1912, following frequent eruptions 
of Kilauea volcano. High levels of activity at Kilauea, including its constant eruption from 1983 
to the present, have facilitated the development and testing of volcano monitoring techniques 
providing a fertile training location for volcanologists. Historically, USGS staff trained at HVO 
went on to work in the other observatories as they were established in the 1980s (Wright and 
Pierson, 1992). HVO remains unusual within the USGS, predominantly because it is the only 
volcano observatory in a small island community setting, isolated from the U.S. mainland. 
Another distinguishing factor is the near constant eruption of Kilauea and another highly active 
volcano, Mauna Loa, resulting in HVO and the local agencies fostering close relationships 
(Tilling et al., 1987). Islanders have experienced numerous volcanic crises and emergency 
responders have developed sophisticated communication and responsive procedures (HVO user 
– emergency manager 1). The small size of Hawaii Island enables the County of Hawaii Civil 
Defense to bring together all departments and agencies responsible for developing and 
maintaining supporting disaster response plans, using a multi-hazard 'Integrated Emergency 
Operations Plan' (HVO user – emergency manager 1). These agencies are coordinated to plan 
development and respond to crises by identifying the roles required at the Emergency Operation 
Centre, but the final decision is made by the State Governor and Mayor of Hawaii County, who 
was also the State Deputy Director of Civil Defense. Email correspondence between senior staff 
at HVO to the VALS standardisation team in April 2003 (FOIA archive) highlight that the 
constant eruption, experienced and educated public, and single emergency management agency 
imply using a VALS, standardised or not, would be redundant or 'pointless' in the Hawaiian 
context: 
 
When asked for his opinion of the proposed alert-level system, the director of 
Hawaii County Civil Defense said he had no strong feelings about it one way or the 
other. He noted that it seemed pointless to use it for the ongoing eruption of 
Kilauea, but said that it might be useful during the build up to a Mauna Loa 
eruption. On the other hand, he said that it might be just one more thing that he 
would need to explain to the public.  
 
The fact that HVO has operated for over 80 years without a VALS indicates they may be 
redundant for continuous eruptive activity. Additionally, the simple but effective organisation of 
the Hawaiian Civil Defense provides an ideal environment for communication, decision-making 
and coordination, particularly given Hawaii's small size and community that lends itself to this 
particular organisational set up. HVO serves as an example that with good communication, 
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warnings can be expressed quickly, accurately and obtain the required response without the use 
of VALS.  
 
4.2.2  Cascades Volcano Observatory (CVO) 
 
The 1980 eruption of Mt. St. Helens was the deadliest and most economically destructive 
volcanic event in the history of the U.S., yet the VHP successfully managed the crisis (Swanson 
et al., 1983, Swanson et al., 1985, Lipman and Mullineaux, 1982, Saarinen and Sell, 1985). The 
eruption gained unprecedented media attention following the growth of media news channels, 
providing a new context in which scientists were expected to engage with the media, both local 
and national. The wide media coverage generated problems because stakeholders interpreted 
scientific data differently and expressed their opinions via the international, twenty-four hour 
broadcasting media (Saarinen and Sell, 1985). Consequently, knowledge about the event 
became pluralistic. This crisis was the first to use the newly established USGS warning system 
by issuing a ‘Notice of Potential Hazard’ in 1977 (Crandell and Mullineaux, 1978). The 
eruption led to the expansion of the VHP and increased financial investment into volcano 
related research.  
 
A number of lessons were learnt by the VHP during this eruption, relating to scientific 
understanding, the management of the crisis, and significant media interest, which are 
summarised below. Despite a number of complex issues encountered during the crisis, the 
assumptions by the scientists were that with further scientific knowledge of volcanic behaviour, 
volcanic crises could be managed better. 
 
The eruption of Mt. St. Helens generated a lateral blast causing devastation over a greater 
distance than the scientists had forecast. Since none of the VHP scientists had seen a lateral 
blast before, the eruption made volcanologists aware of the danger inherent in their ignorance of 
some volcanic processes and limitations in their knowledge (Crandell and Mullineaux, 1978). 
Many of the scientists working on Mt. St. Helens were from HVO, working on Kilauea which 
has a very different style of volcanism. Therefore monitoring, decision making and scientific 
understanding was heavily influenced by the experience of the HVO scientists, which created 
some tension between groups of volcanologists in the VHP (Thompson, 2000). In addition, 
there were a number of conflicting reports on the likelihood and magnitude of eruption issued 
by non-USGS scientists that produced inconsistent advice and warnings for federal officials. 
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The USGS did not want to lose its credibility to other scientists, so it attempted to resolve any 
differences prior to any statement issuance to officials or the media (Foxworthy and Hill, 1982). 
 
The majority of the 57 deaths occurred because tourists ignored designated risk zones 
established by the USGS (Crandell and Mullineaux, 1978). This highlighted a misunderstanding 
in the public’s perception of volcanic risk, and of the rationale behind the volcanic hazard risk 
zones developed. It was fortuitous that the volcano erupted on a Sunday as many loggers that 
work around the volcano were away. Whilst the logging companies had been strongly advised 
to evacuate the area, the commercial demands to keep logging meant that during the day loggers 
were permitted into the established hazard zones (Foxworthy and Hill, 1982). This raised the 
issue of how seriously do the local officials need to take warnings from the scientists even if it 
leads to economic loss? 
 
The growing interest of the media, the public and other federal agencies meant that demand for 
information from the scientists was highest at critical periods when they were immersed in 
evaluating the hazards and their potential consequences. This caused problems for the scientists 
who had to learn to balance their need to understand the volcano with making time to provide 
information about the crisis (Thompson, 2000, Peterson, 1988). 
 
At the time volcanic unrest began in March 1980, the VHP was operating out of Menlo Park in 
California and Hawaii. With no onsite office, the USGS collaborated with a number of federal 
agencies and the University of Washington (who were seismically monitoring the volcano, and 
still do today with the USGS) to manage the crisis. An Emergency Coordination Centre (ECC) 
was set up by the U.S. Forest Service at its administrative headquarters providing work spaces, 
communication facilities and other logistical support for the USGS, enabling the VHP to receive 
and evaluate all monitoring information and then disseminate it, including rapid warnings 
(Foxworthy and Hill, 1982) (CVO scientist 5). The initial lack of resources and facilities made 
the basic tasks of the USGS difficult and time was wasted in setting up appropriate working 
areas and resources, which would have been better spent on analysing the crisis and educating 
the local agencies and public. This is likely to have been one of the key drivers behind why 
volcano observatories were later established in different regions.   
 
For these reasons, including the lessons learnt, the U.S. Congress provided additional funds for 
a larger VHP and further research to understand volcanoes. Consequently, the USGS 
established a permanent regional office at Vancouver, Washington, on May 18, 1982. It was 
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designated the David A. Johnston Cascades Volcano Observatory (CVO), in memory of the 
VHP volcanologist killed 2 years earlier, and was the first volcano observatory founded since 
HVO in 1912. CVO was established to continue long-term monitoring and hazard assessment of 
all the Cascades volcanoes, and to focus on the recurring eruptive activity at Mt. St. Helens, in 
partnership with the University of Washington Geophysics Program. It also became a centre for 
studying the interaction of volcanic activity with glaciers, rivers and lakes that can lead to 
landslides (CVO scientist 16).  
 
Between June 1980, and October 1986, Mt. St. Helens continued to erupt in the form of a dome-
building phase punctuated frequently by dome explosions. Due to the cyclic nature of this 
activity, CVO was able to develop accurate warnings as far as three weeks in advance for 
nineteen of twenty-one explosions (Bailey and USGS, 1983). This gave many scientists 
confidence in their ability to provide precise predictions, and gave the impetus to develop a 
VALS for use at CVO (HVO senior scientist 5).  
 
There are 20 volcanoes within the Cascade Mountain range, so when CVO scientists developed 
a VALS specifically for use in the there during the 1990s, it had to encompass a wide range of 
volcanic styles (from calderas to basaltic cones) and hazards, across three different states 
(Washington, Oregon, and California). The VALS developed reflected alert-level terminology 
used at Mt. St. Helens during the dome-building years based on two types of event 
‘notifications’ to accompany the alert level issued (HVO senior scientist 5). First, information 
statements for unexpected short-lived events (i.e. steam bursts, minor lahars) often with no 
opportunity to provide warning or evacuation information; and second, advisory or alert 
statements where additional information is provided with an alert level change, along with 
updates of volcanic unrest and imminence of hazardous volcanic activity. The alert levels issued 
increase in severity from an information statement, to an extended outlook advisory, volcano 
advisory, and volcano alert, labelled from one to four for increasing severity (see Table 4.2). 
Emergency Managers throughout the Cascade Mountain range correlated suitable responses for 
each level, and although the public were aware of the VALS, it was primarily targeted at 
Federal Agencies. Unlike the USGS warning system of 1977, based on a notice of potential 
hazard, watch, warning (Table 4.1), this VALS has criteria based on 'threat', incorporating the 
risk aspect of volcanic hazards that the report by Saarinen and McPherson (1981) argued was 
needed in order to generate more effective warnings. The CVO VALS was flexible because the 
use of statements enabled scientists to provide information in the accompanying reports. 
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Alert Level Description Summary 
Information Statement 
(Hazard Level One) 
Usually a short-lived, isolated event 
Extended Outlook Advisory  
(Hazard Level Two) 
First confirmation of changes that may lead to an eruption or 
hydrologic event 
Volcano Advisory  
(Hazard Level Three) 
Hazards are elevated but do not pose an imminent threat 
Volcano Alert  
(Hazard Level Four) 
Hazards are elevated; imminent threat to life and property 
 
Table 4.2 Volcano hazard level at CVO (US Forest Service, 1992, pp.20-22) 
 
The VALS developed at CVO specifically focused on eruptive behaviour and hazards that can 
be reasonably determined; however, the events that occurred at Long Valley Caldera generated 
a situation where the VALS had to relay more uncertainty and encompass hazards not 
necessarily related to volcanic eruptions. 
 
4.2.3  Long Valley Volcano Observatory (LVO) 
 
On May 25th 1980, just one week after the climatic Mt. St. Helens eruption, four magnitude 6 
earthquakes occurred at Long Valley Caldera, generating serious concern amongst USGS 
scientists that volcanic activity might be about to occur. Long Valley volcano is a 15km by 
30km caldera in eastern-central California, located in Inyo and Mono Counties. The eruptive 
characteristics of calderas were, and still are, poorly understood (Newhall and Dzurisin, 1988, 
Troise et al., 2006). Past unrest and activity at calderas such as Rabaul in Papua New Guinea, 
1983 and 1994, and Campi Flegrei in Italy, 1982-4, generated no indicators that could provide 
warnings for imminent caldera activity or eruption. The lack of understanding of restless 
calderas generated widespread concern when Long Valley, a large and potentially dangerous 
caldera, started to show signs of activity (LVO senior scientist 1). This was further exacerbated 
by the Mt. St. Helens crisis that was already stretching limited VHP staff and resources. Initially 
Long Valley caldera was monitored as an observatory-like project operated from the USGS 
Western Region headquarters in Menlo Park, California. Increased monitoring of the caldera by 
the USGS and university community led to the formal organisation of Long Valley Observatory 
(LVO) in the late 1990s (VHP manager 4). 
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On the rim of Long Valley caldera, the town of Mammoth Lakes has a permanent population of 
more than 5,000, and a temporary population that swells to over 40,000 during peak weekends 
in the ski season (Hill, 1998). The local ski area on Mammoth Mountain is a popular ski resort 
with Californians and at the time was developing into a major international ski resort. Many 
businesses and investors felt the negative attention of a volcano could ruin this growth potential 
in the 1980s. This made the entire management of the volcanic crisis very difficult. The damage 
caused by poorly managed communication of volcanic hazard warnings made it almost 
impossible for the USGS to fulfil its warning mandate, resulting in a change from the 1977 
USGS warning system. A number of events contributed to this failure. 
  
The first contributing factor was the lack of effective communication from the scientists to 
emergency managers and local populations, resulting in the relationship between them 
deteriorating and setting an example of ‘how to start out on the wrong foot’ (Hill, 1998, p.401). 
Two days after the magnitude 6 earthquakes shook Mammoth Lakes in 1980, the USGS 
Director announced a ‘Hazard Watch for potentially damaging earthquakes’ in the Long Valley 
area (Hill, 1998). Discussions began between the USGS, the California Division of Mines and 
Geology (CDMG), and the University of Nevada, Reno, resulting in a consensus that they had 
the obligation to inform local civil authorities about the potential volcanic nature of Long 
Valley Caldera. A draft report was sent to the USGS director's office recommending a ‘Notice 
of Potential Volcanic Hazards’ (Mader et al., 1987). During discussions between the USGS 
Director and the Governor’s Office in Sacramento about the precise wording of the 
announcement, officials for the Inyo and Mono Counties remained unaware of any potential 
volcano hazard. George Alexander, science writer at the Los Angeles Times, unofficially 
discovered these discussions and wrote an article announcing that the USGS were to release a  
warning 'Notice' for the area in due course (Alexander, 1982). The local civil authorities and the 
citizens of Mammoth Lakes were completely taken by surprise, since they had received no 
correspondence from the USGS about the potential for volcanic hazards, only earthquake 
hazards. The very next day the USGS Director issued a ‘Notice of Potential Volcanic Hazards’ 
but the lack of communication between the county officials and the USGS generated responses 
of outrage, anger and disbelief about the volcano (Hill, 1998, Mader et al., 1987).  
 
The second key social factor leading to the warning system failure was the threat of volcanic 
activity on the economy of Mammoth Lakes town, which led to poor communication between 
the stakeholders involved. Keen to expand their ski resort, which already had significant local 
investment, many officials and local populations denied there was a volcano, especially as there 
Chapter 4. The Case Study 
 
137 
 
was no perceptible change in the environment, only some ground deformation picked up by 
sensitive scientific equipment (LVO senior scientist 1). During 1982-1985, Mammoth Lakes 
town media hardly reported on any volcano or earthquake crises around the world, and USGS 
geologists were not welcomed in the area, they were ‘personae non gratae’ (Hill, 1998, p.401). 
This denial generated significant problems in convincing Mammoth Lakes to take mitigative 
actions. In January 1983, an intense earthquake swarm caused nearly constant shaking for a 
couple of weeks. Large quantities of snow from the El Niño winter blocked roads, including the 
only paved road connecting the town to the highway out of the caldera. This raised concerns 
about maintaining access to the town. The Chairman of the Mono County Board of Supervisors 
ordered a second dirt road to be ploughed and eventually paved, to provide an alternative route 
out of town called ‘Mammoth Scenic Loop’. This was not a popular decision with the local 
population since it in part ‘carried an implicit knowledge that there might actually be a volcanic 
hazard’ (Hill, 1998, p.401). The Chairman was recalled in a special election over the summer, 
such was the level of bad feelings.  
  
In October 11, 1983, the official 1977 USGS 3-tiered warning system was dropped to only one 
tier. It was rumoured that friends of the U.S. President living at Mammoth Lakes used their 
contacts to combat the problem of the original ‘Notice of Potential Volcanic Unrest’ (LVO 
senior scientist 1). The new warning system comprised of 'a formal statement by the director of 
the USGS that discusses a specific geologic condition, process, or potential event that poses a 
significant threat to the public, and for which some timely response would be expected’, 
Federal Register (v.48, n197), (Hill et al., 2002, p.33) (author’s emphasis). The use of the word 
'threat' here is important, because a warning became no longer just about the hazard; a level of 
risk needed to be determined. Independent social researchers suggested this new warning 
system would eliminate ‘unwarranted public concern over potential hazards that present a low 
risk to the public' and  clarify situations where the 'potential hazard may deserve either a near-
term or immediate response to save lives or property’ (Mader et al., 1987, p.31). The change in 
warning system indicated the USGS had become more sensitive to the public response from 
Mammoth Lakes, and political pressures had forced the USGS to reinterpret their federal 
mandate.  
 
Still in effect, the official (bureau-level) USGS hazard notifications system can only issue a 
formal hazard warning. No warnings have been officially issued since the 1984 eruption of 
Mauna Loa, Hawaii on March 29th (email correspondence from Menlo Park scientist to 
standardisation committee in March 2003, FOIA archives). Although the eruption began on 
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March 25th, delay in getting the Hazard Warning signed off by the USGS Director illustrated 
that the bureaucratic process took too long to make the warning useful (LVO senior scientist 1 / 
VHP manager 6). This resulted in individual observatories developing warning systems to cater 
their own needs, rather than using the universal USGS warning system of 1977. 
 
In 1989, following persistent earthquake swarms at Mammoth Mountain, significant levels of 
carbon dioxide gas were released destroying more than 100 acres of forest over two years 
(Sorey et al., 1996). The newly incorporated Mammoth Lakes town (in 1984) created a new 
group of civil authorities who were keen to discuss relevant hazards at Long Valley Caldera. 
The LVO scientist in charge (SIC) became exasperated by constant requests from the city 
manager about the evolving activity, so when the state geologist of California asked if there 
could be written criteria for how seriously he should regard the varying level of activity, it led to 
the development of the ‘Response Plan for Volcanic Hazards in Long Valley Caldera and the 
Mono Craters Area, California’ (Hill, 1991). This plan included a VALS based on the recent 
USGS Parkfield earthquake prediction experiment which, used an alphabetic scheme of five 
alert levels from E to A in ascending order of concern, so that 'A' reflects a warning, 'E' reflects 
weak unrest (Bakun, 1988, Bakun, 1987). This system was adapted for volcanic hazards at LVO 
because it was the only formal alert level system the USGS used in California. The VALS in 
Table 4.3 consists of the status, the USGS required response, the activity level of the volcano 
and the likely recurrence of this activity. Within each 'status' were a number of 'sub-statuses', 
used by LVO scientists as criteria (seismic, continuous strain, geodetic strain, and magnetic 
field status) assigned ‘a-e’ levels, used to assign the alert level using a sophisticated matrix of 
values (Hill, 1991, pp.39-46). This VALS, unlike the one used at CVO, was immensely 
complex, and this may be a reflection of the uncertainties relating to the behaviour of calderas 
The VALS also had stand-down criteria with fixed periods of time required to lower each level, 
and template messages for different levels to aid the communication process (pp.32-33). The 
decision to change alert level was no longer the responsibility of the USGS Director, but that of 
the SIC of the volcano observatory, reflecting a decentralisation of power within the USGS and 
recognition of the role of local scientific experts in making judgement on different alert levels.  
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Status USGS Response Activity Level 
Recurrence 
Intervals  
A 
Alert 
Issue Geologic Hazard Warning 
Eruption likely within 
hours to days 
Decades to 
centuries 
B 
Alert 
Alert Director, trigger Event Response Intense unrest 
Years to 
decades 
C 
Status 
Notify Office Chief, OES Headquarters 
State Geologist 
Strong unrest Months to years 
D 
Status 
Notify team leaders, Branch Chiefs, OES 
comm., USFS CDMG, & UNR 
Moderate unrest 
Weeks to 
months 
E 
Status 
Notify Chief Scientist’s personnel. 
Information call to OES communications 
and local authorities as appropriate (i.e. a 
locally felt earthquake). 
Weak unrest or 
possible instrument 
problems 
Weeks 
N Normal monitoring activities Background activity - 
 
Table 4.3 Status Ranking and Activity Levels at LVO (Hill, 1991, p.4) 
 
High levels of volcanic unrest during the 1990s provided extensive opportunity to exercise the 
lower status levels. However, it became clear, via the media, that most people had no idea what 
a ‘D-level’ alert meant, other than it seemed serious. This led to exaggerated concern by the 
public, renewing frustration in the business community over negative ‘volcano’ publicity. 
Discussions began between the different stakeholders on how to improve this VALS by making 
it less susceptible to misinterpretation by the media and public. In June 1997, the alphabetic 
code was converted to a four level colour code (Green, Yellow, Orange, Red) (see Table 4.4), 
expressed with normal conditions at the top of the alert level table, in contrast to being at the 
bottom of the table as designed in the 1991 VALS (Table 4.3). Like the previous VALS there 
are complex sub-levels and stand down criteria (see appendix D), but it also preserved the useful 
aspects of the 1977 USGS system such as the terms ‘notice of potential hazard’, and ‘hazard 
watch’. In addition, distinctive shapes were used for the colour codes that could be identified 
when using black and white print, and faxing. So far, the lack of technology to relay colours 
meant colours were absent within most warning and alert level systems. The shapes used were 
designed to fall in line with the increasing difficulty of ski slopes, so that skiers could intuitively 
identify the severity of a warning (LVO senior scientist 1 / VHP manager 4). Finally, the red 
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alert level was divided into four sublevels to express eruption intensity from minor, to moderate, 
strong to massive, all of which occur within calderas. Therefore, the LVO VALS was 
specifically designed around the requirements of local users of the VALS and to incorporate the 
characteristics of restless calderas.  
  
 
 
Table 4.4  Summary of Colour-Code Conditions and associated U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) 
responses for volcanic unrest in Long Valley Caldera and the Mono-Inyo Craters region (Hill et 
al., 2002, p.2). 1USGS response for a given condition will include the responses specified for all 
lower conditions. 2 Estimated recurrence intervals for a given condition are based primarily on 
the recurrence of episodes of unrest in Long Valley Caldera since 1980, the record of M>4 
earthquakes activity in the region since the 1930's, and the geologic record of volcanic eruptions 
in the region over the past 5,000 years. 
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The colour code is defined as ‘a graded measure of our concern about how a given level of 
unrest might threaten local communities with a possible volcanic eruption’ (Hill et al., 2002, 
p.5). Again, there is growing recognition of the need to reflect concern about volcanic threats 
building on the recognition that the risk depends on the local population and particular volcanic 
activity. To date, LVO has never moved out of a Green level, despite extended periods of 
elevated activity that fell within ‘normal’ criteria. Although there are rigorous criteria for each 
alert level, the final decision is made by the LVO SIC, partly because there is a lack of history 
in precursory activity, and because ‘personal judgement and experience will inevitably play a 
critical role in decisions on the transition from one colour-code to the next’, (Hill et al., 
2002)(p1). Consequently, the emergency response agencies at Mammoth Lakes developed a 
preliminary plan outlining the response of each agency depending on the colour code issued. 
 
During ongoing unrest LVO had the opportunity to test out different VALS, to determine what 
worked and what didn't (i.e. using colours rather than the alphabet) and how to make decisions 
about assigning alert levels using sophisticated criteria, even though these may be overridden by 
the SIC on the basis of personal judgement. LVO staff drew three major conclusions as a result 
of the handling of the crisis first, understanding the science is key to providing long term 
forecasts and short-term predictions. Second, constant attention and major time commitment are 
required to establish and maintain effective and credible working relations with civil authorities 
and the public, which can be enhanced by long-term continuity with scientific personnel and a 
stable policy with responsibilities clearly outlined. Third, the threat of an impending volcanic 
crisis will test goodwill and trust built over time (Hill, 1998). 
 
These insights however, do not reflect the enormous impact of economic and political issues on 
the warning system. VALS may provide an ‘intuitive, easily understandable framework for 
gauging and coordinating a response to developing volcano crises', but the problems seen at 
LVO highlight the need to consider the impacts of volcanic warnings, in addition to effective 
communication, considered 'the single most important element – to mitigate the risk from 
potentially hazardous volcanoes' (Hill et al., 2002, p.5). 
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4.2.4  Alaska Volcano Observatory (AVO) 
 
The history of AVO is quite different from that of other observatories, as it was driven entirely 
by the needs of aviation clients, thereby introducing a different set of stakeholders and different 
spaces of concern within the USGS. The eruption of Mt. St. Helens in 1980 produced vast 
quantities of ash that shut down several jet engines (Miller and Casadevall, 2000). Whilst this 
caught the attention of the aviation authorities it was not until near tragedies that action was 
taken. From 1978-1992 there were 23 incidents involving aircraft that inadvertently encountered 
volcanic eruption plumes (Miller and Casadevall, 2000). The most dangerous effect is engine 
damage resulting from ash melting and coating the turbine blades when it enters the jet intakes, 
causing the engines to stall (Neal et al., 1997, Miller and Casadevall, 2000). Fortunately, all 
affected aircraft to date have managed to restart their engines, although usually only after a 
severe loss of altitude.  
 
In 1982, following the near-crash of a British Airways Boeing 747 caused by volcanic ash from 
Mt. Galunggung in Indonesia, the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) initiated the 
Volcanic Ash Warnings Study Group (VAWSG) to standardise information provided to flight 
crews about volcanic eruptions. By 1987, a number of provisions for volcanic ash warnings had 
been adopted in aviation protocols, including SIGMETS (significant meteorological 
information) and NOTAM (notice to airman), and by 2003 the Volcanic Ash Warnings Study 
Group was replaced by the International Airways Volcano Watch Operations Group 
(IAVWOPSG) (OFCM, 2004). A consortium of U.S. federal, state, and private sector parties 
worked to develop an improved EWS and protocols for ash avoidance in the heavily travelled 
North Pacific air routes. This resulted in the growth and increased capacity of AVO, founded in 
1986, and the formal adoption of the ‘Alaska Interagency Plan for Volcanic Ash Episodes’ 
(Madden et al., 2008) that documents specific responsibilities and protocols for each agency 
before, during, and after a volcanic event. Endorsed by the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO), this multi-agency early warning system has been emulated in a number of 
volcanic regions around the world. AVO was the first observatory that had to deal with a wide 
diversity of clients, all with differing technologies and systems, and to deal with users who were 
this time global.  
 
In 1986, just prior to the founding of AVO, Augustine Volcano in the Alaskan Cook Inlet 
erupted generating eruption clouds that disrupted regional air traffic (Casadevall et al., 1994). 
Volcanologists at the then USGS office in Alaska worked with University of Alaska Fairbanks 
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Geophysical Institute (UAFGI), and the Alaska Division of Geological and Geophysical 
Surveys (DGGS) to forecast the volcanic activity and advise the Federal Aviation Authority 
(FAA) and U.S. Air Force. By March 1986, this cooperation was formalised as AVO with the 
responsibility of monitoring the four major Cook Inlet volcanoes: Augustine, Spurr, Redoubt 
and Iliamna.  
 
During the eruption of Redoubt on December 15th, 1989, a Boeing 747 aircraft lost power in all 
four of its engines, glided over 4km down restoring the engines only 1km above the nearby 
mountain peaks (Brantley et al., 1990). Whilst no-one was hurt in the incident, the damage to 
the relatively new aircraft was estimated to have been US$80million (Steenblik, 1990). This 
costly event widely affected commercial and military aircraft operations near Anchorage, 
causing the re-routing or cancellation of flight operations. This seriously affected the Anchorage 
economy since Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport handles more international air 
freight dollar value than any other airport in the U.S., and remains one of the largest cargo hubs 
in the world (airport-technology.com, 2010). Staff at the then small AVO began working with 
the FAA to develop a specific VALS for large ash plumes and clouds that might impact aircraft. 
AVO used a number of new techniques to remotely monitor the volcanoes using seismic and 
GPS data, satellite images (remote sensing and thermal imagery), and with ground and pilot 
observations they were able to issue timely warnings. Since volcanic ash poses a threat to 
aviation safety whether the aircraft is in the air or on the ground, avoiding ash completely is the 
only way to guarantee no damage. The aviation community regarded the risk of ash as more 
clear-cut than for ground based hazards, however, there is additional uncertainty in knowing 
how much ash is in the atmosphere in the first place, which depends on the interrelation of two 
complex systems, the volcano and the weather. The Icelandic ash crisis in 2010, has since 
highlighted that even clear-cut approaches to ash hazards may not be acceptable in different 
contexts, in this case Europe, due to the serious economic and social losses associated with 
grounding aircraft to avoid ash.  
 
AVO developed and began using its aviation colour code system in February 1990, during the 
Mt. Redoubt eruption. Unlike the VALS for LVO and CVO, the code needed to specifically 
communicate ash hazards. The AVO SIC and head of the VHP came up with the idea, as 
recorded during email correspondence from the AVO SIC in 1990 (FOIA archives) to senior 
VHP scientists at Menlo Park: 
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[We] desperately needed a simple device to communicate to the airline industry the 
activity, or anticipated activity of Redoubt volcano. I sprung it on the large AVO 
group (maybe as many as 30 people mostly from CVO, Menlo Park, etc) at the 
next morning’s staff meeting in Anchorage. Given the fact that we had geologists, 
seismologists, lahar specialists, tephra people etc., the proposed warning scheme 
almost immediately ballooned to a 6 x 6 matrix (!) so as to satisfy everyone. After 
the meeting was over, we went back to the original 4-colour scheme. 
 
This quote highlights the complexities involved in designing VALS; the more people involved 
in its design, the more complex it becomes as everyone has to account for their particular 
concerns. A highly complex VALS would be beyond realistic capabilities. Given the need for 
quick warnings, the AVO SIC and VHP team chief scientist decided on a simple colour traffic 
light system (AVO senior scientist 8). This system had already been established in South 
America, specifically because local populations easily understood it. Whilst this was an 
undemocratic decision, it was the foresight that a VALS at AVO needed to convey a clear 
message quickly to the aviation sector that ultimately led to its success. Called the ‘aviation 
colour code for concern’, the emphasis was on how concerned the users should be on the actual 
or potential volcanic activity. The use of the word ‘concern’ suggests that risk was the basis for 
issuing an alert level, and that risk mitigation measures were directly targeted (AVO senior 
scientist 8 / VHP manager 4). The colour code was developed to consistently ‘describe the 
status of the volcano when a potentially hazardous event was in progress or was expected’ 
(Brantley et al., 1990, p.26). In addition, an update report was issued with further information.  
 
The original colour code was designed around four colours, with descriptions specific to the 
geography and monitoring stations located on Mt. Redoubt (Brantley et al., 1990, p.26). 
However, just one day prior to the eruption of Mt. Spurr in 1992, a more generic form of the 
colour code used for Mt. Redoubt was issued, shown in Table 4.5. The alert levels increase in 
concern from Green at the top, to Red at the bottom. The description section is largely focused 
on seismic data and explains the level of activity at the volcano, with a plume height of 7.5km 
(25,000 ft)11 used as a cut off between the Orange and Red codes, since most cruising aircraft 
fly above this height. 
 
 
 
 
11 Aviation users and USGS scientists refer to heights in feet. 
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Colour Description 
Green Volcano is in its normal ‘dormant’ state 
Yellow Volcano is restless.  
Seismic activity is elevated, Potential for eruptive activity is increased. A plume of 
gas and steam may rise several thousand feet above the volcano which may contain 
minor amounts of ash. 
Orange Small ash eruptions are expected or confirmed.  
Plume(s) not likely to rise above 25,000ft above sea level.  
Seismic disturbance recorded on local seismic stations but not recorded at more 
distant locations. 
Red Large ash eruptions are expected or confirmed.  
Plume likely to rise above 25,000ft above sea level.  
Strong seismic signal recorded on all local and commonly on more distant stations 
 
Table 4.5 Level of concern colour code used for the eruption of Mt. Spurr, 1992 (Keith, 1995, 
p.5) 
 
Although AVO had the capability to provide timely eruption warnings and help prevent aircraft 
encountering volcanic ash, a number of volcanoes in mainland Alaska and the Aleutian Islands 
remained unmonitored due to their remote location and lack of funds. In 1996, AVO obtained 
new Congressional funding through the FAA and was able to install volcano monitoring 
networks on the Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands (Brantley et al., 2004). AVO also 
developed collaborations with the Kamchatkan Volcanic Response Team (KVERT) created in 
1993 by the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Volcanic Geology and Geochemistry and 
the Kamchatkan Experimental and Methodical Seismological Department. Today they still work 
together to provide volcano information to the flight paths from Asia to America (Kirianov et 
al., 2002). 
 
With increased monitoring capabilities, came recognition of increasing diversity of volcanic 
behaviour, which led to a number of modifications in the colour code. Following the 1996 
Akutan seismic crises, the VALS description was split into ‘intensity of unrest at volcano’, and 
a ‘forecast’ (see Table 4.6). However, by 1998, the older simpler colour codes in Table 4.5 
above, were back in use suggesting that the forecasting element may have been too specific, 
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making it too restrictive, and implying that volcanic activity could be forecast more accurately 
than actually possible in a majority of cases. 
 
Colour Intensity of Unrest at Volcano Forecast 
Green Volcano is in quiet ‘dormant’ state No eruption anticipated 
Yellow Small earthquakes detected locally and 
(or) increased levels of volcanic gas 
emissions 
An eruption is possible in the next few 
weeks and may occur with little or no 
additional warning 
Orange Increased number of local earthquakes. 
Extrusion of a lava dome or lava flows 
(non-explosive eruption) may be 
occurring. 
Explosive eruption is possible within a 
few days and may occur with little or no 
warning. Ash plume(s) not expected to 
research 25,000 feet above sea level. 
Red Strong earthquake activity detected 
event at distant monitoring stations. 
Explosive eruption may be in progress. 
Major explosive eruption expected within 
24 hours. Large ash plumes(s) expected to 
research at least 25,000 feet above sea 
level. 
 
Table 4.6 AVO’s level of concern colour code in 1998 (Waythomas et al., 1998, p.33) 
 
The vested interest of the aviation sector enabled AVO to benefit from additional funding and 
advancement in satellite technology to provide more accurate monitoring and forecasting 
capabilities. By July 2007, AVO had established monitoring networks on 31 of Alaska’s 41 
active volcanoes. Since a number of volcanoes remain unmonitored and it is not possible 
establish the volcano’s characteristic behaviour, they are designated a ‘non-assigned’ (NA) 
status, rather than Green (AVO scientist 6). Not only was technology aiding volcano 
monitoring, but it was changing the way that AVO communicated information and warnings 
through the development of a sophisticated website and database, reflecting the levels of 
technology the aviation sector uses and demanded from AVO. The success of the AVO colour 
code of concern meant that pilots requested its use throughout the U.S. This set the scene for not 
only nationalising the AVO VALS, but also using it as a global standard. This is discussed 
further in section 4.3.   
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4.2.5  Yellowstone Volcano Observatory 
 
YVO, created in 2001 by the USGS, University of Utah, and Yellowstone National Park is the 
youngest of the five observatories. Inauguration followed long-term monitoring and geological 
investigations of the Yellowstone caldera volcanic system, dating back to the 1959 Hebgen 
Lake magnitude 7.5 earthquake. YVO aimed to strengthen scientist’s abilities to track activity in 
the highly active caldera that could result in hazardous hydrothermal, seismic, or other volcano-
related activity (Lowenstern et al., 2006, Christiansen et al., 2007). It was later seen as 
beneficial to establish a VALS for use during heightened activity. The move was at least, partly 
driven by increasing interest in Yellowstone following broadcast of the BBC / Horizon / PBS 
Nova ‘Supervolcanoes’ documentary in 2000. Although the SIC wanted to establish a VALS, 
which version to adopt was not clear; AVO’s, CVO’s or LVO’s? Given that Yellowstone is a 
caldera, LVO’s VALS appeared the most suitable, but in addition, there was a need to have an 
aviation code in place (YVO scientist). The question of which VALS should be adopted at YVO 
contributed to the idea that standardisation of the VHP VALS might be a good practical 
solution. 
 
4.2.6  The need to merge Volcano Alert Level Systems 
 
By the late 1990s, the VHP was operating three different VALS at CVO, LVO and AVO. The 
CVO SIC felt this could potentially generate devastating confusion. Cascade volcanoes also 
occur in California therefore, users in California may not be aware of the VALS used at CVO 
since they are more familiar with the VALS used at LVO. In addition, there was increasing 
pressure from the aviation sector for the colour code of concern to be adopted throughout the 
U.S. On October 6th 2004, CVO adopted the AVO colour code for ash, incorporating it into a 
new-updated VALS, as can be seen in Table 4.7, with levels based on numbers 0-3, a more 
detailed description summary and some forecasting information in addition to the actual 
eruptive behaviour. Relative to the prior VALS used at CVO, the order of words changed from 
‘Extended Outlook Advisory, Advisory and Alert’ to ‘Notice of Volcanic Unrest, Advisory and 
Alert’. The four colours of the AVO colour code of concern were added, but not the 
accompanying descriptions. 
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Alert Level Description Summary 
Information 
Statement  
(Level Zero) 
• Includes usual events such as steam bursts, small avalanches, rock 
falls, and minor mudflows 
• Usually short lived volcano-related events, but some may be 
hazardous 
• May also be issued to provide commentary about notable events 
within any staged alert level during volcanic unrest 
Notice of 
Volcanic Unrest  
(Alert Level 
One) 
• Volcano is restless 
• Significant anomalous conditions that could be indicative of an 
eventual hazardous volcanic event 
• Most likely anomalous condition would be sustained, elevated 
seismicity 
• Expresses concern about the potential for hazardous volcanic activity 
but does not imply an imminent hazard. 
Volcano 
Advisory  
(Alert Level 
Two) 
• Processes underway that have a significant likelihood in culminating 
in hazardous activity, but evidence does not indicate that a life – or 
property – threatening event is imminent 
• Used to emphasize heightened concern about a potential hazard 
Volcano Alert  
(Alert Level 
Three) 
• Precursory events have escalated to the point where a volcanic event 
with volcanologic or hydrologic hazards threatening to life and 
property appears imminent or is underway 
 
Table 4.7 Alert levels for Cascade Range volcanoes revised in 2004 (CVO, 2004) 
 
Volcano alerts in the Cascades have become increasingly important to federal and state agencies 
and the public. When Mt. St. Helens showed renewed signs of volcanic unrest from 2004-2005, 
there was an unexpected appetite for real-time information from the public, driven by the 
development of electronic media (Sherrod, 2008, Frenzen, 2008). In response to a rise in alert 
level and issuance of information statements, the number of inquiries at CVO rose significantly, 
as shown in Fig. 4.2, illustrating that media phone inquiries (daily counts, in brown colour) and 
public web activity (striped) generally spiked following changes of alert level and prominent 
volcanic events, such as steam and ash explosions. These CVO web site statistics illustrate the 
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event-driven demand for online information and the interest VALS generate. In turn this places 
significant pressure on the scientists who feel they have to get the alert level change ‘right’.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Relation between volcanic activity, alert levels, volume of media inquiries to the 
CVO, and number of web pages requests from the CVO website during the first weeks of unrest 
at MSH (Driedger, 2008, p.513) 
 
Whilst the federal and state agencies were able to use and understand the newly established 
VALS during the 2004 crisis, in 2003, CVO staff working on the volcano-response plans for 
Mt. Baker and Glacier Peak were asked by their workgroup stakeholders whether it would be 
possible to change the names of the alerts to those used by the National Weather Service (NWS) 
for flood and tsunami warnings, i.e. Advisory, Watch and Warning (CVO user – emergency 
manager 3). Email correspondence from the scientists involved with the coordination plan to 
senior VHP staff in January 2003 (FOIA archive) informed staff that ‘a change to [National] 
Weather Service alert titles would prevent confusion during volcano crises and that a single alert 
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scheme would be more useful for educating the public about hazard alert levels’. This meant 
that there was a shift in the criteria for VALS toward education and user focus. Since a number 
of the agencies in the workgroups deal with flood issues regularly, and the U.S. Forest Service 
were considering adopting the NWS alert titles at the time for forest fires, it made sense to make 
all the terms standardised if possible, making it absolutely clear for all emergency responders. 
This led to questions about the rationale behind the current alert level titles, and whether it was 
possible to adopt standardised terminology for use at all the different volcano observatories?  
 
4.2.7  Summary  
 
Through these volcanic crises, the VHP and USGS learned a number of lessons. Email 
correspondence between a senior scientist at Menlo Park and other senior VHP staff in February 
2004 (FOIA archive) highlights some of these. First, ‛there is a need and mandated 
responsibility to communicate monitoring and other scientific data to emergency management 
officials in a clear and understandable manner'. Second, 'to establish and maintain scientific 
credibility, it is essential to tell officials what we know and do not know, what we think we 
understand or don't understand etc. The officials and the general public must never get the 
misconception that we scientists always know “everything ’. Third, ‛what we know or do not 
know will vary from volcano to volcano, depending on the amount and quality of available 
scientific information, extent of monitoring, etc. Even at well monitored and well understood, 
volcanoes, we can rarely anticipate with any certainty [about] what the volcano will do next’. 
All these issues, communication, credibility, and local knowledge, have been addressed in the 
literature review, where the volcanic crises presented also demonstrated the need for good 
communication, education, trust and credibility, and the need to understand the uncertainties 
and complexities involved in generating scientific knowledge about volcanic activity. 
Additionally the USGS has learnt the role of social, cultural, economic and political contexts in 
the design, use and effectiveness of VALS. The evolution of the VALS at the USGS tells a 
powerful story of the impact of media, travel, economic development and globalisation as it 
intersects with, and changes the definition of risk. 
 
Within two decades, the USGS’s VHP has evolved in response to a number of crises and 
warning systems changes, few of which were the result of in-depth consultation or design, but 
driven by need, usually over a short time frame. In this context, the evolution of the VALS 
provides a perfect illustration of the theory of social construction of technology (SCOT) (Bijker 
et al., 1987). Shaped and driven by politics, economics, and safety, the VALS used by each 
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observatory were tailored to local physical aspects (volcanic unrest, types of volcanic hazards, 
and monitoring capabilities available) and social factors (design of the VALS, terminology, user 
demands and needs). Therefore, it is questionable whether there was a need for uniformity 
across the different volcano observatories. Yet, pressures to adopt a national aviation code, and 
users demands for the CVO VALS to comply with National Weather Service terms suggested 
that nationalisation of VALS was worthy of discussion, and this would require consultation with 
the USGS’s external partners and the users of the VALS. Within the USGS management there 
was growing concern in having different conventions within the VHP whilst promoting 
uniformity for aviation processes. The question of standardisation was not only being 
considered at observatory level (bottom-up), but also at a national and policy level (top-down). 
These pressures are discussed below.  
 
 
4.3 National perspectives 
 
At the same time, in the late 1990s, when discussions within the volcanological community 
began to consider the idea of developing a global standard for VALS for use by all countries, 
there were serious discussions about adopting the AVO VALS as an international standard by 
ICAO for the aviation community. It was, however, the events of 9/11 in 2001 that triggered a 
number of significant changes within U.S. Emergency Management and Security policy that 
provided the final catalyst to standardise warnings, almost returning the VHP full circle to the 
original warning system set up in 1977. The impact of increasing globalisation, the 
diversification of values within different user groups, and finally new U.S. policy became issues 
that influenced the VHP and USGS as an institution, rather than at each observatory.  
 
Three key issues placed pressure on the USGS, as an institution, to develop a standardised 
VALS: U.S. internal policy on emergency management, globalisation, and tensions within the 
USGS. The following section discusses these three issues before reviewing the implications of 
these factors. 
 
4.3.1 The impact of 9/11 on U.S. security policy 
 
Following the 9/11 terrorist attack in 2001, U.S. Congress passed the Homeland Security Act of 
2002, creating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to improve coordination between 
the different federal agencies that deal with law enforcement, disaster preparedness and 
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recovery, border protection and civil defense. The Department was assigned responsibility for 
protecting U.S. territory from terrorist attacks and responding to natural disasters. In 2002, the 
Department developed a Homeland Security Advisory System, a colour coded terrorism risk 
advisory scale, created to accommodate the Presidential Directive to provide information 
relating to terrorist acts to federal, state, and local authorities and the public (see Fig. 4.3). A 
number of USGS staff were consulted with respect to the design of the code (VHP manager 6). 
Although some procedures at government facilities are tied into each alert level, it is typically 
disregarded due to its apparent ineffectiveness, often staying at one alert level for years 
rendering it meaningless (CVO user – emergency manager 2). This code was even less useful 
for the public who had little idea what to do with each alert level, other than be vigilant.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Department of Homeland Security Advisory System (US Department of Homeland 
Security, 2010) 
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In 2001, emergency managers from state and local government, industry, academia, and the 
non-profit community came together at a public warning summit to discuss why not one single 
public warning system had been activated during the 9/11 event. From this summit a partnership 
for public warning (PPW) was created to assist the federal government in the assessment of the 
emergency alert system (EAS), a platform for the nation's public warning capabilities 
(Partnership for Public Warning, 2003). The PPW developed a national strategy addressing the 
EAS and Homeland Security advisory system, recommending use of one integrated hazard 
warning system with standard terminology and threat scales that promote interoperability and 
the dissemination of warning across multiple platforms. As a result the PPW began discussions 
that led to the interoperability standard alert and warning of the Common Alerting Protocol 
(CAP), something the USGS had to comply with (Oasis, 2008). This demonstrated a shift to 
value warning dissemination as key criteria in EWS, and a shift in governance where previously 
experts sought to manage risk, to one where everyone is considered as already at risk. 
 
The Emergency Warning Act of 2003 (S. 118) passed by Congress to develop and coordinate a 
national emergency warning system (e.g. EAS), required that the Secretaries of Commerce and 
Department of Homeland Security ensured that comprehensive, easily understood, emergency 
warnings were issued for every U.S. risk, whether from floods, hurricanes or terrorist attacks. 
The Commerce Department would be responsible for developing new technologies to issue 
warnings, and Department of Homeland Security would be responsible for developing uniform 
standards for warnings. In 2004, one year after discussion and vetting, the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) was accepted as a structured framework to: 
 
Guide departments and agencies at all levels of government, nongovernmental 
organizations, and the private sector to work seamlessly to prevent, protect against, 
respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents, regardless of cause, 
size, location, or complexity, in order to reduce the loss of life and property and 
harm to the environment (Department of Homeland Security, 2008, p.1). 
 
All federal departments were required to adopt the NIMS, working with the National Response 
Framework to provide the structure and mechanisms for national-level policy for incident 
management. A core component of the NIMS is to enable effective and efficient incident 
management and coordination by providing a flexible, standardised incident management 
structure (Department of Homeland Security, 2008). To do this, three key elements were 
developed; the Incident Command System (ICS), Multiagency Coordination Systems (MACS), 
and Public Information that provide standardisation through consistent terminology and 
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established organisation structures i.e. Joint information Centre’s (JIC’s). The NIMS has been 
adopted by all U.S. Emergency Management agencies so they all operate on a standardised 
platform throughout the U.S. Terrorism had taken over crisis management and as a 
consequence, policy to standardise the systems for procedures and warnings across a multi-
hazard platform, dominated the 2000s and consequently the VALS at the USGS. 
 
4.3.2  The influence of globalisation 
 
The First International Symposium on Volcanic Ash and Aviation Safety in 1991 helped raise 
awareness about aviation ash hazards (Casadevall et al., 1991, Casadevall et al., 1994). 
However, it was not until 1998, when the International Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW) was 
established, that standardising volcanic ash warnings internationally within the aviation 
community was addressed. IAVW was established by the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO) and the World Metrological Organisation (WMO) to formalise 
international arrangements for monitoring and providing warnings in the form of standard 
warning messages (via SIGMETs and NOTAMs) (WMO, 2007). Due to the difficulty in 
providing accurate volcanic activity forecasts for ash clouds, global airspace was divided into 
nine different Volcano Ash Advisory Centres (VAACs) by the WMO, each responsible for a 
section of airspace (see appendix D). VAACs are responsible for coordinating and 
disseminating information on volcanic ash to the aviation sector and to issue volcanic ash 
advisories (VAA) that outline what can be seen in satellite imagery, pilot reports, observatory 
information, forecast trends and other available information. The IAVW coordinates the 
volcano observatory, VAAC, WMO and the aviation companies, making this the first global 
volcano early warning system that reflects the globalisation of airlines (Lechner et al., 2009) 
(see appendix E).  
 
In 2004, ICAO documentation incorporated the AVO colour code chart in its ‛Handbook on the 
International Airways Volcano Watch’, with one modification; the removal of the specific 
height threshold (7.5km / 25,000ft) as the criterion for distinguishing between the Orange and 
Red alert levels (ICAO, 2004). By September 2005, the AVO colour code of concern was 
formally adopted in principle by ICAO to notify the status of a volcano for the purpose of 
supporting operational decisions to issue warnings (via NOTAMS, SIGMETS and VAAs) 
globally. ICAO specifies that ‘the colour code describes conditions at / near the volcanic source 
circa the time of eruption and is not intended to describe the hazard potential of the drifting ash 
cloud itself at locations distant from the volcano or after the volcano has stopped erupting’ 
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(ICAO, 2005, p.5-9). This is an important limitation, since the colour code focuses on the ash 
plume rather than distal, dilute, ash clouds that can, as demonstrated by the Eyjafjallajökull 
eruption, also cause serious disruption. 
 
In contrast, no consensus had developed for an internationally standardised VALS for ground 
hazards. In 1996, the International Association of Volcanology and Chemistry of the Earth's 
Interior (IAVCEI) asked several scientists to explore the use of VALS in different volcanic 
regions of the world. At the ‘Cities of Volcanoes 2’ conference in Auckland, 2001, there was 
significant interest and discussion among the participants about VALS and their usage and 
inconsistencies during a workshop. It was suggested that the ‘global volcanological community 
should accelerate work towards developing and adopting a universal scheme that conveys 
information, in a consistent manner, about changes in conditions at any restless volcano, 
regardless of location or the institution(s) monitoring it’ (Tilling, 2001, p.144). Ideally, this 
system should be ‘solely established by scientists, based on volcanic phenomena, with no 
involvement of civil authorities’, and easy for users to understand (Tilling, 2001, p.144). It is 
not clear why other stakeholders such as civil authorities involved in volcanic crises should not 
be part of this process, however, this may reflect the way volcanologists regard other actors in 
emergency management, and / or the way they perceive themselves. Although a universal 
VALS was not agreed upon for ground hazards due to insurmountable challenges, the 
discussions that took place did contribute to the development of nationally standardised VALS 
(including New Zealand and the U.S.).  
 
Discussions on ground based hazard VALS focused only on physical hazard aspects, with little 
consideration of the social issues or context relating to the users of the VALS or policy 
implications; it is no surprise this focus on science led to failure in achieving a globally 
standardised VALS. The literature review highlighted the importance and role of decision 
makers, users and stakeholders in VALS, and the need to consider local contexts of culture, 
economics and politics. Lessons learnt from the history of USGS crises also reflect these 
findings. Excluding users from discussions about ground-based hazard VALS is possibly one of 
the key reasons why it never happened or became formally discredited as an idea. Although the 
aviation colour code was standardised, it is important to note that ash hazards differ greatly 
from ground hazards in that all stakeholders use highly sophisticated technology and deal with 
only one hazard, ash, and this hazard will dissipate in time enabling a return to normal activity, 
unlike ground hazard impacts which can last for decades. 
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4.3.3  Tensions within the USGS 
 
At an observatory level it became clear that users of VALS were not only diverse, but required 
different information over varying temporal and spatial scales. At an institutional level, there 
were new demands to provide VALS that complied with U.S. disaster policy and develop 
standardised warning systems like the many other U.S. agencies use (e.g. for tsunamis, 
hurricanes, forest fires). This meant that public and emergency responders would understand 
warnings no matter where they were in the country. It was argued by USGS staff that the VHP’s 
diverse range in VALS provided a fragmented appearance, lacking consistency, and 
complicating the advisory role VDAP plays when discussing which VALS would be suitable. 
Lastly, the President himself wanted to have a simple system whereby he could quickly see the 
relative danger levels of a hazard, and this required standardisation (VHP manager 6).  
 
A standardised VALS offered a number of advantages to the VHP. During a crisis VHP staff are 
deployed from all the observatories to help maintain 24 hour coverage, so by using a standard 
VALS everyone would be familiar with it. In addition, it theoretically means that when 
warnings are issued they are uniformly understood by the media and public throughout the U.S., 
as well by the VHP team, partner organisations, and users, many of which collaborate or work 
with a number of different volcano observatories.  
 
In 2001, it was clear the USGS faced a number of problems. How were the observatories going 
to implement the VALS adopted by ICAO, whilst maintaining their existing systems? HVO had 
no desire to have a VALS, YVO wanted to use a VALS but was not sure which one to pick, and 
CVO and LVO operated two different VALS even though some Cascade volcanoes are in 
California where the LVO code was known and used. This raised a number of fundamental 
questions such as: what is the rationale of a standardised VALS? How can a single alert level 
carry the essence of emergency information to non-volcanologists, concerned agencies and 
publics? If there were different codes for different clients would this generate more work and 
cause confusion? 
 
The national and global events that triggered standardisation, predominantly via policy, 
occurred at the same time that emergency managers in the Cascades requested to use the 
National Weather Service terms in the VALS. It was this synthesis between local and national 
pressures that finally led to serious discussions for the USGS to standardised VALS. The 
meeting of bottom-up and top-down demands meant that the VALS had to change. This was a 
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challenge the VHP had so far avoided; how does one incorporate local variations and needs 
already developed at the volcano observatories, with uniformity? Was it possible to standardise 
VALS when the uniform USGS system developed in 1977 had already been proved a failure? 
 
While the concept of having a standardised system seemed a logical solution for USGS 
management, in practice there were strong reasons why this might be untenable as this email 
correspondence for senior management at AVO to senior scientists at Menlo Park written in 
June 1997 (FOIA archives) outlines:  
 
Everyone thinks their system works best for their volcanoes. […] Local difficulties 
in communication channels / abilities and volcanic settings, in particular hazards, 
demand some flexibility in wording, presentation etc. Systems in place seem to be 
working so there is not a lot of incentive to change (plus, the inertia factor is high). 
The AVO system, developed principally for airline use, works well for that 
important and global customer. Hence, what has followed is the formal adoption of 
a similar colour code with slight modification by ICAO.    
 
This chapter has demonstrated how the USGS's VEWS and VALS have evolved through a 
number of volcanic crises, and adapted to changing circumstances including the growing 
number and sophistication of users, and the availability of technology at both local and national 
scales. VALS at the USGS are social constructions driven by local social needs, as the SCOT 
model suggests (Bijker et al., 1987). How these values could be maintained when providing a 
uniform VALS for larger scale users was the toughest question the VHP faced when 
standardising their VALS, particularly given that in Hawaii frequent levels of communication 
between scientists and users rendered the VALS meaningless. The implementation, implications 
and use of the standardised VALS are reviewed within the following empirical chapters, 
providing a window into the operationality of VALS and the usefulness of standardisation as a 
method for managing the many complexities involved.  
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Chapter 5. Managing complexity using a linear system 
  
 
This chapter reviews the capacity of the standardised volcano alert level system (VALS) to 
manage the complex systems involved in volcanic crises, using qualitative data collected during 
the fieldwork. In the first section, the process of standardising the VALS is discussed by 
addressing the difficulties encountered in trying to agree upon the design (i.e. numbers and 
types of levels), and criteria of the VALS between the five diverse observatories and a wide 
range of users, each with different concepts of what a VALS is. The standardisation process is 
analysed using a social constructivist framework, exploring the social factors that played a 
significant role in this process. The second and third section addresses some of the complexities 
that the standardised VALS is unable to cope with in practice including the diversity of physical 
hazards, and organisational complexities of the USGS and users, respectively. In the final 
section, the capability of the standardised VALS to effectively capture and reflect complexities 
to provide warnings, is analysed, raising questions about the ability of a linear VALS to manage 
complex systems that are emergent and adaptive, often with high levels of uncertainty.  
 
The data in this chapter are predominantly taken from interviews conducted with the USGS 
volcano hazards program (VHP) scientists (referred to as 'scientists') at the five different 
observatories in which they are based, and relates specifically to the development and use of the 
VALS. In addition, material from interviews conducted with local, state, and national users of 
the VALS (referred to as 'users') is also incorporated to provide their perspectives of how they 
use the VALS and apply it within their own organisations. A majority of the interviewees have 
worked with the USGS or been involved in volcanic hazards for many years and are able to 
reflect on both the locally developed and the standardised VALS that have been in place at each 
observatory. The experiences of each individual and their involvement with the volcanic crises 
outlined in chapter 4 provide the context from which they shape their views. Often there is 
consensus in the scientists’ opinions across the different observatories, and between the 
observatory scientists and users of the VALS, however, there are some conflicts in opinions that 
raise issues that these groups have to deal with to make the VALS work. Data are also used 
from the archive released under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), including the emails 
of different staff within the VHP discussing the standardisation of the VALS, which provides 
insights into the thinking processes and rationale behind certain decisions. There is no other 
known record of information relating to this process. 
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5.1  Standardisation of the USGS volcano alert level system  
 
Chapter 4 provided a contextual background to the local and national factors that eventually led 
to the standardisation of the volcano alert level system (VALS) at the USGS. This section 
reviews the long and difficult discussions involved in achieving a standardised VALS. 
Obtaining a consensus was the most difficult aspect, partly due to the diverse range in 
observatories, users, and the existence of locally developed VALS. The concept of a VALS is 
explored to establish what VALS are supposed to do, and review whether the design fulfils 
these needs. The implementation of the standardised VALS provided a catalyst for further levels 
of standardisation in associated communication tools. Throughout the whole standardisation 
process, social factors strongly influenced the choices in the design of VALS, demonstrating the 
importance of social contexts above the role of science, making it a challenging process for 
volcano scientists, whose training is in a different approach of pure or applied sciences. 
 
5.1.1  Obtaining consensus  
  
A number of factors contributed towards the need to develop a standardised VALS. Discussions 
were taking place over a proposed national-scale effort by the VHP to ensure that volcanoes are 
monitored at a level commensurate with the threats they pose called the National Volcano Early 
Warning System (NVEWS). Should the NVEWS program be funded (which it was in 2009, as 
discussed in chapter 4), then more volcanoes would be monitored resulting in an increased use 
of the VALS. Email correspondence from a senior HVO staff member to VHP management and 
staff in April 2003 (FOIA archives), stated that the way in which information on volcanic 
activity is communicated is critical to their effectiveness. In addition, the report for USGS 
Science Strategy 2004-2008, suggested one of the five year goals of the VHP should be to 
‘evaluate the effectiveness of existing VHP alert-level notification schemes from unrest and 
eruptions in collaboration with national partners and customers and national and international 
aviation industry’ (VHP USGS, 2003, p.34). For these reasons, and those already outlined in 
chapter 4, the USGS began to investigate the viability of developing a standardised VALS. 
 
In 2003, the need to review the USGS VALS resulted in the VHP team chief scientist putting 
together a panel, the 'standardisation committee', charged with determining if a single alert level 
notification scheme could be developed to cover all possible volcanic hazard scenarios, and if 
no generally-applicable system could be determined, what the next options were (CVO 
manager). The committee consisted of a representative member from each observatory along 
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with the project chief of the World Volcanic Activity and Aviation Hazards project. The panel 
was chaired by a member of staff at CVO (involved in the initial request by emergency 
managers to adopt National Weather Service (NWS) terminology). The requirement to comply 
with other federal agency alert systems and adhere to the U.S. Emergency Alert System (EAS) 
and Common Alert Protocol (CAP) meant that warnings must be technologically advanced 
using specific computer programming (AVO collaborator 2).  
 
The single most contentious aspect of the entire process was the design of the VALS; i.e. how 
many VALS and levels to use, whether to use words or colours, whether the descriptions are 
based just on volcanic activity or forecasts, and the criteria for each alert level. This took much 
longer than expected, due to diverse opinions about how to meet users demands and 
requirements, and about what information the VALS should communicate (CVO manager / 
VHP user – VAAC). At the same time the aviation colour code was under discussion for 
adoption by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), restricting the possible 
designs for a VALS. 
 
The standardisation team initially tested a number of pre-existing (although slightly adapted) 
VALS within the VHP on Cascade volcano coordination groups to obtain some user feedback. 
VALS presented were from CVO, LVO and AVO. The results demonstrated that the 
coordination groups preferred the CVO VALS, but using NWS terminology (of advisory, watch 
and warning), and combined with the AVO code for aviation hazards. Whilst this result may 
have been somewhat biased given the test was conducted with Cascadian users already familiar 
with the CVO VALS, the final VALS design was clearly influenced by these preferences.  
 
In May 2004, based on the test results of the Cascadian coordination groups preference for 
different VALS designs, a white paper written by the standardisation committee reviewed the 
feasibility of a single unified VALS for all U.S. volcanoes (Gardner et al., 2004a). The main 
debate was whether there should be a single VALS used throughout the VHP, rather than 
locally developed ones, to minimise confusion during future eruptions and to avoid the 
development of new VALS by observatories without one i.e. HVO, YVO. The white paper 
reviewed the feasibility of using a single unified VALS for all U.S volcanoes. The rationale for 
designing a single VALS rather than a dual one (with one VALS for aviation users and one for 
ground hazard users) is that ‘some eruptions affect only ground-based communities and others 
only the aviation sector, but explosive eruptions at volcanoes that are near major communities, 
or that are large enough that the ash falls on populated areas, will affect both’ (Gardner et al., 
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2004b, p.38). It was perceived by the standardisation committee that there was more to be 
gained by combining these two user communities with one system, than by having two separate 
systems. The white paper stressed that any proposed system should not disrupt currently 
effective communication protocols between the observatories and their users and partners. A 
unified alert-level notification scheme was put forward based on the VALS the Cascadian 
coordination group preferred (see Table 5.1). Although only one VALS is shown, it was 
designed so that aviation users refer to the colour terms and users involved in ground hazards 
refer to the NWS terms.  
 
There are two important things to note about this proposed VALS. First, at the Watch / Orange 
level, two descriptions were assigned to distinguish between sustained signs of unrest for a 
possible eruption, and an eruption is underway but only poses a localised hazard. Creating a 
fifth level so that each alert level can have a distinct description was disregarded as there is no 
equivalent 'fifth' level in the NWS terminology. Additionally, there was a strong consensus by 
the USGS to avoid confusion with the five tiered U.S. Homeland Security colour-coded system, 
which was regarded as ineffective (HVO scientist 2), as well as the desire to keep the design 
simple. There were also issues about what colour to assign a fifth level as this would require a 
move away from the traffic light system already adopted, known and regarded as effective, 
particularly by the aviation sector (AVO scientist 5). Second, in line with a request from ICAO, 
the 7.5km (25,000ft) boundary between the Orange and Red alert levels was removed, with the 
provision that plume heights should be stated in all alerts. The white paper proposed that, as 
before, any change in alert level should be accompanied with additional activity information and 
potential outcomes via information statements and updates that provide the scientific rationale. 
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Colour Term Description 
Green Normal Normal non-eruptive state; typical background activity 
Yellow Advisory Elevated unrest above known background activity 
Orange Watch Escalating or sustained unrest indicates eruption likely, timeframe 
variable. OR, eruption underway that poses a localized hazard (e.g., lava 
flows, lahars, or hydrothermal activity , or low-altitude ash plumes in 
largely uninhabited areas) 
Red Warning Hazardous eruption is expected within hours or is underway 
 
Table 5.1 Proposed unified alert-level notification scheme (Gardner et al., 2004a, p.2) 
 
In October 2004, as the white paper sat on the VHP team chief scientist’s desk for sign off at 
CVO, Mt. St. Helens began erupting. The massive media interest in the eruption generated 
extraordinary levels of work at CVO and so the white paper was not signed off. Consequently, 
CVO had no choice but to use their old VALS that their users already knew; a crisis is not the 
time to change warning systems as it can generate confusion (CVO manager). During this delay, 
changes were made to the VALS as the debate over the design of the VALS continued and 
became increasingly diverse following the input of different partners and users.  During 2004 
and 2005, discussion focused on whether the VALS should be split into two, a ground and an 
aviation VALS, driven strongly by some members of the standardisation committee, particularly 
those that work within the aviation sector (CVO manager / CVO senior scientist 2). These 
discussions resulted from concerns over only using one VALS; ‘the sticking point was one 
colour really can’t capture activity in the way that is relevant to both ground and aviation’ (VHP 
manager 1). Email correspondence from AVO senior management to the VALS standardisation 
committee in September 2005 (FOIA archives) outlined concern that ground hazard users, and 
the public, would use the colour code instead of the NWS terms, which might create confusion. 
Therefore, the issue that led to the split of the single VALS into two separate VALS appears to 
have been the need to provide a separate tailored product for aviation users, given their financial 
investment into the VHP (particularly at AVO) and their different needs. A pilot needs to access 
warning information quickly due to the fast speeds in aircraft whereas for ground hazard users, a 
lead-time is required to inform and educate the necessary stakeholders.  
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5.1.2  The final design 
 
In March 2006, after three years of long, complex, discussions, the agreed standardised VALS 
was implemented as a dual system. The ground hazard alert notification system reflects the level 
of activity / conditions at the volcano and the expected or ongoing hazardous volcanic 
phenomena using NWS terminology (Table 5.2). The aviation colour code (adopted by ICAO) 
is based on the initial colour code developed by AVO in 1990 (Table 5.3). The description 
associated with each alert level is based only on activity at the volcano; not on the risk, or any 
other hazards that may occur within close proximity of the volcano. For the first time a ‘Watch’ 
was also assigned a dual meaning (like Orange) for both heightened precursory unrest and 
minor eruptive activity, as both require close monitoring but do not necessarily have immediate 
major hazardous effects. Criteria for de-escalating activity were also added into the description. 
The odd thing is that the NWS terms that usually describe meteorological hazards are not used 
to describe the ash hazards influenced by meteorological systems, but the ground hazards (AVO 
collaborator 3). 
  
NORMAL Volcano is in typical background, non-eruptive state 
or, after a change from a higher level, 
volcanic activity has ceased and volcano has returned to non-eruptive 
background state. 
ADVISORY Volcano is exhibiting signs of elevated unrest above known background level  
or, after a change from a higher level, 
volcanic activity has decreased significantly but continues to be closely 
monitored for possible renewed increase. 
WATCH  
 
Volcano is exhibiting heightened or escalating unrest with increased potential of 
eruption, timeframe uncertain, 
OR 
eruption is underway but poses limited hazards.  
WARNING Hazardous eruption is imminent, underway, or suspected. 
 
Table 5.2 Volcano Alert Levels (Gardner and Guffanti, 2006, p.2) 
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GREEN  
 
Volcano is in typical background, non-eruptive state 
or, after a change from a higher level, 
volcanic activity has ceased and volcano has returned to non-eruptive background 
state. 
YELLOW  
 
Volcano is exhibiting signs of elevated unrest above known background level  
or, after a change from a higher level, 
volcanic activity has decreased significantly but continues to be closely monitored 
for possible renewed increase 
ORANGE  
 
Volcano is exhibiting heightened or escalating unrest with increased potential of 
eruption, timeframe uncertain 
 OR  
eruption is underway with no or minor volcanic-ash emissions [ash-plume height 
specified, if possible 
RED  
 
Eruption is imminent with significant emission of volcanic ash into the 
atmosphere likely 
OR  
eruption is underway or suspected with significant emission of volcanic ash into 
the atmosphere [ash-plume height specified, if possible].  
 
Table 5.3 Aviation Colour Codes (Gardner and Guffanti, 2006, p.3) 
 
For most eruptive activity, the ‘alert-level term’ and ‘code colour’ change together (e.g. Yellow 
and Advisory). However, because some volcanic eruptions generate hazards that affect ground 
and aviation communities differently, the VHP decided that in these cases the alert level and 
colour code can move independently:  
 
For example, an eruption of a lava flow that threatens a community but produces 
no significant ash might warrant a volcano alert level of Warning but an aviation 
colour code of Orange. On the other hand, an eruption that produces a huge cloud 
of volcanic ash that does not drift over inhabited areas might warrant a volcano 
alert level of Watch and an aviation colour code of Red (Gardner and Guffanti, 
2006, p.4). 
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The USGS argued that decoupling the top two levels of both VALS created the flexibility 
needed to accommodate end members in the spectrum of volcanic activity; lava flows and large 
ash clouds. Whilst this created flexibility in the use of the VALS, there was concern that this 
might lead to inconsistencies between the volcano observatories that could create confusion for 
the users and the public. 
 
The final decision to split the VALS was not unanimous. Staff at AVO were not keen since they 
used the colour codes for ground hazards, as they rarely deal with volcanic activity that affects 
large populations, other than from ash. In contrast, HVO favoured the split as it gave them the 
flexibility to be at Warning / Orange should Kilauea or Mauna Loa have lava flows that affect 
large populations but have minimal ash emissions (HVO senior scientist 4). Splitting the VALS 
into two was seen to provide more flexibility to accommodate not only different volcanic 
hazards, but eruptive styles, and ground and aviation based user communities. 
 
AVO was the first observatory to adopt the new mandated VALS since they already operated 
the aviation code. On 1st October 2006, CVO adopted the new VALS as Mt. St. Helens became 
stable enough to change VALS without confusing users; it was assigned Watch / Orange. No 
formal notices about the change in VALS were issued, and there was minimal coverage by the 
media (CVO user – media), which is perhaps a reflection of the public’s lack of interest in 
VALS. Later in 2006, HVO, LVO and YVO adopted the VALS, although LVO were less keen 
to adopt a new VALS having just redesigned their VALS in 2002 (LVO senior scientist 1). Each 
observatory had responsibility for educating their relevant users and populations of the 
standardised VALS. 
 
In order to educate users and the public, a USGS Fact Sheet was produced (Gardner and 
Guffanti, 2006) that outlined the new VALS, the underlying rationale for standardisation and 
how they operate. The four key requirements for the VALS were summarise as being able to: '1) 
accommodate various sizes, styles, and duration of volcanic activity; 2) work equally well 
during escalating and de-escalating activity; 3) be equally useful to both those on the ground 
and those aviation; and 4) retain and improve effective existing alert notification protocols' 
(Gardner and Guffanti, 2006, p.1). Section 5.2 addresses the ability of the VALS to 
accommodate different volcanic activity and hazards, but it is important to note that these four 
requirements focus largely on the volcanoes’ activity and do not address issues of risk.  
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5.1.3  Definition and concept 
 
Although the USGS are mandated to provide warnings, whether these warnings should take into 
account local social, political and economic considerations is contested between the scientists. 
VALS are difficult to define because terms such as risk, hazard, activity, warning, alert and 
concern are often used interchangeably by scientists and users. This, in part, is the result of 
unclear definitions of these terms within the disaster management community, but also because 
of the close nature of these terms and the difficulty in separating science, uncertainty and risk 
(see chapter 2).  
 
Defining what a VALS does is critical to establishing whether or not it is serving its purpose, 
and to determine if stakeholders (scientists, users and other actors) share a common 
understanding. The general consensus from all interviewees indicated that the purpose of a 
VALS is to alert the users, communities, individuals, and operators as to what the state of the 
volcano is in a short, concise, brief manner to which they can gear their responses (AVO senior 
scientist 1 / HVO scientist 1). Therefore, VALS are regarded as a tool to communicate quickly, 
excluding technical details, about the nature of unrest and possible hazards, so that in one word, 
such as ‘Red’, a large and diverse range of people know what the conditions are (HVO scientist 
2). There is a common understanding between stakeholders that an alert level alone cannot 
provide all the information required for users to make decisions. They are seen as a flag or 
semaphore to raise awareness by providing  a ‘heads up, pay attention, something has changed, 
you need to look at reports, updates for information statements, or listen to advice from federal 
agencies’ (CVO Senior Scientist 2). This implies that VALS are only able to communicate what 
volcanic activity is occurring. A scientist in the standardisation committee outlines the purpose 
of VALS in three key parts; as a ranking system, that is volcano-centric and used to 
communicate with non-volcanologists. 
 
It is a ranking system, so you have a way to describe change, either in terms of 
increasing intensity or decreasing intensity. It is primarily to describe conditions at 
or near the vent of a volcano, it is not to generalise about hazard levels everywhere 
because they vary depending on where you are in relation to the volcano. It has to 
be about the volcano, volcano-centric. It’s a ranking system, and it is a way to 
speak to non-volcanologists (VHP manager 1). 
 
Generating a specific definition for a VALS proved far more challenging than establishing its 
purpose. As with designing a VALS, defining them begins to reveal the complexities involved 
in how they function in theory and in practice. Section 5.3.2 explores some of the emerging 
Chapter 5. Managing Complexity 
 
167 
 
issues from users relating to defining and designing VALS, that demonstrate why the process of 
standardisation was such a difficult and time consuming process.  
 
The USGS Factsheet on the standardisation of VALS states that: ‘by themselves alert-level 
terms and code colours do not convey enough information for those in affected communities 
and aviation to make decisions regarding specific courses of actions’ (Gardner and Guffanti, 
2006, p.4) therefore, there is a clear need to provide supplementary information. One of the 
longest debates during the standardisation process was establishing the exact wording of the 
criteria or description for each alert level (CVO senior scientist 2). However, the description 
appears to be less meaningful in practice given that supplementary information is provided. This 
is further evidenced by additional levels of standardisation in warning messages that accompany 
the alert level, and in producing visual representation of the alert levels, which is reviewed 
below. 
 
5.1.4  Further levels of standardisation 
 
Once the new standardised VALS was implemented, a number of knock-on changes were made 
to retain and improve effective existing alert notification protocols. Since VALS cannot operate 
in isolation, it was a logical progression that the messages that accompany an alert level would 
also be standardised. Most of the volcano observatories already issued a number of information 
statements reviewing: significant changes in activity; status reports (current, daily, weekly, 
other); and summary reports that recap ongoing events, forecast scenarios, special hazard 
statements, and announcement in changes in procedures, formats, protocols, or capabilities (see 
chapter 7 for further details).  
 
Led by AVO, which had the most resources available to review and launch computer and web-
based products, the VHP developed more consistent messages by consolidating previous 
formats into three categories: event driven (urgent) messages designed specifically to fulfil 
users’ requirements using a Volcano Observatory Notice for Aviation (VONA) for the aviation 
users and a Volcano Alert Notification (VAN) for ground hazard focused users; time driven 
(scheduled) status messages; and general information statements (USGS VHP, 2007, Guffanti et 
al., 2007). Additional information is provided within the VANs and VONAs to comply with the 
Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) guidelines. These messages are available via a Volcano 
Notification Service (VNS), modelled on the USGS Earthquake Notification System. By 
providing a more systematic database with specific input fields, it was possible for the USGS to 
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improve messages and make them quicker to disseminate. In contrast, HVO wanted to maintain 
their individual prose styles in information statements (HVO senior scientist 5). 
 
In 2007, as part of the roll out of the National Volcano Early Warning System (NVEWS), a 
technical information product sub-group identified demand for a number of map-based hazard 
information products (Guffanti et al., 2007). Senior levels of federal agency management and 
government requested a webpage to show the current alert level status of each volcano in the 
U.S., using a map, with clear links to current monitoring data and further information 
(particularly for high threat volcanoes). In response, the VHP redesigned their website, and 
designed an interactive map showing the volcanoes and their current alert levels (Fig. 5.1). 
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Figure 5.1 Volcano status map (VHP Website, 2009b)
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This raised the issue of how to represent the alert levels on a map. A number of icons were 
developed to represent each level: ‘N’ was used for Normal and ‘A’ for Advisory, but Watch 
and Warning were assigned a watchful eye and an exclamation mark respectively to distinguish 
between the two ‘W’s’ (Fig. 5.2). These icons were developed by staff at the Menlo Park, 
following only limited discussion with the standardisation committee, and are becoming 
established as shorthand for the alert levels. It is interesting that the development of the alert 
level icons involved much less consultation than for the initial VALS (YVO scientist). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Icons for USGS Volcanic Activity Alert-Notification System (VHP Website, 2009a) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Allowed combinations for volcano updates using te standard volcano icons (VHP 
Website, 2009a) 
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A key question that emerges is whether or not the design of the standardised VALS is adequate 
to fulfil the concept and purpose of a VALS. The standardised design is based on prior designs 
of VALS used at AVO, CVO and LVO, and, therefore, there are no radical changes in the 
design for these observatories. It follows a linear progression reflecting increasing levels of 
volcanic activity in four different alert levels. Given that the perceived consensual purpose of a 
VALS is to obtain the attention of users or stakeholders so they can quickly gauge what is 
happening at the volcano, VALS may be successful at getting attention, but without additional 
information they appear less useful (explored further in chapter 7). 
 
5.1.5  The social construction of VALS  
 
On reflection, the decisions made about the final design of the standardised VALS were 
significantly different from what was agreed following the 2004 white paper. Only a small 
number of staff were involved in these final decisions, partly because of pressure from USGS 
directors to have something in place following slow progress. Throughout the whole discussion 
process it was clear that the final design was constrained by a number of set requirements such 
as the use of the AVO VALS. A quote from one of the key scientists involved in the process at 
CVO summarises the strong influences on the design: 
 
We didn't have a completely blank slate to work with, we couldn't hatch our own 
system from scratch. We were working in the context, and the context was that 
there is this colour code that the aviation industry had adopted and there was this 
National Weather Service code that not only a lot of ground-based managers 
adopted, but apparently also wanted us to use, and so given those two things I don't 
really see that we have a choice (CVO scientist 3). 
 
This quote indicates that the VALS design was not driven by what would be seen as the ‘best’ 
design in terms of providing a volcanic warning, based on scientific knowledge and the 
capabilities and resources involved. In contrast, the process was dominated by the demands of 
the users of the VALS, and their relationship with the volcano observatories (e.g. Cascade 
emergency managers) and the USGS as an institution (e.g. aviation sector). The pressure to 
accommodate aviation demands due to the financial benefits that the aviation sector provided to 
the VHP was of key importance at a time, post-9/11, when all Federal Agencies were feeling the 
Bush Administration’s squeeze on funding resources (CVO manager / LVO senior scientist 1). 
The pressure for the VHP to adopt common and widespread terminology along with the 
increasing use of NWS terms (at the time also adopted for tsunami warnings) was logical. 
However, volcanic hazards are very different from meteorological ones, and the NWS bases its 
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warnings on probabilities. As the general levels of volcanic activity is insufficient to allow 
development of such probabilistic models (as discussed in chapter 2), the NWS terms in the 
VALS are used in a different way from that of meteorological hazards (discussed in section 
5.3.2).  
 
The pressures to accommodate users’ institutional needs and demands demonstrate that VALS 
are a socially constructed system, designed around the social and political requirements at the 
time of discussion. The VALS standardisation process is constructed by the choices made in the 
design and the way it evolved, that were predominantly based on social factors (Bijker et al., 
1987). First, the rationale for rejection of numerous designs of the VALS was based on social 
reasons, not on the physical characteristics of volcanic activity and hazards; second, the design 
was based on what was seen as ‘best’ for the users (CVO scientist 11); third it was seen as ‘best’ 
for the USGS to accommodate their users rather than develop their own system (CVO senior 
scientist 2); finally, whilst there were competing designs for the VALS all with the potential to 
provide slightly different solutions to the problem, it was the social factors that determined the 
selected design. The process of developing a technological artefact (in this case the VALS) 
reflects a multidirectional rather than traditional linear model, where the ‘successful’ stages in 
the development are not the only possible ones. The standardised VALS is an example of a 
socially constructed system that was not a linear process, but multidirectional, with competing 
models and differing user requirements.  
 
Since aviation and ground hazard users have very different contexts in which they use VALS 
(shaped by their institutional and organisational requirements), it seemed logical to separate the 
two elements, maintaining ‘interpretative flexibility’ (Bijker et al., 1987, p.27;47). By 
establishing two VALS rather than one it was possible to accommodate the key different groups 
involved with their different requirements, by using different designs and enabling decoupling 
of the highest two alert levels. At this point, the closure in the debate over the VALS design 
occurred rhetorically; when the scientists and two key user groups saw the problem as being 
solved. Closure on a design is not permanent, as seen from the change in the VALS from the 
white paper in 2004 to that established in 2006, as changes in the user groups, policy, or 
confusion / lack of understanding or flexibility could drive the VALS design to change (as seen 
historically at LVO). In the future, it may be that advanced technologies or warning systems 
could cause conflict as further standardisation occurs within the U.S. or on a global scale. One 
of the key tests to show the success in the design of the standardised VALS will be the next 
large volcanic crisis in the U.S. The rest of this chapter discusses the implementation and 
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experiences of using the standardised VALS so far and addresses some of the emerging 
complexities.  
 
 
5.2 The inherent complexity of volcanic hazards 
 
The design of the standardised VALS is based on a linear model, where increasing volcanic 
activity leads to a rise in volcano alert level, and a respective drop in alert level for decreasing 
volcanic activity. Application of the standardised system at the observatories between 2006 and 
2008 (when this research was conducted), has already encountered a number of limitations that 
affect its ability to provide an effective warning. This section reviews one of the key complex 
issues that emerge from the data that the standardised VALS are unable to reflect: the 
complexity of volcanic behaviour and hazards. This section first explores the implementation of 
the VALS at the observatories; second, how time and space affects how VALS operate; third, 
the development of hazard specific warning systems; and finally, the implications of using the 
volcano-centric standardised VALS are discussed. Issues relating to organisational complexities 
such as USGS and VHP institutional issues, and those of users are addressed in section 5.3. All 
these issues contributed to the difficulty in establishing the standardised design and in defining a 
VALS. In practice, the elements VALS attempt to manage and communicate are much more 
complex. 
 
5.2.1  Using the standardised VALS to convey hazards 
 
Initially the standardised VALS was intended to be sufficiently flexible to permit interpretation 
by each observatory: 
 
I don’t think an effort was made to standardise from observatory to observatory the 
criteria for colours, it was very much left to the local observatory and that in part 
was done to satisfy each observatory's concern about the legacy of communications 
with their local populations and so folks want to retain whatever flavour or practice 
they had in place (AVO senior scientist 2). 
 
The final design was intentionally designed to enable the flexibility required by the 
observatories to cater for local hazards and volcanoes by de-coupling. Yet, the new VALS 
raised a number of problems, predominantly at HVO, which had no prior experience of using a 
VALS. HVO had to assign active volcanoes an alert level and discuss them at science meetings, 
Chapter 5. Managing Complexity 
 
174 
 
                                                     
which they had never done before. One HVO scientist said ‘all of a sudden we are debating 
about what colour Mauna Loa should be rather than focusing on the science and what it means’ 
(HVO scientist 2) (author’s emphasis). These initial debates to assign alert levels took up a lot 
of time: for example when assigning Mauna Loa an alert level conflict arose because, although 
it had shown signs of unrest in recent years, staff who had worked at other observatories felt it 
did not warrant a Yellow / Advisory alert level since it gave little scope to issue a higher alert 
level should further abnormal activity occur. There was clear conflict between those scientists at 
HVO who had worked with VALS before and understood the strategic aspects of how VALS 
work, and those that had no experience with them and used the description of the VALS as a 
strict criterion, indicating that how they work in practice, is not the same as how they operate on 
paper (HVO scientist 2). Another major problem at HVO was assigning Kilauea an alert level. 
Given the large scale of the volcano, with several eruptions occurring in different locations 
(both on the summit and east rift) they discussed developing VALS for different parts of the 
volcano, although this was never developed (HVO scientist 2). There was also confusion about 
using the ground and aviation VALS because Kilauea does not emit much ash, certainly not 
enough to affect anything other than local tourist aircraft that fly around the volcano. However, 
because Kilauea is erupting continually, it has to be at alert level Orange / Watch, even though 
ash levels were negligible (prior to the Halema’uma’u Crater in 2008). It was not possible to 
assign Yellow / Watch because the standardised VALS only enable decoupling on the top two 
alert levels (HVO senior scientist 6). Since in Hawaii, emergency agencies are generally not 
concerned about Kilauea's activity unless there is some new or anomalous behaviour, or lava 
flows are heading towards populated areas or tourist sites, the alert level loses its meaning as it 
never changes and is unable to relay the urgency of new information locally (HVO scientist 2). 
For all these reasons many scientists and the local users at HVO felt VALS were useful for 
strato-volcano12 types, but less so for large calderas like Kilauea (HVO scientist 2). 
 
At AVO there have been a number of volcanic crises that posed a risk to aviation, yet very little 
risk to local ground populations, as the area is uninhabited. Despite much debate at AVO, 
however, the VALS have never been decoupled to reflect this difference in risk because some 
scientists argue there is always the risk that someone may be close to the volcano, fishing, or 
camping for example (AVO senior scientist 2 / AVO senior scientist 5). The new standardised 
VALS is forcing AVO to think more about ground hazards than before, and the decision not to 
decouple the VALS means that AVO do not wish to take advantage of the flexibility that has 
12 A strato-volcano, is a tall conical volcano built by strata from previous eruptive activity. These 
volcanoes typically display periodic explosive activity, and there are a number of them in the Cascades 
region in the U.S. 
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been offered to them, as it could create problems should people be killed because they did not 
issue the appropriate alert level. This demonstrates that scientists at AVO are keen to follow a 
precautionary approach for accountability reasons. In contrast to HVO and AVO, CVO and 
LVO have not had many concerns with the new standardised VALS, other than adjusting to the 
new terms, because it is similar to what was in place before (LVO user - Mammoth Lakes 
town). 
 
The problems faced by each observatory may be seen as ‘teething pains’ but they highlight the 
difficulties of using a standardised VALS rather than a locally developed one that can 
accommodate local contingencies. Whilst the VALS has been designed to decouple the top two 
alert levels to provide more flexibility, it is not being made use of at AVO, and at HVO there is 
a demand to make the VALS decouple even further since eruptive activity at Kilauea is 
regarded as normal activity. All these inconsistencies indicate that to make a standardised 
VALS work at each observatory is very difficult, and is not working as well as hoped. 
 
5.2.2  The spatial and temporal complexity of volcanic hazards  
 
The standardised VALS has two systems, both relating to eruptive activity at the volcano, but 
focusing specifically on ash and eruptive hazards (i.e. lava and pyroclatic flows). However, 
there are numerous hazards that can occur within close proximity of a volcano, whether it is 
active or not, and these occur in different locations (geographically) and at different times. 
Many of these hazards are excluded from the standardised VALS, which relates only to the 
occurrence of eruptive activity at the volcano.  Many scientists felt that VALS should convey 
information about all volcanic hazards, whether they are proximal to the volcano i.e. volcano-
centric, or distal. They recognise that in practice this is very difficult to implement within the 
confines of a simple VALS. Some scientists were unsure whether VALS should represent 
volcanic hazards that can occur when the volcano is inactive such as landslides or lahars. 
However, the main rationale for limiting the VALS to being volcano-centric is that conveying 
spatial and temporal aspects of a hazard with one alert level is difficult and can change over 
time. A good example is provided by the 1999 eruption of Pichincha in Ecuador, on which the 
USGS Volcano Disaster Assistance Program (VDAP) team worked. The volcano sent a plume 
of ash to over 7.5km (25,000ft) and affected three communities: the aviation community who 
were concerned with the ash plume of moderate concern (an Orange alert); the towns of Nano 
and Yaya, 10-20km from the summit that were evacuated due to high concern from pyroclastic 
flows (a Red alert); and Quito City upwind of the activity that would receive a light dusting of 
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ash of low concern (a Yellow alert). With three different levels of concern, but only one alert 
level to issue, how is an alert level decided? Despite the claim that VALS are about the user's 
needs, in practice this does not seem to be the case; the risks vary spatially. One VHP manager 
stated that to make a VALS work, it has to be volcano-centric: 
 
If you make [VALS] a level of concern, hazard concern strictly, then which group 
are you talking about? That's why you have to make it primarily […] about what’s 
happening at the volcano (VHP manager 1). 
 
Timing is critical when issuing an alert level; equally, an alert level implies the time frame in 
which a hazard may be expected. Some scientists said information should be provided as soon 
as possible, by changing the alert level to reflect new information; others said the timing needs 
to be strategic, either to provide further scientific certainty or accommodate the needs of the 
local community or users. Each observatory requires resources to provide a timely alert level. 
Email correspondence from senior AVO staff to the standardisation committee in July 2005 
(FOIA archives) stated that ‘a major determinant of the colour-coded changes for short-lived 
events is how fast you can make the decision and disseminate information’. To help make 
warnings faster the process is streamlined with fill-in-the blanks information releases ready to 
go (i.e. VAN and VONA messages). The VALS used previously at LVO had an assigned 
timeframe for each alert level to prevent ‘yo-yoing’ (VHP manager 6) between alert levels as 
volcanic activity changed, yet this was not adopted in the standardised VALS, presumably to 
facilitate greater flexibility. Email correspondence between a CVO staff member and the 
standardisation committee in March 2003 (FOIA archives) highlighted that ‘ultimately the time 
frames most important are the ones that encompass times required for critical mitigatory action, 
such as how long it takes to evacuate the area’. These local contingencies are discussed further 
in chapter 7, and raise questions about who is the expert in deciding when to change alert level, 
and how do scientists and users cope with issues relating to incertitude? 
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5.2.3 Warning systems for specific volcanic hazards 
 
As reviewed in chapter 1, the different characteristics of each hazard can affect populations at 
varying distances from the volcano and, often it is not possible to monitor the likelihood or 
potential for a hazard event until it happens. Some scientists expressed the view that a warning 
can only be truly issued after the event has begun (CVO collaborator 2), therefore the only way 
to measure if a lahar has developed, or where an ash cloud is moving, is to monitor them 
individually. Therefore a number of the observatories have developed independent alert level 
systems for different hazards that require specifically tailored warning systems given the nature 
of the hazard. The adapted warning systems are presented below. 
 
Volcanic gases resulting from volcanic unrest or activity can kill, but for many they are an 
unpleasant smell and can cause respiratory problems. Following a small explosion in March 
2008 at Halema’uma’u Crater (Kilauea summit), a vent was created that continues (to date of 
writing) to emit a plume of highly concentrated sulphur dioxide (SO2) volcanic gas, and some 
ash, which can cause vog; a term used to describe a haze caused by gases being emitted into the 
air and mixing with water vapour and sulphur particles. The focus of HVO activities shifted 
from destructive lava flows to local ash aviation hazards and concern over public health safety 
from the high concentration of sulphur dioxide in the plume. In response, HVO, with Kilauea 
National Park, established a sulphur dioxide alert level system to reflect the level of sulphur 
dioxide within the park for the safety of employees (and visitors), based on Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA) safety standards (Hawaii Volcanoes National Park, 2008), 
(HVO scientist 1). However, the sulphur dioxide also affects local populations outside the 
National Park, including the island capital Hilo and even Honolulu on Oahu Island during 
strong trade winds. The populations around the volcano placed pressure on the Hawaiian civil 
defense to develop an alert level for the gas since it poses a health risk (Hawaii State Dept. of 
Health and County Civil Defense, 2008), (HVO user – emergency manager 1). In response, they 
developed an alert level based on the U.S. Federal Agency of Health alert system. 
Consequently, there are now two different codes for sulphur dioxide levels, which are shown 
below in Table 5.4 and 5.5. Both alert systems use a colour code to represent the levels of 
concern (HVO considered colours as less confusing than numbers or using words), but 
unfortunately using two different models generated confusion for the public (HVO user – 
emergency manager 1). At the time of research, HVO focused more on the sulphur dioxide alert 
system, than the VALS, as the issue of sulphur dioxide affected the local population's quality of 
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life more than that of lava flows. This clearly indicates the inability to adapt the VALS for 
important and ongoing hazards, to the extent that HVO developed their own system. 
 
Condition  Recommended Response  
GREEN  
Trace  
Sensitive Groups: Highly sensitive individuals may be affected at these levels  
Everyone else: Potential health effects not expected.  
YELLOW  
Light  
Sensitive Groups: Avoid outdoor activity  
Everyone else: Potential health effects not expected, however actions to reduce 
exposure to vog may be useful  
ORANGE  
Moderate  
Sensitive Groups: Avoid outdoor activity and remain indoors  
Everyone else: Potential health effects not expected, however actions to reduce 
exposure to vog may be useful  
RED  
High  
Sensitive Groups: Avoid outdoor activity and remain indoors  
People experiencing respiratory-related health effects: Consider leaving the area  
Everyone else: Avoid outdoor activity  
PURPLE  
Extreme  
Sensitive Groups as well as everyone else: Avoid outdoor activity and remain 
indoors  
People experiencing respiratory-related health effects: Leave the area and seek 
medical help  
Everyone: Leave the area if directed by Civil Defense  
Table 5.4  Sulphur dioxide information. Sensitive groups include children, and individuals with 
pre-existing respiratory conditions such as asthma, bronchitis, emphysema, lung or heart disease 
(Hawaii State Dept. of Health and County Civil Defense, 2008) 
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Condition Response Gas Levels 
GREEN 
(Good) 
Business as usual <300 ppb 
YELLOW 
(moderate) 
Basic protective actions 
Dispatcher alerts staff 
Inform visitors of hazard 
>300 ppb 2x15-min 
averages 
ORANGE 
(unhealthy-for sensitive 
groups) 
Moderate protective actions 
Relocate/cancel nature walks and other 
outdoor work 
>500 ppb 15-minute 
average 
RED 
(unhealthy) 
Extended protective actions 
Consider closing entrance station and 
Visitor Centres 
>1000 ppb 15-minute 
average 
 
Table 5.5 Sulphur dioxide advisory levels (gas levels are determined by the Air Quality Index 
by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) (Hawaii Volcanoes National Park, 2008). Within 
the last year, two further levels have been added: Very Unhealthy ≥ 3 ppm 15-minute average 
(colour purple), and Hazardous ≥ 5 ppm (colour burgundy) 
 
At LVO, volcanic gases are also an important focus, being one of the few volcanic hazards that 
has killed people in the caldera. In 2006, three ski patrol staff died of carbon dioxide (CO2) 
poisoning when they fell into a fumerole that had melted through the snow (LVO user – 
Mammoth Lakes town 2 / LVO user – emergency manager 1). The popular Horseshoe Lake on 
the south side of Mammoth Mountain is monitored for carbon dioxide following 170 acres of 
tree kill in the area in 1990 (Sorey et al., 1996), (LVO senior scientist 1). There is a clear 
demand by locally affected populations to provide warnings about dangerous levels of gases. At 
both HVO and LVO the predominant hazard encountered on a daily basis is gas, yet this hazard 
is not reflected in the VALS as it does not necessarily relate to eruptive behaviour.  
 
Lahars pose a serious threat since they can travel at velocities up to 80 kph down valleys 
towards populated areas, usually facilitating a warning of less than an hour in which to evacuate 
vulnerable populations (Scott et al., 2001). As a result, rapid warning systems have been 
specifically designed for lahars (Lockhart and Murray, 2004). At CVO, this is a significant 
concern since large lahars have occurred on many of the Cascade volcanoes, travelling 
significant distances, some greater than 50km over what is now highly populated or 
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industrialised land. One example is the Electron Mudflow, a lahar derived from slope failure on 
the west flank of Mount Rainier about 600 years ago (Crandell, 1971), that has not been 
correlated with an eruption of the volcano, which suggests that lahars may occur even without 
volcanic activity from loose debris on the volcano. This mudflow was more than 30 meters deep 
where it entered the Puget Sound, not far from the City of Seattle. Should this event happen 
again it would be devastating for the populations in the volcano’s valleys, and impact the large 
industrial areas in the Puget Sound affecting critical infrastructure along the West Coast of the 
U.S. Therefore, there was a need to bring together scientific expertise, with an understanding of 
the vulnerable populations, infrastructure and businesses to develop effective warnings, and 
encourage a precautionary approach towards a lahar. 
 
VALS cannot usefully be applied to lahar hazards for three reasons: first, they are difficult to 
forecast; second, they can occur in the absence of eruption; and third, a volcano could be at 
Advisory / Yellow alert level yet a lahar could be generated. Acoustic Flow Monitors (AFMs) 
have been developed to detect lahars using seismic signatures for large flows that trigger a 
warning (Dorava and Meyer, 1994). They are designed with a ‘dead man’ which is a log in the 
river, released in the flow and then detected further downstream to make sure that the warning is 
not false i.e. just triggered by an animal or flooding. The responsibility for issuing these 
warnings lies with NWS since they have the communication infrastructure and staff 24 hours a 
day to facilitate the quick response needed, which the USGS cannot support (CVO scientist 9). 
 
AFMs are installed at a number of volcanoes around the world and provide a vital warning 
system for debris hazards that, historically, have caused over 50 percent of all fatalities in 
volcanic eruptions since 1902 (EM-DAT, 2008). In addition, to understand the possible routes 
lahars may take down a volcano, various models have been developed to simulate the 
typography and possible flow routes and speeds. The USGS model, Lahar-Z, has been used all 
around the globe to establish where to place AFM’s and where vulnerable populations are 
located (Schilling, 1998). 
 
Significant ash eruptions can produce plumes stretching vast distances, and with strong winds 
ash clouds can travel independently of the plume, yet remain an aviation hazard. Whilst ash 
clouds are partly the responsibility of the NWS and the VAACs, the University of Alaska 
Fairbanks developed the ‘PUFF’ model, a volcanic ash tracking model that shows the 
distribution of ash given current meteorological conditions or forecasts, aiding flight planners 
for flight routes (Mastin et al., 2009, Webley and Mastin, 2009, Webley et al., 2009). The PUFF 
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model is used by the Alaskan NWS and VAAC, and the U.S. Air Force Weather Agency 
(AFWA). Therefore, in the case of ash, numerous agencies work together to provide a warning, 
bringing together different warning systems and models, and differing levels of expertise and 
technology. 
 
Ash can also affect ground populations, significant distances from the volcano, as seen from the 
eruption of Mt. St. Helens where Yakima city, 90km from the volcano, received 100-130mm of 
ash (Tilling et al., 1990). AVO and the Anchorage NWS have worked together to draft and 
propose a matrix of ash-fall severities to be used in standard warning messages (see Table 5.6). 
This matrix links accumulations of ash with impact thresholds (such as roof collapse, or roads 
impossible to drive on). Using NWS products (i.e. ash fall statements, advisories, and warnings) 
this information is issued providing guidance, with each of the five levels of ash warning, 
encouraging people to take some action such as remain indoors or protect electronics.  
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Term Accumulation 
(mm) 
Impact thresholds NWS products Key call to action elements 
Trace or 
dusting 
<0.8mm Minor irritant, very low impacts for most Special Weather Statements (SPS), Public 
Information Statements (PNS), Marine Weather 
Statements (MWS) 
Avoid excessive exposure to ash which is an eye and 
respiratory irritant. Those with respiratory 
sensitivities should take extra precautions  
Light 0.8-6.4mm Possible crop / animal, equipment / 
infrastructure problems; widespread clean 
up likely 
Ash fall advisory (NPW, ZFP, CWF), Marine 
Weather Statements (MWS) 
Protect electronics and air intakes. Minimise driving 
and listen to your local radio stations for further info 
Moderate 6.4mm -  
25.4mm 
Ash removal efforts significant Ash fall advisory (NPW, ZFP, CWF), Marine 
Weather Statements (MWS) 
Seal windows and doors. Avoid driving and listen to 
your local radio stations for further info 
Heavy 25.4 mm- 
100mm 
Weaker roofs begin collapse at ~100mm Ash fall advisory (NPW, ZFP, CWF), Special 
Marine Warning (SWS) 
Remain indoors unless absolutely necessary and 
listen to your local radio stations for further info 
Very heavy 100- 
300mm 
Roof collapse, damage to trees, services 
interrupted 
Ash fall advisory (NPW, ZFP, CWF), Special 
Marine Warning (SWS) 
Remain indoors unless absolutely necessary and 
listen to your local radio stations for further info 
Severe >300mm Roads impassable, severe infrastructure 
damage, heavy biotic loss 
Ash fall advisory (NPW, ZFP, CWF), Special 
Marine Warning (SWS) 
Remain indoors unless absolutely necessary and 
listen to your local radio stations for further info 
 
Table 5.6 A draft proposed matrix of ashfall severities to be used in standard warning messages (Neal et al., 2006). N.B. Some of the size categories are not mutually 
exclusive. 
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Volcanic hydrothermal activity is regularly encountered at the calderas of Long Valley and 
Yellowstone. Both observatories monitor activity from geysers and nearby rivers and evaluate 
the chemical composition of the waters as an indication of potential volcanic unrest or activity. 
At LVO there has been recent attention at a new small geyser in Hot Creek River near 
Mammoth Lakes town, which caused some deaths  and some severe burns among careless, 
often drunk swimmers in the river (LVO user - USFS). The area is now closed off and is 
monitored closely by the U.S. Forest Service staff. Once more, the VALS does not cover 
hydrothermal hazards, which are particularly abundant in large calderas, and can pose safety 
concerns, particularly at a significant tourist location such as Yellowstone National Park.  
 
On a larger scale, many volcanoes in Alaska are islands or are near coastlines, so that when 
either pyroclastic or debris flows occur, the material produced can displace water creating 
significant tsunamis. Tsunamis are detected by a tsunami warning system (TWS) operated by 
the NWS who issue an advisory, watch or warning (NOAA NWS, 2010). It is the responsibility 
of the NWS to issue tsunami alerts, although they collaborate with the USGS prior to any 
volcano-related tsunami alert issuance to clarify details. Secondary volcanic hazards are often 
issued by other agencies who have developed a number of specific warning systems to cope 
with the spatial and temporal factors involved. This indicates the difficulty for a single VALS to 
encompass the wide range of hazards that occur, given that other federal agencies also have 
mandates to warn of these hazards. Volcanic hazards are complex because they are diverse, 
have secondary effects, and cut across the boundaries in institutions that are responsible for their 
monitoring.  
 
5.2.4  The implications of a volcano-centric alert level system 
 
From the above information, it is clear that the standardised VALS only represents eruptive 
volcanic activity, mainly lava flows or pyroclastic flows or ash, near the volcano. In addition, 
many volcanic hazards have their own alert / warning system or modelling tools to provide 
warnings or forecasts. This raises the question of how useful is a VALS when it only represents 
a proportion of the possible hazards? A scientist at CVO stated that in the future it is likely that 
VALS will need to review the many flow hazards that volcanoes generate: 
  
We are heading to an alert level system that deals with eruption behaviour 
involving the intrusion of hot rock, to viewing volcanoes as the sites of origin of 
catastrophic flows that can occur anytime and escalated risks that won’t be fully 
incorporated into our system of escalating alert levels (CVO scientist 4). 
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The scientists still see a role for a standardised VALS, despite the legal responsibility other 
agencies have to issue warnings for some volcanic-related hazards, because a volcano's activity 
remains the primary focus for the other alert or warning systems, given that a majority of 
hazards correlate to volcanic activity. Restless caldera activity is the most common exception to 
the rule, where every day smaller non-eruptive hazards can still significantly affect the quality 
of life for local populations.  
 
The ability to determine criteria for each alert level is complex, as demonstrated from the 
aforementioned example from HVO to assign alert levels to Kilauea and Mauna Loa. Each 
volcano has its own behaviour patterns or 'character' as the scientists described it (AVO scientist 
9), making it difficult to use standard monitoring parameters to judge the volcano’s level of 
activity. Background activity for one volcano, such as Veniaminof (Alaskan peninsula), 
includes significant seismic tremors, which if seen at neighbouring volcanoes would be highly 
concerning (AVO scientist 6). Therefore, it is important that the scientists get to know the 
volcano and its 'normal' behaviour to determine any abnormal activity that may lead to a 
discussion about changing an alert level; this could be regarded as tacit knowledge. Local 
scientific knowledge is important and there needs to be some flexibility when assigning 
appropriate alert levels. For the scientists at AVO, establishing background activity levels can 
often be challenging as not all the volcanoes have adequate monitoring equipment, or 
capabilities given their remote locations. Severe weather frequently damages equipment, and 
cloud coverage can prevent satellite images confirming a volcano is erupting, which can leave 
AVO scientists with little data on which to base their assessments of what is happening at the 
volcano. Equally, volcanoes can behave in ways not observed before, such as the lateral blast 
seen at Mt. St. Helens in 1980. These ‘black swan’ events (see chapter 2) occasionally surprise 
the actors in a VALS.  
 
The unique individual behaviour of a volcano, each with a diverse range of hazards makes 
monitoring, understanding the activity, and issuing a warning for a volcano alert a highly 
complex process. A key problem highlighted by a scientist at YVO is that ‘there needs to be 
flexibility because nature is continuous, and when we make discreet 'bins' to put natural activity 
into, we sometimes don’t do a good job’ (YVO collaborator). Categorising nature into these 
'bins', effectively one of the four alert levels, creates a dilemma since ‘more bins make it more 
complicated, and fewer bins give you more times when activity doesn’t really meet the criteria 
that you have established’ (AVO scientist 3). A vast majority of the scientists identified with 
this problem but defended the use of the standardised VALS as the best possible solution for the 
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problem of volcanic warnings, given available time and resources; it is ‘an implicit probabilistic 
risk assessment […] that is encapsulated in the colour code’ (AVO scientist 4). Developing 
'bins' or alert levels may be the consequence of historical VALS that became naturalised into the 
daily operations of the observatories. The idea of developing a radical new design of VALS, 
that may be more flexible to accommodate the diversity of physical hazards seen at volcanoes 
throughout the U.S., was never pursued. Two of the scientists interviewed proposed designs for 
a more flexible VALS, but were informed by the standardisation committee that they may be 
too confusing for users (AVO scientist 4).  
 
There is a constant drive by policy makers to organise things, such as nature which is a 
continuum, into boxes, or 'bins'. Yet, the individual characteristics of each volcano's behaviour 
question the ability and usefulness of a VALS to convey these variables. Interviews with 
scientists repeatedly indicated it was the number of physical hazard complexities involved in the 
design process of the standardised VALS that resulted in the process taking so long (CVO 
manager). Some scientists, as this one at AVO outlines, reflected on standardisation criticising 
that a 'one size fits all’ is not necessarily the best approach to adopt within VALS: 
 
I have been a sceptic about this standardisation all along, mainly because I look out 
across the globe and see so many different situations and scenarios, that I think it 
could be difficult, that it might not be informationaly sound and correct to try and 
cookie cutter something that applies in every situation [to] every volcano 
everywhere. Now many of my colleagues completely disagree with me on this 
[…]. I always feel like modern society needs to box everything into organised 
cubicles and have something that applies to everything. I'm just not sure that this 
really lends itself [to that process] (AVO senior scientist 1). 
 
Despite some concerns about the standardised VALS, a majority of staff felt that it is useful, 
regardless of its design or operation because without them it is not possible to disseminate 
information easily. This following quote from a CVO scientist on the standardisation committee 
captures the dilemma of using a simple VALS to communicate complex messages: 
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It’s a very tricky business; any time you try to communicate a complex message in 
a simple way, it's very, very difficult. You still have to do it, it is still necessary, 
it’s still important, but it's difficult because volcanoes are so complex and diverse 
and situations are so different, it’s just fundamentally different if you have a 
volcano doing a certain thing within reach of a large population centre, or not, 
whether you are intensively monitoring a volcano or whether it is out in the middle 
of the Aleutians and you have very little monitoring. It’s very hard to standardise, 
because the situations you are trying to describe in a single colour or single alert 
level can just be so varied (CVO senior scientist 1). 
 
With this dilemma, it seems that any standardised VALS is setting itself up for a hard task. 
However, it appears the problems that arise are more to do with the linear design of the VALS 
than the concept of using a alert level as a semaphore to convey important information. 
 
 
5.3  The organisational complexities of volcanic hazard warnings  
 
The previous section discussed how the standardised VALS manage the diverse range of 
volcanic behaviour and hazards. This section aims to review how scientists and users are 
positioned within the standardised VALS, demonstrating the organisational complexities 
involved in its operation. This section raises questions about how scientists and users negotiate 
complexities in practice, and this is discussed further in relation to decision-making in chapter 
6, and to communication in chapter 7. 
 
5.3.1 Institutional issues for USGS scientists  
 
Institutional factors such as the epistemic culture of the observatory can strongly influence the 
VALS’ capability to work in practice. The complex dynamics of USGS policy, governance and 
operations have a profound effect on the resources, required to provide an effective VALS, such 
as funding for monitoring capabilities, staff resources, and protocols for issuing warnings. 
Education and outreach are essential components of the broader VEWS in order to ensure that 
stakeholders are aware of VALS and how they work, and this requires staff time and resources. 
However, the biggest constraint in resources discovered during this research, is the structure of 
job promotions. This section outlines some of these institutional dynamics and constraints. 
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The traditional focus of the USGS, and the VHP in particular, has been academic research and 
the publication of papers. To be promoted within the USGS is partly dependent upon the 
quantity and quality of papers published by the applicant, alongside his or her citation record. 
Some highly active VHP scientists have been known to withdraw from volcano monitoring 
activities to publish further papers, in order to be promoted (AVO senior scientist 1). Equally, 
there are VHP staff who have dedicated their lives to assisting at volcanic crises around the 
world, or developing new monitoring equipment or software to improve monitoring capabilities, 
but were not promoted because they did not publish enough papers (AVO senior scientist 1 / 
CVO scientist 15). In this context, the role of monitoring appears to be secondary to traditional 
academic work. Yet, it is the requirement to fulfil the Stafford Act (to provide warnings of 
volcanic hazards) that drove the VHP to develop volcano observatories in the first place. At 
CVO, LVO and YVO volcanic activity occurs periodically, so a majority of the scientists focus 
on their research, but at time of crisis take on a monitoring role. Unfortunately, this institutional 
environment, along with extended periods of volcanic inactivity, does not provide incentives to 
improve warning capabilities. Although this ethos is changing, numerous staff have not received 
financial rewards via promotion for their achievement in saving lives (CVO management). This 
makes the USGS quite different to other Federal Agencies such as NOAA (NWS) and NASA, 
where promotions are based on both monitoring performance and research into the phenomena 
monitored. Both research, monitoring, and crisis management are equally important (VHP 
manager 1). Research provides the knowledge to better process monitoring data, and monitoring 
data can generate new research increasing knowledge about volcanoes. One possible reason for 
the USGS’s historical focus on academic publications is the legally required five-year review of 
the VHP conducted by academic institutions such as the National Research Council and the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science (National Research Council, 2000, 
American Association for the Advancement of Science Research Competitiveness Program, 
2007). Their focus on academia and the drive to publish papers may explain why the VHP 
maintains an academic approach to their research conducted. A realignment of values in both 
monitoring and research would reflect those used at other agencies, and encourage more time to 
make volcanic hazard warnings, communication and education more effective.  
 
Due to the flat hierarchical structure of the VHP, it has been possible to easily exchange and 
discuss data between the volcano observatories, which has enabled the VHP's knowledge base 
to improve. Although each observatory has its own culture and identity; emails, meetings, 
workshops and conference-calls keep the whole VHP in frequent communication with one 
another, sharing problems and solutions. In addition, staff are permitted to move to another 
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observatory to assist in a crisis, or to move for a number of years as part of a 'tour'. Databases 
and internal communication web tools are becoming increasingly standardised between the 
observatories, for example, the database used at AVO is slowly being adopted and adapted at 
the other observatories, which will enable even better communication and access to monitoring 
data, volcano records, and discussions on volcanic activity or anomalies with colleagues no 
matter where they are located (AVO collaborator 2). This facilitates communication of 
information and ideas between the scientists within and between the volcano observatories, and 
is partly a positive result of the academic ethos adopted within the VHP.  
 
Historically all observatories (except YVO which had not been formed) had an ‘outreach 
officer’, appointed to coordinate volcanic hazard warning education and outreach events with 
institutions and vulnerable populations to volcanic hazards (Adleman et al., Unpublished). At 
the time of writing only CVO and LVO have an outreach officer, with AVO and HVO no 
longer able to afford the additional position. Interviews with current and past outreach officers 
indicated the role is extremely challenging (although personally hugely rewarding) since it was 
conducted in addition to other research or management responsibilities (CVO scientist 4 / HVO 
senior scientist 3). There are constant requests for scientist interviews, presentations and 
information by the media, educational institutions, academic institutions, the public, and users 
of the VALS (Driedger, 2008). To accommodate this demand, scientists throughout the 
observatory build relationships with specific groups. Scientists have differing levels of interest 
in outreach and some are better communicators than others and so the work is divided amongst 
those best skilled for the responsibility. To fulfil the demands of the role of outreach, more staff 
time and financial resources are required. Given the importance in training stakeholders about 
VALS and how they work, as part of compliancy with the Stafford Act, in practice, the role of 
outreach is under-valued (CVO scientist 5).  
 
At the time of research the USGS, like many agencies under the Bush Administration, were 
struggling to reconcile slashed budgets and increasing duties (VHP manager 6). This severely 
constrained the ability to expand or maintain monitoring equipment, employ new staff and 
increase outreach responsibilities. Unfortunately, reducing employment contracts is not 
uncommon in federal agencies and this can impact users of the VALS who may have developed 
a relationship with a particular member of USGS staff, and vice versa. While there will always 
be financial constraints, the restrictions imposed by the Bush administration placed the VHP in 
a particularly difficult scenario. At the time of fieldwork there was no anticipation that 
important projects such as the NVEWS program would be funded, and numerous other smaller 
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but beneficial programs were shelved. One reason the VHP survives through extensive funding 
cuts is that a significant proportion of the scientists have emeritus scientist status, retired, yet 
still working, in particular at Menlo Park (VHP manager 6). There has been concern about the 
lack of new younger staff within the VHP  and the reliance on retired emeritus staff to maintain 
the VHP (National Research Council, 2000). In the near future, there is likely to be a gap once 
retired staff leave permanently and newer staff have not yet built up experience or expertise, 
particularly for volcanic crises.  
 
With constraints on funding and an aging staff the VHP, like any other institution, has problems 
that change over time. Changes in governments affect funding resources as certain politicians 
place more value on science than others (VHP manager 6). Technological developments have 
changed the way scientists communicate across thousands of miles, and the increasing demands 
of the media and public for information relating to potential volcanic hazards are a burden on 
the VHP scientists time during a crisis. Given the legal mandate for the USGS to provide 
notification for volcanic eruptions to enhance public safety and reduce losses through effective 
forecasts and warnings based on the best possible scientific information, it appears that this still 
does not play a central role in the VHP institutional structure. The struggle between the research 
and monitoring staff is one that continues, and possibly reflects the need for the academic 
culture to shift to a more 'mode 2' style approach, where the focus is to bring together 
interdisciplinary groups together to work on the problems that impact people (Gibbons, 1994) 
(see chapter 2). The ramifications of remaining in a 'mode 1' type of knowledge affects the 
ability for scientific knowledge to translate into effective warnings. There is a need to move 
from the epistemic authority of volcano science to the need to engage with users, whilst 
remaining locked in an academic culture that rewards publishing. This requires engaging with 
users more, as seen in other federal agencies such as the NWS, who have dedicated staff for 
monitoring and warning responsibilities. The complex science involved in understanding 
volcanic behaviour, raises questions about whose expertise counts in determining a volcanic 
hazard.  
 
5.3.2 The users of the VALS   
 
There is a diverse range of VALS users, ranging from emergency managers to land owners 
(U.S. Forest Service, National Monuments, private land) who are generally local, to partner 
organisations (collaborative universities and institutes), state geologists, and the NWS, which 
are regionally at state-level, and the aviation sector (VAACs and Air Traffic Control), which are 
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national. Managing all the demands and expectations from such a diverse range of users remains 
challenging for the scientists. This section first reviews the users’ perspectives on the purpose 
and definition of a VALS; second, discusses issues relating to the terminology and use of the 
alert levels; and finally, the difference between ground based hazard and aviation users, 
highlighting the diversity of users involved, at a range of scales from local authority to 
international organisations. All these factors highlight organisational complexities of the users, 
that contribute to the difficulties in operating a VALS.  
 
Scientists frequently define VALS as a tool designed for use by the public (CVO scientist 16); 
however interview data and ethnographic observations indicated that VALS are predominantly 
used by local emergency managers and other federal agencies rather than the public. This is an 
important point given that a significant proportion of discussion during the standardisation of 
the VALS focused on developing a VALS that would not confuse the public. Emergency 
managers stated that the public generally want simple but effective information that will enable 
them to establish whether a volcanic hazard or event is going to affect them and, if so, to be able 
to obtain further information (CVO user – emergency manager 2). Therefore, although the 
VALS is available for the public, they tend to rely on their local emergency managers for 
guidance (CVO user – emergency manager 1). Whilst the volcano observatories interact 
frequently with the public, particularly for educational purposes, in practice the USGS VALS 
appears to be a tool to communicate with different users. 
 
How an alert level is defined and what it means depends on the user, and their institutional 
requirements for the alert. For example, an employee within the Alaska NWS uses them as a 
‘trigger to do more, pay more attention’ (AVO - user NWS 2), as emergency managers in the 
Cascades respond through preparation and opening the lines of communication. Federal users 
see VALS as a tool to acquire their attention from their many other duties outside that of 
volcanic hazards, which are usually not common occurrence (except for Hawaii) (AVO user – 
NWS 2). Therefore, for many users, including some scientists, a specific definition of a VALS 
was not seen as important. Some went as far as not understanding the need to have a VALS at 
all as explained by this senior scientist at HVO: 
 
I think the whole alert level thing is […] an attempt to better communicate with the 
public, media [and] help scientists convey the message. Most people put too much 
emphasis on that and not enough with the basic problem which is communication 
between scientists and non-scientists (HVO senior scientists 4). 
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This viewpoint was particularly prominent at HVO where there was concern that the 
information accompanying the alert level would not be read. The information communicated by 
an alert level between the scientists and users is context driven and this could be a consequence 
of their individual and institutional experiences and expectations from historical VALS, which 
have shaped their understanding and expectation of VALS (discussed further in chapter 6). 
 
The implementation of the standardised VALS has raised questions about the use of the NWS 
terminology within the standardised VALS for ground hazards (Watch, Advisory, Warning), 
and the confusion they generate. First, NWS terms are generally defined as shown in Table 5.7 
however, there are different definitions used for these terms within the NWS for different 
hazards such as hurricanes, tornadoes, and snowfall. Second, the NWS scheme is itself often 
regarded as ‘confusing’ because it is based on confidence levels and probabilities of events 
occurring (CVO user - NWS), as the VALS is not. The NWS use their alerting scheme in a 
different way to that of the VALS. Rather than escalating and de-escalating through the VALS 
in a progressive order, the NWS alert assigned depends on the probability of the event 
occurring. Consequently, the NWS terms have designated timeframes for each issued alert, 
which relate to the likelihood of the event occurring. Third, the NWS terms, as used in the 
VALS, are used in a ‘different order’ to most NWS products (AVO user - NWS 1). Instead of 
the order used in the VALS of a Normal-Advisory-Watch-Warning alert, at the NWS the order 
of alert is Outlook-Watch-Advisory-Warning (see Table 5.7). It seems odd that emergency 
managers have become familiar with the order as used by the VALS rather than the NWS one, 
hence requesting its use in the VALS. Unfortunately it was not possible to ascertain why this 
was. Fourth, most scientists found it difficult to remember the order of severity of the NWS 
terms as used within the VALS. Equally it would appear that the ‘public don’t really understand 
NWS terms, but you got to pick something’ (CVO user - media). Scientists expressed concern 
that the NWS terms have no rationale in their order and that people generally like visual things 
to remember, such as colours, which are more instinctive (AVO collaborator 3). Finally, some 
interviewees commented that the NWS terms are misleading and not very logical; ‘Warning 
doesn’t say something is going to happen, it just says "warning" and implies it is going to 
happen’ (LVO user - Mammoth Lakes town 2). Equally Watch sounds like, ‘watch your step’, 
and Advisory ‘you need to take advice and do something’ (AVO user – NWS 2). Therefore, 
there are inconsistencies with how the NWS terms are used and understood for different hazards 
and by different groups, adding an additional level of complexity to the VALS since there are 
already established perceptions about what these terms mean by users in the context of 
probabilities, risk, and levels of concern.  
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Outlook Issued to advise all users of potential wind storm conditions in the 3-5 day period 
Watch Issued when conditions are favourable for hazardous wind conditions to develop, 
but its occurrence, location and  / or timing is still uncertain. It is intended to 
provide enough lead time so that those who need to set their plans in motion can do 
so. Watches are issued for events forecast to begin in the 12 to 48 hour time frame. 
Advisory Issued for events which don’t quite reach warning limits, but are of significant 
inconvenience and may be hazardous if caution is not exercised. Advisories are 
issued for events forecast to begin in the next 12 to 36 hours. 
Warning Issued for events that can be life threatening or can cause significant damage to 
property. Warnings are issued for events that are imminent, occurring, or forecast to 
begin in the next 36 hours. 
 
Table 5.7 The NWS definitions used for hydrological events (wind, flooding etc.) from 
email correspondence between staff at NOAA to the standardisation committee (at CVO) in 
April 2003 (FOIA archives) 
 
To add to confusion, a significant proportion of scientists and users refer to the VALS, either for 
ground or aviation hazards, using the colour terminology, even though it is only applicable to 
the aviation code. Traffic light signals such as this are an international convention (AVO senior 
scientist 8), and easy to understand since they are used every day by people and drivers around 
the world (VHP manager 2). In contrast, emergency managers do not like the use of colour 
codes, partly because of the failure of the Homeland Securities Terrorism Alert System, which 
has become ‘devalued’ (CVO user – emergency manager 1) by staying only at alert level 
Orange, and thereby losing its meaning. This same argument could be extended to Kilauea 
volcano, which has always been at Orange / Watch alert level. The ground hazard VALS are 
still frequently referred to as a colour by both users and scientists, adding confusion as to 
whether an alert level relates to ground or aviation hazards.  
 
The alert level helps communicate a sense of urgency, but the actual terminology of it can 
generate confusion and other issues for users, partly because they have a historical institutional 
context in which they use warnings within their own area of expertise. Consequently, it is clear 
that the terminologies of alert levels are not straightforward and simple, but contextualised by 
their meaning and use, as Hall (1980) outlines in his theory of encoding and decoding messages 
(discussed further in chapter 7).  
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Some scientists argued that the colour code is not especially relevant to the aviation sector as it 
could easily adopt a different code, as this quote from email correspondence from senior AVO 
staff to other agencies involved with aviation at Anchorage sent November 2003 (FOIA 
archive) states: 
 
In essence, there needs to be an information gatekeeper ensuring that only 
information of a particular shape and form is allowed into the aviation arena for use 
by WMOs [World Meteorological Organization] and VAACs [Volcanic Ash 
Advisory Centres ] [..]. Whether this information, in part, takes the shape of colour 
code or numerical descriptors is actually of less significance than ensuring 
adequate prescribed information is fed into a predetermined way to the aviation 
sector, and it can be used in a uniform procedural manner. 
 
This quote begs the question: if the design of the colour code is not that important to the 
aviation sector, why did it have such a large influence on the design of the standardised VALS 
design when it does not hold much value within the community? Senior USGS managers who 
deal with the aviation sector argued that aviation needs are quite separate from other users and 
the VHP should be encouraged to produce prescribed information (VHP manager 1), but in 
practice it seems less important what is actually used.  
 
The standardisation of the VALS was not just a national initiative. ICAO adopted the aviation 
code globally. Yet, most VALS around the world are not ICAO complaint. In fact, at the time of 
research, no-one outside the U.S. has adopted the ICAO aviation colour code, primarily because 
many volcanically active countries (e.g. in South America) do not have funding for the 
resources required to issue these codes in addition to ground hazard warnings (VHP user – 
VAAC). The Washington VAAC works with numerous countries to help notify pilots of 
potential ash clouds and volcanic eruptions to provide some level of information to the aviation 
sector. It seems acceptable that a level of standardisation on a global scale may take more time 
and be far more complex than on a national scale. However, the ‘Washington VAAC doesn’t 
even put colour codes in the VAAC’s messages’ because pilots may ‘misinterpret as the ash 
cloud is yellow’ (VHP manager 1) (author’s emphasis). This indicates there is confusion as to 
whether the volcano, ash plume or ash cloud is being assigned the colour code. Additionally the 
colour code is actually an optional field in the Volcanic Ash Advisory (VAA). Interviews with 
aviation users stated that pilots do not really pay any attention to the colour codes, but just the 
reports and information they receive as a VONA or VAA (VHP manager 1 / VHP user - 
VAAC). It is odd that the pressures to serve the aviation sector, that led to the splitting of the 
VALS during the design process of the standardised system, would result in such little practical 
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impact. It appears that a key problem for the aviation sector is that there are no colour codes for 
ash clouds (VHP manager 1). Although this is being addressed via the development of the 
PUFF model at University of Alaska Fairbanks, VONAs were designed to be ‘more specific for 
what VAACs need like direction of movement, speed, height of ash and plume’ (VHP user - 
VAAC). The VAACs pass the VONA onto the pilots and airlines. So what role does the 
aviation colour code actually play? As a VAAC employee states: ‘having a colour code though 
still helps us, even though we don’t put it in our VAA, it still helps us understand which 
volcanoes we need to monitor’ (VHP user - VAAC). It provides a level of screening whereby 
aviation users only pay attention to volcanoes if at Orange / Watch or Red / Warning, helping 
them to manage the many volcanoes they monitor (up to 500 at the Washington VAAC) since 
volcanoes are not the only hazard they monitor (others include tropical cyclones). 
Pragmatically, the colour code provides a vital filter to help with the ‘work load’ (VHP user - 
VAAC) and highlights the limitation of institutional resources to have sufficient staff to monitor 
potential hazards.  Therefore, VALS have an important role to play in establishing how much 
awareness users should have in relation to a volcano and its activity, in order to enable quick 
and effective focus for users who may be preoccupied with other aspects of their job; in effect it 
provides an organisational tool for them.  
 
 
5.4  How effective are linear VALS in managing the complexities involved in volcanic 
 hazard warnings? 
 
The design of the standardised VALS is that of a linear system. Yet, the data presented in this 
chapter and in chapter 4, suggest that VALS interact with a number of complex issues; 
scientific, social and institutional. Table 5.8 provides a summary of these issues for each 
observatory and reviews how the VALS has been adapted to cope with them. From this Table it 
is clear that the linear standardised VALS is unable to accommodate the flexibility required to 
cope with these complex issues at each observatory. 
 
Chapter 5. Managing Complexity 
 
195 
 
Observatory  HVO  AVO  CVO LVO YVO 
Scientific 
issues 
• On-going activity 
• Fairly predictive behaviour 
• Slow moving lava flows 
• Chance of explosive 
behaviour 
• Fairly predictive behaviour 
• On-going activity 
• Consistent hazards  
 
• Fairly good understanding 
with some forecasting models 
• Plenty of case studies to 
compare 
• Variety of hazards 
• Difficult to interpret 
• Limited  knowledge of 
caldera behaviour 
• Wide variety of  
volcanic hazards 
• Highly complex  
• Usually surficial hazards 
• Difficult to interpret 
• Long lead up to eruption 
expected 
Social issues • Historical memory of activity 
• Influences land planning 
• Insurance concerns for home 
owners 
• Not largely populated due to 
on-going activity and remote 
location 
• Affects aviation users, both 
civil and military 
• Often part of a National Park 
due to natural beauty 
• Nearby hazardous locations 
can be highly populated with 
critical infrastructure  
• Tend to be fertile farm lands 
• Can give long term 
notice, but volcano may 
erupt with short notice 
• Raising awareness for 
hazards, especially with 
tourists 
• Too active to be populated 
• Well known due to media 
documentaries 
• Popular tourist location 
Institutional 
issues 
• Constant communication and 
awareness between scientists 
and users 
• Highly monitored volcano 
• Remote locations makes it 
difficult to monitor 
• Collaborates with UAF and 
DGGS partners making 
decision-making more 
complex 
• Highly monitored 
• Must liaise with land owners 
i.e. National Parks and Forest 
Service  
• Particularly focused on media 
interest 
• Need to work with local 
businesses i.e. the ski 
area 
• Liaises with land 
owners and managers 
i.e. U.S. Forest Service 
 
• Collaboration between different 
land owners and managers i.e. 
the National Park 
• Highly monitored for research 
• Collaborates with partners and a 
number of universities on 
research activities 
Adaption of 
VALS 
• Developed alert level system 
for sulphur dioxide hazards 
• Not used due to constant 
eruption of Kilauea volcano 
• Focused on aviation users 
• Not usually concerned with 
ground hazard alerts 
• Developed lahar early 
warning system (AFMs) 
• Gases pose significant 
hazard 
• Alert level never 
changed 
• Hydrothermal activity not 
reflected by VALS 
Table 5.8 Summary of the different influences at each observatory and their impact on how the VALS is used. 
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Scientists expressed the view that the standardised VALS solved the needs and concerns of the 
two key different user groups, however many of them still feel that the VALS has a number of 
shortcomings, as this scientist from AVO observes:   
 
[The] complicated reduction of all of these factors (risk, hazard, activity) and 
boiling that down to a simple number [means] inevitably if you do that, something 
is going to be lost. You can’t just project a ten dimensional problem down to one 
dimension and expect it to retain all its complexity (AVO scientist 4). 
 
Yet this reduction to a simply designed VALS is precisely what has happened, largely to fulfil 
U.S. Government requirements to manage these complexities and provide information for other 
federal agencies in a standardised manner. This reflects on whose expertise matters to managing 
risk and developing regulation.  
 
Some of the underlying institutional dynamics of the USGS are shaped by the need for authority 
(or expertise) to retain accountability and credibility. To maintain credibility, there is great 
pressure to assign the 'right' alert level, despite all the complexities and uncertainties (AVO 
senior scientist 1). Yet, there seems to be an implicit assumption that the users, federal agencies, 
government and public cannot deal with these uncertainties, complexities or unknown risks. The 
work of Wynne and Stirling indicate that the public in particular can deal with these ambiguities 
well, if informed correctly (Wynne, 1996, Stirling, 2003); therefore it could be implied that 
sophisticated users would also understand.   
 
This chapter has reviewed the difficulties faced in designing the standardised VALS and the 
influence of social and institutional factors on this process. It is clear from the data presented 
that VALS are unable to deal with a number of complex systems, whether they relate to the 
physical hazard or organisational issues because of their linear structure and lack of flexibility. 
Therefore, by using a linear system to communicate a warning, it hinders the ability of it to 
reflect the complexities involved. In particular, the alert level descriptions limit the flexibility of 
the system to provide alerts that reflect activity for certain volcanic styles, in ways that are 
meaningful. The role of VALS to fulfil policy is to provide a tool that manages the complexities 
involved in providing volcanic warnings, but in practice this is limited by the design. How is it 
possible to manage a complex world via a linear system? The next two chapters will detail how 
this happens in practice, and in turn unpack the black box of VALS by revealing how they 
operate, and how the actors involved work around the constriction of the linear VALS design to 
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make it work more efficiently, providing an opportunity to review how VALS may be 
reconceptualised.  
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Chapter 6. Decision-making: negotiating uncertainty and risk 
 
 
Decision-making is a core component of volcano alert level systems (VALS). There is a series 
of decisions made throughout the system, ranging from what the monitoring data is indicating 
about volcanic behaviour, to how this affects the alert level, whether to change the alert level 
and when, and what information to communicate to users and stakeholders. Once an alert level 
is issued, users interpret it and may discuss with the scientists in further detail, to decide what 
actions to take and when. For the scientists, decisions mostly revolve around the complexities of 
a volcano’s behaviour and are shaped by the institutional dynamics of the USGS, Volcano 
Hazard Program (VHP), and the observatory. The users’ decision-making has to consider the 
physical complexities, in addition to the social complexities of their respective institutions and 
the vulnerable populations and infrastructure for which they have responsibility. This chapter 
argues that in practice, the complexities that VALS aim to manage imply that it is not possible 
to separate scientific knowledge and the consideration of risk when making decisions on which 
volcano alert level to assign. This is important because this study shows that the 'first mile' of 
the volcano early warning system (VEWS) is critical and far more complex than expected.  
 
This chapter reviews how decision-making operates in practice when applying the VALS. 
Interview data and the ethnographic study, undertaken at all five observatories, provide a rich 
body of evidence to suggest that decision-making is a complex and iterative process. The 
previous chapter introduced that the decision to change an alert level is often not exclusively 
based on the physical aspects of volcanic activity, as intended by the design of the standardised 
VALS. Although elements of risk are considered by the scientists in their decision to change an 
alert level, high levels of uncertainty limit these decision-making capabilities. From the 
fieldwork, three key stages of decision-making within VALS have been identified which this 
chapter reviews. First, there is the difficulty for scientists of interpreting scientific data and 
making decisions about what the volcano is doing when dealing with complex volcanic 
processes and high levels of uncertainty. Second, social factors influence the scientists' 
decisions to change alert levels and therefore highlight the influence of risk rather than science 
in making these decisions. Third, the gap between the scientists and users, and the influence of 
management and institutional factors on this process. By investigating the decision-making 
processes within a VALS it is possible to understand how VALS work operationally, and 
investigate in more detail the limitations that a linear design imposes. This chapter will 
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highlight, that there is controversy that emerges over who the expert is in making decisions 
relating to volcanic risk, and how different experts work together to mitigate a potential 
volcanic crisis.  
 
 
6.1  Constructing scientific knowledge  
 
In order to provide a timely warning for volcanic hazards to communicate to the users, it is 
important for the scientists monitoring the volcano to accurately interpret scientific data, 
provide the best information about current activity, and generate reasonable forecasts for 
potential hazards. As already discussed in the literature review, the levels of complexity in 
volcanic processes and hazards make them difficult systems to understand, and given their 
infrequency and incomplete scientific understanding, there are many uncertainties involved in 
volcanic crises. This section will review in more detail the difficulties faced by scientists in 
constructing their scientific knowledge and developing forecasts, and the tools used to aid this 
decision-making process. 
 
6.1.1  Obtaining and interpreting scientific data 
 
Before scientists discuss what alert level volcanic activity should be assigned, there is a rigorous 
process of establishing exactly what is going on at the volcano. This process is often dependent 
upon the monitoring capabilities of each observatory to provide scientific data. The ability to set 
up and maintain monitoring equipment, interpret and analyse the data, and develop forecasts 
appears to be determined by available funding for such equipment, staff, and access to data, not 
just in the U.S., but also globally. These resources enable scientists to discuss the data and to 
establish which alert level should be assigned to the current activity of a volcano. In any 
situation, there are going to be ‘incomplete data sets, some individual familiarity, pattern 
recognitions’ that play into the understanding of a volcano’s behaviour (AVO senior scientist 
5). So far, monitoring capabilities have been predominantly limited by funding resources. In 
recognition of the need to establish ‘a proactive, fully integrated, national-scale monitoring 
effort that ensures the most threatening volcanoes in the United States’ (Ewert et al., 2005, p.3) 
the USGS developed their National Volcano Early Warning System (NVEWS) program that 
aimed to meet the monitoring standards expected by other U.S. federal agencies. Some 
scientists expressed concern that NVEWS would focus the activities of the VHP on monitoring 
rather than research, but the premise of NVEWS was ‘not to abandon research, but step-in, 
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providing a reliable service that is a core function, not an afterthought’ (VHP manager 1), 
providing background records of the activity of a volcano over a period of time. To implement 
this, an updated and universal IT framework was required. The standardisation of the VALS and 
subsequent new communication products and databases, helped develop a unified IT platform to 
cope better with more monitoring data, which is discussed in the next chapter on 
communication. 
 
An effective monitoring capability is vital to scientists as it provides the ability to view the 
volcano and its many 'symptoms' during volcanic unrest. The more monitoring equipment on 
the volcano, the easier it is to determine what is going on (CVO scientist 13). However, there 
can be a point where too much data is more of a hindrance than a benefit (CVO user - USFS 1). 
New monitoring techniques can capture events that happen at volcanoes that have never been 
seen before, and can involve the public who have access to live data or webcams online (in 
particular at AVO13) that can create new debates between scientists, users, and the public about 
the activity of a volcano. One major disadvantage of increased monitoring data is it requires 
more resources to analyse, discuss and understand in relation to the activity of that volcano. For 
many of the more active volcanoes, there are large data-streams every day from numerous 
seismic and GPS stations, satellite images, webcams, and gas monitoring equipment that need to 
be processed via computer programs before even being viewed by a volcanologist. Many 
software programs exist to process raw data, such as 'Earthworm' a processing module for 
integrating regional seismic network data, although often these programs are not completely 
standardised between the five observatories. This creates issues when trying to correlate data 
and look at patterns of volcanic behaviour, so there is a strong rationale to standardise the 
format of all scientific data, although standardising data formats can institutionalise a bias.  
 
Due to the very large quantities of data that feed into the computer systems at all the 
observatories, an automated system has been set up so that should specific monitoring signals 
exceed established parameters, an alarm will be raised. For example, if an earthquake of 
magnitude three or more occurs, or more than two magnitude three earthquakes occur within a 
space of 24 hours, then an alarm is triggered and the scientists responsible for that particular 
data set at each observatory are alerted by a bleeper they carry. At the observatory, scientists 
rotate the 24-hour role between them every week and are responsible for responding to 
automated alarms or odd observations. This places a huge reliance on technology, so it is 
important that a scientist vets alarms raised in case there are errors within the system, either 
13 See: www.avo.alaska.edu 
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from technology, or rational explanations for odd behaviour such as severe weather conditions, 
helicopters (that can affect the sensitive equipment) or explosions.  
 
Faults can also occur within the telemetry involved in getting data from the volcano relayed 
back to the observatory. Telemetry is a costly process that requires a lot of maintenance and can 
be affected by severe weather or volcanic activity; therefore, a few dedicated VHP staff monitor 
and maintain the telemetry systems. Developing automated systems makes monitoring more 
manageable in an age where there are vast quantities of data. Data are stored and used for 
research purposes as it may help understand the dynamics of an event and establish 
relationships between different data sets. Yet, it is important to note that every automated alarm 
system used has its parameters designated by a scientist making their selection subjective. In 
addition, these parameters are different for each volcano.  
 
As discussed in chapter 5, each volcano has its own ‘personality’ and therefore time is required 
to characterise and understand the normal background activity of a volcano before deciding 
whether or not it is behaving abnormally. This is one of the principal reasons supporting the 
NVEWS program; so that the VHP can be proactive rather than reactive. The following quote 
from a scientist at CVO highlights the individuality of volcanoes by providing an analogy:  
 
When I try and describe this problem to people I often use a medical analogy. You 
know there is a tremendous amount of information about the population of people, 
about the percentage of people who will have heart attacks […] but when you come 
down to one person, you can’t say ‘well you are going to have a heart attack at the 
age of 63’. We can say that 35% of population will have a heart attack by 63, but 
we can’t say anything about an individual (CVO senior scientist 7). 
 
Understanding a volcano is ‘part science, partly an art’ (CVO senior scientist 7), since 
volcanoes can behave in unexpected ways, and recognising patterns of behaviour for a volcano 
is critical to understand what that volcano is doing and to generate accurate forecasts. To do this 
requires both monitoring data and research into the meaning of the data. Occasionally, a volcano 
does something unexpected or not seen before, a 'black swan'. Like medical patients ‘volcanoes 
can have long-term illness or heart attacks’ (AVO senior scientist 5). Clearly, shock events 
generate significant discussion and research, as often there are no known examples of a volcano 
behaving in that particular way. Volcanologists around the world are currently working towards 
developing a global database for volcanic events and behaviour called WOVOdat so that during 
a shock event it may be possible to compare data anomalies with other volcanoes that have done 
similar things (WOVO, 2010). At a national level a database has been established for U.S. 
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volcanoes, and the VHP, with collaborative research staff who have conducted extensive 
research on a volcano, can provide expert opinions on its particular behaviour patterns.  
 
Although monitoring data can provide specific measurements about what is happening at the 
volcano, it is far more difficult to interpret what these measurements imply about the volcano's 
behaviour. Decisions made have to integrate many different aspects; not just the monitoring 
data but the experience of the scientist interpreting the data, managing the uncertainties, 
ambiguities and ignorance involved, and the expectations of the users. All VHP observatories 
have procedures in place for various committees to convene if abnormal monitoring data is 
identified, either by automated alarms or observation. Commonly, the committees include the 
scientist in charge (SIC), their deputy, and representatives from different or relevant scientific 
groups within the observatory such as seismic, deformation, gas and ash, and satellite imagery. 
Together they review the data, interpret it, and establish possible scenarios for forecasts. This 
involves discussing the data, historical behaviour at the volcano or similar volcanoes, and the 
value and significance of one particular data stream (i.e. seismicity) versus several different 
streams (ground deformation, geochemical anomalies). This process of discussion, in essence, is 
dependent on the expertise of the scientists, discussed below in section 6.1.2.  
 
Further complications arise when the scientists review possible forecasts, particularly useful to 
users. Forecasting volcanic behaviour has greater uncertainties than determining volcanic 
activity, especially since volcanoes, unlike many other hazards, can sustain unrest or eruptions 
for long durations. The predictions made by the VHP during the early eruptions of Mt. St 
Helens in the 1980s were more accurate that those usually possible for volcanic activity, due to 
the recurring nature of the eruption at that time, but today forecasts are used, to reflect greater 
uncertainties. Forecasts are presented via three possible scenarios: worst, best and most likely. 
The main goal has become to ‘alert people, tell people as much as we can. Whether it is right or 
wrong is less important’ (HVO senior scientist 3). This quote highlights the importance of 
communicating information, and accepting that this information is uncertain is critical. Many 
users have difficulty in distinguishing between a prediction and forecast; a prediction is a 
precise statement of the time, place and nature of impending activity, as a forecast is an 
imprecise statement (Swanson et al., 1985). A scientist in Hawaii stated that ‘we try and use 
precise language in science but the public does not speak this language’ (HVO collaborator). 
Therefore, there are complications not only in developing forecasts based on current monitoring 
data, but also in the interpretation of them by users and their understanding of the uncertainties 
involved (discussed in section 6.3).  
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6.1.2  Deciding an alert level  
 
The description of an alert level provides a criterion as to which alert level should be assigned 
yet a lot of time is spent discussing at which alert level a volcano should be. Clearly, the 
scientists feel a burden to get the definitions of the alert level ‘right’, and help the users in their 
decision-making responsibilities. Although an alert level does not convey risk, it does express 
levels of uncertainty as seen in Orange / Watch and Red / Warning where the description states: 
‘hazard is imminent, underway, or suspected’ for a warning (author’s emphasis), but there are 
no specific forecasting elements other than indications of an imminent eruption. The exclusion 
of risk largely relates to issues of accountability, and the desire to defend the alert level 
assigned, as summarised by a member of the standardisation committee: 
 
We wanted to make sure that we could always come back and defend why we were 
in that colour code on the basis of activity at the volcano. It gets, I’ll admit, a little 
fuzzier when you’re in Watch and Warning, especially Watch, because we are 
making a determination about hazard (CVO senior scientist 2). 
 
This quote highlights that the ability to assign an alert level based solely on activity at the 
volcano is a challenge since there are areas of fuzziness or uncertainty. Although the USGS is 
unlikely to be sued on issues of accountability since it is part of the U.S. Government, the VHP 
does not want to be seen as providing false guidance if an alert level is issued too early or late.  
 
Whilst some scientists feel that ‘the language that goes along with [VALS] is as important or 
more important [than the alert level]: it’s what we convey verbally in the accompanying 
language that is important’ (AVO scientist 6), it is clear that VALS still play an important role 
in volcanic hazard warnings. A user of VALS at AVO emphasised that VALS enable the: 
‘technical folks [volcanologists] to evaluate a risk and translate the urgency of that action to us’ 
(AVO - user emergency management). Chapter 5 highlighted that the purpose of a VALS is to 
translate the urgency of information to users so they can generate an appropriate response. But 
in practice how does an observatory decide to go from one alert level to another?  
 
By empowering an experienced member of the observatory staff to decide the alert level, rather 
than the USGS director as protocol demanded during the early years of LVO, experienced staff 
at the observatory can make the decision rather than USGS management, who may have no 
experience of working in a volcano observatory or understanding of volcanic behaviour and the 
uncertainties involved. It is the responsibility of the scientist in charge (SIC) to allocate an alert 
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level, which establishes a clear line of authority in the observatory. This role is a rotating one, 
whereby they have responsibility for the observatory for 3-5 years before it is passed onto the 
next elected SIC. All SICs are highly experienced scientists both in conducting research and 
monitoring volcanoes. Senior scientists are normally nominated for the role, which is decided 
by the VHP management staff. Typically the SIC will consult with observatory scientists to 
obtain a consensus before making the final decision to assign or change an alert level (CVO 
senior scientist 2). Arguably a SIC knows how to make these decisions, because they have been 
exposed to the process for years. It also means that each volcano observatory tends to have a flat 
hierarchical structure, resulting in fewer struggles over power and authority. 
 
The process of interpreting monitoring data in order to establish a volcano's activity and set an 
appropriate alert level usually occurs during a meeting between the scientists at the observatory, 
held either regularly (daily, weekly) or infrequently (monthly) depending on the activity of the 
volcano. During fieldwork at CVO in 2008, I was able to attend such a meeting to decide the 
volcano activity and alert level of Mt. St. Helens. The volcano had not shown much sign of 
activity for a while and there was discussion about dropping the alert levels from Yellow / 
Advisory to Green / Normal. Nearly all CVO staff attended the meeting, with the University of 
Washington (their academic partner) and other agencies dialled in by telephone to participate in 
the debate. In addition, technology enabled all participants to present their interpretations of 
data. The decision-making process was democratic in that each specialist scientific group (i.e. 
seismologists, geochemists) presented their data, the possible interpretations, and their 
consensus. Other scientific groups asked questions about the data, often leading to discussion. 
Following the views of all specialist groups, the group as a whole discussed the implications of 
the data presented, and what the data inferred about the volcano’s current activity. In the 
meeting I attended, a significant proportion of the scientist felt that Mt. St. Helens was no longer 
showing signs of being active, but there was some data that suggested that it was not entirely 
inactive. Consequently, the SIC made the decision to keep the alert level at Yellow / Advisory 
and review the data in a month, when if no further activity occurred it would be downgraded. At 
CVO the process is regarded as democratic in that the SIC follows the consensus on most 
occasions, unless they are privy to additional information, usually relating to other social or 
institutional factors (CVO senior scientist 2). Throughout the process there was no use of 
probabilistic models or event trees (although they could be used to guide discussion); just open 
discussion and debate was used to make decisions. In practice, there is an apparent mismatch 
between the way decisions are made at the USGS and investment of academic time into models 
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like event trees. This section goes on to explore why a deliberative approach is adopted rather 
than a rigorous mathematical or scientific one.  
 
The observatory scientists employ a number of methods to manage the scientific uncertainties 
involved. Many of the scientists interviewed endorsed the use of event trees, but mostly in crisis 
situations. Event trees are most popular with the Volcano Disaster Assistance Program (VDAP) 
team when aiding in crises abroad, using them as probabilistic models upon which to base 
decisions. A majority of scientists interviewed felt that event trees provide a ‘very effective way 
for both the scientists to think through the logic of sequence of events and the accumulative 
probabilities […] give you a good sense of the uncertainties involved in the full process’ (CVO 
senior scientist 7). Bayesian Event Trees (Marzocchi et al., 2006, Marzocchi et al., 2007), are 
used within the VHP as a tool for stimulating discussions among themselves or with other actors 
about the likelihood of events. Some scientists expressed concern at their use; ‘it’s all a fairly 
subjective expert opinion thing, but you base it on what the behaviour of this volcano was in the 
past and ask what it is capable of doing, what do you think is the likelihood?’ (CVO scientist 8). 
This quote recognises the 'art' required in the process of making decisions based on scientific 
data. 
 
Using a probabilistic approach is problematic in that it requires input from a number of different 
volcanoes, and in any one crisis ‘each volcano is unique and so you might get generalities out of 
probabilistic assessments, […] but it’s really more than generality that you really want to know 
about that particular volcano’ (HVO senior scientist 5). Some of the scientists regard an alert 
level as an ‘implicit probabilistic risk assessment’ (AVO scientist 4). Yet for some it seems 
inevitable that event trees will be used more in the future as they provide a semi-quantitative 
basis for decision making, and that alert levels could be tied into these forecasts from event trees 
(VHP manager 3), as Aspinall and Cooke have already explored (1998). Most importantly, 
using quantitative methods for deciding alert levels provides an audit trail of the decision-
making process, which is critical when scientists are concerned about issues of accountability. 
Developing understanding about what is currently happening at a volcano and its likely 
behaviour is quite a different process to that of other hazards, simply because so little is known. 
Whilst such statistical models exist for volcanoes, they are not necessarily useful since ‘what is 
not communicated [to the users] is any sense of the uncertainty of that number’ (CVO scientist 
3). People have different perceptions of risk and so view percentages dependently (Slovic, 
2000). Using human judgement, rather than probabilistic models, means that decisions can also 
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incorporate experience (albeit only the experience of the scientists involved), which 
probabilistic models cannot factor into the calculations they use.  
 
Currently, the three forecast scenarios (best, worst, most likely case) are provided to users rather 
than providing a numerical and probabilistic breakdown of the likelihood of each scenario. By 
not using risk models and basing their decisions on consensus between their expertise, it enables 
greater flexibility to consider the ambiguities and possible ignorance involved. However, it is 
important to remember that ‘the conclusions established through scientific negotiations are not 
definitive accounts of the physical world. Rather, they are claims that have been deemed to be 
adequate by a specific group of actors in a particular cultural and social context’ (Knorr-Cetina 
and Mulkay, 1983, p.95). This is reflected through the development of a consensus to issue an 
alert level and establishing what information to release.  
 
In the absence of significant databases on each volcano and their behavioural characteristics, 
human judgement plays a vital role in interpreting what is going on at the volcano. Alert levels 
are not simply changed because some seismic activity meets some criteria level, ‘it has to be a 
conscious, scientific decision whether we change levels […] you just can’t do it by modelling, 
you can’t do it by theoretical methods. There is no magical threshold at which at some point the 
volcano erupts’ (VHP manager 4). At AVO one senior scientist provides a representative view 
of the process, outlining the difficulties in deciding when to change and the role uncertainty 
plays: 
 
There is a big difference between ramping up the colour code and ramping back 
down. We tend to ramp up relatively quickly, and then probably tend to stay at 
colours for longer than we should. With 20 / 20 hindsight we probably ought to 
ramp up sooner than we do. We always seem to be ‘look at this’, and this comes 
into how we forecast volcanic eruptions and many people are upset or bothered by 
the fact that it is still as much an art as is it is a science. It doesn’t come from the 
idea that we understand this is what is going to happen and we can assign a 
probability to it and say well, we understand exactly what’s happening at this 
volcano and it is going to erupt next Tuesday (AVO senior scientist 5). 
 
Therefore, the decision to change alert levels is a subjective one, although it appears that 
scientists want to issue a warning based on as much objectivity as possible. However, the desire 
to not adhere to criteria for the alert level, indicates that the scientists are aware of the need to 
interpret large sets of data, rather than pigeon hole one set of data on which to make decisions. 
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A scientist from AVO outlines that the decision-making process is also different for varying 
stages of volcanic activity, especially if volcanic eruptions are imminent:  
 
The early colour code decisions are more strategic in nature. I think when you get 
towards an eruption they are much more tactical; you know an event just 
happened, what do you do? And those [decisions] have to be very quick. The early 
strategy of […] ‘how [are] you going to get people buying into the idea that things 
are changing and it could lead into an eruption’ are much more strategic and 
involve a large group of people. When you get down to tactical responses the 
damage has happened and it typically involves a much smaller group of people 
who have to be on top of the game in realising that something significant just 
happened, because then the timeframes are compressed and [people] really want to 
get things out as quickly as possible (AVO scientist 3) (author’s emphasis). 
 
This quote indicates that the type of volcanic activity affects the strategic and tactical response 
to change alert levels, whether it is quick, changeable or significant. This alludes to the 
consideration of risk when changing alert levels, but also indicates the strategic use of VALS to 
create awareness of something occurring at the volcano. Therefore, VALS can be regarded as a 
strategic tool. This can also be seen in the quote below from a scientist at CVO who explains 
that sometimes the decisions of the VALS in the observatory do not reflect true levels of 
volcanic activity or even concern: 
 
Internally, we tend to be a little out of sync with the colour code that we present to 
the public, and the reason for that is we see something is going on, we watch it for 
a little while and we ramp ourselves up before we ramp the colour code up, and 
then on the reverse side ramp down, before the colour code ramps downs, that’s 
our own way of dealing with these things (CVO scientist 3). 
 
There is one other major factor influencing the decision to change an alert level; the concern 
that subsequent events will show the decision to have been a 'bad call' (HVO scientist 1). It is a 
case of ‘professionalism’ (AVO collaborator 1) and the SIC wants to make decisions that are 
defendable to their peers and the government. There is always the concern that an event will 
happen once an alert level has been downgraded and that this may affect the credibility of the 
VALS and the observatory. One scientist at AVO had a number of philosophical discussions 
with their colleagues about this dilemma and states that there are two key schools of thought on 
this issue depending on how conservative you want to be: 
 
 
Chapter 6. Decision-making 
208 
 
One school of thought says that if there is a geophysical anomaly then you are 
completely ok to go to Yellow and if nothing happens then fine, that’s just the way 
the world works but you have done your job because there was a geophysical 
change. The other school of thought would say it doesn’t matter, we can’t say we 
know enough about it to know for sure if activity goes up or down whether that 
means something is going to happen. So in such a case it is better to be 
conservative i.e. don’t risk being wrong, and not change colour code until you are 
really certain that something is going to happen (AVO collaborator 1). 
 
This provides evidence that in some cases a more precautionary approach is taken, and in others 
a more reactive approach. There is a battle between these two approaches, driven by the 
scientists approach to uncertainty. A scientist who adopts a precautionary approach recognises 
that their role goes beyond doing their job, and that users may be interested in this information, 
no matter how irrelevant the scientists think it is. Equally there is a need to not over-concern 
users with information that may be irrelevant - this is the fine line they balance. For many, it is 
the Orange / Watch alert level that creates the most ambiguity as this scientist from the 
standardisation committee describes: 
 
Orange to me is a clutch mechanism, as in a car. A clutch harmonises the speed of 
two very different spinning gears, Yellow and Red; on, off; erupting, not erupting. 
That’s a huge difference in spin power and so the Orange has to be a clutch 
mechanism. [It] helps slow the Red down and sometimes it helps speed the Yellow 
up (VHP manager 1). 
   
Orange / Watch alert level presents a problem, because it involves two descriptions for the 
VALS, with one predicting imminent eruption, and the other describing an already occurring 
but non-threatening eruption. There is also general concern amongst scientists that an alert level 
should not be at a single status other than Green / Normal for too long, otherwise the alert level 
loses its meaning and impact as the public or users get complacent about it, much like what has 
been seen with the Homeland Security Terror Alert System. For places like Hawaii, the constant 
eruption means the alert levels is at Orange / Watch, but for the users this becomes meaningless 
as it is the ‘status quo’. Therefore it seems the VALS is trying to encompass several roles into 
its dual systems – a forecasting tool with warnings, and a reportage tool describing what is 
happening at the volcano, such as an eruption. 
 
With concerns about how to assign a volcano alert level and when to ramp-up and reduce the 
levels, the complications that certain levels such as Orange / Watch present, and the worry of 
being wrong makes assigning an alert level a highly complex process. Essentially, this ‘forces 
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the scientist to think about the alert levels rather than the science’ (HVO senior scientist 5), 
rather than conducting free flowing discussions, to rank the possibilities of what is going to 
happen and then release this information.  
 
You have to pretend to understand the volcano well enough to know you can go, 
‘aha, we now go onto another level’. That’s when you start fooling yourself. It’s 
obviously vitally important to understand the volcano well enough to know that it’s 
time to go from one level to another, but vitally important is not the same as being 
able to do it (HVO senior scientist 5).  
 
What this implies is that scientists are spending a lot of time and effort trying to do something 
that is not possible. Given uncertainties about complex volcanic behaviour, this may seem an 
obvious observation yet, it is one of the most profound in supporting the idea that it really is 
difficult to manage complex situations using a linear process, and so far we have only reviewed 
the physical complexities and the uncertainties involved in making sense of the science.  
 
6.1.3  Decision-making with scientific uncertainties  
 
Scientific uncertainty remains a focal point for the scientists and the best way to try to establish 
the uncertainties is to generate discussion between the scientists so that all the different data, 
views and perspectives can be analysed. Between the scientists and users there is a dependency 
on communication and interaction when changing an alert level to consider what the risks 
involved are. In the light of significant uncertainties in scientific knowledge of volcanic 
behaviour and the complexity of the physical processes involved, the USGS essentially follows, 
unknowingly, a post-normal science (PNS) approach, involving open discussion between 
different groups of scientific expertise to try and maximise understanding of volcanic behaviour 
and to develop the best forecasts as possible. It can be said that in these circumstances ‘facts are 
uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent’ (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993, 
p.744). Although, however, there is often (but not always) an extended peer community of 
scientists, partner organisation experts, and external experts of a particular volcano during these 
discussions (as I witnessed at CVO), this expertise is still limited to that of the scientific 
community. Therefore, the expertise of the users is not considered, or that of local populations 
who may be highly sensitive to volcanic behaviour. This means that the discursive process is 
not completely reflective of PNS as it does not review the perspectives and values of each 
stakeholder (actors) through representation. Despite this, section 6.2 highlights that there is still 
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consideration of users and their values when determining alert levels, and the amount and type 
of information issued by the volcano observatory.  
 
Philosophical and sociological knowledge of scientific knowledge (SSK), as reviewed in 
chapter 2, highlight the difficulties involved in constructing knowledge relating to a volcano’s 
activity, with aspects of inductivism, falsification, scientific values and conduct all playing a 
role in the quest to understand volcanic behaviour and processes, in addition to the unknown, or 
‘black swan’. SSK states that knowledge itself is socially conditioned, and this can be seen by 
the experiences and process by which the scientists make their decisions: lengthy discussions 
are conducted with several different scientific expert groups through deliberation and exploring 
the possibilities, trying to place the most rational explanations within contexts of high 
uncertainty and considering the risk of failure to provide appropriate warnings. These methods 
of debate have become institutionalised as formal procedures within the VHP where scientific 
knowledge is reviewed in context of wider society dynamics which, follows a SSK approach to 
decision-making as outlined by Martin et al. (1995b), where persuasiveness or networking 
abilities are used within the scientific community to discuss the possible options. However, in 
practice a positivist approach is used to close the debate and make a decision, since it is the 
scientist's expertise that is used, rather than ‘group’ expertise generated from collaborating with 
users. 
  
 
6.2 Considering risk when assigning a volcano alert level 
 
When the VALS was standardised, it was clearly stated in documents that the decision to assign 
an alert level should be based on the activity of the volcano, thus automatically excluding any 
consideration of the hazard or risk (Gardner and Guffanti, 2006). One could assume that 
volcanic activity is the only criterion for an alert level, yet, nearly every VHP interviewee 
discussed during their interview the role that risk plays in assigning an alert level, making the 
process less 'black and white' than many assume. This section reviews the scientists’ 
consideration of risk when deciding an alert level, and highlights that negotiating between 
science, uncertainty and risk is one of the core decision-making processes that occurs within the 
VALS black box, not just by the scientists, but also by the users.  
 
As described in chapter 4 and 5, local contingencies at each observatory and each volcano are 
important, affecting decision-making and the setting of alert levels. Often, scientists consider 
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these contingencies, and their impact on risk by reviewing their users’ needs and circumstances, 
institutional issues, and social, economic and political factors. A scientist at AVO described the 
compromise of balancing volcanic activity and risk in deciding alert levels as a ‘dangerous 
game, as the job is to be aware of risk, but the job is really to provide a scientific basis [on 
which] to make decisions’ (AVO collaborator 1). Most scientists acknowledged difficultly in 
not considering risk and hazards within their decision-making processes, since they are 
concerned for people's safety. Despite these concerns, there are differences between the 
scientists’ perception of risk, for example, the level of potential risk may determine how 
conservative the scientists are when issuing an alert level. Whilst scientists seem comfortable 
generating forecasts, they have typically shied away from evaluations of risk, largely because 
they do not see themselves as experts in risk. Questions from users and the public like ‘should I 
fly today’, or ‘how much ash can a ship ingest before it stops?’ are seen as risk decisions. Most 
observatory scientists stated they felt uncomfortable in answering such questions and a scientist 
from AVO highlights why there is a dilemma in approaching these questions, which are nearly 
always asked: 
 
Those are risk decisions, and those aren’t things that we as volcano scientists 
should be involved in. But it is always the question you get asked; should my kids 
go to school today? Should we not have school today? We play around the edges 
there and try […] to put the information in terms that allow people who are making 
decisions on risk to make informed decisions. But we have to be very clear, 
careful, not to slip into that realm […or you] end up in a place you shouldn’t be as 
[you] don’t know all the factors that affect these decisions (AVO scientist 3). 
 
Despite discomfort in relation to dealing with risk, this remains a factor that is considered by the 
scientists when assigning alert levels or writing information statements. The influence of 
politics, economics, and institutional and user protocols will be discussed to demonstrate how 
they influence the decision to change an alert level. First, a scientist from CVO explains the 
influence of politics of assigning an alert level:  
 
Change in a colour code is not necessarily purely volcanic, it is also political [...] 
Sometimes a volcano can be 'burping' but not really affecting anybody, and in that 
respect we may not change the colour code. And other times when it is doing the 
exact same thing but a pilot saw and reported it, we would have to do something 
about it, so the politics is driving it a little bit. There has been speculation that 
sometimes people leave [alert levels] at slightly elevated levels so to have a bigger 
political profile at Washington D.C. I’ve never officially heard of that happen or 
not, but it could (CVO scientist 10).  
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Clearly political factors affect VALS operation, as demonstrated during the Long Valley crises 
during the 1980s to 1990s when the VALS were changed several times due to political pressures 
(Hill, 1998). There are also economic drivers. When an Orange or Red aviation alert level is 
issued, many airlines have procedures in place to reroute around the erupting volcano to avoid 
ash, but this requires extra fuel. This is expensive, from not only the cost of extra fuel, but also 
the additional weight of the fuel, which reduces energy efficiency (VHP user – VAAC). 
Aviation companies do not want to continue precautionary actions at great costs if unnecessary. 
Since there are economic repercussions if the SIC assigns aviation alert level Orange or Red, 
they want to make sure their decisions are defensible. This pressure can result in some erupting 
volcanoes not assigned as an Orange or Red alert level since it may not be considered to pose 
any significant risk for aviation users (AVO scientist 4). In addition, the decision to go to an 
Orange / Watch alert level is also not made lightly because according to VHP institutional 
protocols, it requires the observatory to go into 24-hour watch mode (except at HVO). This is a 
costly process because the observatory requires additional staff, and the normal functions are 
put on hold whilst they focus on the volcanic crisis. Economic influence is also relevant to 
ground based hazards, as emergency managers can align their response actions with specific 
alert levels, affecting a SIC's decision to assign particular alert levels (CVO senior scientist 2). 
Therefore a SIC may be hesitant about issuing a Watch alert level if they know that the response 
will be too drastic for the event, yet the emergency managers would comply with the established 
procedures. It is inherent that describing a change in the hazard infers there should be a response 
to that risk (CVO collaborator 1). Many scientists felt that whatever alert level is issued, it is 
less meaningful than how users have to respond therefore, the message accompanying an alert 
level change is tailored to each circumstance.  
 
Subtle social factors can also can play on a SIC’s mind. For example, in 1997, at LVO 
following significant unrest, the SIC had to decide whether to change the alert level up to 
Yellow / Advisory; but there was a complication: ‘we knew that the ladies [skiing] downhill 
world cup was scheduled for Mammoth Mountain later that week or something, so these are the 
insidious kind of things that inevitably influence what you decide’ (LVO senior scientist 1). 
Although the SIC was close to raising the alert level they waited a few hours and the activity 
subsided. The downhill race was not key in the decision to not change the alert level per se, but 
it was a consideration because the potential media interest and consequences should the race be 
cancelled due to safety could have been devastating to Mammoth Lakes town if nothing had 
happened. On the contrary, if the activity had worsened, then the USGS would be blamed for 
not providing adequate warning. 
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All these examples illustrate the difficulties involved in making sound decisions and 
demonstrate that there is a negotiation occurring between the perceived risk by the scientists and 
the needs and capabilities of the local users. This makes the decision to change an alert level a 
fine line that the scientists have to balance between the science and risk. In contrast, a few 
scientists indicated that if an alert level needed to be at a certain level it would be set no matter 
what pressures there may be: 
 
If it needs to be at Orange, we are going to go to Orange, but we are not going to be 
flippant with it. We are just not going to cover ourselves by going to Orange, we 
are going to say, here is the criteria, here are the reasons, we are at Orange 
regardless of who, how it affects our users economically (AVO senior scientist 1). 
 
The decision to change an alert level requires interpretation, analysis, discussion and action 
within a tight timeframe depending on the speed of the volcanic activity. At AVO, an eruption 
can be sudden, requiring a speedy change in alert level, and so the SIC may make that decision 
without much consultation or discussions with colleagues except for those who observed the 
monitoring data. In many cases, significant time is taken to consider the implications of 
assigning alert levels, rather than telling the concerned people the information as soon as 
possible. In some sense, this facilitates more negotiation between understanding the science, 
uncertainty and risks involved. However, some scientists argue that the danger of discussing 
which alert level to assign is that so much time is spent discussing that the information does not 
get out quickly enough, and this drains the resources of the scientists rather than freeing them up 
to keep an eye on the volcano’s activity (discussed further in section 6.3).  
 
If a scientist considers potential risks when deciding to change an alert level, then the decision is 
a compromise between the uncertainties of the volcanic system, and the risks involved in the 
local context and for the users. Often the scientists understand who and where vulnerable 
populations are, and can take into consideration the expected type of activity and hazard and 
how that will affect different areas, and over what time scale. For example, lahars are confined 
to valleys, but only a short warning notice can be generated. Although this information is 
communicated to the users, an understanding of the vulnerable populations and possible threats 
may influence the speed, or level of information provided to these groups. Therefore, whilst risk 
is not officially part of the warning decision-making process, it becomes an implicit component 
by shaping the urgency to change alert levels, whether the change of alert level is useful for 
users, how long to maintain alert levels, and what kind of information is issued with an alert 
level change.  
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Ultimately, risk is contingent on the location of the volcano and the vulnerability of the 
surrounding populations or infrastructure, much as the uncertainties of the volcano are 
contingent on that particular volcano and its historical behaviour. Therefore, the decision-
making is dependent on local contexts. The consideration of local contexts, in both the science 
and social aspects, results in a number of feedback loops in the decision-making process that 
occur over time depending on the changing physical and social factors. 
 
Managing the different elements of incertitude is clearly an issue that continues to challenge the 
scientists at the USGS volcano observatories. It has been paramount to establish that the 
decision made about which alert level to assign is influenced by the risks involved, which, in 
turn are influenced by the relevant social, political and economic factors. This decision-making 
process is subjective and a socially negotiated process of the circumstances (physical and social) 
by the scientists involved. The scientists interviewed argued that they do not have enough 
certainty or expertise to exercise judgement of alert levels based on risk, yet in practice the 
VALS are manipulated to help raise awareness and get the attention of users if the relationships 
between the them are not strong or frequent. The next section reviews the specific impact of this 
interaction with users when making decisions about what is going on, and how alert levels are 
established and acted upon. 
 
 
6.3 Integrating scientists and users in the decision-making process 
 
A key question emerges about who is the expert when providing a warning if risk is considered? 
Is it the scientist who understands the science and related uncertainties or is it the users who 
understand the local risks? There is a gap between these two sets of expertise that needs to be 
negotiated in order to make the warning effective. In a volcanic crisis there are plural values at 
stake so all relevant experts may usefully discuss together in a manner suggested by post-
normal science so that all stakeholders represent their values; although during a crisis, in 
pressured circumstances, not all stakeholders may be available to contribute to these 
discussions. Yet, for legal reasons, the decision process between the scientists in assigning a 
VALS is based on activity at the volcano, and the decisions made by the users for the best 
appropriate action are kept separate. The following quote from an AVO scientist highlights the 
concern by scientists as to whether decision-makers will respond to alert levels by making the 
‘right’ decision: 
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The idea that what we say impacts the movement of other groups in their actions 
appropriately comes up, because a lot of us have an idea about we think those 
groups should do, but that may not be what they do do. […] We have to basically 
rely on them to make correct decisions (AVO scientist 7). 
 
Therefore, it is clear that the division in decision-making is not as distinct in practice, as it is in 
theory. This section aims to review the gap between the scientists and users in making decisions 
based on alert levels to argue that in practice, responding to an alert level is far from clear-cut 
and is itself a close negotiation between many actors (scientists, users, and others) within the 
VALS that involves complex and adaptive feedback. 
 
6.3.1  'Mind the Gap' 
 
There is a clear dilemma in thinking between the scientists’ desire to remain neutral and report 
on the scientific information only, which is their expertise, and the importance of providing 
information on hazard and risk information, which are regarded by many to be an essential 
component of providing an effective warning. A scientist at HVO described the gap between the 
decision-making capabilities of the scientists and users with a useful metaphor (HVO scientist 
1). Between the two groups of actors is a line, and the distance between these two groups 
changes as they walk towards or away from the line. If the gap is narrow and the groups nearly 
meet at the line dividing them, then the groups involved are interacting and communicating well 
to try and close the gap of knowledge in decision-making. However, in some circumstances the 
gap is bigger, reducing the communication and interactions involved in decision-making. This 
can be due to a number of reasons including the limitation of knowledge by the users of the 
VALS, or even personality clashes. This creates a wide gap in how each group decides to use 
warning information, and the size of the gap changes over time as this HVO scientist describes: 
 
I have been doing this for so long, […] through so many transitions of both the 
mangers and SICs. They would have very different styles, so you see this gap 
getting wider and narrower and shifting around with things working better or not as 
well. It’s tricky, it’s a tricky business (HVO scientist 1). 
 
All U.S. federal agencies take responsibility for their decisions and do not want to be 
accountable for mistakes. So what exactly is this gap? A scientist from HVO stated that ‘the 
corollary with observatories issuing an alert level is that they know what the repercussions are 
of issuing them. The higher the alert level, the more action the public officials have to put 
pressure on the scientists, I don’t think that is right’ (HVO senior scientist 5). There is a divided 
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view amongst the scientists as to how much they assist emergency mangers in making decisions 
for response actions. Clearly the legal remit lies with the users involved, not the USGS who are 
supposed to only advise on the sciences i.e. volcanic activity. But one could argue what is the 
point of telling people about the science, if they do not understand the implications: is this an 
effective warning? A VALS does not relay the uncertainties involved with the scientist’s 
decision to assign an alert level. Some scientists stated that ‘I don’t think that we scientists 
should strive to make the jobs of public officials any easier, I think that we should tell them 
honestly what we don’t know as well as what we know, they have tough choices to make and 
should not be spoon-fed’ (HVO senior scientist 5). This quote highlights the struggle that the 
scientists have to provide a 'picture' of science being simple and straightforward to users, when 
in fact, as we will discover, many of the users are more than aware of the uncertainties. Tough 
choices have to be made, and these are choices that can be a matter of life or death, so it is 
essential for decision-makers to understand the uncertainties involved when they make their 
decisions.  
 
6.3.2 The need to integrate different expertise 
 
So why do users sometimes get ‘spoon-fed’ by scientists? First, scientists can provide confusing 
information in the face of large uncertainties. If scientists are uncertain about a volcano alert 
level assigned, they tend ‘to run on a bit with descriptions and putting in qualifying statements’ 
(CVO scientist 11). This can lead to confusion for the users, by providing a ‘pre-digested sense 
of how concerned they need to be at the moment’ (CVO scientist 11). In other words within 
information statements the scientists can provide strong indications as to the level of concern, in 
addition to the activity of the volcano. Second, users such as emergency managers typically deal 
with severe weather, fires, or car accidents on a frequent basis. Since volcanic activity is 
generally infrequent it is not something that emergency managers or other users such as land 
owners may be particularly aware of or have expertise in. In fact, some scientists relayed 
examples of decision-makers denying the existence of a volcano within their area of 
responsibility, making the provision of a warning challenging (CVO scientist 13). Even if 
decision-makers acknowledge the threat of volcanic hazards, few will have a good 
understanding of volcanology or the implications of different volcanic hazards, such as ash, or 
the possible risks that hazards pose (e.g. for asthmatic people). Therefore, there is a gap in the 
understanding of the hazards and the risks they pose by the scientists, and an understanding of 
the social risks involved by the users. Scientists have knowledge and experience not just of 
volcanology, but how hazards impact people. However, they do not know all the social risks 
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involved, although they can process the most obvious ones, since as already reviewed in section 
6.2, scientists consider some of these elements of risk in assigning an alert level. However, 
scientists do not always know the land, infrastructure, emergency resources, or social activities 
occurring at each vulnerable location at the time, which may impact the judgement of a user in 
taking action. Conversely, users do not necessarily understand the potential hazard, so there is 
also a gap in expertise between the scientists and users. To reduce this gap, a user may turn to 
the scientist for more guidance, as this scientist from HVO describes: 
 
If we are in a large population at risk, the geologists are going to be sweating 
bullets anyway because they are the ones that have to interpret the information for 
emergency managers, and they know that. For emergency managers, even though 
it’s very much their decision what to do with those people at risk, it is not the 
scientists’ decision, yet emergency managers will lean on you as hard as they can 
and they will come back and blame the scientists for whatever decisions are made. 
So the scientists are in the hot seat no matter what, and what we normally factor for 
is to just communicate and put out as plain and consistent a message as possible 
(HVO senior scientist 4). 
 
The VHP scientists feel a moral obligation or responsibility to help as much as possible, as often 
users may not have had any experience with volcanoes at all, or even visited an active one 
before. Scientists often get asked off-the-record questions such as ‘what would you do in this 
situation’ and ‘tell me what you really think’ when assessing a change in volcano alert level or 
some new issuance of information (VHP manager 4 / CVO scientist 6).  
 
What the official wants is certainty, 'can you guys tell me what day and what hour 
it will erupt?' All we can do is tell them based on the information we have, 'this is 
probably what might happen, we can’t give you a time window exactly' (VHP 
manager 4).  
 
Difficulties in pinning down ‘what, where and when’ for volcanic activity or a hazard creates 
uncertainties that are difficult for users to manage (AVO user – NWS 1). Even though a user 
often appreciates the uncertainties involved, they still have to make a decision. Often 
probabilities or statistical tools to convey the uncertainties are seen as useful by the scientists if 
they put ‘it into context without getting too mathematical for the officials that they can 
apprehend a little easier’ (VHP manager 4). However, scientists are concerned that non-
scientists may not understand probabilities very well, or know what to do with them. Rather 
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than try and evaluate the information provided, many scientists have said that decision-makers 
react based on their judgements: 
 
In reality a lot of emergency managers probably say, 'ok, you are not supposed to 
tell us whether to evacuate but what would you do if you were living in this place?' 
So the line between us providing advice and them making decisions is, I don’t 
think it is ever as quite an abrupt a line as we would like it be in an ideal 
circumstance (CVO scientist 6). 
 
Users want to know with the best scientific information what the situation is likely to be. This 
places the scientists in a very difficult situation, as they are more than aware of the uncertainties 
involved and some of the potential risks. Many scientists said they did not like to be put in the 
position of providing their own judgement, in case they turned out to be wrong, but many users 
argued differently, as this aviation user at AVO stated: 
 
Whatever decision you make it will be better than your customer, because you will 
be making an educated guess and they don’t have the educational background 
training that you [scientists] do. You need to make your best guess for them, and 
that is what we need these guys to do; don’t worry too much about getting it to 
exact, just get your best guess out there, and be confident about it. If it is too 
‘wishy washy’ we have to throw it out anyways (AVO user – NWS 2). 
 
The high uncertainty, changing behaviour, and sometimes long durations involved in volcanic 
behaviour lead to another problem; changing alert levels regularly. The scientists feel it is 
important that alert levels do not yo-yo from one alert level to another, as they believe it will 
cause confusion between the users, and may possibly lead to an information overload for them. 
In contrast, users of VALS can be more sophisticated than the scientists give credit for, and 
many users (aviation in particular) would like to have a more sensitive VALS that yo-yo’s more 
to reflect the current thinking about the activity. Most users expressed that they appreciate the 
challenges involved in changing alert levels but they want to obtain the information as quickly 
as possible so they can pass it onto their users (such as pilots), and changes in alert levels are an 
acceptable method to do this (AVO user – NWS 2 / VHP user – VAAC). So there seems to be a 
disconnect between what the users want (information, no matter how certain) and what the 
scientists provide to enable users to make the best decisions, and not unduly concern them. 
However, there may also be a disconnect between users’ ideal, and the practical in these views. 
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Not only is there a gap in decision-making between the actors, but the size of the gap changes 
over time as events unfold and there is emerging clarity over the situation, as this scientist 
explains: 
 
Early on when unrest first begins, all you know is that something is happening, you 
don’t have any idea where it is going to go, and it isn’t until you get further and 
further into the episode of unrest where you can actually start to apply some 
windows, forecast windows, and for the highest level of certainty that forecast 
window is going to be short, right before the event (VHP manager 3).  
 
Scientists are often unable to obtain any clarity about what a volcano is going to do until hours 
before it happens; unfortunately this is not useful from an emergency manager perspective. Such 
an impossibly narrow window is not helpful, yet that is the scientific reality. Therefore, more 
work is invested in providing specific warnings and additional information sources, as the 
picture of the volcano's activity becomes clearer with time using various different 
communication tools (see chapter 7).  
 
VALS create additional problems as outlined by this user in the Cascades who described the 
process of reviewing the change of an alert level and the accompanying information with CVO 
scientists before they actually officially issue it: 
 
My biggest feedback to you is that this all takes time […]. Basically after the action 
in 2004, I said I thought that it was dangerous actually; that they got state 
emergency managers and people like x just sitting around deciding what the words 
[for the information statement] are going to say, and I said ‘you know we need to 
call the Monument, and let them know. I don’t care what it says we just need to 
know that something has changed’. To be sitting worrying about what the three 
sentences are is silly. […] There is this tension between wanting to have everything 
be just right and needing to get the word out (CVO user - USFS). 
 
This process of over-deliberation is debilitating for this emergency manager, who feels the most 
important aspect of decision-making is to provide the information that something could happen 
as soon as possible so that those closest to the potential volcanic activity can make appropriate 
and timely decisions given their circumstances. In these cases, the precision of information is 
not the key factor. This raises questions about the efficiency of VALS and whether the process 
is overtly consumptive of time, providing little benefit to the scientists or users.  
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Generally, the scientists want to provide the media with information as soon as possible as the 
demand is huge, and there is a fear expressed by some scientists that if they do not provide the 
media with good information quickly, they may resort to other less trustworthy sources, as seen 
at Mt. St. Helens eruption in 1980 (Saarinen and Sell, 1985). Therefore, time is pressured when 
making decisions during rapidly changing volcanic activity or if there are vulnerable 
populations with significant interest in activity.  
 
6.3.4  Closing the 'gap' 
 
One of the greatest difficulties for the scientists is establishing and maintaining relationships 
with user agencies. Whether a scientist is better qualified than a user, given both their 
knowledge and experience, is difficult to establish but there is a case where users find it difficult 
to make decisions about a hazard they are unfamiliar with and do not necessarily have enough 
scientific knowledge to comprehend the implications of the warning provided. Therefore, it 
makes sense for the scientists and users to work together and combine their expertise, as the 
methods suggested by post-normal science encourage (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993). 
Developing protocols and coordination groups at the observatories has helped formalise the 
relationships between the two groups so they can discuss issues and learn about potential 
hazards prior to an event, so to be better prepared. Not all users can develop these relationships 
though, as they may be limited by available funding, time, resources or even stubborn 
characters. In these cases, the gap between the actors involved expands and is further 
exacerbated by a lack in clarity of the roles and capabilities of the different actors involved in 
managing a crisis. Whether it is possible to create a new position where someone acts as a 
mediator between the science and risk elements is questionable, but the USGS was not 
considering this for the future. Within the National Park Service, emergency management 
agencies and the National Forest Service, staff are constantly rotating or moving to gain new 
experiences and obtain promotions. This makes it hard for the scientists who have remained 
consistent over decades, to maintain the required relationships and make sure all user decision-
making staff that may be affected by volcanic activity are adequately engaged with them. 
 
Many interviewees, both scientists and users, argue that VALS provide a bridge for the gap in 
decision-making between the scientists and user groups: 
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How do you make the bridge between the scientific data, to practical actions that 
the officials can take? Alert level systems are part of that, they are part of that 
bridge and it is something you make the transition with. It is where science and 
reality kinda meets the road (VHP manager 4). 
 
But how can a VALS bridge this gap when it is just a semaphore system to signal information 
about volcanic activity and is unable to relay the complexities involved in reality such as the 
uncertainties and risks? If anything, the VALS makes the process far more complicated than it 
needs to be, as this Hawaiian scientists explains, reflecting perhaps on the U.S. culture's 
dependence on federal agencies:  
 
I feel like society has become too dependent on those land managers, and we have 
lost the resilience we once had with sensible thinking people, and that we want a 
colour, we want a wording, and we want those agencies to take care of everything. 
I think it is the wrong direction, I think people need to be reimbued with ‘here is 
the information, make some logical decisions’ (HVO scientist 2). 
 
The gap between the decision-making of the scientists and users can be exacerbated by a lack in 
clarity of the roles and capabilities of each in managing a crisis. To some extent, there is already 
a vast amount of work done to prevent reliance on just the VALS by developing protocols and 
procedures such as a telephone 'call-down' to make sure users are aware of new information 
quickly, with information tailored to their needs. These protocols provide clarity of each actor's 
role and capabilities (discussed in chapter 7), but it is important to note that these additional 
products, outside of VALS, do play a role in decision-making and help the VHP fulfil the 
Stafford Act’s requirements to provide a warning of potential volcanic activity. 
 
 
6.4  How are decisions made within VALS in the context of complexity, uncertainty 
and risk? 
 
Decision-making is at the very core of how VALS work. By focusing on this process it has been 
possible to open the black box of VALS and see how VALS work in practice. Decision-making 
is a complex process, in part the result of the complex physical and social systems involved, and 
the negotiation between science, uncertainty and risk that occurs when assigning an alert level 
or providing other information as guidance. Clearly scientific knowledge about volcanoes 
cannot just be ring-fenced, it is subject to influence by knowledge of the potential hazards and 
risks involved. However, this chapter has demonstrated that the design and structure of the 
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VALS itself presents further complexities. The rigidity of the alert level criteria generates 
discussion for the scientist about how and whether they should change an alert level or not, and 
if so, when. The uncertainties involved make this process even more complex, and on top of this 
there is a consideration of risk by the scientists in this decision-making process. Since VALS 
are unable to convey uncertainties and risks, a range of different procedures and protocols are 
used instead to communicate this information, demonstrating the limitations of VALS. VALS 
need to convey complexity because the hazards they manage are complex, but the VALS is a 
linear tool, unable to convey complexity, and subsequently creates additional problems in the 
decision-making process that are not necessary.  
 
In practice, there is a breakdown in the boundaries of knowledge and expertise. A scientist or 
user is no longer a single expert in a volcanic crisis, so to make a warning effective, 
communication between them is required. This chapter has shown that ‘recognising the social 
role of scientific uncertainty will help us to see how many of our problems about risk are deeply 
cultural and cannot be overcome simply by the application of more and better science’ 
(Jamieson, 1996, p.43).  Although, multi-directional communication with scientists and users is 
not part of the recognised VALS process, nearly all interviewees had been involved in 
negotiated decision-making between different expertise in crises. Communication between the 
scientists and users generates feedback between the two groups to negotiate the concerns of the 
scientists and the needs of the users, which may influence the decision to change alert levels or 
issue further information. Since decision-making processes involve a number of feedback loops, 
they do not fit in with the linear design structure of the VALS.  
 
A VALS operates differently from how it is envisaged in theory. This is because scientists are 
aware of the threats of the hazard, the uncertainties involved, and the fact that there needs to be 
guidance for users, all of which are seen as part of adopting a precautionary approach. For 
situations like this, i.e. within post-normal science contexts, it is necessary to apply the 
precautionary principle which states that ‘if there is a threat, which is uncertain, then some kind 
of action is mandatory’ (Sandin, 1999, p.891). This fits in with the ideals of mode 2 knowledge 
and post-normal science that have led to transdisciplinarity, the management of uncertainty and 
extension of the peer community, participation and communicative rationality, and the 
precautionary principle. All these different approaches support communicative rationality; 
extended peer communities to include stakeholders in understanding their needs, requirements 
and values; and high uncertainties where risk is socially constructed, and the stakes are high 
(Haag and Kaupenjohann, 2001, p.54). Consequently ‘all of these processes challenge the 
Chapter 6. Decision-making 
223 
 
established authority and monopoly of science to define reality’ (Haag and Kaupenjohann, 
2001, p.57). This means that knowledge is socially contextualised so that reliable knowledge 
will be tested under concrete local circumstances (Nowotny, 1999). Scientific models have to be 
evaluated for the particular problems within decision-making processes, which are unique in 
each case. Unfortunately, standardisation does not provide this flexibility. When events cannot 
be predicted the local variables, and temporal and spatial contexts gain importance. Therefore, a 
‘multiplicity of endo-perspectives [internal perspective] thus obtains priority over a universal 
exo-perspective [external perspectives]’ (Nowotny, 1996). This supports the idea that important 
factors to be considered, given the uncertainties, need to be by local stakeholders rather than on 
a national level by people external to what it going on. To be able to do this there is a need to 
develop transparency within the system to involve stakeholders to obtain mutual learning (Haag 
and Kaupenjohann, 2001). This is already happening within the black box of VALS via 
decision-making, negotiations and communication networks, discussed further in chapter 7. 
However, the rigid standardised VALS using four alert levels, as designed by the USGS, does 
not fit with this precautionary approach that is happening in practice, and is consequently 
making the warning process more difficult for the scientists and users, who are both already 
aware of their limitations in knowledge and expertise.  
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Chapter 7. The role of communication within the standardised 
volcano alert level system 
 
 
The previous two chapters have demonstrated that communication is essential between the 
different actors within the volcano alert level systems (VALS) to manage the many complexities 
involved and aid effective decision-making. This chapter focuses specifically on the role and 
forms of communication, reflecting on the ability of the standardised VALS to communicate a 
warning to both local and global users. The essence of a warning is the provision of meaningful 
information from experts to those that need to act. The processes of communication, like those 
of decision-making, are iterative, with constant interaction and feedback between users, 
scientists, and other actors. For any warning to be successful, the people who need to act must 
understand the warning and make decisions to reduce the loss of life or economic impact of any 
volcanic hazard. Drawing predominantly on interviews conducted with users of the VALS and 
the literature on communication and expertise (discussed in chapter 2), this chapter argues two 
main points. First, it suggests that for VALS to be effective they need to incorporate local 
context into communication tools, decision-making processes, and the planning and 
development of the VALS. Second, the chapter argues that in practice VALS are a part of a 
broader communication network, a complex adaptive system, which has the flexibility to adapt 
to local contexts and the changing nature of the hazard, as well as the circumstances of the 
population. To do this, the chapter examines the importance of local contingency or context, and 
how this is accommodated and communicated within the standardised VALS.  
 
 
7.1   Standardisation and the importance of the particular 
 
Throughout the empirical chapters, there has been one key emerging theme: the role of local 
contingency when using a VALS in practice. Contingencies include the local culture; economic, 
political, and institutional issues; education, infrastructure and media to name a few. This 
section reviews the implications of local contingency on the ability of users to understand a 
warning, and the information that different users require. 
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7.1.1  Decoding warnings and the role of different expertise 
 
The standardised VALS was developed with the aim of providing a universal warning to the 
range of users, so that once an alert level is issued, all users are able to understand it, no matter 
where they are from within the U.S. (see chapter 4).  But, was this successful? There are both 
theoretical reasons and empirical evidence that suggest a standardised alert level system cannot 
have a singular meaning when users are both diverse and geographically distributed.  
 
Empirically, research at the observatories, revealed numerous different interpretations of the 
meaning of VALS. One such example, recalled at both AVO and at HVO (HVO senior scientist 
6, and AVO senior scientist 2), concerned a commercial Alaskan pilot flying from Alaska to 
Hawaii. The pilot, used to flying in Alaska and dealing with the aviation colour code frequently 
in place there, was concerned that the Kilauea volcano on the island of Hawaii was assigned an 
Orange alert level. Based on his experience with volcanoes in Alaska, he anticipated that the 
volcano would be exhibiting unrest with increased potential for eruption with ash. When the 
pilot arrived in Hawaiian airspace, he expected some form of diversion or information (such as a 
Volcanic Ash Advisory) regarding Kilauea, but received nothing and landed with no problems. 
He later discovered that Kilauea is erupting, but only emitting a small ash plume that prohibits 
low level flying within close proximity of the volcano. What he expected was based on his 
experience with volcanoes assigned alert level Orange in Alaska. Although alert level terms are 
standardised throughout the U.S., they mean different things to users, in different locations, 
demonstrating both flexibility and inconsistency in the meaning and interpretation of VALS by 
users. Often these interpretations build on an individual’s local experiences and interactions 
with a VALS. In addition, the meanings of alert levels change between agencies. An Orange 
alert level does not affect the local VAAC or NWS in Hawaii as it does in Alaska. For the 
emergency services in Hawaii, an Orange / Watch alert level is meaningless due to the constant 
eruption of Kilauea yet, if the alert level for Long Valley caldera were raised to Yellow / 
Advisory this would trigger significant levels of response. Furthermore, locally developed 
VALS in place before the introduction of the standardised VALS may affect the meaning 
associated with each alert level.  
 
Since the meaning of a VALS varies depending on the user, there is a need by users to have 
clarity over what the alert levels mean ‘specifically’, that is in their context, as by themselves 
the alert level ‘can be vague’ (LVO user – emergency manager 1). Users want to know why 
there was a change in alert level and seek further information that is specific; they are ‘not just 
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going to look at red and evacuate’. The following processes involved in decoding VALS 
(understanding a message) (Hall, 1980), highlight the importance of local context. First, 
scientists recognise the inescapable processes of interpretation and the importance of context in 
decoding, suggest ‘it’s impossible to have an alert level system where everybody […] is going 
to have the same understanding’ (CVO senior scientist 2). Given its multiple and spatially 
distributed users, the interpretation of a standardised alert level will never be universal. Second, 
VALS are not a static tool, they change in purpose as the volcano goes from gearing up or down 
from an eruption, to during the eruption and its various phases of eruptive activity as it 
interchanges between a forecasting tool, to reporting the status of eruptive activity (Metzger et 
al., 1999). The message being encoded and decoded changes at different stages, thus both 
warning producer and receiver have to understand these temporal changes too. Third, there is a 
need for users to understand the characteristics of a volcano. An extended elevated alert level 
can become dangerous if no event occurs, as users tend to respond by thinking ‘I don’t need to 
be worried about it’, particularly pilots, who may put the lives of passengers in danger if the 
volcano suddenly erupts, as per the Orange / Watch alert level (AVO user - FAA). Therefore, a 
number of users become more expert, learning about the history of the volcano and 
understanding what to watch out for so that once an alert level is issued they know how to 
respond (AVO user – NWS 2). Furthermore, scientists also acknowledge that they are able to 
communicate less information than they want. VALS do not reflect a number of volcanic 
hazards that can cause a lot of concern, therefore scientists have commented that the ‘alert level 
itself is less important as to what they have to do in response to about it’ (CVO scientist 6). 
What this means is that the users ‘framework of knowledge’ (Hall, 1980) may not be adequate 
to understand the warning, implying a disconnect in knowledge's between the different actors, 
as well as shifting patterns of expertise between scientists and users as they seek to redress these 
gaps. Finally, many users view alert levels as a form of ‘calibration’ for what they need to do, 
but as a user for Hawaii points out ‘there is an intrinsic difference in a hazard that occurs every 
day versus somewhere like Mt. Rainier’, where eruptions and activity occur every few hundred 
years (HVO scientist 1). All these issues illustrate that the standardised alert level is inserted 
into local systems where there are multiple users with differing levels of experience and 
expertise on volcanic hazards. 
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Given there is a need to integrate expertise on volcanic behaviour, with the expertise on how 
this activity may affect vulnerable populations and the environment (including critical 
infrastructure), it is clear there is no one expert involved. This was identified in chapter 6 as a 
'gap' between the two groups. Users involved with VALS recognise that there is never going to 
be one expert who knows everything that needs to be known about a crisis; however with ‘more 
experience, the more familiar you are’ (HVO user - NPS), and over time, users are slowly 
becoming experts in understanding the volcanic knowledge they require to do their job. As 
Wynne et al. (1996) suggest, the role of expert, even in science, cannot be confined to the 
observatory scientists, particularly because they use the scientific information in different ways. 
Many users did suggest that ‘the people in the science world must know, they must make an 
attempt to know of the response’ that is needed (HVO user – emergency manager), presumably 
because they appreciate the influence this has on the decision-making of the alert level by the 
scientists (chapter 6). Therefore, it appears that all the involved actors work hard external to the 
VALS, to make sure that the decoding of a warning is accurate and meaningful. This is done 
through communicating with all the others involved using a number of communication 
products, and cooperating with one another via the coordination plans and meetings that give 
the opportunity for users to discuss what the hazards and potential risks are, and being prepared 
by developing a response plan, both of which are discussed further below.   
 
From interviews with users, it has become apparent that they need clarity beyond that of an alert 
level to help them understand what the alert level means. An emergency manager in Hawaii 
stated that VALS cannot work alone as ‘what is the good of all this if I don’t have the follow up 
information on what to do when’ (HVO user – emergency manager). The user needs additional 
information outside of the VALS to make a warning contextualised and therefore more 
effective. Emergency managers or those people in charge of making decisions about people’s 
safety have difficult problems to deal with like ‘should I evacuate or not?’ (LVO user - 
emergency manager 1), ‘where are people going to go / live?’, ‘will people actually pay 
attention or ignore the warnings?’ (HVO user – emergency manager). The same emergency 
manager went on to state that ‘I know this is insulting to scientists, but sometimes they don’t 
listen very well, they are so entrenched with their science, but science is supposed to be for 
people, not science’ (HVO user – emergency manager). Emergency managers need scientists to 
try to understand the problems they face and their situation and to help with their decision-
making processes, and their limitations in knowledge. To address these issues, some locations 
hold ‘desktop’ simulation exercises where the scientists and emergency managers / stakeholders 
run through scenarios to establish what possible problems may emerge (CVO scientist 5). 
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The issues raised in this section of the disparity in meaning, expertise, and understanding of 
warning messages can be framed using theoretical exploration of the relationship between 
producers and consumers in any communication system. Here the point is made by reference to 
the theories introduced in chapter 2, but the conclusion is similar; what is intended by a 
communication is not necessarily what is received by audiences. As Hall (1980) explains, 
messages are both encoded and decoded, and there is no necessary correspondence between the 
processes of encoding and decoding. The prior empirical chapters focused on the processes 
involved in encoding a message, which incorporate the scientific and institutional commitments 
of the USGS within a VALS.  This chapter demonstrates that the decoding of this message is 
equally important, returning to considerations of social risk and complexity. Hall (1980) draws 
attention to the importance of the social and institutional contexts for both producers and 
consumers, and their associated frameworks of knowledge, relations of production, and 
technical infrastructures. In theory, this suggests standardisation can only work if the hazards 
and local users are standardised too. Yet, in practice as one user suggests, ‘we are mixing up 
oranges and tangerines’ (HVO collaborator); currently an alert level at one volcano and used by 
a set of users may mean something quite different to another volcano and associated users.   
 
 
7.1.2  Information requirements of the users  
 
The legal mandate of the USGS is to provide a warning and make sure that the relevant people 
receive and understand it, but as the section above has indicated, this is not the only way the 
users of the VALS get the information they want.  This section outlines what the users want 
from a VALS, and then reflects on how the standardisation has affected users’ ability to decode 
a message.  
 
Prior to the standardisation of the VALS in 2006, users worked with the VALS relevant to their 
local volcano observatory. The initial rationale for developing VALS stemmed from the 
emergency managers in the Cascades during the 1980s. One of these emergency managers 
wanted the VALS to provide some scale of severity of information/warning: 
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The scientific community is used to providing information and then having people 
react to that information. In the emergency response field, we are more attuned to 
reading that kind of information but at the end of it needing some guidance as to 
some sort of scale; how serious is this information you are providing us? So that 
was the difference, scientists were ‘capsulising ‘information on possible states of 
the volcano without really delineating on any kind of a scale how important this 
was; and first responders need that kind of references point, so that’s how we first 
began to talk about the alert levels (CVO user – emergency manager 1). 
 
Interviews with users suggest that they regard the VALS as a scale to determine the importance 
of the information being distributed. This is in contradiction to the intention of the standardised 
VALS, which is to provide an indication of the eruptive activity of the volcano. Users tend to 
work in busy government agencies that are often already overwhelmed with other duties. For 
the users, VALS provide a method ‘to narrow our scope of view’ (VHP user - VAAC). With so 
many other duties, the alert level provides an important method of knowing which hazards are 
in a state of unrest and require more time and concentration in the course of other activities. In 
addition, VALS let the emergency managers know something is going on, as this emergency 
manager from the Cascades highlights: 
 
We need to prepare for something that could happen. When we get that first 
advisory we start dusting off plans because people do not read them every day, we 
get re-familiarised with the ‘what ifs’, that could happen and the lines of 
communication open up (CVO user – USFS 2) 
 
Establishing the urgency of warning information is a key priority for the users to determine 
‘where we are in terms of imminent danger’ (LVO user – Mammoth Lakes town 2). The VALS 
helps to ‘ramp up situational awareness’ that ‘dictates and drives our situation awareness and 
staffing’ (AVO user – NWS 3). So VALS not only provide information about the physical 
hazard, they are also used by the users for ‘planning purposes: what level we are at for planning; 
to determine whether open an Emergency Operation Centre (EOC) and start planning for an 
event’ (LVO user – emergency manager 1). Since U.S. emergency management protocols were 
standardised under the National Incident Management System (see chapter 4), all emergency 
managers are required to make the same preparatory decisions and follow standard protocols. 
For users, making sense of the VALS is just the first step to translating this warning into the 
subsequent stages of emergency planning, so instigating a whole new series of warnings 
encoded and decoded by other groups. The following emergency manager at the Cascades 
outlines the responsibilities of their job and provides an insight into how emergency managers 
conceptualise VALS as part of a chain or system of communications: 
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For me as an emergency manager it [VALS] is a key tool in trying to arrive at 
public information statements and messages that we can give to the public that are 
understandable. And so it’s got to be simple and understandable to us before we 
can craft a message that we then send to the public that they fully understand. [...] 
The key thing is not to create undue unnecessary panic in the messages, the public 
information statements that we send out, and to ensure that the messages coming 
from the scientific community are such that we can translate them for the elected 
officials, the public, whoever is going to use that information to make informed 
decisions as to what their actions should be, should they be faced with a threat 
(CVO user – emergency manager 2). 
 
This quote highlights the responsibilities emergency managers and other users have during a 
crisis to protect the vulnerable public. In order to do this they need to understand the scientific 
information and warnings to make difficult but important decisions. Since it is important not to 
create any undue panic, there needs to be clarification between the scientists and users as to 
what precisely the risks are. The alert level is not decoded in isolation, but in consideration of 
scientists intentions in relation to potential public responses.  Generally, if a user wants to know 
what is going on, then they are going to call directly the SIC or duty scientist (CVO user - USFS 
1). In addition, whilst many of the emergency managers believe that the VALS are not really for 
public use, they are regarded as a useful ‘yardstick that experts as well as general public can 
hopefully somewhat intuitively understand’ (YVO collaborator).  
 
For aviation clients, the issues are slightly different again: the high costs of diverting flight 
routes and carrying extra fuel for potential re-routing is unappealing, but equally they want to 
minimise the risks. Since pilots move at speed, they need relevant information quickly, in quite 
a different way than emergency managers on the ground as this scientist at LVO highlights: 
 
For ground response, [...] what is really important is that you have clear 
communication and understanding between the volcanologists and the officials 
responsible for emergency response. If you have that then the problem is solved, it 
really is. The aviation industry is different, the pilot is about to get into a plane, he 
looks through his NOTAMS and other sorts of guidance and warnings about 
hazards, be it weather or other things, and makes certain decision about how much 
fuel to load onboard, and talks to the dispatcher about routing. These things all 
have to happen fairly fast and they have to cover a range of hazards that might be 
spread over thousands of kilometres. It is a very different world. He is never likely 
to talk to a volcanologist, he has to have something simple and clear to react to 
(VHP manager 5). 
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As the previous chapter demonstrated, for the scientists, VALS are often a time consuming 
activity requiring discussion, deliberation and consensus building. The users of VALS, 
particularly of ground hazards, have expressed concern over the time lost during these 
discussions in getting what could be vital information to them. The users commonly portrayed 
VALS as a limited tool; and felt that if the scientists knew some information, but without any 
real certainty or clarity about what it means, it is still better to communicate this to the users as 
it is better to say something rather than ‘nothing at all’ (LVO scientist 2).  The users regarded it 
‘better to be ahead of the game rather than hide facts’ and consequently ‘not give very much 
warning time’ (LVO scientist 2). Unfortunately, a number of users felt that since the VALS is a 
formal expression under the USGS mandate to provide a warning, scientists are discouraged to 
issue alerts until there is greater certainty, which in turn puts pressure on the scientists to get the 
decision 'right' (AVO scientist 3). However, the users just want the information, and care little 
for formalities. Therefore, informal methods of warning and communication such as telephone 
calls are able to communicate information in a more interactive manner, especially if there is 
high uncertainty that is of interest to the users, without issuing any official warning information.  
 
Although the standardisation committee took account of the requests by many users, a wide 
spectrum of users were not directly involved in the design process. Consequently, there appears 
to be a shortfall between what information the users want and what they actually get. Whilst in 
practice, elements of a post-normal science practice emerge from engaging with users during the 
standardisation process (Ravetz, 1999), a post-normal science approach is not as evident in the 
process of designing the standardised VALS. Yet, these extended peer communities seem even 
more important at the preplanning stage, where understanding local context and knowledge’s 
can provide enhancements to the design and use of VALS. During times of non-crisis, the actors 
involved can spend time deliberating plans and protocols, but during a crisis, they require 
information quickly, regardless of scientific uncertainties, and with more guidance on what the 
information means and how to act upon it. 
 
 
7.2  Accommodating context and communicating a warning  
 
The previous section outlined the importance of the particular when developing and 
communicating a warning. This section explores how local contexts and contingencies are 
communicated via the VALS and a number of other communication products that have 
developed outside the USGS. VALS are in essence a communication tool, but it has become 
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clear that an alert level alone is not able to accommodate local contexts. For example by issuing 
‘Orange / Watch’ it is not possible to know exactly what is going on at the volcano, or where or 
when activity or hazards may occur since the assigned descriptions for these levels are: 
‘exhibiting heightened or escalating unrest with increased potential of eruption, timeframe 
uncertain’ or ‘eruption is underway but poses limited hazards’ (Gardner and Guffanti, 2006, 
p.2). To overcome these limitations, a number of communication products and protocols were 
established to provide more information and interaction for users to make sense of warnings in 
their own contexts. Consequently, many scientists and users regard VALS as providing a trigger 
point to initiate communication, as this scientist outlines: 
 
 [An] alert level system is a shorthand, is the vehicle, it is the excuse to get into 
communications and dialogue, that gives you a justification and purpose […] that 
provides you the entry into having a discussion with very busy people who are 
otherwise occupied with other duties they have (VHP manager 4). 
 
VALS can trigger a number of communication protocols and products (see below) that depend 
on the alert level, providing tools to alert different hierarchies of users, from the local level to 
the President of the U.S. The contexts of the users have influenced these products, as this 
scientist discusses:  
 
The aviation sector needs simple communication to make rapid decisions. On the 
ground first hand interaction with observatories is crucial. So as a result on the 
ground the uniform code is not that crucial in terms of guiding decision-making, 
but where it becomes more important is communicating the severity of the situation 
to Washington D.C., to the media, to the national and international public. That is 
where its real value is (VHP manager 5). 
 
VALS are ‘some way of starting the communication process’ (CVO senior scientist 1), that also 
‘help first responders to quickly grasp what is going on at the volcano and make rapid but 
informed decisions’ by providing a ‘shortcut towards long discussions with emergency 
managers’ (HVO senior scientist 5). Establishing communication products and protocols 
between the scientists and users also helps to establish contact, to maintain credibility, and to 
foster trust. 
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7.2.1  Communication products 
 
As the Volcano Hazard Program (VHP) evolved throughout recent decades, as discussed in 
chapter 4, there has been an increase and diversification of users, and significant advances in 
technology in communications (i.e. the internet and mobile phones). Since the standardisation of 
the VALS a wide spectrum of communication products have developed, some also standardised, 
such as information statements, Volcano Activity Notices (VANs) and Volcano Observatory 
Notice for Aviation (VONAs), and the VHP website with alert levels assigned on a single map 
(see chapter 5). These products are uni-directional, in passing information from the scientists to 
the users as a final product. However, a majority of communication that occurs during a crisis is 
multi-directional, involving communication with several people, usually formalised via a 
number of protocols such as telephone call-down lists, and meetings between the relevant actors 
usually as part of a coordination plan, media talking points, and personal communication 
between the decision-makers. These two different types of communication products are 
reviewed in further depth to provide insights into how the VALS work in practice. 
 
For the scientists, information statements provide a greater level of flexibility in communicating 
information than just issuing an alert level, although they follow a uni-directional format of 
information. Scientists tailor these messages to be relevant and of interest to the local users, 
however, these messages are still limited to text so there is no opportunity for dialogue or for 
users to add context. As a scientist states: 
 
I think info statements are really the key thing, I mean especially let’s look at 
Hawaii, the info statements about sulphur dioxide hazards and stuff like that brings 
a whole different thing that is not reflected in the alert level and that is what people 
need to be concerned about (VHP manager 6). 
 
Together ‘the alert levels tell you how closely you should pay attention to the information 
statements’, and the information statement reassures the users and public that someone is 
‘watching’ the volcano (CVO scientist 12). Information statements are ‘critical to explain what 
is happening and why’ but they are also the most ‘time consuming’ and ‘pressurised’ aspect of 
the warning (LVO senior scientist 1), since they need to be issued quickly. Since there is the 
strong desire by the scientists not to raise ‘undue alarm’, the decision to warn can become a ‘big 
time sink’ (LVO senior scientist 1). A scientist at CVO said that the rate in which the scientists 
‘process and disseminate information is dependent of the alert level’ (CVO scientist 12) 
implying that at Red alert, information statements would be issued faster than at Yellow alert. 
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Therefore, the alert level issued provides a ‘flag for users for how often the users should be 
looking for information’ (CVO scientist 12). This implies that an alert level communicates a 
level of concern or sense of urgency. There is clearly a strong relationship between the VALS 
and the accompanying information statements, and many regard a VALS as a ‘wrapper around 
the information statement’ because it provides an instant way of identifying the importance of 
the information provided (HVO user - NPS). Therefore, an alert level without a message is 
unable to represent the complexities involved that relate to the volcanic crisis. 
 
Although many users have become accustomed to the information statements they receive, 
including specific volcanic terminologies used, it is not always easy for the users to understand 
the information provided and they often have to ‘keep reading the statements otherwise they are 
hard to make sense of’ as this Hawaiian user states (HVO user - NPS). This is usually a 
consequence of technical information overwhelming the ‘uninitiated geologist’, although users 
do not have to understand everything to get the information they require (HVO user - NPS). 
Some users argued that ‘to understand the colours [alert levels] you have to understand the 
paragraphs that the colours are based on, so why not give the paragraphs, why not give 
information?’ (HVO senior scientist 5). This would give users the option of using the VALS if 
they wanted to, but not forcing it on them. In places like the Cascades where activity can be 
sporadic, emergency managers consider VALS as a useful tool to help gain their attention (as 
discussed in chapter 5). Therefore, where volcanic activity is infrequent, VALS play a more 
significant role in obtaining attention about new activity.  
 
Differences in user groups also affect the type of information given in an information statement. 
A scientist said: ‘I think from the words we put out with hazard notices or alert level changes; 
that is the real message, not necessarily the code itself, except for the aviation community’ 
(VHP manager 6). For ground hazards there is a need to distinguish what is going on at the 
volcano and what potential hazards or activity may be occurring and where, but for the aviation 
sector they are only interested in just one aspect: is there ash in the air and where? The type of 
information these two user groups require is very different, which is why at AVO information 
statements have been standardised to form the VONAs and VANs that specifically 
accommodate each user’s needs reflected in the two standardised VALS developed. VANs and 
VONAs have evolved as part of the standardisation process as reviewed in chapter 5 and the 
templates for each message is shown in Table 7.1. Originally developed at AVO, other VHP 
observatories are gradually adopting them.  
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AVO/USGS Volcanic Activity Notice (VAN) (1) Volcano Observatory Notice For 
Aviation (VONA) 
Volcano:  
Current Volcano Alert Level:  
Previous Volcano Alert Level:  
Current Aviation Colour Code:  
Previous Aviation Colour Code:  
Issued:  
Source:  
Notice Number:  
Location:  
Elevation:  
Area:  
Volcanic Activity Summary:  
Recent Observations: 
Remarks:  
Contacts:  
Next Notice:  
(2) Issued: 
(3) Volcano: 
(4) Current Colour Code: 
(5) Previous Colour Code: 
(6) Source: 
(7) Notice Number: 
(8) Volcano Location: 
(9) Area: 
(10) Summit Elevation: 
(11) Volcanic Activity Summary: 
(12) Volcanic cloud height: 
(13) Other volcanic cloud information: 
(14) Remarks: 
(15) Contacts: 
(16) Next Notice: 
 
Table 7.1  Details of a Volcanic Activity Notice  (VAN)  and a Volcano Observatory Notice For 
Aviation (VONA) (Observatory, 2010) 
 
Since there is a complex relationship between the volcano, the social context, and the users 
involved in a volcanic crisis, different communication tools shape the way that VALS are 
encoded and decoded. Because this complex relationship is dependent on the crisis (what and 
when), VALS have in practice become locally adapted using a number of communication tools 
to make them useful to the key decision-makers and the local population, demonstrating the 
limitations in the standardised VALS and the creativity of local systems for circumnavigating 
this. To make encoding and decoding a message more effective, so that both groups understand 
the message and concerns of one another, local context is incorporated into a wide range of 
other more iterative communication processes, which are multi-directional. 
 
Establishing contact to communicate effective warnings between the scientists and users is also 
essential and involves adopting multi-directional tools. During a crisis, each observatory follows 
a number of protocols, many of which are correlated to different alert levels, to facilitate these 
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links. Once the scientist in charge makes the decision to change alert level or to issue new 
information, the first requirement is to do a call-down; a sequenced set of quick telephone calls 
to key agencies to notify them in person of the information, enabling ‘discussion as to how you 
issue those levels’ that is ‘unique to that situation’ (CVO scientist 13). For each observatory the 
sequence of the call-down is different depending on the users, ‘who owns the land, the 
jurisdiction’, the volcano’s activity and the hazard characteristics (CVO scientist 13). Once the 
call-down is complete, an electronic form of the information is emailed to all the users, 
observatory mailing lists, and put on the website for the public to access, usually via a VAN / 
VONA. This whole process is incredibly fast, particularly following the introduction of the 
standardised message formats, which are set up as a database (primarily at AVO). It is through 
these processes that contact between the scientists and users is initially made, ensuring that 
those who really need to know the information are provided with this in person. In addition, the 
call-downs generate the opportunity for communication between the scientists and users, which 
may continue at greater length either by telephone or meeting in person to deal with the 
situation (discussed in section 7.2.2). This generates a personal feel to the message and 
facilitates multi-directional communication between both the encoders and decoders of the 
warning message to clarify the meaning and implications of the message. 
 
Fostering trust is vital to make sure that once a crisis occurs, all actors are at least familiar with 
one another, and ideally have developed good relationships, so as to have enough mutual 
understanding to trust one another and the information provided. A number of users expressed 
the view that trying to get ‘facts out of scientists’ is difficult, but by ‘building trust ahead of 
time’ it was possible that they could trust each other and understand the others limitations, 
despite their institutionally ‘different cultures’ (CVO scientist 5). This requires a significant 
level of preparatory work and open communication commonly achieved by developing 
coordination plans between the volcano observatory and user agencies. The key purpose of this 
plan is to have ‘recognised and standardised a system within an area of coverage, to promote 
communication of the hazard and management decisions’ (CVO senior scientist 8). Plans such 
as these, have been implemented in Alaska, the Cascades, Mammoth Lakes and in Hawaii (Hill 
et al., 2002, Madden et al., 2008) and are vital to the success of communication because ‘with 
the coordination plans, the communication is in place’ (VHP manager 1). The plans are drawn 
up to provide background information about the volcano, its history and potential hazards, the 
different land owners, stakeholders and federal or state agencies involved with the land, and the 
plan for a crisis. The crisis plan typically outlines different roles and responsibilities of the 
different groups should a crisis happen, and are established following a number of meetings 
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between the different actors, facilitating an opportunity to develop trust between the different 
actors involved. 
 
Maintaining credibility is crucially important to the monitoring scientists. Without it, they fear, 
understandably, that users may not respond to warnings. The media and vulnerable populations 
may often request further information from the scientists, as seen by the overwhelming response 
to the Mt. St. Helens eruption, both in 1980 and 2004. Since the media are able to contact 
individual scientists rather than going through one central media representative at the 
observatory, it has been vital for scientists to develop ‘talking points’ about the crisis, so that all 
scientists give the same information, viewpoint and data (CVO manager). This reduces any 
confusion, prevents loss of credibility and generates a strong unified message from the 
observatory. Most users will only accept information relating to the crisis from the USGS, 
especially at HVO since it is the ‘only source that is responsible for hazard resources and 
identification. That is their job’ (HVO user - emergency manager). However, there are other 
academic scientists who may have different information relating to the crisis and if they do not 
collaborate with the observatory they can generate confusion within the media, which could be 
potentially dangerous. Users are equally wary of information from other so-called experts, who 
may have valid information but are not associated with the USGS. The observatory maintains 
credibility by following protocols to remain open 24 hours a day when at Orange / Watch alert 
levels or higher, providing the most up to date information for an on-going crisis (unless it is 
Kilauea under stable conditions, such as constantly erupting).  
 
Users have differing capabilities and technologies to make sense of and act upon volcanic alerts. 
Communication has become more streamlined so that users can quickly access the information 
they need with the internet fast becoming a focal product for many users, especially at AVO 
where they are able to access live monitoring data themselves via the sophisticated public 
website. Although this is regarded by some scientists as dangerous, because you have 'non-
experts' interpreting monitoring data, most users find it useful as it gives them a sense of 
ownership over the data and helps them identify with the difficulties the scientists have to face 
in interpreting the data (AVO - user NWS 2). One of the reasons this works particularly well at 
AVO may be because the agencies involved (mainly NWS, FAA, and VAAC) staff are used to 
looking at weather data and satellite images, which AVO also depends on strongly to identify 
ash at the remote volcanoes they monitor. In fact, one user stated that some of the users in 
Alaska ‘don’t want to know the code, they want to know what’s the data, what’s the monitoring 
data that is showing a change’ (AVO scientist 7). With improving technological capabilities, it 
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will be interesting to see if the other observatories find internet tools as useful as AVO and their 
users have. 
 
Interviews with numerous users have suggested that implementation of the standardised VALS 
at all the volcano observatories had little impact on the users. They are using protocols similar 
to those used before the standardised VALS, but with the new terminologies and using new 
standardised products, which may have occurred without the implementation of the standardised 
VALS. A user in Alaska stated that in many cases it is ‘overkill’ to change the system to a 
standardised VALS because what is in place seems to work well, and with modern technology 
providing many different ways to communicate, VALS may seem redundant (AVO scientist 7); 
they certainly were in Hawaii prior to the introduction of the standardised VALS, which 
previously consisted only of open communication.   
 
7.2.2  Generating situational awareness 
  
The existence of numerous communication products and tools indicate that observatories have 
to use them to make the VALS a meaningful tool to fulfil the user’s needs. All actors involved 
in the VALS interviewed agreed that an alert level works well as a semaphore, but as a linear 
system it does not have the flexibility to communicate a full warning. Therefore, the large range 
of communication products and protocols provide compensation for this limitation, supporting it 
to prevent confusion and misinterpretation, and generate the desired response. Through open, 
multi-directional communication, the actors can develop mutual understanding that helps break 
down the boundaries that exist in both knowledge and expertise of each group, and their legal 
mandate, in order to make the best decision possible given the uncertainties involved and 
resources and capacity to respond in a crisis.  
 
Only a few scientists defined VALS as ‘a carefully crafted, consensus of appropriate 
communication, methods and communication protocols for describing the state of unrest at  a 
volcano and depending on the acceptable laws of the culture, the reactions that should occur 
from that state of unrest’ (CVO senior scientist 8). Feedback from all users showed that 
communication is the vital connection between all actors involved in the VALS. But, more than 
this, the relationships fostered during the communication of volcano information are a key 
aspect of the warning system. A scientist went as far to state that ‘whatever system you have, as 
long as it is communicated to people, it is fine’ (VHP manager 4). This implies that in practice, 
some of the users are not particular about the form of VALS used or its design.  For users to 
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manage the complexities involved in a VALS, communication over volcanic activity has to be 
multi-directional, open and discursive. This moves the understanding of how VALS work 
operate away from the focus on a single standardised alert level and towards the approaches 
suggested by post-normal science, in which deliberative processes bring together the expertise 
of scientists and users are encouraged, so that situational awareness can be generated. 
 
Whether establishing contact, building trust or maintaining credibility, all these issues are 
addressed by having meetings, developing preparedness plans, and meeting frequently so as to 
get to know one another and generate some situational awareness between the different actors 
involved. In 2007, as part of this study, I attended such a meeting; the coordination team for the 
Mt. St. Helens Volcano Response Plan. During the meeting, it emerged that scientists were 
concerned that users tend to gear their response actions to specific alert levels, which 
consequently places pressure on the scientist when making the decision to assign an alert level 
(as discussed in chapter 6). Therefore, once the scientists communicate an alert level, the users 
know what to do as it is written into the plan, except it may be something unexpected. 
Consequently, there is a lot of ‘situational awareness’ that goes on around the volcano between 
the scientists and the users (CVO scientist 5), which also enables scientists to communicate to 
users ‘so they [users] have some sense of our level of anxiety on escalating unrest on a volcano 
so they can understand the alert levels better’ (LVO senior scientist 1). These coordination 
meetings provide the opportunity to clarify the nuances of the terms as understood by the users 
and scientists so each group are confident about what each alert level is likely to mean to each 
user for that specific volcano. All these activities follow the kinds of interactions suggested by a 
post-normal science, where different experts meet to establish and understand the complexities 
involved, much like advised in the Cynform model (Kurtz and Snowden, 2003). 
 
Many of the communication tools used provide opportunities to educate different user groups 
about each other's roles and responsibilities, and learn more about volcanic activity and hazards. 
The observatory scientists work hard to educate users and the public about volcanic hazards and 
conduct many outreach and educational events to help prepare vulnerable populations against 
potential volcanic hazards. This long term preparatory approach is however, costly and time 
consuming, but rewarding by enabling risk communication (Fischhoff, 1995). Some scientists 
felt that obtaining people's attention during a crisis provides a more ‘teachable moment where 
you can impart some information to them while you’ve got their attention, but the half-life of it 
is probably in terms of days or weeks’ (CVO senior scientist 8). A key concern of the scientists 
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is whether or not people will become complacent if there is a VALS in place; assuming they are 
safe because they will receive sufficient warning. 
 
Communicating with the public can be a very powerful tool. In Hawaii, a scientist recalled an 
incident many years ago when scientists at HVO gave a talk to a local community telling them 
that following Kilauea’s latest activity their community was highly likely to be overrun by lava. 
‘The strange thing was they applauded, they came up and talked to me and they said “we really 
appreciated it cause you treated us like grown-ups that can process the information, rather than 
just things to be told like what we are supposed to do like children” ’ (HVO collaborator). This 
incident demonstrated that if you tell people what is going on using language they understand, 
people can understand and follow it. This openness stressed the importance of honest 
communication, whether good or bad news. It also indicates the importance of timing. 
Providing information in time for people to act on it is essential because during a crisis there is 
often little time to educate people and prevent panic reactions. 
 
The media also plays an important role in educating and communicating to the public, but the 
alert levels themselves do not play a significant role as this journalist from a large newspaper in 
the Cascades details: 
 
It wasn’t a big issue for the [x newspaper], because whatever the alert level is 
we’re going to probably not get into that in depth, we are simply interested in 
what’s happening at the mountain, what can you tell us about it, and we are 
interested in writing about it from more nuance point of view than just telling 
people an alert level and expecting them to know that some government agency 
ascribes to a level of risk (CVO user - media). 
 
There is a need to learn from volcano crises around the world to prevent scientists and users 
repeating mistakes. Many scientists and users stressed the importance of the experiences of the 
VDAP team, and the need to access these experiences from this group of highly experienced 
scientists as ‘these learning opportunities for people who have to face them [volcanic eruptions] 
are few and far between’ (CVO user – emergency manager 3). 
 
Although communication and trust are dependent on establishing coordination plans and 
effective interaction between all the actors, these factors are determined by the institutional and 
organisational contexts, time and resources available to the staff concerned, and staff remaining 
in their role for a number of years to provide a level of consistency. The role of the institution or 
organisation is critical in developing knowledge and protocols, as discussed by Vaughan (1999). 
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However, boundaries still exist between the institutional structures of the scientists and user’s 
agencies or organisations, including their political agendas. To overcome these boundaries, 
policies / plans have been established using coordination meetings that facilitate communication 
between the different users. 
 
 
7.3 Does the standardised VALS function effectively in communicating information 
about hazardous volcanic behaviour to a range of users?  
 
The purpose of a VALS is to communicate and to aid the difficult decision-making processes 
that occur between the different actors. These actors have different values, institutional 
limitations and capacities, and operate within a context of uncertainty and unknown risk. In the 
course of this study, it has become clear that as these conditions change, whether it is the 
volcano’s behaviour or social contexts, then the communication networks adapt to 
accommodate these changes. To some extent the communication between the actors becomes a 
self-organising process where protocols and procedure assist but do not necessarily dictate the 
frequency or type of communication that needs to occur. Whilst VALS are intended to be linear, 
in practice the process of issuing a volcanic warning is complex since there is multiplicity of 
legitimate perspectives, non-linearity, self-organisation, multiplicity of scales, and areas of 
continuing uncertainty. Therefore, the self-organising and adaptability of the communication 
networks provide the flexibility to accommodate the user’s needs, requirements and capabilities 
in making decisions and communicating such information to their users. This is not achieved 
through the VALS. It seems reasonable to ask whether VALS fulfil their purpose of 
communicating warnings, or are they making this process more difficult by complicating the 
communication network? Or do they just act as a guide for concern or awareness? 
 
It is because VALS operate within a number of complex systems, that it restricts the ability to 
integrate different experts, and investigate who is involved in decision-making and their 
measures of quality. Gallopin et al. (2001, p.226) state that ‘knowledge in the sense of insight 
and understanding is absolutely not synonymous with capacity for prediction’ and that ‘equally, 
awareness of risks is not synonymous with capacity to intervene to reduce or control the risks’, 
illustrating that there is a need for scientists to engage with other stakeholders in order to 
promote awareness and put into place plans to deal with potential volcanic hazards. This is 
something the USGS has been particularly successful at doing and demonstrates that when 
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dealing with complexity in an open flexible fashion, is possible to effectively manage the 
complexities involved. 
 
In order to manage the gaps between the science, uncertainty, and the risks posed in volcanic 
hazard warnings, multi-directional communication provides the key to facilitating open 
discussion between the scientists, users and other stakeholders or actors involved in the crisis. 
This communication occurs outside of the VALS because it is not a linear or top-down process. 
During a crisis, the communication that occurs becomes a complex network, or system, that 
generates feedback loops and enables the communication between the different actors to adapt 
and evolve as per the requirements of each of the actors involved. For every crisis, this system 
will be different, even if it is the same volcano, because the actors involved and the 
circumstances are constantly changing. By having a flexible and adaptive communications 
network, it is possible to accommodate the needs of the diverse range of users and varying 
hazards over time, unlike in the context of the VALS. Returning to communications theory, 
establishing open communication enables the producers and consumers of warnings to establish 
meaningful interpretations of the warning system, even if they are based in different contexts, 
rather than relying only on encoding and decoding the single alert level change. In addition, by 
using a standardised VALS, rather than one that is locally developed, it makes decoding even 
more complicated for the users. The wide scope of users with their own needs, geographies, and 
temporal relations to the hazard, makes decoding a generic message, such as a standardised alert 
level, challenging, hence the development of two different VALS to deal with ground and 
aviation based users. 
  
This chapter has used information from both the scientists and the users of a VALS to conclude 
that in practice, the process of scientists generating a warning that is meaningful and useful to 
users, occurs as a sophisticated communication network. This network exists largely outside of 
the standardised VALS. Therefore, rather than conceptualising a VALS as the tool that 
communicates warning information, in practice VALS are only a small part of a very large and 
complex system of communication, already in place and working.  
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Chapter 8. Discussion and conclusions 
 
 
This thesis sets out to understand better the volcano alert level system (VALS) concept and to 
evaluate how effective linear, standardised VALS are as warning tool for potentially hazardous 
volcanic behaviour, in the contexts of complexity, uncertainty and risk. Using the USGS, which 
standardised its VALS in 2006, as a case study, research conducted at the five Volcano Hazard 
Program (VHP) volcano observatories and at several user groups (U.S. federal agencies) during 
2007 and 2008 has yielded data that has helped to answer the key research question. This study 
is important because there are increasing levels of standardisation nationally in both VALS and 
VEWS, as well as other natural hazard early warning system (EWS), globally. There is no 
known analytical study of the impact of standardisation on the ability for VALS and volcano 
early warning system (VEWS) to function effectively. Without this knowledge, it is not possible 
to establish what benefits or constraints standardisation can bring, and consequently policy-
makers are unable to decide whether or not standardisation is appropriate for their jurisdiction, 
and if so, how best to standardise volcanic warnings to match their requirements. The UN 
endorses a globally comprehensive EWS, and therefore there is a concern that blindly following 
a current trend without understanding the full consequences may have severe repercussions. 
This study has provided the first investigation into VALS reviewing 'the first mile' in relation to 
how they work (unpacking the black box), reviewing the impact of standardisation, analysing 
them from an interdisciplinary perspective, and highlighting the importance of social science 
research and social contexts within the process.   
 
 
8.1  Addressing the research aims  
  
Through interviewing USGS and U.S. federal agency personnel, it has been possible to address 
the research aims and questions, using a large representative group, selected using the guidance 
of the scientist in charge at each volcano observatory. It is important to note, however, that the 
conclusions of this study only apply to the U.S. The country is a wealthy global power that 
adopts sophisticated emergency management practices and makes use of state-of-the-art 
scientific knowledge and technologies. Whilst the U.S. may not be representative of other 
nations that have to deal with volcanic hazards, notably those in the developing world, this 
thesis analyses arguably the most successful VALS in operation today. Therefore, it is possible 
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to say with confidence, that given adequate funding, expertise and resources, the VALS 
addressed here provides an important benchmark for other VALS. It is likely that for developing 
countries, this same study would raise different issues such as lower levels of funding that result 
in limited monitoring capabilities, expertise, and resources for education and the communication 
of warnings. With less data on a volcano's activity uncertainties are likely to be higher, and with 
populations that may be difficult to access or communicate a warning, the risks involved may 
also be greater. 
 
The field work conducted as part of this study provided the opportunity to observe how VALS 
work in practice and to obtain the views of USGS scientists on their interaction with the VALS 
both prior to, and post, the standardisation. An added advantage was gaining access to the users 
of the VALS to obtain some feedback on the application of VALS and the interactions between 
the different actors involved. Through interviews and ethnographic studies, it has been possible 
to address the three constituent research questions that each empirical chapter addressed. 
Throughout these chapters, the themes of managing complexity, decision-making, and 
communication recur, resulting from the problems of forecasting the hazard, the rigidity in the 
design of the VALS, the process of decision-making in issuing an alert level, and the 
standardisation of the VALS. These issues arise because of the difficult interactions between 
science, uncertainty and risk and the boundaries that are placed between them.  
 
A review of relevant literature helped in understanding the constituent research questions from a 
theoretical standpoint, but the research conducted and presented in the empirical chapters 
provides a perspective based on actual application at the USGS. This next section summarises 
the main findings in the context of the three subsidiary questions introduced in chapter 1 and 
addressed in the empirically-focused chapters, before going on to provide an answer to the key 
research question and to relate the research findings to the body of literature analysed during 
this study.  
 
1. Why and with what implications did a linear VALS emerge as a tool for managing 
complex volcanic hazards? 
Chapter 5 reviewed the process of standardisation of the VALS at the USGS, viewing it as a 
socially constructed process, shaped by the demands of users and governmental policy 
developed following 9/11. The many complexities involved in VALS, such as the physical 
hazards and organisational issues, challenge the notion that a linear VALS can accommodate all 
these variabilities and complexities, despite the VALS already comprising of two different 
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systems, one for ground hazards and the other for aviation hazards. This is possibly, why it took 
more time than expected to standardise. It is concluded, therefore, that a VALS is a limited tool 
since it is unable adequately to reflect the complexities involved. Consequently, it is proposed 
that VALS should be reconceptualised into a more flexible tool. 
 
2. How are decisions made using the standardised VALS given contexts of complexity, 
uncertainty and risk? 
Chapter 6 analysed the role of decision-making in VALS, showing that the complexities 
involved, both in relation to the volcanic behaviour and social contexts, lead to uncertainty, 
particularly scientific uncertainty. Because of these uncertainties decision-making becomes a 
difficult and subjective process. The data strongly indicate that scientists do not just assign alert 
levels based on the science or volcanic activity, but also consider the risks involved, which are 
dependent on the local social contexts. Establishing a sufficient body of knowledge and 
experience amongst the scientists and users of the VALS, so as to be able to make useful 
decisions that generate an effective warning, requires the actors involved to integrate closely to 
reduce the gaps between their respective levels of expertise and knowledge. Additionally it is 
identified that the standardised VALS in its linear form is actually complicating the warning 
process. 
 
3. Does the standardised VALS function effectively in communicating information about 
hazardous volcanic behaviour to a range of users? 
Chapter 7 demonstrated that communication is vitally important during the application of the 
VALS, enabling it to address the many complexities involved via a number of communication 
networks and protocols. In practice, the volcano warning system is an iterative, adaptive system 
that evolves like a complex adaptive system, facilitating the different actors involved to manage 
the volcanic crisis and establish the risks involved. This process is a negotiation within the 
communication networks that in practice work outside the standardised VALS framework. 
Consequently, it was concluded that the VALS are only a small part of a large communication 
network since a standardised VALS is limited in its ability to accommodate the important local 
contexts, local hazards, and local knowledge that has been identified throughout the empirical 
chapters. The real black box of the VALS is in fact, the nature and working of numerous 
communication processes and protocols that are already in place. 
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In summary, the empirical chapters concluded that standardisation is difficult to achieve for 
three reasons.  Firstly, conceptually, natural hazard warning systems are complex and non-
linear, and the VALS intervenes in an overall system characterised by emergent properties 
involved the interaction of many agents, for which forecasting and prediction are difficult. 
Secondly, pragmatically, the decision to move between alert levels is based upon more than 
volcanic activity and scientific data, with broader social and environmental risks playing a key 
role in changing alert levels.  Thirdly, empirically, the geographical, social and political 
contexts of each volcano observatory results in the standardised VALS being applied in non-
standard ways.  
 
 
8.2  Research outcomes  
 
From these findings it is possible to address the over-arching research question: to what extent 
are standardised VALS an effective warning tool for volcanic hazards in different contexts 
of complexity, uncertainty and risk? This section addresses this research question by first, 
reviewing whether the standardisation of the VALS works in practice; second, noting the fact 
that VALS cannot operate alone but only as part of a broader VEWS, and third, through 
evaluating whether or not VALS are useful tools, standardised or not, and if not, what could or 
does work? 
 
8.2.1  Does standardisation of the USGS volcano alert level system work? 
 
Given the pre-existence of separate VALS at three of the five observatories, and a different 
method of warning used in Hawaii, it is possible to review whether the standardisation of the 
VALS has proved to be an effective method for managing volcanic hazards as implemented at 
the USGS, by using the qualitative data presented.  
 
It is difficult to establish precisely how effective the standardised VALS has been, primarily 
because it is a difficult metric to evaluate. For the aviation sector, it may be possible to 
determine how many aircraft may have avoided damage since the implementation of the 
standardised VALS, and how much this cost the aviation sector in flight diversions, although it 
is hard to obtain this data, since it is proprietary information held by the airline companies. 
However, the question remains; what metric do you use to evaluate the success of the 
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standardised VALS? It is particularly hard to come up with such a metric when, in practice, the 
VALS are operated differently at each observatory:  
 
One of the main weaknesses is consistency and application across the 
observatories, we have not had enough practice yet among all the observatories to 
see how consistent we are; the answer is we are not, and how we going to get 
there? (AVO senior scientist 2) 
 
This thesis has identified a number of advantages and disadvantages with respect to developing 
locally and nationally standardised VALS for local and national users, which are summarised in 
Table 8.1 below, so as to demonstrate the consistency and effectiveness of the standardised 
VALS. The three key categories reflect the information presented in the three empirical 
chapters. 
 
Issues  
Locally developed VALS 
(individual USGS observatories)  
Nationally Standardised VALS 
(new standardised system)  
Management  
Local stakeholders develop close 
relationships  
Streamlines communication within 
federal agencies, thereby  reducing 
opportunities for confusion  
Decision 
Making  
Gears decision to local needs, 
circumstances and knowledge  
Descriptions provide guidelines / 
criteria, but implications may vary  
Communication  
Provides flexibility for locally 
adapted warnings, consequently 
interpretation likely to be more 
effective  
Provides familiar terminologies for 
use across different contexts, but 
associated meanings may be 
different  
 
Table 8.1 This graphic compares pros and cons of local (left) and standardised (right) VALS. 
 
Table 8.1 shows that there are benefits associated with both local and national systems. Using a 
local system provides greater flexibility to adapt to the local needs and integrate the VALS into 
the management processes of the crisis. However, local systems are becoming increasingly 
limited by nationally standardised disaster protocols such as the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) and Common Alerting Protocol (CAP). Dependence on common terminology 
for each alert level may help streamline communications but equally can be misleading as a 
standardised VALS cannot provide specific information that a locally developed VALS can. 
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Limitations in the ability to provide diversity and pluralism suggest that there may not be 
enough flexibility in the design. It is clear that designing one standardised VALS (with two 
separate systems) to accommodate all the complexities involved is very difficult. The principle 
of ‘one size fits all’ does not apply to VALS; they need to adapt to reflect changes in volcanic 
behaviour and their impact on people, and this is better done when they are viewed from a 
holistic perspective to incorporate all the variables involved, many of which will be unknown 
prior to the crisis. 
 
This study demonstrates that it is difficult for a VALS to be standardised, to maintain the 
benefits of a local system and, in addition, to be understood by users both local and global (e.g. 
aviators). This creates a problem as the more flexible a system becomes, the less standardised it 
is; this is the dichotomy of standardisation already identified in the standardisation literature 
(Fujimura, 1987). Although consistency is frequently identified as a key element of 
standardisation, in practice it does not seem to work. Currently the standardised VALS works 
around limitations in flexibility through the many communication products and networks 
developed between the scientists and the users. However, from the perspective of the USGS, 
most of the staff interviewed felt the standardised VALS has generally worked well resulting in 
a number of benefits, but also some drawbacks for the VHP team as outlined in Table 8.2. 
 
Benefits Drawbacks 
Easy to use 
 
The VALS cannot be tailored to local needs and 
local hazards, hence HVO uses an alert level 
system for SO2 gas, and LVO could use one for 
CO2 levels 
Provides flexibility for staff to move from 
different observatories during a crisis to aid 
one another 
The VALS has hardly been decoupled / split, and 
therefore it seems the purpose of having the two 
systems is redundant 
Provides consistency across the 
organisation, which aids media and public 
response, also helps government and the 
president’s office if there is a crisis 
The VALS can be misinterpreted because of the 
double meanings in some of the levels and 
because users are used to what a particular alert 
level means within their local context 
 
Table 8.2 Benefits and drawbacks of the use of the standardised VALS within the USGS 
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From a managerial or policy perspective, it could be argued that the standardised VALS works 
well in operation, since all the observatories use it to relay the status of volcanic activity, and no 
one has raised any serious concerns with its use (to the author’s knowledge). However, this 
research has demonstrated that users develop different perceptions about what an alert level 
means, and that each volcano observatory has adapted the VALS to accommodate these 
different perceptions. There are significant cultural differences between Alaska, Hawaii, 
California and Washington States that affect the contextualisation of the VALS and the uses or 
role that they have. Therefore, it can argued that the standardised VALS is not actually standard 
as applied.  
 
Yet there is a need for standardisation. There are a number of positive aspects of a standardised 
VALS that have already been identified for the USGS, users, policy makers and government to 
use. In addition, standardisation has made it easier for the aviation sector to use across the 
nation and territories, and for the emergency managers under standardised emergency 
procedures following the implementation of the NIMS. But there are limitations, for example 
tools such as national maps indicating alert levels for all volcanoes are useful but only reflect 
the volcano status, when in fact there are a lot of other associated hazards that could occur, 
posing significant threats.  
 
The analysis of the standardisation of VALS, within the U.S. alone, highlights the complexities 
involved in using a national VALS, let alone an international one. There are more problems 
associated with ground hazard VALS, since populations and infrastructure are fixed and unable 
to avoid volcanic hazards unless areas are evacuated and critical infrastructure carefully 
planned. The volcano observatories have evolved in each location specifically to deal with the 
local aspects of the hazard, otherwise one could argue why is there not just one volcano 
observatory based in Menlo Park USGS Western Headquarters? In contrast, the aviation VALS 
is highly centralised and deals with users that are highly mobile and usually able to avoid ash 
hazards. Yet, even with the sophisticated and technologically advanced aviation sector, there 
have been real challenges in getting the ICAO aviation code adopted globally. It is still only 
used within the U.S. and, although on paper it has been accepted globally, in practice it has not 
been actively adopted outside of the U.S. Whether all countries will be pressured by ICAO in 
the future to comply remains to be seen, but such scales of policy implementation will generate 
some interesting questions. There is a unanimous agreement in the value of having a 
standardised VALS for the aviation sector by all interviewees, but this research suggests even 
this may have limitations, as subsequently seen during the Icelandic volcanic ash crisis in 2010. 
Chapter 8. Conclusions 
250 
 
It appears, therefore, that the ability of a VALS to satisfy local and global users needs remains 
problematical. The USGS case study highlights the fact that balancing the needs of local and 
global users when standardising a VALS is difficult and complex. From this insight alone it can 
be concluded that establishing a worldwide standardised VALS for ground hazards would only 
create further complications as there would be significantly larger differences in cultures, 
federal agency or civil defence management, and resources to manage volcanic crises. In 
addition, most volcano observatories already have VALS in place that their users know and 
understand, and which are designed to address local contexts. 
 
The problems associated with the standardisation of VALS have been encountered many times 
within other contexts; complications in standardising procedures when the conditions they are 
operating in are changing (Fujimura, 1987), incorporating and extending old practices 
(Timmermans and Berg, 1997), fitting techniques to settings and methods (Knorr-Cetina et al., 
1995), and defining boundaries about what should be left out of standardisation. Standardised 
practices may benefit policy makers but can lead to lower levels of compatibility and reduced 
standards (David and Greenstein, 1990). Most standardisation literature reviewed highlights the 
fact that there are levels of localisation for many standardised processes, and this is also 
revealed in the findings of this study, whereby local adaptations have evolved historically and 
continue to do so, despite implementation of the standardised VALS.  
 
8.2.2  The need for an integrated volcano early warning system 
 
Social contexts affect the use and success of VALS far more than previously acknowledged. 
There are still many scientific uncertainties within volcanology; scientists are continuously 
developing theories to understand the origin, processes and eruptive behaviour of volcanoes and 
the numerous associated hazards. However, this thesis indicates that it is not just scientific 
constraints involved in determining warnings, but also constraints from social and institutional 
contexts. Volcanic hazards become a problem in society because they generally occur on a 
longer time frame than political terms or human generations and therefore are not normally a 
priority. This generally results in limited funding and resources for monitoring volcanoes and 
conducting research on their past behaviours, and limited volcanic hazard awareness. From an 
institutional perspective, the wide ranging impact of volcanic hazards tends to result in the 
involvement of numerous institutions and agencies, and it is often difficult to maintain 
communication both within and external to each body involved. Increasing levels of 
bureaucracy and contending stakeholders mean that decisions can be complex and take a long 
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time to make and implement. Decision-making is a highly pressured process, particularly for the 
scientists in charge and federal agency users who have a legal obligation to respond. To reduce 
this pressure emergency response plans are established prior to crisis to aid and generate 
communication and understanding; but this is not enough. Managing volcanic crises requires 
careful consideration and understanding of how to take action in the context of extreme 
uncertainty and complexity, both scientifically and socially. To do this successfully a VEWS 
should be fully integrated to cover everything from monitoring and detection, to analysis and 
interpretation of the data and understanding risk, to communication and generating an effective 
response. This requires planning, cooperation, the execution of drills, education, and discussion 
and communication, to name a few processes, between all actors so that during a crises effective 
decisions can be made quickly (see Fig. 8.1). VALS cannot operate without the foundation and 
support of a broader VEWS and it is possible to develop four key sub-systems, each one 
representing the complexities of a VEWS: the understanding and forecasting of volcanic 
hazards, volcano scientist management, volcanic crisis management, and the response (see Fig. 
8.1). These sub-systems expand on those used by Mileti and Sorenson (1990), namely detection, 
management, and response,  by distinguishing between management of the scientific activities 
and of the crisis, viewing each sub-system as a series of complex systems. Broader economic 
and social issues can limit or enhance the ability for the VALS and VEWS to fulfil its purpose. 
If the elements of a VEWS are in place, then a VALS is likely to function well. In reality, 
obtaining the staff, resources or funding to provide these capabilities are limited, for all agencies 
involved. To compensate, there needs to be feedback between the different groups and actors 
involved to make sure decisions are an iterative and collaborative process. Yet, all this activity 
occurs behind the scenes, and is not a formal part of VALS.  
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Throughout the empirical chapters concerns are raised about using the standardised VALS. Yet 
chapter 4, which reviewed the VALS that existed prior to the standardisation, indicates there are 
 
 
Figure 8.1 Model for how the volcano alert level system and volcano early warning system 
integrate 
 
It is important to note that the sub-systems do not form a linear model, but are connected in such 
a manner as to influence one another in varying ways for every different context. The 
relationships between them are complex and this model aims only to raise awareness of the 
processes involved in EWS identified during this research. All of these sub-systems are part of 
the daily activities of the observatories, before, during, and after a crisis. Considering a VEWS 
as representing interactions between different complex systems consisting of different 
knowledge types and cultures of diverse user groups could provide some beneficial insights.  
 
8.2.3  Are volcano alert level systems an effective warning tool? 
 
The empirical chapters present not only the complexities involved in using a standardised 
VALS, but bring to attention the question of whether VALS are an effective tool to 
communicate volcanic hazards. This section explores whether VALS benefit or limit the 
warning process that the USGS has a mandate to fulfil.  
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ynamic and adaptive in order to 
flect the complexities involved. As circumstances change a VALS should be able to re-
g to a decision about which alert level is 
ost appropriate to assign. This decision is difficult because although it is supposed to be made  
 the USGS appears overcomplicated given that the idea of 
e system is simply to obtain attention. Valuable time is spent on deciding alert levels rather 
some recurring problems. It seems that whichever VALS is used, similar questions arise, such 
as: what are the criteria for changing alert level? When is the decision made to change alert 
levels? How many alert levels should there be? Are colours or numbers better to use for the alert 
level? VALS old and new exclude many hazards and focus solely on the hazards on and within 
very close proximity of the volcano. Whilst it could be argued that the process of 
standardisation has helped raise awareness of different issues, it is clear that all VALS, 
standardised or not, have similar problems. The common theme is they are all linear tools 
managing complex situations, and although older VALS were designed for specific volcanoes 
or regions to address specific issues, they still have limitations.  
 
The empirical chapters have demonstrated that VALS must be d
re
establish its normal state and have capacity to self-organise and self-stabilise, which may be 
difficult for institutions to accommodate. The current standardised USGS VALS, however, is 
unable to adapt to changes due to its linear design. If the descriptions of the alert levels were 
more flexible, it might be possible to develop a system that could reflect complexity as required. 
However, it is not just the design that is limited; as a crisis unfolds a VALS needs to evolve 
since it initially provides an indication of potential volcanic activity based on uncertainty, but 
once the volcano approaches eruption it transforms to a forecast tool, and once the volcano is in 
eruption the VALS is based on higher levels of certainty.  Therefore, the VALS should adapt to 
these changes, or focus on a single specific function.  
 
The most difficult aspect of a VALS involves comin
m
solely on the basis of the volcano's behaviour, the associated hazards and their potential impact 
on society is also considered, as is the local culture, risk perception, and the political situation, 
amongst many others already discussed. Therefore, within this decision-making process there is 
a feedback loop, creating a circular causal relationship between the outputs and inputs, which 
helps to explain why it is so difficult for scientists to make decisions on alert levels. It is not 
possible to map the many different inputs and outputs involved in decision-making, or 
communication, or of the impact of the volcano, society or environment on the process, thereby 
indicating this is a complex system. 
 
The standardised VALS now used by
th
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ing the communication of potentially hazardous 
olcanic behaviour, which is occurring in any case via the complex communication networks 
 awareness levels 
than initiating the necessary contacts to pass on written statements of scientific information. By 
establishing fixed descriptive criteria for each alert level, the VALS becomes a linear process, 
and therefore is unable to capture the complexities involved or to reflect any adaptation that 
occurs and express that in a suitable manner. The scientists have to negotiate complex 
phenomena with high levels of uncertainty and differing levels of potential risk. This exerts 
pressure to get the alert level right, making it very difficult to define the boundaries of each alert 
level. A certain element of ‘gut feeling’ is required and this is not reflected in the current VALS. 
In summary, the implication is that VALS are not sufficient, in their own right, to communicate 
the complexities involved in a volcanic crisis.   
 
So why have a VALS at all if they are complicat
v
that operate outside of the VALS? At HVO no VALS existed prior to the standardised version, 
and communication was, and still is, made directly between the scientists and users on a daily to 
weekly basis as required. Whilst this is appropriate for a constantly active volcano such Kilauea, 
it may not be appropriate for infrequently erupting volcanoes where, if a volcano became active, 
the close communication between the scientists and users is likely to take significant amounts of 
time to develop. Therefore there is an argument that in practice, a VALS is a communication 
initiation tool; an instrument to develop coordination plans, and provide a general awareness 
about the state of the volcano rather than about a specific hazard. This is most important in 
locations that do not deal with volcanic hazards frequently. If this communication occurs 
regularly then it may be surplus to requirement, as seen in Hawaii, although even here it might 
be of value to flag unexpected events. Users must communicate what information they need, 
and establish what to do in time of crisis. Effective outreach and education are the keys to this 
success, for both the decision-makers and the vulnerable public. A VALS therefore works a lot 
like a coat stand; it provides a frame from which to hang various protocols. If these protocols 
are in place (i.e. communication, coordination plans, education and outreach as identified in Fig. 
8.1) then the VALS has completed its function and is surplus to requirements. However, if all 
the protocols are not in place then the VALS will still be needed to provide a framework to help 
communicate warnings. VALS could therefore be reconceptualised as a framework, rather than 
as a linear system. This raises the question of whether or not it should be the protocols that are 
standardised.  
 
8.2.4  Hazard
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S are complex systems that are adaptive, have emergent 
roperties and are self-organising. Rather than using linear models there may be more merit in 
that it was imperative that alert levels be accompanied 
ith the appropriate information (i.e. information statement) since the VALS currently only 
This study has shown that VAL
p
applying models based on complexity to manage the complexities involved in issuing volcanic 
warnings. Approaches outlined by post-normal science (Ravetz, 1999) and the Cyneform model 
(Kurtz and Snowden, 2003) that are more deliberative and explore the values and knowledge 
required by the scientists and users, could help provide a more effective warning system with 
greater flexibility that encourages more stakeholder involvement. This research reveals that 
VALS currently exclude a number of processes within the communication network that are 
fundamental to the operationalisation of VALS. Therefore, it is the communication network that 
has been black boxed. The communication networks already exists, but it is not part of the 
linear VALS with four alert levels. Therefore, by removing the formality of the linear VALS it 
would enable the communication networks to operate more effectively as a flexible system that 
can manage the complexities involved.  
 
Most interviewees expressed the notion 
w
represent the status of the volcano. So the key component of the warning, from the standpoint of 
scientists and users alike, is the detailed information issued that is adapted for the specific 
situation.  So why have a description or meaning associated with the alert level when all it is 
trying to do is to raise awareness, to get people’s attention?  When a user gets a warning, they 
want to know how severe it is and how much attention they need to pay to it. This led to the 
idea that VALS need to reflect the awareness that users should have of the information being 
issued which can relate to the volcano (dormant or active) and the many associated hazards. It 
could be possible to establish a volcano awareness system, where a traffic light colour system 
indicates the level of awareness needed for the particular situation. This means that it could be 
tailored to any situation and any potentially hazardous volcanic behaviour, and would be, 
therefore far more flexible. It also encourages discussion as to what awareness is needed so that 
users can make decisions based on speedy information (even if uncertain), and the scientists can 
focus on providing this information and interpreting the science. Such an awareness system 
could potentially be standardised throughout the U.S. yet be locally operated and adapted for the 
local hazards and needs, and reflect temporal changes effectively. Nationally, an awareness 
level would indicate the level of awareness at each volcano and therefore the severity of a 
hazard such as a lahar, ash, or gas emissions. This way the system is able to be truly flexible, 
whilst maintaining the required broader government and congressional mandates. By removing 
the alert level descriptions and the focus on the eruptive activity only, it essentially frees the 
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whole system to do its job, enabling the system to express awareness about the complex and 
different hazards and situations with less confusion in a simple design. Colours are selected 
rather than the NWS terms because they are more intuitive, as the data has indicated, and can be 
used by many different users without the association of probabilities and meteorological hazards 
that NWS imply.  
 
Awareness Level Meaning 
Red Urgent 
Orange Important 
Green  Of Interest
 
Table 8.3 ple of what a haza s system could look like 
 
Currently V  a simple 
near tool. In fact, it is integration that is required. Awareness levels require discussion and 
ge volcanic eruptions gain the attention of the media, 
any people who live around active volcanoes in the U.S. are affected by hazards that persist 
LS in their current form 
main the standard, the lessons learnt as a result of this research could play a part in developing 
 An exam rd awarenes
ALS try to bridge the gap between the physical and social sciences using
li
consultation between scientists and the users, which already occurs, and enhance the broader 
integrated VEWS, making more transparent the decision-making and communication processes 
that already occur outside of the current VALS. So instead of trying to 'police' the gap between 
science and risk, they try and integrate it 
. 
It is also important to note that whilst lar
m
over long periods, such as noxious gases (e.g. Long Valley caldera), and low-level seismicity 
(e.g. Long  Valley, Yellowstone, and Hawaii). It is such ever-present hazards that are not 
captured in the VALS that could provide most discomfort to local populations. An awareness 
system would additionally help accommodate these short to medium term changes.  
 
8.2.5 Recommendations for volcano alert level system guidelines  
 
Whether hazard awareness alert levels are tested and developed or VA
re
guidelines and suggested practices. It is possible to establish some common guidelines for the 
best practice in VALS. This could be reviewed and adopted by an International Association of 
Volcanology and Chemistry of the Earth's Interior (IAVCEI) committee to distribute globally 
and aid monitoring scientists and users around the world in establishing their own VALS / 
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e a VALS in place prior to a crisis 
) Design a VALS that can be easily used and be locally effective: no more than 3 or 4 levels 
ing meetings so that stakeholders communicate face to face, 
ns and practices 
The within the U.S. In order to develop these 
uidelines for international use, further studies of comparable VALS in other developed and 
.3  Contributions to theoretical frameworks 
indings and their practical implications, but 
ese findings can also be applied within a theoretical framework as outlined in the literature 
VEWS, or evaluating the effectiveness of their own system. The aim would not be to develop 
rigid frameworks for users, but to enable them to make more informed decisions when 
reviewing how to best manage hazard complexity within policy and in practice, based upon 
experiences, and lessons learned, at other volcanoes and observatories. Some provisional 
guidelines developed from this study are listed below, based on what has been effective for the 
USGS: 
 
1) Hav
2
and keep the design simple  
3) Provide a clear description of what each alert level means or outline the role of each level 
4) Organise coordination plann
develop relationships, and update the plan frequently 
5) Provide educational and training opportunities aimed at key actors including drills and 
desktop exercises to understand one another's limitatio
6) Communicate a change in VALS by issuing a standardised report that provides details about 
what has happened i.e. information statement. 
 
se recommendations reflect lessons learned 
g
developing countries would provide invaluable input with respect to the importance of different 
economic and social circumstances. It would also be useful to evaluate whether or not there are 
if there any aspects of a VALS or VEWS that are shown to be most critical in providing 
effective warnings, so that countries with limited funding for VALS can focus their resources. 
 
 
8
 
This chapter has reviewed the value of the research f
th
review. The conclusions drawn link back to the UN's review of EWS (UN ISDR PPEW, 2006). 
This study has demonstrated that although the role of science in EWS is important, it is not the 
element that is causing frequent failures in EWS. Gaps in the EWS have been identified by 
conceptualising VEWS as a series of complex-sub-systems that are connected by complex 
linking systems that bring these sub-systems together. These linking processes include aspects 
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e subjectivity of scientists when interpreting scientific data, 
nd the limitations of their knowledge. Although models exist to provide statistical and 
iculties of dealing with uncertainties, risk, ambiguities and ignorance are an integral part 
f understanding volcanic data and managing volcanic crises. In the literature review, Table 2.1 
here is a need to make sure that when warning information is encoded by the scientists, that 
sers are able to usefully decode it so as to make the decisions they need to make as effectively 
highlighted in Fig. 8.1, such as communication, decision-making, and negotiating risk that are, 
in themselves, complex issues. In addition, this study has shown the importance of local context 
in EWS. It is hoped this study can provide feedback to the UN's recommendations for EWS, and 
encourage further research into understanding how EWS operate in practice by comparing 
different case studies, as accomplished in this study through comparing the application of one 
system in five different locations. 
 
This study has also highlighted th
a
theoretical frameworks in order to better understand volcanic processes or to aid in decision-
making (Aspinall et al., 2006b, Sparks and Aspinall, 2004, Marzocchi et al., 2007), the 
complexities and uncertainties involved result in socially constructed knowledge. Integrating 
further insights from the sociology of scientific knowledge may help improve understanding of 
how scientists can, in practical terms, cope better with scientific uncertainties and the 
manufacture of knowledge within their own observatory, or even paradigm (Knorr-Cetina, 
1981).  
 
The diff
o
on p.77 provided an overview of all the different studies of these individual components, that 
Stirling regards as comprising 'incertitude' (Stirling, 2003). There is a need to understand better 
how incertitude can be considered in a more holistic way, enabling more consideration to the 
local context of not just scientists, but also of the users of the VALS. Research at the USGS has 
indicated that the scientists recognise risk is a social construct, and is not something easily 
quantifiable, hence they do not rely on the many risk models available (Newhall and Hoblitt, 
2002, Marzocchi and Woo, 2007). In addition, risks are reviewed as 'reflective' in the way that 
Beck refers to in his 'Risk Society' (1992). This is because first, the decisions made during 
volcanic crises impact upon whether or not there is a risk, and second, successful land-use 
planning and coordination can help reduce the risk of populations to hazardous volcanic 
behaviour. Therefore, Beck's ‘Risk Society’ may have value when trying to understand how to 
better manage natural hazard risks.  
 
 
T
u
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my between bottom-up (locally adapted methods) and top-down 
pproaches (government policy) which need to be integrated, but how can such a compromise 
ed within policy development that aims to close down and simplify 
omplex issues (Stirling, 2008). This study has shown that the simplification of the VALS has 
as possible (Hall, 1980). This is made difficult by the different contexts of each actor involved 
in the VALS, and their individual and institutional knowledge's and values. It is possible to 
overcome the difficulties of pluralistic expertise and different values held between scientists, 
users and other stakeholders (including the public) by adopting approaches such as post-normal 
science, which intend to bring these groups together to develop a broader understanding that 
may be beneficial, helping to close the gap of knowledge between scientists and users (Ravetz, 
2005). Methods commonly used within social science, such as deliberation and multi-criteria 
mapping, may help provide further levels of integration, beyond those already achieved between 
the USGS and their users (Burgess et al., 2007, Stirling, 1999). This could be implemented 
using progressive policy.  
 
There is a clear dichoto
a
be achieved? This research is unable to establish any solutions, other than suggesting the use of 
hazard awareness levels, but the standardisation of VALS has created a linear tool that is trying 
to manage complex issues, rather than using more flexible deliberative tools, which are 
increasingly being used to address complex problems such as health issues and climate change. 
There is growing momentum for a shift in the way that science is viewed, building on different 
levels of expertise and the realisation that science is a social construction that needs to be open 
to debate and discussion (Wynne, 1996). Given the wide range of volcanic eruption styles and 
hazards, the USGS is in the fortunate position of being able to learn from the range of volcanic 
crises within the U.S. and abroad through the VDAP team. Taking ideas from the social science 
literature it may be possible to reconceptualise VALS as a complex adaptive system of 
communication networks. 
 
Standardisation is a tool us
c
been difficult to achieve in practice because a number of other tools and systems have 
developed around the VALS to make it work, rather than questioning whether the system was 
fundamentally workable. This research however, has shown that VALS provide an important 
starting point for discussion between the different stakeholders in a VEWS, that facilitates an 
'opening up' of complex issues. There is a need to open up rather than close down policy 
development of VALS that will facilitate approaches such as that of post-normal science. 
Opening up EWS policy for volcanoes encourages a precautionary approach, so that locations 
with infrequent volcanic activity can prepare for a crisis. This approach is adopted by the 
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ithin volcano literature. An institution’s cultural approach to its work shapes the way that 
cent, but sparsely-numbered studies that demonstrate that  
omplexity theory can provide a useful analytical or conceptual framework in disasters studies, 
USGS, but recognising it as a precautionary approach may help reconceptualise the role of 
VALS. Studies on the application of the precautionary principle to other complex, uncertain 
situations such as climate change, may provide insights into how VEWS and VALS could be 
more effective (Kriebel et al., 2001). Applying the framework outlined by Stirling in Fig. 2.12 
(see p.86) would help articulate precaution and risk assessment in relation to a volcanic crisis 
(Stirling, 2007, p.313). The framework provides a method of determining whether precautionary 
appraisal, deliberative processes or risk assessment is needed to deal with the problem, 
providing a tool to evaluate the process, manage it and communicate it. Frameworks like this 
could be extremely valuable when looking at how best to provide warnings in a volcanic crisis. 
 
The role of the organisation or institution in a VALS and VEWS has been somewhat overlooked
w
decisions are made and how the organisation communicates with other institutions (Vaughan, 
1999). In addition, institutions have emergent effects in the way that complex information is 
transmitted between themselves and others, adding to the already complex systems operating 
during a volcanic crisis. This study has shown, however, that the cooperation and coordination 
required to make VEWS successful, as identified by Peterson and Tilling, is in practice critical 
(Peterson et al., 1993). The USGS have learnt from mistakes made in volcanic crises throughout 
the world, for example by adopting media 'talking points' so all scientists provide the same 
information, and therefore help maintain credibility and trust. One possible way to help 
facilitate scientific information into effective warnings decisions is to reorganise institutional 
practices to follow a mode 2 approach of science, which is context-driven, problem-focused and 
interdisciplinary (Gibbons, 1994). 
 
Finally, this work supports the re
c
and in particular, for warning systems (Paraskevas, 2006, Ramalingam et al., 2008). 
Reconceptualising EWS not as a linear system or a system full of feedback loops, but as a 
complex adaptive system that has to adapt to the changing nature of the complex systems within 
the EWS, enables a more open, transparent and comprehensive warning system, that embraces 
uncertainties and emergent properties, thereby changing the expectations of users, policy 
makers and the publics. As Wynne (1996) implies from his research, these groups are most 
likely fully capable of dealing with these complex factors. It seems somewhat regressive to 
think that science is a truth that is static and certain. By embracing science as a complex, 
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 summary, this research contributes to the growing literature within the field of disaster 
 addition, this research has presented a different methodology for analysing large quantities of 
Notwithstanding the issues raised and the problems identified as a consequence of this study, it 
is unlikely the USGS will change the standardised VALS in the short term. Many scientists and 
uncertain and ever-changing body of knowledge, freedom is provided for users of this 
information to understand its limitations and determine, as a consequence, the risks involved.   
 
In
management that deals with complexity; highlighting the difficulties encountered in adopting 
standardisation as a tool to manage the complexities associated with potentially hazardous 
volcanic behaviour, and demonstrating the need to accommodate social issues and local context 
in decision-making. By developing awareness levels and establishing guidelines for VALS it 
may be possible to make transparent the processes that are currently black boxed and 
fundamental to the effective operation of a VALS. This research suggests that the UN’s drive to 
create a global platform for early warning systems across hazards requires further consideration 
since first, there are too many cultural issues between regions let alone countries; second, 
warning systems are locally adapted; third, there are many complexities involved in one hazard 
so making it a multi-hazard platform seems a further simplification of complex issues; and 
finally, there needs to be a review in the development of more holistic and effective methods in 
managing complexity where top-down and bottom-up approaches can work together in a 
constructive manner. It is also important to develop further knowledge about the processes that 
link sub-systems between VEWS and review how to better manage uncertainty and the 
considerations of risk in VEWS. It is possible that the sub-systems and suggested links between 
them, proposed in Fig. 8.1, could provide a form of basic criteria in evaluating VEWS, by 
providing a check-list of desired issues i.e. developing institutional dynamics and relationships. 
However, this research cannot determine which of these issues is more critical than others; 
additionally this model was developed in relation to VEWS and VALS in U.S. alone. Research 
of these systems in a developing country may identify different sub-systems and linking 
processes, although it is anticipated they would be similar, since many of the processes seem 
fundamental regardless of funding levels, monitoring capabilities, or technology. 
 
In
interview recordings within a multi-sited ethnography, using mind mapping. This method 
reflects the need to develop new ways of synthesising large quantities of qualitative data so as to 
understand interrelating issues that cut across many different contexts, in this example VALS, 
within different volcano observatories.    
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.4  Recommendations for future work 
 which a number of future research projects may 
e built. One such project could focus on the evaluation of VEWS within a developing country, 
 
omprehensive guidance and guidelines in relation to VEWS and VALS, outlining best 
vide a more flexible approach to VALS and hazard 
in this study has been the need to combine local 
quirements with those of a national government. It is suggested, therefore, that future research 
users felt that after putting so much time and effort into the standardisation process, it was 
unlikely to change radically, if at all, in the near future. Some felt, however, that it would be 
worth revisiting in five years time, so as to evaluate how the effectively the systems was 
working, assuming the occurrence of one of more volcanic crises in the U.S. over this period. 
Most scientists agreed that VALS would also need to be reviewed by the various users to obtain 
feedback about how useful it is for them, how they are using them, and any problems they are 
having. The VALS system is likely to continue to evolve in the future as it has done in the past. 
 
 
8
 
This research has provided a foundation upon
b
in order to identify any differences in the operation of VALS and VEWS compared with the 
U.S. A developing country with a wide range of volcano observatories across different cultural 
regions, for example, the Philippines or Indonesia, could host informative comparative studies.  
 
One of the most tangible products of this and future research could be the development of
c
practices and the advantages and disadvantages of different aspects of VEWS and VALS so that 
those implementing or designing these systems are able to make more informed decisions and 
maximise relevance to local circumstances. 
Another key area of exploration is to test the viability of hazard awareness levels or other 
complexity model approaches in order to pro
communication. This would involve a shift in the way a VALS works, and requires full 
evaluation by all actors to determine whether or not they can operate in practice and be more 
useful than the traditional linear formed VALS. 
 
One of the more problematical issues addressed 
re
might focus on how early warning and disaster management policy may be better integrated so 
as to usefully incorporate both top-down and bottom-up approaches that can negotiate the 
different scales of needs better.  It might be possible that the hazard awareness levels proposed 
in this thesis could provide the link. There is also a need to develop understanding of the 
processes that link different sub-systems within VEWS, so that they can be designed to be more 
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his study demonstrates that the success of any VEWS and VALS lies in effective 
ommunication between the different actors to manage the complexities involved and to 
effective. In addition, adopting a framework for articulating precaution and risk assessment 
(Stirling, 2007) within a disaster context may have some value and warrants further 
investigation.  
 
In conclusion, t
c
facilitate informed decisions. As demonstrated by the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull ash crisis, there are 
limitations to just how much standardisation is possible and desirable within VEWS and VALS, 
whilst at the same time retaining local meaning and contexts that ultimately appear to be critical 
in making warnings effective.  
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Appendix A: Interview structure  
 
OVERVIEW 
 
A: Introduction and Ethics Form 
Individual Scene Setting 
• Involvement with VALS 
• What role does VALS play in work 
• Their definition, and understanding of the purpose of VALS 
To provide a context for the next section:  Wish to review the changing nature of VALS given 
USGS new VALS. Is this something that has played a key role in your work? 
B: What is your understanding of the process of standardisation coming about? 
• When? 
• Who – who was consulted? How consensus achieved? What roles were played? 
• What –weather system? 
• Why? 
• Where? 
• What was your involvement? 
C: Implications 
• What are protocols now? Procedures? 
• How adopted within the organisation? 
• What are implications for you and the others within the organisation 
• What are implications for the users of the VALS?  
• Problems (e.g. adoption of technology) 
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D: Uncertainty and Meaning  
• Are the alert levels defined by specific criteria?  If so what? 
• How does the decision making work? 
• How is uncertainty and risk factored in? 
 
E: Ask for two examples 
Talk through an example of how VALS work 
a) Before standardisation 
b) After 
Provide prompts that link to theory: communication, roles, risk / uncertainty, knowledge / 
science 
 
F: Opening out: to talk about change and future 
• How far has your practice re VALS changed? For others? 
• Where do you see the new VALS going now? 
• What future challenges? 
• What future opportunities? 
• If you were going to standardise what would you have done? 
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Appendix A: Detailed interview schedule 
 
A: Introduction and Ethics Form 
Before we start, I’ve a few admin issues...hand over ethics review leaflet.   
• Firstly, hope it is okay to digitally record.   
• Second I need you to sign something to say you consent to this interview – all pretty 
straightforward – mention data archive 
• Summary of interview: This interview aims to review how the VALS standardisation came 
to about, and what your experiences are of using it now.  
The interview will take approximately one to one and a half hours. 
 
Individual Scene Setting 
I would like to start asking a few questions about your personal interactions with VALS… 
• What has been your involvement with VALS? 
• What role does has VALS played in your work? 
• What is your definition, and understanding of the purpose of VALS? 
 
I am interested in reviewing how the new VALS standardisation came about and the changing 
nature of VALS given USGS new volcano alert notification system. Is this something that has 
played a key role in your work? 
 
B: What is your understanding of the process of standardisation coming about? 
I would like to understand the process of standardisation by reviewing firstly what the driving 
forces of change were, and then how the new system came about. 
 
1) What were the driving forces of change? 
• When was standardisation first discussed, when did it actually change? Try to develop a 
chronology 
• What was seen as the problem with the previous VALS in place?  
• Why was standardisation selected as a tool to cope with volcanic hazard communication?  
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• Who wanted to make the change?  
Who implemented the changes and were these people involved in the decision making, and 
how were they selected?  
Were other actors involved in this process such as the end users i.e. EM, the media, public 
etc.? 
 
 
2) How did the new system come about? 
• What was seen as the best solution and why?  
Were other systems considered?  
What were the considerations – scientific, political, technological? 
How was it designed? 
What assumptions were made during standardisation? 
How was flexibility considered? 
 
• Who was consulted?  
How was consensus achieved?  
What roles were played? 
 
• Where were discussions held physically? 
Where within the hierarchy of the organisation?  
Were there pressures within the organization for such changes? 
 
• How can the old and the new work together – for VALS and also technology / knowledge 
specific  
• What were the problems encountered when discussing standardisation?  
What were identified as problems the new VALS would present? Between roles, 
communication between stakeholders  
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C: Implications 
I would now like to understand the implications of the new VALS within the USGS (or agency), 
and if there were any problems? 
• What are the protocols now? What happened, who and how? 
How have procedures changed? 
 
• How has the VALS been adopted within the organisation? 
How far has your practice re VALS changed? For others within the organisation? 
How has the VALS affected use and compatibility within the different observatories?  
What are implications for other users of the VALS?  
 
• What do you consider as the main changes in adopting the VALS (e.g. adoption of 
technology, good or bad?) 
Are the procedures and the language used more effective for users now? How can you test 
this? 
Has the new VALS improved early warning capacity and practice? 
Are people safer as a result? 
 
D: Uncertainty and Meaning  
One of the things that interest me is the management of risk and uncertainty within a 
standardised VALS. 
• Are the alert levels defined by specific criteria?  
If so what are they? 
Are the criteria different for each volcano / observatory? What do they mean? 
Are the warnings a forecast or to provide current information? 
 
• How does the decision making process work? 
Is the accuracy of the warning and ease of assigning a level dependent on the availability 
and quality of data? 
Has NVEWS helped to provide more accurate alerts? 
Do different observatories have different approached to decision making? i.e. cultural issues 
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• How is uncertainty and risk factored into the VALS? 
Is there flexibility within the current system to cope with uncertainties? Does it  
o Accommodate the various sizes, styles and durations of volcanic activity i.e. 
hazards, ability to forecast 
o Work equally well during escalating and deescalating activity 
o Be equally useful to both those on the ground and those in aviation 
o Retain and improve effective existing alert-notification protocols 
What new risks do you think the new VALS now poses to ability to provide an effective 
warning? 
 
E: Ask for two examples 
I would like to understand how VALS work in practice and your experiences using them, could 
you talk me through a brief example of how VALS worked before the standardisation, and now 
with the new VALS? 
Provide prompts that link to theory: communication, roles, risk / uncertainty, knowledge / 
science 
 
F: Opening out: to talk about change and future 
In the last section of the interview I would like to discuss your thoughts relating to changes 
  
• Where do you see the new VALS going now?  
• Where else has the system been used? 
• What do you think future challenges are? 
• If you were going to standardise what would you have done?  
 
G: Thanks, closing questions / feedback 
• Is there anything which I haven’t talked about which you would like to mention? 
• Any recommendations for further people to talk to?  
• Any final questions? 
• Thank you for your time! 
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Appendix D 
Appendix D: Long Valley Colour Code 
 
Table C1. Criteria for deformation and strain rates for Colour-Code conditions at LVO (Hill et al., 2002, p.42) 
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Table 3. Stand-down rules for Colour-Code conduction under declining activity levels (Hill et al., 2002, p.9)
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Appendix E: Volcanic Ash Advisory Centres  
  
Map of the Nine Volcanic Ash Advisory Centres around the world and their responsbile areas for advising international aviation of the location and movement of 
clouds of volcanic ash (Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre, 2010)
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Appendix F: The International Airways Volcano Watch 
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SIGMETS, VAA, NOT  volcanic ash hazards 
(VAA) to communicate between the different actors involved within the IAVW 
A simplified diagram of the International Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW) (Lechner et al., 2009, p.14). 
AM, VONA and VAR are all forms of notifications used for different purposes such as meteorological (SIGMET) or
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